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PART I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Abstract 
 
Participation at workplaces encompasses different mechanisms used to involve the workforce 
in decisions at all levels of an organization – whether direct or indirect – conducted with 
employees or through their representatives. In its various pretexts, the issue of employee 
involvement has been a recurring theme in economic theories, industrial relations, and human 
right instruments. The dissertation relies on the rich material which has already been written 
about participation. Drawing on the finding of these works, the current dissertation sets out to 
analyse employee involvement from a dual perspective: as an economic tool, which enhances 
competition and also as a human right, which develops human dignity at workplaces. The 
dissertation chiefly focuses on forms of direct representation. 
The introductory part first concentrates on participation as an element of economic as 
well as industrial democracy. Second, the notion of participation is analysed from the 
perspective of ILO and as a part of the European Union’s social acquis. Distinctive 
characteristics from trade union representations and from other forms of employee 
representations are drawn up in this part. Third, hypotheses and the summary of major finding 
of the research are introduced. Last, an overview on the research methodology is provided. 
The second part of the dissertation focuses on the dual nature of employee 
involvement. First, its origins reaching back to the era of the Weimar Republic are introduced. 
Second an overview on different economic theories dealing with participation is presented. 
Third, the concept of participation in various human rights instruments is analysed. 
The third part concentrates on the possibility to expand employee involvement to 
reach global coverage. First the existing hard law and soft law frameworks are introduced 
with a special focus on the European framework directive on information and consultation 
(2002/14/EC) and the recast directive on European Works Council. Second is the normative 
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conclusion of the dissertation. I argue that the extension of the personal scope of the 
Directives 2002/14/EC and 2009/38/EC could effectively contribute to the promotion of 
employee involvement as a fundamental right at subsidiaries of Europe-based multinational 
companies which are located outside of the European Union. Third, the changes concerning 
employee involvement in Hungary are examined in the light of the recent re-codification of 
Hungarian labour law. 
The fourth part juxtaposes employee involvement systems in Japan and in the state-
socialist era in Hungary, examining to what extent employee involvement could function in a 
collectivist-oriented environment and also to shred light to the important impacts of political, 
economic and social aspects of democracy on participation. The fifth part concludes the 
findings of the dissertation. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
I Economic Democracy 
 
The right to participate in decisions affecting one’s life is a basic value in a democratic 
society. This principle should be present in all areas of civil society, encompassing political 
and economic spheres, including workplaces.7 Robert Dahl argues that “people involved in 
[certain kinds of human] association possess a right, an inalienable right to govern themselves 
in democratic process,”8 and if democratic decision-making is required at the state level, then 
it is also justifiable at the workplace level.9 Involvement in decision making which affects 
one’s life is an essential part of human dignity.10 The ‘voice of workers’ has traditionally been 
represented by trade unions through collective bargaining.11 Employees’ right to be directly 
involved in issues related to the workplace gained recognition much later – the theory of 
economic democracy has venerable traditions reaching back to the Weimar Republic. 
 Economic democracy, as a philosophy of socio-economics promotes a more equal 
distribution of wealth to reduce poverty, unemployement, and starvation. In that sense, it has 
three aspects: workers’ participation, leading to production control; individual security, 
meaning fair access of every one to common resources, such as water, land or raw materials; 
and enhanced purchasing power of individuals.  
Economic democracy constitutes a core element of Hugo Sinzheimer’s work. The 
central point of his argument was that a subordinated worker has to be recognized as a human 
being. Whereas the employers’ right to command workers at a workplace is inherent in the 
notion of capital, argues further Sinzheimer, it is important to identify the limits of the power 
arising from private property. 12 In Sinzheimer views, labour law could serve as a tool to free 
workers from the abuses of employer power and thereby contribute to the democratization of 
the economy. Similarly to political democracy, economic democracy could contribute to the 
emancipation of individual workers vis-à-vis economic power.13 According to Sinzheimer, 
                                               
7 Cs Kollonay Lehoczky (ed), A Magyar munkajog II [Hungarian Labour Law II], (Budapest, Kulturtrade) 151. 
(Kollonay Lehoczky n 1) 
8 R Dahl, ‘Preface to Economic Democracy’, (University of California Press, 1985). 
9 R Mayer, Robert Dahl and the Right to Workplace Democracy (Spring 2001), 63 The Review of Politics, 228. 
10  H Sinzheimer ‘The Development of Labour Legislation in Germany’ (1920) 92 Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Social and Industrial Conditions in the Germany of Today  
11 A Bogg and T Novitz, ’Investigating Voice at Work’ (2011-2012) 33 Comparative Labour Law and Policy 
Journal, 323. 
12 H Sinzheimer, Grundzuge des Arbeitsrechts (1927), quoted by R Dukes, Constitutionalizing Employment 
Relations: Sinzheimer, Kahn-Freund, and the Role of Labour Law (2008) 35 Journal of Law and Society 3, 346. 
13 H Sinzheimer, Das Wesen des Arbeitsrecht, in Arbeitsrecht und Rechtssoziologie: gesammelte Aufsätze und 
Reden (1976), quoted by R Dukes supra 346. 
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participation could enable all economic actors to jointly form the economic conditions of the 
workplace (and share responsibility related to the jointly made decisions). Therefore, 
employees would be freed from subordination, and equality would be brought to the 
economic sphere. 
Sinzheimer believed that political and social democracy could only exist if they are 
accompanied by economic democracy. Sinzheimer witnessed the ‘reconstructualization’ of 
labour law: in the name of ‘free competition’ the employers took advantage of the 
individualistic regulatory system leaving trade unions vulnerable. Such managerial practices 
radically reduce the value of work, which could have undesirable effect on the society as a 
whole. According to Sinzheimer, an economic constitution (Wirtschaftsverfassung) could put 
labour in equal power position to capital by enabling labour to make decisions together with 
property. Protecting labour has essential importance for the society, as the ‘working power of 
man is not only an individual but also a social asset’. The worker serves the employer 
directly, but the society indirectly, argues further Sinzheimer; thus the society owes an 
equivalent return for his service, and this equivalent is the protection itself. 
The notion of the ‘economic constitution’ according to Sinzheimer is what role the 
state (government) plays or could play in ordering, or constituting, the economic institutions 
and actors by laws and a legal framework. Thus, the economic constitution encompassed laws 
that regulate (allow for, encourage, prohibit or constrain) worker participation in decision 
making.14 Thus, the economic constitution is much broader than the law of the labour market 
and also than collective agreements, it encompasses all legal instruments concerning the 
economic sphere which suggests a concern with democratic participation as a means of 
emancipating workers. Also, it goes much further than the conservative understanding of 
constitution as a bill of rights, as Sinzheimer considered it later as an agent of social 
progress.15 Through labour law the state recognizes the economic actors and empowers them 
to act, for example through legally binding norms concerning collective bargaining, and at the 
same time, sets limits to their power. The notion of economic constitution also clarifies the 
role of labour law. According to Sinzheimer,16 the overarching purpose of labour law was17 to 
free workers from subordination to employers by securing the freedom of meaningful 
participation in regulating the economy, while respecting the autonomy of economic actors. 
Sinzheimer, on a Kantian recognition of human dignity, argued that the 
democratization of the industrial sphere through the economic constitution might have 
brought equality and real freedom for workers – freedom which is not manifested in the way 
how freedom of contract allowed exploitation, but freedom from subordination in 
employment relations. 
The idea of economic democracy also gained significance as a criticism of formal 
democracy, because, as argued, democracy cannot be divided from the economic structure in 
which it exists.18 The concept of economic democracy is often juxtaposed with industrial 
                                               
14 R Dukes,’The Labour űonstitution: The Enduring Idea of Labour Law (Oxford, 2014, OUP), 5-6. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Correspondingly, it is also reflected in the works of Otto Kahn-Freund. 
17 It is argued that Sinzheimer underestimated the weight of conflicts derived from the ambigious role of the 
Weimar Republic regarding state intervention in industrial relations. 
18 See, for example, A Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford, 1999), especially 14-34. 
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democracy, as it promotes workers’ participation in corporate governance with a view of 
democratizing employment relations within the companies.19 
It is argued that modern property relations externalize costs, subordinate the general 
well-being to private profit and deny the justifiability of democratic voice in economic policy 
decisions.20 To ensure economic empowerment, most proponents claim that basic necessities 
and sufficient purchasing power should be guaranteed to everybody, and local control should 
be exercised over economic decisions.21 The classical liberal argument claims that ownership 
and control over the means of production should belong to private firms and can only be 
sustained by means of consumer choice, exercised daily in the marketplace.22 In contrast, 
proponents of economic democracy generally argue that modern capitalism periodically 
results in economic crises characterized by deficiency of effective demand, as society is 
unable to earn enough income to purchase its output production. Thus, economic democracy 
could mitigate the gap between demand and supply. 23 Economic democracy is argued to 
secure economic rights and to support access to political rights as well. Both market and non-
market theories of economic democracy have been proposed to encompass economic 
democracy. This dissertation will in particular examine the theories of Hugo Sinzheimer and 
Amartya Sen, and will also provide an overview on relevant economic theories related to 
participation. 
 
II Industrial Democracy 
 
Although they are related in many ways, industrial democracy and economic democracy 
convey different meanings. These differences are much related to diversity in industrial 
traditions. Historically, industrial democracy became an effective force within workers’ 
movement primary as an idea of representative democracy. 24  The principle of industrial 
democracy implies replacement of unilateral regulations with joint decisions on matters 
concerning workplaces or employment conditions. Thus, it is a socio-economic philosophy 
which proposes that citizenship rights in employment allows the workforce to partially or 
completely participate in the running of an industrial or commercial organization.25 Industrial 
democracy could be divided into two categories, representative or indirect and direct forms of 
influence.  
                                               
19 O Kahn-Freund, Industrial Democracy (1977) 6 Industrial Law Journal, 65-84; Lord Wedderburn, The Land 
of industrial Democracy (1977) 6 Industrial Law Journal, 68-89. 
20 J W Smith, Economic Democracy: The Political Struggle for the 21st century (Radford, 2005, Institute for 
Economic Democracy Press). 
21 D Schweickart, After Capitalism (New Critical Theory) (Rowman & Littlefield, 2002). 
22 L V Mises, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis (Yale University Press, 1953). 
23 D Harvey, The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism (Oxford, 2010, Oxford University Press). 
24  W Müller-Jentsch and N Levis, ’Industrial Democracy: From Representative űodetermination to Direct 
Participation’ (199ő) 2ő International Journal of Political Economy 3, ő0-60. For an opinion contrary to this 
theory see, S and B Webb, ’Industrial Democracy’ (London, 1897). The Webbs considered industrial democracy 
as collective bargaining within trade unions. 
25 Casale (n 8) 104. 
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Industrial democracy is a system that increases the extent and means of employees are 
being involved in their work environments. In a broad sense it could include participation in 
setting agendas, implementation of various policies, or election of board of directors. It is 
argued that industrial democaracy has great many benefits, such as improved communication, 
more effective policies and better morale of employees. Industrial democracy also fosters 
engagement; employees tend to implement policies better if they are not only in charge for 
execution of them, but are also part of the decision-making process. By that, industrial 
democracy reduces insubordination, because employees feel that even though decisions and 
orders are imposed on them, they could make their own choices which fit their personal 
interests the best. 
Industrial democracy challenges both the authoritarian and bureaucratic structures of a 
capitalist enterprise and the centralized regime in the state socialist planned economies. In that 
sense participation was also dissolution of the Taylorist-Fordist model, which favoured flat 
hierarchies and direct orders and it takes into account that workers are not only bearers of 
labour power, but members of democratic societies from which they derive a set of civil, 
political and social rights.26 The Hawthorne studies evidenced in the early 20th century the 
ability of employees and employee groups to exercise informal control of productivity.27 The 
recognition of legitimate power for employees paved the way for the development of the 
industrial democracy concept.28  
The paradigmatic transformation brought new production concepts and management 
techniques,29 which offered more leeway for self-regulation and responsibility to rank-and-
files. Such techniques also supported the legitimacy of management at workplaces. However, 
implementation of participative models has usually been made with an eye toward securing 
higher level of competitiveness. 
It is argued that without participation, workers’ alienation is inevitable at workplaces, 
which, on a long run, involves that also as citizens they become indifferent towards public 
affairs, which is a real danger to democracy as a whole. 30  Critics claim, however, that 
participation is often used as a manipulative device used by management to weaken trade 
unions and control workers’ mood or morals. 31  Sceptical arguments claim that even in 
extensive worker self-management regimes, like the Mondragon cooperatives in Spain, the 
decentralized state socialist model of Yugoslavia or the Japanese self-managed work-groups, 
the control of power retain. 
                                               
26  T H Marshall, ’Citizenship and Social Class’ (űambridge, 19ő0) and W Müller-Jentsch and N Levis, 
’Industrial Democracy: From Representative Codetermination to Direct Participation’ (199ő) 2ő International 
Journal of Political Economy 3, 57. 
27 E Mayo, ‘The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization’ (New York, 1933, Macmillan). 
28 Most notably see the ‘empowerment theories’, which claim the positive effect of voluntary redistribution of 
managerial power. They are based on the assumption that employees can make important contributions to the 
organization other than those confined to tasks and roles. For more detailed arguments see the works of Argyris, 
Ouchi, Covey and Mc Arthur. For participative management theories see for example the researches of Likert, 
Fernie and Metcalf, Keller, or Strauss. 
29  See for example the works of Chris Argylis on the evolution, especially ‘Understanding organizational 
behavior’ (1960, Tavistock). 
30 O Kahn-Freund, Trade Union Democracy and the Law (1961), 22 Ohio St. L.J. 5 
31 For a comprehensive overview on the critical approaches arising in the 1960s, see E Rehnman, Industrial 
Democracy and Industrial Management – A critical essay on the possible meanings and implications of 
industrial democracy (London, 1968, Tanistock), especially 67-69 and 90-91. 
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III Notion of Participation 
 
Participation in decision-making processes could exist in many different ways, starting from 
the mere right to be informed, it could also include consultation, and, the strongest influence 
could be provided by means of co-determination. Employee participation could be of a 
different nature, depending on the models of workers representation, the public or private 
nature of the employment relationship, the organizational dimensions of the enterprises and 
markets, as well as the relationship between the legislative and contractual sources. Naturally, 
participation reflects the industrial relations systems within which it is applied. The increasing 
globalization of capital, product and labour markets has increased the need for effective and 
functioning models of participation. However, the co-existence of the different systems has 
led to paramount difficulties in defining the meaning, and especially the boundaries of 
employee participation both in academia and in practice. 
 
A Definition of Participation by ILO 
 
The subject of employee involvement at workplaces has for many years been of interest of the 
ILO in the production of regulatory provisions.32 Based on the studies published on various 
national systems of employee participation, it is safe to conclude that the term ‘participation’ 
does not have a single, unambiguous meaning. The actual definitions include diverse notions 
and disciplines concerning a non-unitary and diverse set of workers’ rights originating in laws 
or in agreements, or in both. The notion of employee involvement (in European context 
nowadays often used as synonym for participation) in most countries is based on a distinction 
of powers and roles between the employers and the employees.33 Through the different means 
of participation, workers seek to influence certain decisions made by the enterprise employing 
them and may also share some the economic and financial consequences of these decisions. 
 Another interpretation considers participation as a mean to modify or improve 
employment relationship and conditions, and in many cases, also the socio-economic 
                                               
32 See for example A Űronstein, En aval, des normes international du travail: le role de l’OIT dans l’elabortion et 
la revision de la legislation du travail, in: JC Javillier, B Geringon (eds), Les norms internationals du travail: un 
patrimonies pour l’avenir: Melanges en l’honneur de Nicolas Valticos (Geneva, 1999, ILO) 219-49; G Casale, J 
Tenkorang, Public service labour relations: A comparative overview; Paper No 17 (Geneva, 2008, ILO); G 
Casale, Globalisation, Labour Law and Industrial Relation: Some Reflections, 55 Bulletin of Comparative 
Labour Law; J Schregele, Forms of participation in management (1976) 113 International Labour Review, 117-
22. 
33 R Blanpain, Representation of employees at plant and enterprise level (1994, Martinus Nijhoff). 
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conditions of the society. 34  Focusing on the socio-economic aspects of participation, this 
approach focuses on employees’ influence (or potential influence) on decisions affect 
employment and conditions of life and work.35 This “all-inclusive”36 definition, including 
collective bargaining, does not meet with the wide consensus of scholars.37 
 The ILO defines concept of participation as “any workplace processes or mechanisms 
that allows employees to exert some influence over their work and the conditions under which 
they work.”38 A wide spectrum of practices is included in this definition from consultation of 
employees concerning aspects of the production process or workplace environment, to co-
determination in decision-making by employee representatives, or even the full control of 
workers in managements, such as the model of cooperatives.39 Thus this definition could be 
divided into four approaches which may co-exist in the same workplace: 1) indirect 
participation through employee representation; 2) direct participation, practiced face-to-face 
between employees and the (representative of) employers, like quality circles or autonomous 
work groups; 40  3) financial participation, meaning the different schemes through which 
employees are able to benefit from the enterprises financial performance, like ESOP;41 4) 
employee participation on boards of management.42 
 The above definitions encompasses great many aspects of participation, however, this 
paper considers participation (interchangeably used with ‘involvement’) in a stricter meaning. 
I use the term participation/involvement in its meaning of direct participation and as a form of 
indirect representation through employee representation at enterprise level, which allows 
employees to influence decision-making processes at their workplace.43 
  
                                               
34 See, for example K F Walker, Workers’ participation in management. Problems, practices and prospects 
(1975) 12 International Institute for Labour Studies Bulletin, 9 ff. 
35 Preamble of the ILO Resolution concerning Workers, 1966. 
36 G Arrigo and G Casale, A comparative overview of terms and notions of employee participation (Geneva, 
2010, ILO) 3. 
37 The significance of the differentiation between collective bargaining and participation, as well as between 
direct and indirect representation will be explained later in this chapter. 
38 G Arrigo and G Casale, A comparative overview of terms and notions of employee participation (Geneva, 
2010, ILO) 148. (Casale n 8) 
39 Casale (n 8) 148. 
40  On the distinction between direct and indirect representation and direct and indirect participation see 
especially Cs Kollonay Lehoczky (n 1) 155 ff; the issue will be discussed later in this chapter. 
41  An employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) is an employee-owner method that provides a company's 
workforce with a stock ownership interest in the company, usually as a part of the employees’ remuneration 
package. 
42  See, for example, Directive 2001/86/EC supplementing the European Company Statute; in Article 2(k) 
participation is defined as “the influence of the body representative of the employees and/or the employees’ 
representatives in the affairs of a company by way of the right to elect or appoint some of the members of the 
company’s supervisory or administrative organ; or the right to recommend and/or oppose the appointment of 
some or all the members of the company’s supervisory or administrative organ.” 
43 When, for historical or other reasons, the term is required to be used in a broader meaning explanation will be 
given separately.  
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B The European Dimension of Participation 
 
The system of workers’ participation in company’s decision-making shows considerable 
differences across Europe. Neither the institutional structure nor the intensity of participation 
is on a somehow similar level, arising from differences of basic philosophy of industrial 
relations between the Member States of the European Union. The most significant differences 
could probably be detected between the German, the Scandinavian and the Anglo-Saxon 
models. In the Anglo-Saxon system institutionalised workers’ participation show little 
compatibility with the traditional pattern of industrial relations, whereas in Germany and in 
the Scandinavian countries industrial relations could be characterised as cooperation-based. 
But even where institutionalised workers participation exists (like in France), it often remains 
on the level of mere information and consultation. There are other models of employee 
involvement as well, most notably the southern European system (with special regard to the 
Mondragon cooperatives), the eastern European (post-soviet) model, or even kibbutzism. Co-
determination in its strict sense does not exist in majority of the Member States. However, a 
lower level of institutionalisation concerning workers’ participation does not automatically 
mean lesser influence on management’s decisions, as the activity of trade unions or 
persuading the management by informal means of could result in high level of actual control 
on decision making. 44  
The different culture of industrial relations is resulting from the different political, 
cultural and economic developments of the Member States. As Manfred Weiss points it out, 
in view of the heterogeneous situation it would be largely unrealistic to shape the structure of 
workers’ participation identically throughout the EU, the most could be achieved is to 
approximate the systems in a functional sense.45 However, approximation was indispensable, 
as the EU has no longer been a mere market and economic community but (hopefully) on its 
way to a political union. 
The first approximation regarding workers’ participation concerned specific matters, 
such as collective redundancies, transfer of undertaking, and safety and health issues, based 
on the initiations of the first Social Action Program of 1974. The Directive on collective 
redundancies was passed in 1975 46  followed by the Directive on the safeguarding of 
employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses 
two years later. 47  Both Directives provide for information and consultation of workers’ 
representatives according to the law and practice of the respective Member State.48 Thus, 
                                               
44  For a survey see M Űiagi, ’Forms of Employee Representation at the Workplace’, in R. Űlanpain (ed), 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies (6th ed, 1998), 341 
45 M Weiss, ‘Workers’ participation: A crucial topic of EU’ in, R Hoffmann, O Jacobi, Ű Keller and M Weiss 
(eds), Transnational Industrial Relations in Europe (Hans Űöckler Stiftung, 2000), 8ő-94. 
46 OJ (1975), L 48. 
47 OJ (1977), L 61. 
48  This also applies to the Framework Directive of 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health of workers; see, OJ, (1989), L 183/1. 
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employers are only obliged to inform and consult employees’ representative in accordance 
with the rather vague term of “balanced participation with national law or practice.”49 
Not only that the approximation was limited to the mere right to information and 
consultation in these Directives, but only succeeded to a very limited extent.50 Event though, 
by the amends of Directive on collective redundancies in 199251 and of Directive on transfer 
of undertakings in 1998, 52 the EU tackled the issue of transnationality, the importance of 
these Directives on the transnational level remained marginal compared to the effect of the 
establishment of an European Works Council.53 The adoption of Council Directive 94/45/EC 
is considered as a major breakthrough in light of the long learning curve after the failure of 
the Vredling proposal.54 The Directive introduced European Works Councils or alternative 
procedures in order to ensure information and consultation for employees of multinational 
companies on the progress of the business and any significant decision at the European level 
that could affect their employment or working conditions. Council Directive 94/45/EC was 
repealed and replaced in 2009 by the Recast Directive 2009/38/EC. 
The EU used the stimulus of the positive experience with the Directive on European 
Works űouncils to revitalise the project concerning workers’ participation in the boards of the 
European Company, which was considered to be at a fatal deadlock by the 1990s. The EWC 
further encouraged the EU to another far-reaching step: instead of prescribing information and 
consultation only for certain specific issues the national systems of information and 
consultation was approximated in a comprehensive way by Framework Directive 2002/14/EC 
on information and consultation. This Directive sets minimum principles, definitions and 
arrangements for information and consultation of employees at the enterprise level within 
each country. Leveraging on the key success factor of the EWC Directive, here again the 
Member States enjoy substantial flexibility in applying the Directive's key concepts 
(employees' representatives, employer, employees, etc) and implementing the arrangements 
for information and consultation. 
Workers’ participation constitutes a characteristic element of the European human 
rights instruments, from the European Social Charter through the Charter on the Fundamental 
Social Rights of Workers, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The 
common aim of these human rights instruments is to make the worker a ‘citizen’ of an 
enterprise. Wolfgang Hermann and Otto Jacobi call the members of European Works 
űouncils as “ambassadors of the European civil society”55 due to their remarkable potential to 
develop a strategic management structure, which represents the common interests of a 
multinational workforce and which formulates and represents common employment interests. 
                                               
49 Art 11 Para 1 of Directive on collective redundancies. 
50 A possible explanation to this partial success given by Manfred Weiss is that the actors qualified as ‘employee 
representatives’ in the different Member States are way too different; see, M Weiss, supra, 87. 
51 OJ (1992), L 245/3. 
52 OJ (1998), L 201/88. 
53 M Weiss, supra, 86. 
54 For a detailed analysis on the adoption of űouncil Directive 9Ő/Őő/Eű see, M Weiss, ‘Workers‘ Participation 
in the European Union’, in P Davies et al, (eds), European Community Labour Law – Principles and 
Perspectives (1996), 213 ff. 
55 W Hermann and O Jacobi, ‘Ambassadors of the European űivil Society: Practice and Future of European 
Works Councils, in R Hoffmann, O Jacobi, B Keller and M Weiss (eds), Transnational Industrial Relations in 
Europe (Hans Űöckler Stiftung, 2000), 9ő-113. 
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Manfred Weiss argues that if democratisation of the economy is understood to be a promoting 
and stabilising element for democracy in the society as a whole, and workers throughout the 
EU should have a similar chance to influence decisions by which they are affected. 56 
Therefore, argues further Weiss, in a globalised environment the right to participate in 
decision making had to be extended beyond national borders, and it became necessary for the 
EU to address the transnational dimension of involvement. Hermann and Jacobi, while 
acknowledging its social importance, emphasise the economic dimension of participation, 
while Weiss pinpoints its societal nature and its connection to democracy. I will argue that 
both as an economic tool and as a human right, participation should not remain a privilege of 
European citizens, but have to be treated as a universal right of all workers employed by 
Europe-based multinational corporations. 
 
IV Comparison of Participation with Other Forms of 
Representation 
 
A Trade Union Representation and Participation 
 
A systematic differentiation between Trade Union representation and participation was first 
made by Csilla Kollonay Lehoczky in her seminal paper on the topic in 1997. 57  In her 
definition participation is a form of indirect representation, exercised through representatives 
directly elected by employees, in contrast to trade union representation, which is a form of 
representation through an organisation separate from the employer or the community of 
employees. From this basic distinction other differentiating factors follow. 
Trade Union representation could be traditionally described as a form of representation 
which is protecting employees’ interest against those of the employers’. The main function of 
Trade Union is to secure the biggest possible benefit for employees from the employers’ 
profit through different ways, mostly through the machinery of collective bargaining or other 
forms of wage negotiations. In contrast, participation leverage on the common denominator of 
employers’ and employees’ interest: the prosperity of the workplace. Discovering and keeping 
employers’ competitive advantage on the market is not only in the interest of employers, but 
also essential for employment security, a basic need of employees. 
The differences in the field of interest also determine the available instruments. The 
integrative nature of participation assumes that instruments facilitating cooperation between 
                                               
56 M Weiss, supra, 86. 
57 űs Kollonay Lehoczky, The emergence of new forms of workers’ participation in űentral and East European 
countries, in: Raymond Markey, Jacques Monat (eds) Innovation and Employee Participation Through Works 
Councils – International Case Studies (Avebury, 1997) 170 ff. 
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parties to achieve shared goals.58 The confrontational relationship between employers and 
trade unions anticipates, at least in principle, that bargaining between parties is adversarial or 
distributive.59 Thus, trade unions’ most frequently used legal tool is collective agreement, 
while participation is likely to be effectuated through information, consultation and 
sometimes co-determination procedures. However, a narrowing gap between the positions of 
the parties and the reconciliation of their interest could also be detected.60 In the thesis I will 
use the notions of information, consultation and co-determination in the below specified 
meaning.  
Access to information during decision-making is essential for employees (or their 
representatives). Following the definition provided by Directive 2002/14/EC61, information is 
the “transmission by the employer to the employees’ representatives of data in order to enable 
them to acquaint themselves with the subject matter [of the future decision] and to examine 
it.” 62  Compared to the mere transmission of information, consultation assumes a more 
complex, bilateral exchange of information. Consultation is defined by Directive 2002/14/EC 
as “the exchange of views and establishment of dialogue between the employee representative 
and the employer.”63 
Co-determination creates an obligation to agree; therefore it creates a single will in the 
decision-making process. With other words, co-determination is more than a consensus in a 
subject matter between the parties. Consensus reached by the parties in individual cases, like 
changing the form of employment, is reached by two, albeit concordant declarations of an 
employee and an employer. Another important difference is that consensual decisions are only 
binding on the parties, whereas agreements concluded through co-determination could be 
binding on others as well, for example a workplace agreement concluded by works councils 
and employers on safety and health related matters.64 Co-determination naturally requires 
information and consultation. It could appear in distinct levels, via works councils and, in 
some cases, as board-level participation. Co-determination presently exist in a limited scope 
both in terms of subject matters and in industrial relations traditions providing for such right. 
Traditionally, trade unions have an autonomous organization, separate and 
independent from that of the employers. Employee participation, on the other hand, does not 
require a separate organisational structure. Moreover, having an established organisation 
                                               
58 This integrative nature of participation could be detected in the wording of Art. 1 (3) of Directive 2002/14: 
“When defining or implementing practical arrangements for information and consultation, the employer and the 
employees’ representatives shall work in a spirit of cooperation and with due regard for their reciprocal rights 
and obligations, taking into account the interests both of the undertaking or establishment and of the 
employees.” 
59 Casale (n 8) 46. 
60  For a more detailed analysis see, G Casale, Experiences of tripartite relations in Central and Eastern 
European Countries (2000) 16/2 The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations. 
61  Directive 2002/14 established a framework for informing employees and consulting with them in the 
establishments in the European Community. It applies to all undertakings employing at least 50 employees or  
establishments employing at least 20 employees in the European Community, according to the choice made by 
the Member States. 
62 Article 2 (f) of Directive 2002/14/EC. Limitations on information will be discussed later in this paper. 
63 The conditions are further articulated by Art. 4 (4) regarding the appropriate timing, method and content of the 
consultation. 
64 See L Román, A munkajog alapintézményei [Űasic Instruments of Labour Law] (Pécs, 1998, University Press 
of Pécs) 129-35. 
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would make the indirect representation form vanish altogether. 65  Representatives are 
executing their participatory rights in accordance with the structure of the respective 
employer. 
The differences in the organisation structures lead to the next differentiating factor: on 
one hand, trade unions are forms of indirect representation: the representatives are delegated 
in accordance with the organisation’s internal structure and regulations, trade union officers 
are representing the union’s interest.  Participation on the other hand is based on direct 
representation, where representatives are elected directly by the employees and they are 
responsible directly to their ‘electors’: the employees. 
The origins of trade unionism go back to the 19th century and are related to the 
detriment of working conditions in the era of industrial revolution. Participation took an 
autonomous legal and organizational only in the years following the First World War in 
Europe. The idea is by and large associated with the principle of economic democratization in 
the Weimar Republic in the 1920s.66 However, some sort of worker participation forms were 
established in other European countries around that time: the Whitley Councils67 influenced 
the creation of works committees in the United Kingdom in 1918, laws on works councils 
were issued in Austria in 1919, in Czechoslovakia in 1920, and some forms of factory 
committees were recognized in Russia in 1917. However, the rise of the national socialist 
ideology set aside the participation movement until the end of the Second World War. Then, 
in the early post-war years the idea was revisited and widely debated in the then Federal 
German Republic. On an international level, workers participation became topical in the 
1960s and made headway especially in America and some countries of Asia. 
 
B Single and Dual Channel Systems 
 
Employee participation, irrespective of its degree of evolution or stability, is a part of a 
complex system of collective relations within the enterprise. National models of collective 
representation have an apparent influence on participation methods. On one hand, in certain 
national systems the negotiating and participatory methods have developed in the basis of the 
single-channel model of union representation, as no a priori distinctions exists between the 
holders of the rights of information, consultation and the holders of the negotiating powers. 
Thus, the same actor can be at one and the same time representatives of workers at the 
                                               
65 Kollonay Lehoczky (n 1) 155. 
66  On economic democracy see for example F Napthali ‘Wirtschaftsdemokratie. Ihr Wesen, Weg und Ziel‘ 
(1928). 
67  Whitley Councils, also called Joint Industrial Council, were originally a series of councils made up of 
representatives of labour and management for the promotion of better industrial relations. The Councils were 
named for J H Whitley, chairman of the investigatory committee (1916–19) who recommended their formation, 
were first instituted as a means of remedying industrial unrest. Many of them later developed into wage 
negotiating bodies. 
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workplace holding participatory rights and be a bargaining party. In single-channel models, 
enterprise-level employee representation is often carried out by external trade unions. 
 On the other hand, in other national systems the dualism of the two concepts is 
apparent. In dual channel models the holders of involvement rights and the holders of 
bargaining powers are separate. In this model, workers’ general representation in the 
enterprise is entrusted in a single body elected by all the workers, while unions are guaranteed 
autonomous forms of presence at the workplace which allow them to protect the rights of their 
members. Legal provisions generally govern electorate procedures, active and passive 
electorate and ensure that democratic principles are formally respected. A double-channel 
model exists for example in Germany, which can be characterized by the autonomous sphere 
of the co-determination, consultation and information procedures of works council, even 
though that these processes could lead in some cases to company level agreements. 
The relationship between participation and collective bargaining is very complex, in 
some national contexts the exact borders are not easy to detect. A theoretical distinction 
assumes that participation is rooted and is operated through the concept of cooperation rising 
from the shared goals of employers and employees. Collective bargaining, in contrast, is 
assumed to be based on the conflicts of interest of the parties. Recent developments in 
national industrial relations however contradict to this distinction, making the material 
boundaries between their respective areas of autonomy uncertain.68 Even the path followed by 
the European Union combines the elements of two models. The EU lawmaker does not have a 
preferred model,  69 certain degree of interaction emerges in Directives between collective 
bargaining and employee involvement right. 70 
Also, the contraposition of unions and workers’ direct representation is tempered by 
the fact that works council representatives are often union members.71 A number of factors 
play part in this development, most notably is the unions’ right to develop autonomous forms 
of workplace representation not solely to protect their members, but to create an effective 
communication channel to formulate union’s strategy. 
Due to the different traditions of industrial relations among the Member State, there 
are many different forms of representative structires in the European Union. As a possible 
classification, the European Company Survey 72  classifies employee representation at 
company level as follows: single channel representation, where works councils are the sole 
eligible employee representation structure (examples are Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands); dual channel representation, wher both types of representation can be found, but 
                                               
68 See, for example the recent changes in the Hungarian system, whereby works councils are allowed to conclude 
a collective agreement-like  contract with the employer, covering all aspects of the employment relationship, bar 
wages (Section 268 of the Hungarian Labour Code (Act No 1 of 2012)). 
69 Art 153 of TFEU (ex-art 137 of TEC) does not give the Union specific competencies regarding the right of 
association, the EU lawmaker can only provide for the rights of employee representatives. 
70 Under Directives 2001/86 and 2003/73 collective bargaining is intended to select and regulate the forms of and 
the arrangement for involvement, and in collective redundancy procedures, consultation with the workers in 
intended to reach an agreement (Directives 98/59 and 98/50).  
71 See the former Hungarian Labour Code, which linked union representativeness to the results of the works 
council elections (Section 29 Para 2 of Act No 22 of 1992). 
72 Employee representation at establishment level in Europe – European Company Survey 2009, the on-line 
report is available at http://eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef_files/pubdocs/2011/43/en/1/EF1143EN.pdf 
(last retrieved on 20 November, 2014). 
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works councils have a stronger role (examples are Belgium, France, Italy and Spain73). In 
some Member States, the union-based system is present together with works councils 
(examples are Poland, Romania, Slovakia, the UK, and to some lesser extent, Ireland); dual 
channel representation, with trade union shop stewards playing a prominent role (examples 
are Denmark, Finland, Portugal, Slovenia and Croatia); and single channel representation, 
where trade unions are the sole representative bodies (examples are Cyprus, Malta, Sweden, 
FYROM and Turkey). 
 
C Direct and Indirect Forms of Participation 
 
It is important to take a note on the difference between direct and indirect forms of 
representation and the direct and indirect forms of participation. Workers could participate in 
decision making either directly themselves or indirectly through their representative. Direct 
participation is based on a one-on-one, often face-to-face interaction between employees and 
their managerial counterparts, whereas indirect participation assumes that the views or 
concerns of the employees are communicated by a representative (or representatives) of the 
employees. Direct forms of participation (sometimes called ‘consultative’ or ‘deliberative’ 
participation) tend to be small scale and decentralized, like quality circles or autonomous 
work groups, integrated usually into decisions about daily work. The traditional form of 
indirect participation in Europe is through works councils. Works councils are, in general, 
legally established representations, elected or appointed by all employees in an establishment, 
irrespective of their membership of trade unions. 
 Autonomous and semi-autonomous groups are teams that determine and carry out 
work tasks, quality control, decide on incentive payments and discipline members who do not 
meet performance standards. They serve to complement or partially replace the traditional 
manager-subordinate structure and have the greatest degree of independence.74 Quality circles 
are small groups of employees, which meet regularly on company time, aiming to improve 
quality and productivity within their own work areas. Management may or may not 
implement their suggestions, which signifies lesser degree of autonomy; however, it provides 
an opportunity to workers to influence the manner of manufacturing. Works councils are 
standing bodies providing for the information and consultation (sometimes co-determination 
as well) of employees at workplace level. Members are elected by all the workforce of an 
establishment or an undertaking.75 
 
                                               
73 In case of Spain, the report only asked about the presence of works councils, not trade unions. 
74 Casale (n 8) 39. 
75 Article 7 of the Additional Protocol of the Social Charter already provided for that the requirements of Article 
2 of the Additional Protocol are satisfied if great majority (80per cent) of the workers is protected under its 
provisions, however, workers excluded in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 2 were not taken into account 
in establishing the threshold for workers concerned. 
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D Financial Participation 
 
Financial participation is a term applied to the various forms of employee profit-sharing and 
share ownership schemes which give employees a financial stake in the company for which 
they work. Usually a part of the profit is paid to the employees in addition to their wages. This 
form of participation could also be characterised by sharing the property rights with 
employers and it gives employees a residual right from the company’s profit. Neither profit-
sharing nor shared-ownership schemes are necessarily associated with employee participation 
in corporate governance. In theory, stock-ownership may permit influence on decisions, but in 
practice it is a fairly limited option.76 Several studies confirmed that financial participation as 
a sole incentive has limited impact on business performance and employee involvement; but 
when it is combined with other policies (like professional trainings, job security or other 
forms of direct or indirect participation), the scheme may be positively linked with employee 
participation.77 Despite of the importance of financial participation on company performance 
and its correlation to other forms of employee involvement, this paper excludes all forms of 
financial participation from its research scope. 
E Board-Level Participation 
 
Workers’ representation on company boards could be understood as one step further in 
changing the power structure in the economic field.78 While in most Member States of the EU 
board-level participation is an important component of corporate governance, company law 
regulations on the relationship to the company of employee representatives in the highest 
enterprise organs reflect the broad spectrum of different national conceptions.79 
Employee participation is referred to in Council Directive 2001/86/EC (supplementing 
the European Company Statute) concerning the involvement of employees. Article 2(k) 
defines participation in particular terms as ‘the influence of the body representative of the 
employees and/or the employees’ representatives in the affairs of a company by way of the 
right to elect or appoint some of the members of the company’s supervisory or administrative 
organ; or the right to recommend and/or oppose the appointment of some or all the members 
                                               
76 Among other reasons, it is due to the agency problems between shareholders and management. 
77 See for example, M Festing, Y Groening, R Kabst and W Weber, Financial participation and performance in 
Europe, 15 Human Resource Management Journal, 54–67; P Kalmi, A Pendleton, and E Poutsma, (2005) The 
Relationship between Financial Participation and Other Forms of Employee Participation: New Survey 
Evidence from Europe (2006) 27 Economic and Industrial Democracy, 637-667; A Pendleton, E Poutsma, C 
Brewster and J van Ommeren, Employee share ownership and profit-sharing in the European Union: incidence, 
company characteristics, and union representation (2002) 8 European Review of Labour and Research 47-62. 
78 M Weiss ‘The effectiveness of labour law: reflections based on the German experience’ (2006) 48 Managerial 
Law, 3, 283. 
79 N Kluge and P Wilke ‘Űoard-level participation and workers’ financial participation in Europe - State of the 
art and development trends’ (2007) European Trade Union Institute for Research, Education and Health and 
Safety (ETUI-REHS). 
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of the company’s supervisory or administrative organ’. űouncil Directive 2003/72/Eű 
(supplementing the Statute for a European Cooperative Society) repeats this definition of 
participation. The current dissertation does not deal with the forms of board-level 
participation 
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Chapter 2 
Hypotheses and Research Questions 
 
During my research I established the following hypotheses: 
 
H1 EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT HAS A DUAL NATURE: IT HAS TO BE REGARDED BOTH AS AN 
ECONOMIC QUESTION AND AS A HUMAN RIGHT. 
H2 DUE TO ITS HUMAN RIGHTS CHARACTER, EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT CANNOT BE 
REGARDED AS A PRIVILEGE OF EUROPEAN CITIZENS, BUT HAVE TO BE TREATED AS A UNIVERSAL 
RIGHT OF EVERY WORKER AND HAS TO BE SAFEGUARDED WITH SUFFICIENT LEGAL PROVISIONS. 
H3 PARTICIPATION IS SUBJECT TO SIMULTANEOUS RECOGNITION OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 
AND THE FORCE OF SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON THE EXTENT AND REACH OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM. 
 
Theories arguing that political democracy and economic development could be treated 
separately have been overcome, mostly by the advocates of a new theoretical paradigm, 
known as ‘human development’ or ‘capability approach’.80 These ‘counter-theories’ argue 
that urgent human problems and unjustifiable human inequalities have to be addressed in a 
different way, no matter how much the dominant theories have been rooted historically in 
policy choices. Increased GDP has not necessarily influences people’s lives, and has little to 
do with combating inequality and deprivation. The new approach shall encompass human 
dignity as its central element. 
While the importance of market mechanisms in development should not be denied, but 
other aspects, such as social and economic equity or political liberties, need to be equally 
considered and assessed. As Amartya Sen phrases it, “[e]conomic unfreedom can breed social 
unfreedom, just as social or political unfreedom can also foster economic unfreedom.”81 Sen 
also challenges the dichotomy, prosperous in East Asian countries,82 that denies the relevance 
of political freedom when the urge to meet economic needs requires it. Sen, challenging the 
“Lee Thesis”, 83  asks the question of what should be more urgent for policy makers: to 
                                               
80 M ű Nussbaum, ‘űreating űapabilities’ (űambridge, 2011, Harvard University Press), x. 
81 A Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford, 1999, OUP), 8. 
82 Sen particularly refers to China and Singapore. 
83  Sen argues against the ‘Lee Thesis’, named for President Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, which states that 
denying political and civil rights is acceptable if it promotes economic development and the general wealth of 
the population (Sen, 1999:15). He rightly insists that we should approach political freedoms and civil rights not 
through the means of eventually achieving them (GDP growth) but as a direct good in their own right. Freedom 
is also good because it creates growth. See, O'Hearn 'Amartya Sen's Development as Freedom: Ten Years Later', 
Policy & Practice: A Development Education Review, Vol. 8, Spring, pp. 9-15. 
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eradicate poverty, or to guarantee democratic rights (for which poor people have little use 
anyway)? Sen’s answer to this question is very straightforward: economic development and 
liberty are interconnected. Separating them or prioritizing one over the other is entirely the 
wrong approach. Without freedom, including the opportunity to participate in decision-
making on matters affecting the main areas of an individual’s life there is no economic 
freedom. 
Hugo Sinzheimer compared economic democracy to political democracy and noted 
that they are similar in the sense that they both guarantee freedom to individuals vis-á-vis 
power (capital), and they both enable individuals to participate in the creation of a common 
will.84 In Sinzheimer’s views, economic democracy has two complementary pillars: the self-
regulation of the industrial actors (employers’ associations, trade unions, works councils) and 
the rights of workers to participate in the management of the economy.85 
 
It follows from the above that 
 
H1 EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT HAS A DUAL NATURE: IT HAS TO BE REGARDED BOTH AS AN 
ECONOMIC QUESTION AND AS A HUMAN RIGHT. 
 
The research questions concerning HYPOTHESIS 1 was, (Q1) What are the most influential 
economic theories concerning employee involvement? (Q2) Whether employee involvement 
has helped to mitigate the negative impact of economic crises and (Q3) How employee 
involvement is addressed in human rights instruments?? 
On one hand, the positive effect of employee involvement has been heavily 
contested.86 Indeed, the methods of how decisions are made naturally affect the dynamics of 
the enterprises. The more participants are involved in decision-making, the longer it takes to 
reach a conclusion, therefore the more expensive the process becomes.87 The promoters of the 
efficiency theories argue that since producing outputs at the lowest cost is in the utmost 
interest of the residual claimants of the company as it increases net cash flows, employees’ 
interest in involvement is contrary to that of the residual claimants. On the other hand, there 
are many economic theories88 which argue for the positive correlation between productivity 
                                               
84 Hugo Sinzheimer, Das Wesen des Arbeitsrecht, in Arbeitsrecht und Rechtssoziologie: gesammelte Aufsätze 
und Reden (1976). 
85 Hugo Sinzheimer, Eine Theorie des Sozialen Rechts (1936) XIV Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht. 
86 See for example, Michael ű. Jensen and William H Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, October, 1976; E. F. Fama and M. C. 
Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26. No. 2, 1983; R. B. 
Freeman and E. P. Lazear, An Economic Analysis of Works Councils, in Works Councils: Consultation, 
Representation, and Cooperation in Industrial Relation. 
86 A. A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory, 58 J Poll. Econ. 211, 1950 
87 R. B. Freeman and E. P. Lazear, An Economic Analysis of Works Councils, in Works Councils: Consultation, 
Representation, and Cooperation in Industrial Relations. 
88 For theoretical background see, Black, S. E. and Lynch, L. M. (2004), What's driving the new economy?:The 
benefits of workplace innovation. The Economic Journal, 114: F97–F116; and for recent case studies, among 
other, J. M. Gallego, L. H. Gutierrez, S. H. Lee, A firm-level analysis of ICT adoption in an emerging economy: 
evidence from the Colombian manufacturing industries, Industrial and Corporate Change, 2014; Mohamed 
Kossaï, Patrick Piget, Adoption of information and communication technology and firm profitability: Empirical 
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and employee involvement. Path dependence theories, property and human capital theorems 
and findings of behavioural economics will be presented to challenge the efficiency theory.   
While the theoretical discussion has been going on for many decades, the economic 
crises have provided solid reference points for researchers to study the interrelatedness of 
firms’ performance and the different forms of social dialogue from 2007 onwards.  Though 
the negative consequences of an economic turmoil typically reach the labour market with 
delay, this time the effects were almost immediately visible,89 forcing social partners to act 
quickly. Despite the fact that the crisis was described as an ‘omnipresent phantom in the 
autonomous European inter-professional social dialogue’, 90  the various forms of social 
dialogue at national, sectoral and company level have been proven to be effective instruments 
in mitigating the negative social and economic impacts of the crisis.91  
Regarding the human rights character of employee involvement, my starting point was 
the theory of Hugo Sinzheimer on the interrelation of political, economic and social aspect of 
democracy, also justified by the findings of Amartya Sen. Further to the principle of 
democracy, it is argued by Csilla Kollonay Lehoczky that “being involved in decisions made 
on matters affecting the main areas of the life of a person is a fundamental human right. It 
guarantees a person to not be treated as a subject, a serf, instead, a ‘citoyen’ – a citizen in the 
full moral and political meaning of the word.”92 Even though some of the human rights 
instruments explicitly promote employee involvement as a fundamental right, 93  its 
acknowledgment is much dependent on political regimes. Currently only European human 
rights instruments recognised employee involvement as a human right, the European Social 
Charter and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. However, efforts to 
expand its scope of application were made by the ILO and the OECD. 
Even though employee involvement certainly has an economic impact on firms 
(whether it is positive or negative), as Sen argues, political liberty and civil freedoms are 
directly important on their own and no further justification is needed for their existence in 
                                                                                                                                                   
evidence from Tunisian SMEs, The Journal of High Technology Management Research, 2014, 25, 1, 9; Masaki 
Matsunaga, Development and Validation of an Employee Voice Strategy Scale Through Four Studies in Japan, 
Human Resource Management, 2014, 53, 5. 
89 The unemployment rate went up from 7.4 per cent (2007) to 7.7 per cent in October 2008 (See, European 
Commission, Economic forecast, Spring 2008, 1 European Economy. 
90  S űluwaert, I Schömann and W Warneck (2010), ’The European interprofessional and sectoral social 
dialogues and the economic crisis’ in Benchmarking Working Europe 2010 (Brussels, 2010, ETUI), 75. 
91 ű E Triomphe, R Guyet and D Tarren, ‘Social Dialogue in Times of Global Economic űrises’ (Eurofund, 
2010), V Glasner and B Galgóczy, ‘Plant-level responses to the economic crisis in Europe (ETUI-REHS, 2009), 
I Guardiancich (ed) ‘Recovering from the crisis through social dialogue in the new EU Member States: the case 
of Űulgaria, the űzech Republic, Poland and Slovenia’ (ILO (Eű), 2010); B Segol, M Jepsen and P Pechet (eds) 
Benchmarking Working Europe 2014 (ETUI-ETUC, 2014,). 
92  űs Kollonay Lehoczky ‘The fundamental Right of Workers to Information and űonsultation under the 
European Social űharter’ in Dorssemont and Űlanke (eds) ‘The Recast of the European Works Council Directive 
(Intersentia, 2010) 3-4; emphasis in origin. 
93 European Social Charter (Arts 21 and 22), Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Art 27). 
While the literature is evidently more addressing Article 28, this might be considered evident in the light of the  
“contemporary” Laval and Viking decisions, however, the importance of the Article 27 rights is not-questioned. 
For a more detailed analysis see Silvana Sciarra ‘Viking and Laval: űollective Labour Rights and Market 
Freedom in the Enlarged EU (2007-08) 10 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 563 ff and E Ales 
’Information and űonsultation within the Undertaking’ in T Űlanke, E Rose, H Voogsgeerd and W  Zondag (eds) 
Recasting Worker Involvement? Recent trends in information, consultation and co-determination of worker 
representatives in a Europeanized Area (Groningen, 2009, Kluwer). 
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terms of their positive effects on the economy.94 In his view, even a tyrannical form of work 
can itself constitute a form of deprivation. In this sense, human capability is the substantive 
freedom of people to lead lives which they have reason to value and to enhance the real 
choices they have. Thus, the basic human value that people ought to have influence on 
decisions made about issues that affect important areas of their lives should prevail. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2 follows from that argument: 
 
H2 DUE TO ITS HUMAN RIGHTS CHARACTER, EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT CANNOT BE 
REGARDED AS A PRIVILEGE OF EUROPEAN CITIZENS, BUT HAVE TO BE TREATED AS A UNIVERSAL 
RIGHT OF EVERY WORKER AND HAS TO BE SAFEGUARDED WITH SUFFICIENT LEGAL PROVISIONS. 
 
Kollonay further argues  that the protection of human dignity and social democracy requires 
the extension of human rights to ‘private relationships’, such as employment, and the states 
have positive obligations to safeguard it. After reviewing the provisions of the relevant human 
rights instruments and the framework of the transnational model of employee involvement of 
the European Union, the following research question was formulated: (Q4) If employee 
involvement is a fundamental human right, thus, in that sense, has a universal value, what 
measures have been taken to promote it outside of the European terrain?  
I reviewed the instruments of ILO and OECD and looked into measures of non-state 
actors as well. The answer to this question was that absent fiat, employers tend not to 
propagate employee involvement within their organization. Recommendations, guidelines and 
other non-compulsory instruments could play an important role, especially at multinational 
enterprises, as compliance with human rights principles have increasingly been measured and 
evaluated by the market.  
The European Union addressed employee involvement in general in three major 
directives,95 the European framework directive on information and consultation (2002/14/EC), 
the (recast) directive on European works councils (2009/38/EC) and the directive on 
employee involvement in the European Company (2001/86/EC). 96  However, the limited 
personal scope of legal instruments (European Social Charter, CFREU, various EU 
Directives) concerning employee involvement overlooks the fact that transnational companies 
often operate subsidiaries outside of the Member States/Contracting States. The activity of 
these undertakings significantly contributes to the overall performance of the group, and the 
different (generally lower) standards of the non-EU countries constitute a competitive edge 
for most European multinationals. The next research question followed from these findings 
                                               
94 A Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford), 3, 16. 
95 Besides this general frame, a range of directives secure the right of information and consultation of workers in 
specific situations, such as in case of collective redundancies (98/59/EC), transfer of undertaking (2001/23/EC). 
The directive on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at 
work (89/391/EC) also contains important regulations on participation. In total, more than 15 directives deal with 
information and consultation in some kind of a general or specific sense and thus form part of the social acquis 
in this regard.  
96 Directive 2001/86/EC however will not be examined in the current dissertation. 
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was, (Q5) What role the European Union could have in better safeguarding employee 
involvement as a fundamental human right? 
One of the biggest challenges to controlling the activities of European corporations 
operating outside of the territory of the EU is the territorial sovereignty of States. The exercise 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction faces both legal and political obstacles. A general rule of 
international law affirms that one state cannot take measures on the territory of another state 
by means of the enforcement of national laws without the consent of the latter. However, 
within a limited scope, specific principles can offer a legitimate basis for exercising 
jurisdiction. The doctrine to be applied to justify extraterritorial jurisdiction depends on the 
nature of the regulatory area. 
I took the liberty to examine whether the extension of the personal scope of the 
relevant EU Directives (2002/14/EC and 2009/38/EC) could theoretically offer a solution to 
the above problem. I quoted an example from the area of environmental protection, where the 
EU has made a step towards extraterritorial jurisdiction – supported by the judgment of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union – to protect a fundamental right (which has 
nevertheless significant economic impact as well). 
The first normative conclusion of the dissertation is that the expansion of the personal 
scope of the Directives 2002/14/EC and 2009/38/EC could effectively contribute to the 
promotion of employee involvement as a fundamental right at subsidiaries of Europe-based 
multinational companies which are located outside of the European Union. The directive on 
European Works Council has set up an outstanding institutional model for information 
exchange and consultation on transnational matters of multinational enterprises. Since 
framework directive 2002/1Ő/Eű acts a ‘transmitting agent’ for information and consultation, 
it would be necessary to expand its scope too. 
In terms of personal scope, three points was considered to investigate further the 
possibility of extension. One was the definitions provided by Directive 2009/38/EC. For the 
purposes of the Directive, a ‘controlling undertaking’ means an undertaking which can 
exercise a dominant influence over another undertaking (the controlled undertaking) by 
virtue, for example, of ownership, financial participation, or the rules which govern it. The 
ability to exercise a dominant influence is presumed when an undertaking, in relation to 
another undertaking directly or indirectly: (a) holds a majority of that undertaking’s 
subscribed capital; (b) controls a majority of the votes attached to that undertaking’s issued 
share capital; or (c) can appoint more than half of the members of that undertaking’s 
administrative, management, or supervisory body. These conditions are also supposed to be 
met in the relation of subsidiaries which are located outside of the European Union. 
Two was the notion of transnational character. According to the Directive, matters 
with transnational character are those which concern the entire undertaking or group, or at 
least two Member States. These include matters which are of importance to the European 
workforce in terms of the scope of their potential effects or which involve transfers of 
activities within the Member States  
Three was the scope of Directive 2009/38/EC. The EWC Directive is not only 
applicable to undertakings or groups of undertakings which are located within the territory of 
the EU, but also addresses non-European businesses by stating that the mechanisms for 
informing and consulting employees in undertakings (or groups of undertakings) operating in 
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two or more member states shall encompass all establishments, regardless of whether its 
central management is located inside or outside of the territory of the Member States. The aim 
of this extension is the protection of the European workforce, and it does not constitute 
extraterritorial legislation as it refers to business activities which take place within the EU. If 
employee involvement has a fundamental value, it should not be treated as a privilege of 
European workers and its promotion is a positive obligation of the European Union. 
To ensure that the right of information and consultation is effectively realized at 
subsidiaries of the Europe-based multinational companies which are located outside of the 
territory of the EU, the personal scope of Directives 2002/14/EC and 2009/38/EC should be 
expanded in a way that encompass all branches which are under the control of the controlling 
undertaking domiciled in the EU. The notion of a controlling undertaking could create a link 
to subsidiaries located outside of the EU territory. Regarding trans-nationality, as argued 
above, in reality the impact of these ‘third country subsidiaries’ is of great significance for the 
multinationals. Therefore issues related to their activity, or which involve transfers of 
activities between the operations, have an increased importance for the entirety of the 
workforce in terms of the scope of their potential effects. All branches then should be 
included in the concept of the transnational character. 
It may be argued that the enlarged personal scope would constitute a competitive 
disadvantage to European multinational companies and therefore would encourage businesses 
to move their seats outside of the Member States. However, the empirical evidence quoted 
above proves that it would, on the contrary, ensure even higher level of competitiveness for 
European undertakings. It has to be also noted that both the framework directive and the EWC 
directive have problematic areas. The change in the regulatory technique allowing more room 
for Member States for transposition with regard to the different traditions in industrial 
relations catered better for employee involvement and constituted a key success factor of the 
(original) EWC Directive. However, researches showed that such flexibility regarding the 
actual implementation of the respected Directives resulted in great inequalities in national 
laws for the detriment of workers. Regarding the definitions, firstly the notion of confidential 
information has to be better addressed. Specification on the quality and quantity of the data 
provided for employees’ representatives would be necessary. Further to that point, the 
limitations regarding the disclosure of the information which has been provided to the 
employee representatives and liability for the violation of the provision has to be centrally 
regulated. The level of protection what employee representatives enjoy ought to be also 
unified. Furthermore, the position of employee representatives needs to be consolidated. The 
enforcement mechanism in employee involvement signifies a difficult socio-legal problem. 
However, regulations concerning the set-up of the representation system are lex imperfecta, 
meaning that there are no sanctions imposed if the employees do not initiate the activity.97 
Positive actions on the employees’ side could hardly be triggered by legislative measures, the 
incentive itself is to be informed and consulted. Strengthening the position of the employee 
representatives could initiate more interest among workers in participation. Adequate training 
opportunities providing better understanding on business management may also encourage 
employees to take a more active role in the information and consultation processes. Lastly, 
                                               
97 Or, if we consider the fact not being informed and consulted as a sanction itself, lex minus quam perfecta. 
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sanctions imposed on employers for not complying with the information and consultation 
provisions have to be unified as well for better predictability for both employers and 
employees.  
Due to the recent re-codification of Labour Law in Hungary, it seemed important to 
examine the changes concerning employee involvement in Hungary. While Act No I of 2012 
maintains the democratic principles of its predecessor concerning works councils, it has 
brought significant changes to the regulation of industrial relations. Since the changes 
substantially affected the stance of works councils, the research question articulated regarding 
this matter was (Q6) Whether the provisions of the new Hungarian Labour comply with the 
European norms, such as the European Social Charter and Directives 2002/14/EC and 
2009/38/EC? 
The new Labour Code successfully cleared away most of the confusion originated in 
the horizontal dual channel model of Act No XXII of 1992; however, my findings concerning 
the rights of works councils are rather negative. First, a fundamental misconception of works 
council is indicated by the statement that the function of works council is to monitor the 
compliance of employers’ practices with the employment regulations. The existing rights of 
works council are not sufficient to provide effective control over employers. The sanctions 
related to the unlawful practices of employers, eg, the violation of information, consultation 
and co-determination rights are not dissuasive enough to prevent the malpractice of 
employers. As Professor Kollonay argues, sanctions and remedies are indispensable 
instruments and “a sine qua non of the information and consultation rights as genuine and 
enforceable human rights.”98 I found that the protection of employee representative is not 
sufficient. Whereas it is uncontested that ‘regular’ members of works council deemed 
employee representative (for example the regulations concerning confidential information are 
binding on them), only the chairperson is protected against unfair dismissal. This practice 
obviously goes against the requirements set forth by Directive 2002/14/EC and violates 
Article 22 of the European Social Charter as well as the provisions of ILO Convention No 
135. Third, even though the scope of consultation was enlarged compare to that of the 
previous Labour Code, the right of co-determination was curtailed. The available remedies are 
not as effective as they were before. However, without dissuasive sanctions and proper 
remedies, the right to conclude a workplace agreement covering subject matters of a 
collective agreement is not a sign of empowerment of works councils, but a rubber stamp on 
the workplace rules unilaterally drawn up by employers. However it might occur as an 
overwhelmingly strong statement in a doctoral dissertation, the new Labour Code – in line 
with other legislative measures concerning social dialogue99 – had a significant share in the 
process which has gradually turned collective labour law into vaudeville in Hungary.  
 
Finally, while it is unquestioned that participation largely depends on the industrial traditions 
of a state, I was also interested how social patterns influence employee involvement. I 
                                               
98Kollonay, Fundamental…, 30. 
99  Most notably Act XCIII of 2011 on the National Economic and Social Council (Nemzeti Gazdasági és 
Társadalmi Tanács), which abolished tripartite social dialogue in Hungary, or, as a matter of fact, social 
dialogue per se. Another example could be the Permanent Consultation Forum (Versenyszféra és a Kormány 
Állandó Konzultációs Fóruma), which was not even established by a legal instrument. 
25 
 
examined two models of employee involvement in particular, the Japanese system and the 
Hungarian state-socialist model. Analysing how employee involvement is embodied to a 
given political and social environment, and established HYPOTHESIS 3: 
 
H3 PARTICIPATION IS SUBJECT TO SIMULTANEOUS RECOGNITION OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 
AND THE FORCE OF SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON THE EXTENT AND REACH OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM. 
 
The first question I looked into here was: (Q7) was how the traditional decision making 
patterns influence employee Involvement in Japan? Japan or more precisely, the ‘Japanese 
economic miracle’ has gained much attention all over the world. Indeed, the Japanese GDP 
got doubled and then tripled in the 1960s compare to the years following WWII, and the 
Japanese employment model significantly contributed to this success.  100 Here I just would 
like to point out two major aspects. One is that after the Second World War democratization 
was forced on Japan by the Allied Powers and this process has had an ambiguous success.  101  
Second, to some extent following from the first point, Japan does not have a long-standing 
democratic culture. Feudal patterns could be detected in many layers of the society, especially 
in decision-making process. Even though legislative movement have been supportive towards 
participation, the traditional master-servant type of subordination tradition seems to overwrite 
the institutionalised system of participation. The limitations imposed on individual freedom to 
promote social commitment seem to make participation meaningless at workplaces. 
 The second model I looked into was the state-socialist model through the example of 
Hungary. I refer to state-socialism as the economic model adopted in Hungary and in other 
Eastern European states during the communist era. The ideology was based on the state 
ownership of the means of production and centralized planning, along with a bureaucratic 
management of workplaces, and the ideological subordination to the all-encompassing 
communist party. As oppose to its original theoretical roots promoting the control of workers 
over the management and control of production, the party controlled the national economy 
and planned the production and distribution of capital goods. State-socialism promoted 
workers’ participation and the official rhetoric referred to it as a distinguishing element of 
‘socialist democracy’, which was superior to capitalist systems.  102  Participation was also 
recalled as a tool to improve economic performance. These elements reappeared throughout 
the legislative movements. While it is presupposed that centralized, autocratic systems are 
counter-interested in promoting democratic decision making processes, I examined the role of 
grass-root participatory instruments in political democratization processes first after the end of 
the second World Was and then in the course of the revolution in 1956. The second research 
                                               
100 G Űai ’Japan's Economic Dilemma: The Institutional Origins of Prosperity and Stagnation’ (New York & 
Cambridge, 2001, Cambridge University Press). 
101 See for example, M Schalber, ’The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia’ 
(OUP, 1985); M E. Caprio and Y Sugita, ’Democracy in Occupied Japan: The U.S. Occupation and Japanese 
Politics and Society’ (Taylor and Francis, 2007); űJ űoyne, ’After War: The Political Economy of Exporting 
Democracy’ (Stanford University Press, 2008). 
102 Erzsébet Strassenreiter: The social democratic party in the political life of the country (19ŐŐ – 1948) In: 
Múltunk 1990/3 (11Ő-128) 
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question under this hypothesis was (Q8) whether participation could function in a genuine 
manner in an autocratic regime? My brief answer to this latter question is negative. There are 
extensive interconnections between political freedoms and participation, as a possible 
realization of economic needs. The significance of economic needs underscores the urgency 
of political freedoms, rather than deducts it.103 
Autocratic regimes deny the reason of existence of human rights and individual 
freedom, as centralised systems could not afford the control which enforceable rights would 
impose on them. However, the example of state-socialist Hungary (similarly to the Japanese 
model) demonstrates that there is no substitute for individual freedom – and individual 
responsibility either. As Sen argues, any affirmation of social responsibility that replaces 
individual responsibility is counterproductive. Therefore, the state-socialist model (regardless 
of the way how power was exercised by the Communist party and its successors) could never 
achieve the intended function of worker participation. 
The final conclusion of the dissertation is that it is not possible to have genuine 
participation in regimes which deny the existence or even question the importance of 
individual freedom. The right to information and consultation is an individual right, in a sense 
that it should be enjoyed unconditionally by every employee, and which is exercised by the 
representative body of employees.104 Thus, it is not enough if a system is devoted to group- or 
collective-oriented rights, what matters is the simultaneous recognition of individual freedom 
and to the force of social influences on the extent and reach of individual freedom.105 The 
European model of participation is successful not only because it encompasses employee 
involvement as a human right and a tool for economic efficiency, but also because 
participation has a solid foundation based on principles of democracy. 
Only democracy can create an environment that fosters the substantive freedom of 
people to lead lives which they have reason to value, that enhances the real choices they have, 
and that thereby promotes social justice. Observations Sinzheimer and Sen made on the 
importance of democracy have to be remembered here. Protection of the human dignity of 
employees has essential importance to society, as the working power of man is not only an 
individual but also a social asset. The right to employee involvement has to remain protected 
and be promoted not only as tool to enhance economic competitiveness but also as a 
fundamental right. Moreover, this protection cannot be limited to the territory of the European 
Union in the context of globalization. The recognition of the humanity of workers through 
involvement ought to be seen as a shared responsibility of global economic actors. 
 
  
                                               
103 A Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford, 1998), 148. 
104 E Ales ‘Information and űonsultation within the undertaking’ in Recasting Worker Involvement? Recent 
trends in information, consultation and co-determination or worker representatives in a Europeanized Arena’ 
(Kluwer, 2009) 13. Similarly, Otto Kahn-Freund argued that the right to strike is an individual right; see, O 
Kahn-Freund ‘The Right to Strike: Its scope and limitations’ (Strasbourg, 1974, Council of Europe), 5 ff. 
105 A Sen, ‘Development as Freedom (1998), xii. 283-89. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 
Defining the notion of participation or employee involvement required the research of tertiary 
sources, especially dictionaries and encyclopaedias relevant to the topic. The sources of the 
ILO and Eurofound106 were found to be indispensable in the quest for commonly acceptable 
definitions. 
After the initial research based on tertiary sources, it was apparent that the topic of 
employee involvement or participation has been well researched both as an economic and as a 
legal question. The recent economic crisis also put participation in researchers’ spotlight as a 
possible tool to mitigate the negative impacts of the economic turmoil. The dissertation aims, 
however, to provide a more profound analysis of employee participation than a mere 
summary of previous scientific achievements. The purpose of the dissertation is to provide an 
in-depth analysis of participation based on the direct evidences and observations of scientific 
researches or observations. The research sets to go beyond the legal instruments and tried to 
contemplate the relevant socio-economic phenomena as well. 
Especially the firth part concerning the sate socialist model of employee involvement 
relies heavily on the historical records of the Trade Union Archives of Hungary 
(Szakszervezeti Levéltár) as well as the Institute of Political History (Politikatörténeti Intézet). 
However, probably the most important primary sources of the dissertation are the 
national and international legal instruments concerning employee involvement. The 
dissertation presents three participation models in the European Union, in contemporary 
Hungary, in Japan and in the state socialist era of Hungary. To understand the differences and 
similarities between these models, it was evident to analyse their legal foundations. With 
regard to the transnational dimension of employee involvement, the law of the European 
Union was examined. This analysis contained mostly primary and secondary sources of law, 
however, supplementary sources of European Union law, such as the case law by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, international law and general principles of European Union 
law were also taken into consideration.  
Regarding the de lege ferrenda concept of the dissertation, principles of public 
international law were examined, with a special emphasis on those of concerning 
extraterritorial legislation. In this context, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union was also analysed. To understand the transnational dimension of participation outside 
of the borders of the European Union, legal instruments of non-state actors, such as the 
                                               
106 See, Arrigo and Casale (eds) A comparative overview of terms and notions on employee participation, ILO 
Working Paper No 8, (Geneva, 2010) and the European industrial relations dictionary of Eurofound at 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/, also, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law. 
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regulations of the OECD were analysed. To less extent, company regulations and good 
practices were also included in the primary sources. 
The European, Japanese and Hungarian case law on employee involvement also 
formed an important part of the primary resources. The critical analysis of the court decisions 
has helped to capture the different and sometimes contradictory interpretations of the legal 
regulations. 
The dissertation aims to present employee involvement in an interdisciplinary manner.  
Studies which analyse, interpret and criticize primary sources had utmost importance in 
relation to the synthesis of the different researches, eg, analysis from legal, economic, 
organizational theory, cultural or philosophical fields. 
 Also, secondary sources were used to analyse employee involvement in its historical 
context. Concerning the evolvement of collective labour law in Hungary after World War II, 
very rich literature could be found concerning the history of trade unions. However, only a 
few secondary sources deal with participation. In the Hungarian context, therefore, primary 
sources had special significance. In contrast, due to language barriers and lack of access to 
primary sources, secondary sources were used for the assessment of the historical background 
of the Japanese model. 
Employee involvement takes into account each country’s cultural, historical, economic 
and political context. The complexity of the notion is also apparent in the great many 
definitions used in the different scientific fields. 
Due to its fundamentally different roots, there is no ‘one size fits all’ model of 
participation that can be readily exported from one country to another. Adapting employee 
involvement to the national situation is a key to ensuring successful implementation of its 
principles due to the diversity in institutional arrangements, legal frameworks and traditions 
of participation. Therefore, a comparative analysis of the legal instruments was indispensable, 
even though, it is not the primary goal of the dissertation to compare the different models with 
each other. 
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PART II 
THE DUAL NATURE OF EMPLOYEE 
INVOLVEMENT 
 
Chapter 1 
Weimar Origins 
 
I Precursors of Works Councils in Germany 
 
The institutionalized system of works constitution and the form of employee representation 
through works council are generally connected to the labour movements of the Weimar 
Republic. However, some rudimentary forms of such representation could be found in earlier 
stage of history. At the beginning of the 19th century, to keep trade unions out of the plants 
and to provide more legitimacy to employers’ policies, employers voluntarily established 
some forms of employee participation. 107  The majority of these shop committees were 
unsuccessful due to the limited power provided to them and the strict limitations of their 
functions to unimportant issues. However, in 1898 during a big strike in the mining industry, 
strikers sent a delegation to Keiser Wilhelm II to seek his help with settling the industrial 
incident and to ask his support regarding the establishment of shop committees. The Emperor 
declared himself in favour of the shop committees and signed the so called ‘Űerlin Protocol’, 
which granted the right to miners to set up shop committees.108  
Further to this agreement an industrial regulation order was promulgated in 1891, 
allowing workers to set up shop committees (Arbeiterausschüsse, Arbeiterräte) in every 
                                               
107 From 1889 to 1891 there were major strike movements in Germany, which was connected to the birth of the 
large trade unions. 
108 In the Reichstag Emperor Wilhelm II also delivered a speech on February Ő, 1890 stating that ’In order to 
protect the interest of the workers and to establish permanent peace in industry, there must needs be created a 
legal body in which the representatives of the employers and the workers should get together to regulate their 
common affairs’ - quoted by Ű Stern, Works űouncil Movements in Germany’ (Űureau of Labor Statistics, US, 
No 383, 1925), 16. 
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establishment employing more than 20 workers.109 In 1905 a new resolution provided for the 
compulsory establishment of shop committees in mines employing 100 or more workers. The 
workers’ representatives were given the right to participate on equal terms with the employers 
in the management of the mutual aid funds, to take up and discuss with employers all the 
complaints and demands of the workers, and to supervise the weighing of the coal and the 
wage accounts of the workers. Later, due to the political changes the perception of trade 
unions towards employee participation was changed, and they supported shop committees as a 
democratic form of plant management which could control the employers’ decision-making 
power. Also, the shop committees were under the control of trade unions. However, in 1920 
during the enactment of the first Act on Works Councils, a compromise had to be found with 
the conservative majority of the Parliament. Thus, the model as it appears in the Act 
resembles more to the original, 19th century form of employee participation than the later 
concept developed by trade unions. The dualistic model of trade union representation and 
works council representation independent from trade unions was established.110 
It is a striking question, what was the original motivation for establishing the legal 
framework concerning participation? Whether it was the idea of democratisation of 
workplaces, or, a more mundane reason, to keep trade unions away from workplaces? 
Answering this question, Ernst Fraenkel 111  argues that until the point in time when the 
movement was stronger politically than economically, it was likely to rely on its industrial 
might to gain recognition from employers; and when it was pacified, eg, became industrially 
weak, yet was represented in Parliament, the emphasis was put on legal instruments to 
promote their interests.112 
 
II Constitutional Framework 
 
The Works Council Act (Betriebsratgesetz) of February 4, 1920 was a part of the framework 
established by the Weimar Constitution far ahead of its age.113 Article 165 of the Weimar 
Constitution provided for that workers and employees in order to look after their economic 
and social interests ought to cooperate with employers on an equal footing regarding the 
regulation of salaries, working conditions, as well as in the entire field of the economic 
                                               
109 The original draft called for the compulsory establishment of shop committees; however, due to the fierce 
opposition of the Social Democrats, the compulsory phrase was eliminated from the final text. Despite of the 
voluntary nature of the regulation, the shop committee movement was accelerated, and in 1906 about 1000 shop 
committees were reported, covering 10per cent of the eligible establishments – quoted by B Stern, supra, 18. 
110 M Weiss and M Schmidt, Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Germany (Kluwer Law International, 4th 
Edition, 2008), 222. 
111 Ernst Fraenkel was a political scientist, who was a member of the social democrats and one of the few jurists 
who held socialist opinions during the Weimar Republic. Fraenkel worked closley with Hugo Sinzheimer during 
this period. 
112  E Fraenkel, ‘Die politische Űedeutung des Arbeitsrechts‘ in T Ramm (ed) Arbeitsrecht und Politik: 
Quellentexte 1918-1933 (Neuwied am Rhein 1966), 266. 
113 Adopted on August 11, 1919. The Act was abolished and replaced by the Act on the Order of National 
Labour on the 20th of January, 193Ő that based the works constitution on the basis of the “Führerprinzip”. 
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development of the forces of production. The scheme provided for a parliamentary form of 
governance, similar to and parallel with that of the political state. The lowest unit, the 
Enterprise Workers Council, was representing the interest of employees at workplace level. 
The next unit in the industrial field was the economic district, represented by the District 
Works Council. The District Workers Councils were to be made up of an equal number of 
representatives of capital and labour. Finally, the highest unit was to be the nation itself, 
governed by the Reich Economic Council, also to be composed by the elected representatives 
of labour and capital in the same way as it was to be at the District Workers Council.114  The 
detailed regulations of Factory Workers Councils were promulgated in the Act on Works 
Council, but District Workers Councils and the Reich Economic Council had never been set 
up. 
According to the Constitution, District Workers Councils and the Reich Economic 
Council would have met with the representatives of employers and other interested population 
groups for the purpose of performing economic functions and for cooperation in the execution 
of the laws of socialization, foreseen by Article 156 of the Weimar Constitution. Further to 
the plans, the competent Ministry, before proposing important drafts of social- or economic-
related bills, would have had to submit the plans to the Reich Economic Council for 
consideration. The Reich Economic Council would have itself had the right to initiate drafts 
of such bills too. If the Reich Ministry had failed to assent, it would have had nevertheless the 
right to present the draft to the Reichstag accompanied by an expression of its views.  115 
 
III Works Council Act 
 
The Act on Works Council constituted the most extensive and most important piece of social 
legislation of the era. It touched upon almost every phase of labour and social legislation, such 
as the Code of Industrial Regulations, the law concerning collective agreements, labour 
exchanges, mediation and arbitration. Even though the final text of the law was compromised, 
its significance is unquestioned.116  
The Act on Works Council set forth that “[in] order to safeguard the collective 
economic interest of the employees (...) as against those of the employer, and to assist the 
latter in fulfilling the <economic aims> of the establishment, works councils are to be 
organized in all establishment having under normal conditions not less than 20 employees.” 
                                               
114  Article 165 of the Constitution of the Republic of Weimar; available online at 
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Weimar_constitution (last retrieved on November 16, 2014). 
115 For a detailed description on the envisaged role see, Weltner (1961) 573ff. 
116 The first draft of the Act was heavily contested by both employers and trade unions. The proposal was turned 
over to a special committee to balance the needs of various political parties For example the works council co-
determination right on hiring was eliminated, but on dismissal it was retained The weakening of the power of 
works council was met with an outburst of opposition, delegations were continuously sent to the special 
committee to renegotiate the provisions, and during the second reading of the law, over 100,000 workers 
demonstrated at the Reichstag - the demonstration was ended by the police, shooting into the crowd, leaving 42 
persons killed and 105 wounded; B Stern, supra, 27. 
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 In the light of the provisions of the Weimar Constitution, the dual nature of employee 
involvement appears in a sprouting form in the Works Council Act. First, the concept of 
‘collective economic interest’ of the employees and the envisaged parliamentary form of 
interest representation through the District Workers Council and the Reich Economic Council 
projects the Sinzheimerian ideal of economic democracy. Sinzheimer argued that involvement 
in the formation of their economic conditions empowers employees with real freedom in their 
employment, which they otherwise cannot enjoy in the process of negotiating their individual 
contract due to the imbalance of power between the contracting parties.117 In Sinzheimer’s 
views, the democratization of the economic sphere is necessary for freeing employees from 
subordination in employment relations, which is essential to safeguard their human dignity. 
Second, the furthering of the ‘economic aims’ of the establishment appears as a common goal 
of both labour and capital, for which they ought to strive in a cooperative manner. However, 
such cooperation was only possible if the economic aims of the establishment  were not 
identified with the profit-maximizing tendency of the employer/owner, but rather with 
efficiency and the highest possible productivity, aiming for an economic operation.118 
 
A Rights and Duties of Works Councils 
 
According to the law, works councils had to make up of three representatives in 
establishments with 20 to 49 employees; and the number of the representative was growing 
proportionately with the size of the establishment, the highest number of representatives was 
maximized in 30. The wageworkers’ council and the salaried employees’ council were to be 
made up of the corresponding group members in the works council.119 
 
i General Provisions 
 
Section 66 of the Works Council Act specified the duties of works council. In accordance 
with the provisions of the law, works councils were provided the right to advise the 
management regarding economic plans, including the introduction of new technologies, in 
order to maximize efficient production; to safeguard the establishment against disturbances, to 
see whether the decisions of the board of adjustment (Schlichtungsausschuß) or other similar 
                                               
117 Hugo Sinzheimer, Eine Theorie des Sozialen Rechts (1936) XIV Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, quoted by 
Ruth Dukes ‘Constitutionalizing Employment Relations: Sinzheimer, Kahn-Freund, and the role of Labour Law‘ 
(2008) 35 Journal of Law and Society 3, 346.  
118 Section 66 Para 1 of the Works Council Act of February 4, 1920. 
119 Section 15 of Act on Works Council of February 4, 1920. 
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agencies are carried out; to draw up or modify factory rules together with the employer; to 
further the solidarity among employees and to stand up for the rights of workers to organize; 
to take up complaints of the separate group councils and to affect their redress; to supervise 
health and safety matters in the establishment; to cooperate in the administration of various 
welfare plants. 
In order to fulfil their tasks, works councils had the right to demand the employer to 
report on all the practices in the establishments directly effecting the employment or the 
activity of workers. Works council also had the right to examine wage sheets and other 
records related to the realisation of existing wage agreements. Both rights could only be 
exercised if they did not endanger the industrial or trade secrets of establishments. 
In case of dismissal of a large proportion of employees due to an expansion, 
contraction or closing down of the establishments, or due to an introduction of new technical 
appliances or new technical methods, the works council had to be consulted on ways and 
means of accomplishing the redundancy of employees to avoid unnecessary hardships upon 
them.120 
Employers at establishments which were not part of the wage agreements had to seek 
the approval of a works council on wage regulations. In case of disagreement, both parties had 
the right to appeal to the board of adjustment, which rendered the final decision, except when 
the disagreement was concerned with hours of work.121 
Works councils had co-determination right concerning dismissals. Employees were 
given the right to seek the works council support in case of unfair dismissals.122 Within five 
days after receiving notice, employees could file a claim to the group council, and in case the 
group council found the protest justifiable, it had to consult the case with the employer. In 
case an understanding could not be reached within a week, either the group council or the 
employee could appeal to the board of adjustment, which rendered the final decision in the 
case.123 
 
ii Right to Information 
 
As it was briefly mentioned above, to enable the works council to efficiently perform their 
tasks, workers’ representatives were granted rights to information, divided into three parts. 
First, the right to demand information and explanation about all proceedings in the plant 
which bear a direct relationship to the collective agreement or to the general conditions of 
work in the plant gave the worker’s representative a large insight into the plant. At the same 
                                               
120 It is important that neither the timing, nor the proportion of employees to be made redundant were specified 
by the law; see, Section 74 of Act on Works Council of February 4, 1920. 
121 Section 75 of Act on Works Council of February 4, 1920. 
122 These cases were when the dismissal was allegedly based on discrimination (sex, religion, political or trade 
union affiliation were mentioned specifically by the law), or were given without stating the reasons, or in case it 
was given following the employee’s refusal to permanently take up a different job than for which the person was 
hired, or if the notice was an unfair hardship, not justified by the employee’s behaviour. 
123 Sections 81-90 of Act on Works Council of February 4, 1920. 
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time employers were permitted to refuse the workers’ representatives any information which 
was considered as business secret. Since the law did not provide details either on the content 
of information or the limits of confidentiality, also, it was not specified whether it should be 
given orally or in writing, the amount and quality of information which was given to workers’ 
representatives depended entirely on the relationship between the works councils and the 
employer concerned. 124 
 Second, the right to examine the wage records and any other data pertaining to the 
carrying out of the collective agreements constituted more precisely formulated rights. Due to 
its nature, it had to be provided in writing. 
Third, employers were obliged to draw up and present quarterly reports concerning the 
conditions in the establishments and in trade as whole, with special emphasis on the 
accomplishments of the establishment and its prospective labour requirements.125 Moreover, 
employers which met certain specific conditions126 had to report to the works council their 
yearly balance sheets, including loss and profits made during the completed business year.127 
 
B Protection of Workers’ Representatives 
 
Workers’ representatives exercised their function on an honorary basis; the only special 
protection granted to them was the protection against discharge. Section 96 of the works 
council law expressly provides that no member of the works council, while in office could be 
discharged or transferred from one plant to another without the approval of the other members 
of the works council. When the works council refused to approve the dismissal, the employer 
could appeal to the board of adjustment, which rendered the final decision on the case.128 
However, the workers’ representative could not be dismissed until the decision was delivered. 
No approval was needed in case of a complete shutdown of a plant or when the workers’ 
representative committed a crime which made him subject to disciplinary dismissal.129 
 
  
                                               
124 Stern gives a detailed explanation on law suits intiated by works councils at the board of adjustment; see, B 
Stern, supra, 56 ff. 
125 Section 71 of Act on Works Council of February 4, 1920. 
126 Those which employed at least 300 wageworkers or 50 salaried employees and were under the obligation of 
keeping full accounting; see, Balance Sheet Law of February 5, 1921. 
127 Section 72 of Act on Works Council of February 4, 1920. 
128 Later to the Labour Court. 
129 See Article 123 of the Industrial Code. 
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IV Evaluation of the Role of Works Council 
 
The abstract nature of the right to advise the management in strategic issues made it difficult 
to exercise such power in practice, especially in view of the stubborn opposition of the 
employers’ interest groups in the making of the law. There was no provision in the law 
compelling the employers to consult works councils if they did not wish to do so and works 
councils had no right to interfere in the management on their own initiative.130 
 Also, no executive power was provided to works councils to force the employers to 
carry out workplace agreements. The works councils were prohibited from encroaching upon 
the rights of the management by issuing an order to change existing practices. Thus, the 
executive powers were vested solely in the management. The ambiguity between the spirit of 
the law and its actual provisions could also be detected in the vague language used by the 
lawmaker. As if the repetitions and unclear provisions were to cover the indecisiveness of the 
lawmaker. This haziness could largely be explained with the political unrest characterizing the 
post-war times. 
The struggle around the legislation mirrored the political battles.131 The employers 
were frightened by the aggressiveness of extremist trade unions and soviets which 
spontaneously sprang up after the 1918 revolution, and gathered increasing political and 
industrial powers. The amazingly rapid growth in membership of the socialist union was also 
an alarming sign of their increased power: in October 1918 the socialist unions had a total of 
1,648,313 members, while in 1920 the total membership was over 7,000,000.132 The masses 
of members demanded the recognition of workers’ soviets by the unions, which led to a split 
within the socialist unions. Thus, the establishment and empowerment of works council 
represented the interest of capital to pacify the radical left at workplaces, but there was no 
genuine intention to share managerial prerogatives. Therefore, nominal rights were given to 
works councils to monitor the compliance of employers’ practices with the employment 
regulations, but it was not accompanied with executive power. 
The establishment of works councils was also an acceptable solution for trade unions, 
to keep extremists outside of gates. In spite of the successful incorporation of the system of 
works councils, there were fields where trade unions and works councils had to clash with 
each other. The friction resulted from the different objectives of the two organizations and 
from the fields of activity. 
                                               
130 Sections 69, 72 and 82 of Act on Works Council of February 4, 1920. 
131 It has to be also noted that the coming into force of the Act of Works Council coincided with the Kapp 
Putsch, which was a coup attempt in March 1920, aimed at undoing the results of the German Revolution of 
1918–1919, overthrowing the Weimar Republic and establishing a right-wing autocratic government. It was 
supported by parts of the military and other conservative, nationalistic and monarchist forces. 
132 A possible explanation given by Stern to the phenomena is that the returning soldiers and the unorganized and 
untrained workers who joined the German soviets automatically became members of the local trade unions. 
Stern quotes his data from the Special Annex to the Reichsarbeitsblatt, 1924, Nos 1-2. See, B Stern, supra, 62, 
64.  
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The regulations concerning works council interfered with the already existing schemes 
of trade union operation. Members of works councils and shop stewards (Betriebsobmann)133 
134 ought to organise themselves into works council groups corresponding with the industrial 
divisions. Memberships in these works council groups were determined by virtue of being 
employed in a plant belonging to a certain industrial group. It meant that workers’ 
representatives belonging to the same union, if employed in different industrial groups also 
belonged to different works council groups. Thus, all the workers’ representatives of a single 
establishment had to belong to the same works council organizations. Also, this scheme 
reinforced industry-based trade union organisations (majority of the socialist unions had 
already been organised industrially) over craft-based ones, further polarising trade unions. 
According to the theory of ’economic constitution’, works councils were supposed to 
be first and foremost representatives of workers at the establishment and they were in charge 
to protect all employees regardless of their union affiliation. Moreover, works councils were 
in charge to safeguard industrial peace within the establishment to ensure continuous, high 
level productivity. Thus, responsibilities of works council would have had to supersede those 
of the unions. Some of the unions, therefore, complained that the operation of works councils 
hamper the growth of trade unions within the establishment.135  
A clash between trade unions and works councils was also apparent with regard to the 
issue of strikes. As the keepers of industrial peace, the law obliged works councils to prevent 
strikes or any other action interfering with the continuation of production, and even in case a 
strike was called by a trade union, workers’ representatives were not permitted to lead the 
action. Moreover, the members of the works council could be found liable, individually or 
jointly for the interruption of production, and the individual members or the whole council 
could have been impeached by a board of adjustment. Thus, admittedly, work councils 
successfully helped pacifying industrial conflicts, as they had an important role in preventing 
major wildcat strikes during the 1921-23 inflation, which caused the rapid devaluation of the 
mark and led to weekly changes of the Government food index, which was the basis of wage 
calculation. 136  The limitations regarding strike activity have remained a distinguishing 
element of the rights and duties of works councils.137 
The concept of an economic constitution and the idea of works councils have long 
survived the overthrow of the Weimar Republic.138 The economic democracy theory was 
much more than the transfer of parliamentary forms of democracy to workplaces, but more 
importantly it conveyed the principle of democracy and the resolving of industrial conflicts 
                                               
133  Shop stewards had to be elected at establishments employing at least five, but less than 20 employees 
(Section, 2, 15 and 70-71 of Works Council Act of February 4, 1920,). 
134 Shop stewards had to be elected at establishments employing at least five, but not more than 19 employees 
(Section 2 of Works Council Act of February 4, 1920). 
135 ILO Studies Series B No 6. 
136 B Stern, supra, 37. 
137  M Űiagi and M Tiraboschi ’Forms of Employee Representational Participation’’ in R Űlanpain (ed) 
’Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies’ (9th and revised 
edition) (The Netherlands, 2007, Kluwer Law International) 470. 
138For a detailed analysis of the Weimar Republic see, P Fritzsche ’Did Weimar Fail?’ (1996), 68 The Journal of 
Modern History 3, 629-656; and H Mommsen, ’The rise and fall of Weimar democracy’ (UNC Press Books, 
1998). 
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through dialogue. The Works Council Act incorporated the duty of an employer to consider 
not only the interests of shareholders, but also those of the employees. The contemplation of 
employees; interest improved the living and working conditions of workers and thus largely 
contributed to better social development. Participation also introduced an important limitation 
on the misuse of economic power of employers. By establishing the long-term development 
of an establishment as a shared goal of labour and capital, the responsibility for the economic 
decision was also shared between the parties, but in a proportionate manner, which created a 
productive balance of interest. When seen this way, participation was an important factor in 
the stabilisation of the economic and social order. Last but not least, the Weimar model of 
participation chiefly influenced the current employee involvement system of Germany, which 
has had further impact on the European model of participation. 
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Chapter 2 
Employee Involvement as a Question of 
Economic Competitiveness 
 
Employee involvement has been in the focus of economic researches for decades, and its 
importance is still extraordinary. The necessity to improve workers’ influence on management 
decision making is not any lesser in the quest for competitiveness of the 21st is apparent. 
However it shall not be overlooked that even in times when efficiency has had a major 
influence on labour regulations the primary goal of labour law is to balance the power-
inequality between labour and management, employers and employees. 
The methods how decisions are made naturally affect the dynamics of the enterprises 
and have been studied by many economic scientists related to corporate theories.139 The more 
participants are involved in decision making, the longer it takes to reach a conclusion, 
therefore the more expensive the process becomes. 140  Costs include direct and indirect 
elements, such as the time spent by management preparing for the information and 
consultation processes. In a competitive environment though, it is argued that only those firms 
are able to survive that deliver their products demanded by customers at the lowest price 
while covering costs.141 Also, the time delay could easily eliminate profitable market options 
that require prompt responses from the economic players.142 Moreover, producing outputs at 
the lowest cost is in the utmost interest of the residual claimants143 of the company as it 
increases net cash flows. Thus, employees’ interest in involvement is contrary to that of the 
residual claimants. 
Although, it has also been argued that information asymmetries can produce negative 
outcomes. First, the insufficient information flow between management and ownership leads 
to increased agency cost.144 Second, the lack of exchange of information between labour and 
management could also create inefficient social outcomes: workers may fail to inform the 
management about ways to improve production efficiency, or if employees’ needs for voice 
                                               
139 For example A A Űerle and G ű Means, ‘The Modern Corporation and Private Property’ 2nd edn (New 
York, 1967, Harcourt, Brace and World) (originally published in1932); M C Jensen and W H Meckling, Theory 
of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure (1976) Journal of Financial 
Economics, October; E F Fama and M C Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control (1983) 26 Journal of 
Law and Economics 2. 
140 R B Freeman and E P Lazear, An Economic Analysis of Works Councils, in Works Councils: Consultation, 
Representation, and Cooperation in Industrial Relations, in R Streeck (eds) 1995:42. 
141 A A Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory, (1950) 58 J Poll. Econ. 211. 
142 Freeman and Lazear 1995:44. 
143 The residual claimants are those who receive the remainder of the sum after all costs have been accounted for. 
See Fama and Jensen, 1983:303. 
144 Berle and Means, 1932: 124. For more detailed explanation on the principal-agent problem and agency cost, 
see, n 171. 
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remain unheard, employees may choose to exit, thus creating more direct and indirect costs 
for an enterprise.145 
Thus the economic input of employee involvement could not be overseen. Many 
hypotheses exist on both sides, aiming to prove either the inefficiency or the efficiency of 
employee involvement.  
In the following section examples of various economics theories dealing with 
participation will be introduced first, then empirical data from recent researches will be 
discussed. The following table gives a comprehensive overview on the presented economic 
theories related to employee involvement. 
 
Table 1. Employee Involvement in Economic Theories (own compiliation). 
  
                                               
145 Fama and Jensen 1983: 33. 
AGAINST Employee Involvement FOR Employee Involvement 
Jensen and Meckling Freeman and Lazear 
･ EI is not chosen by managers as an efficient solution 
･ EI conflicts with profit-maximization 
･ Shareholder will rather choose inherent agency costs 
･ EI could effectively improve productivity 
･ EI enlarges the total 'pie' what stakeholders need to share 
 (but, works councils often cause the 'prisoner's dilemma') 
Hansmann and Kraakman Deakin 
･ The shareholder-owned corporation has survived 
･ Company should be run for the shareholders' interest 
･ EI forces companies to remain with an inefficient result 
･ Winning model was the best in a certain past environment 
･ The model is not necessarily the most optimal in the future 
 (therefore, institutional survival is not decisive) 
Becker  Blair 
･ Employers are willing to invest in firm-specific trainings ･ All parties who invested in the firm should share the rights in  
ownership including control rights i.e. decision-making 
Kandel and Lazear Leana 
･ EI increases the agency problem and the related cost 
 (the process gets sluggish due to more participants involved) 
･ EI increases the employee’s commitment and trust 
･ EI reduces alienation and resistance towards changes 
･ EI motivates employees to work harder 
Brown and Cregan 
･ Information sharing and involvement in decision-making  
successfully reduce organizational change cynicism 
Taylor Mayo 
･ Productivity can be influenced by changing working patterns,  
break times and monetary incentives 
･ Productivity can be influenced by recording reactions, opinion  
and thoughts of workers 
Simon and Blumberg 
･ The productivity of Hawthorne workers did go up because they  
could genuinely participate in workplace decisions 
IV. Human Resource  
Management Theories 
V. Behavioural  
Economic Theories 
*When it's not accompanied by the sincere intention of management, employees quickly lose interest in EI 
*This ‘voluntary’ withdrawal from EI could lead to the false impression that employees are not interested in involvement 
Employee Involvement (EI) in Economic Theories 
 
*Employee involvement could not fulfil its role as a voluntary instrument 
*Sufficient rights must be allocated to employee representatives in order to realize the additional economic surplus 
*Employee's participatory rights shall be safeguarded in front of employers and trade unions 
"Market participants have a natural tendency to adopt the practices of the majority" (Boyd and Richerson) 
"Markets have a natural preference for the present state and oppose changes" (Kahan and Klausner) 
"The 'natural selection' by itself will not automatically eliminate all inefficient structures" (Bebchuk and Roe) 
*Expecting EI to be voluntary adopted in national systems which do not traditionally encourage EI would be futile 
I. Efficiency Theories 
II. Path Dependence  
Theories 
III. Property and  
Human Capital  
Theories 
"Having the fear that the employer strips them off, employee will underinvest their human capital to the firm" 
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I Efficiency Theories 
 
The economic analysis of employee involvement started with the emblematic question of 
Jensen and Meckling asking “if co-determination is so efficient, why do managers not choose 
it voluntarily?”146 They argue that the firm is a “black box”147 operating in a way to maximize 
profit and inside this black box there is a nexus of contracts that regulate the relationships 
between the individuals. Thus the firm is a legal fiction where the conflicting objectives of 
individuals are balanced by the framework of contractual relations. Models denying the 
principle of profit-maximization are rejected by the market and employee participation is 
eventually abandoned for the traditional shareholder formation despite its inherent agency 
costs.148 
In their response to the Jensen-Meckling theory, Freeman and Lazear claim that forms 
of employee involvement could effectively improve productivity. 149  In sum, employee 
involvement enlarge the total ‘pie’ what owners and employees need to share, but eventually 
owners tend to end up with a smaller slice altogether. Thus, absent fiat, employee 
involvement is not encouraged at enterprises and employers provide less power than socially 
optimal for institutions fostering employee involvement. Analogously, since the size of the 
pie gets larger by the greater power of the works councils, employees would prefer to have 
more power than optimal. The optimum level of power sharing also depends on the 
bargaining system of the country where the firm operates. The figures suggest that employee 
involvement fits better to the labour relation systems where pay and other elements of the 
compensation are determined outside of the company through relatively centralized collective 
bargaining.150 
Regarding the voluntary or mandatory nature of the works councils, Freeman and 
Lazear came to the conclusion that despite the fact that many of the analysed firms voluntary 
established employee involvement to avoid unionization, most abandoned them, as the 
insufficient power they had been provided for alienated workers and they stopped 
cooperating. Without real power to affect decision many firms eventually introduced wages 
and employment conditions in a unilateral manner. This pattern highlighted the ‘prisoner’s 
dilemma’151  showcasing the cooperating-defecting solutions of works councils. When the 
gains from employee involvement, like any other cooperative arrangements, are based on 
long-term benefits, austerity measures discourage the operation of voluntarily established 
institutions.152 
                                               
146 Jensen and Meckling 1976:9. 
147 The idea of the black box appeared first at Berle and Means 1932. 
148 Jensen and Meckling 1976:71-72. 
149 The analysis was specifically focusing on the operation of works councils in private enterprises. 
150 Freeman and Lazear 1983: 32. 
151 The prisoner's dilemma is an example of a game analysed in game theory that shows why two individuals 
might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do so. It was originally framed by Merrill 
Flood and Melvin Dresher. See, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PrisonersDilemma.html 
152 Freeman and Lazear 1983: 33. 
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It is also argued that the benefit of information sharing depends on the economic 
certainty or uncertainty. Management often relies on employee representative to transmit ‘bad 
news’ such as plant closure to the workers, as their credibility is greater than that of the 
management. By contrast, in affluent times, the information given to the employees through 
their representatives is at the expenses of management. Though, the analytics suggest that the 
social gains of full information, including profit information, would be especially valuable 
regardless of the economic situation, as it could increase flexibility within the organization.153 
Apart from information sharing, consultation also could create enterprise surplus, as new 
solutions to firm-specific problems that neither party would have revealed separately could be 
discovered as an outcome of the teamwork. However, it is argued that workers only provide 
information that management does not have if they are empowered with the right to propose 
solutions. 
As a final conclusion Freeman and Lazear suggest that the social gains from employee 
involvement could only be maximized if the rules governing information and consultation 
processes are carefully bound the power of both labour and management, as well as fit the 
broader industrial relations system in which the representative bodies function.154 
Based on the above arguments, it could be summarized that employee involvement 
could not fulfil its role as a voluntary instrument. Moreover, sufficient rights must be 
allocated to employee representatives; otherwise the additional economic surplus could not be 
realized. Participatory rights of employees shall be safeguarded both in front of employers 
and other parties of industrial relations, notably trade unions.  
 
II Path Dependence Theories 
 
The neo-classical approach to corporate governance applies the Darwinian notion of the 
survival of the fittest and envisages a process of natural selection within the market which 
only allows the most efficient formation to survive.  The heavily contested155 proposal of 
Hansmann and Kraakman on The End of History for Corporate Law,156 suggests that the 
shareholder-owned corporation has triumphed the contest for survival in the global market, 
and there is no need for future research for any alternative models. Hansmann and Kraakman 
argue that there is a “normative consensus” that corporate leaders should run the company in 
the best interest of their shareholders. Models designed to foster employee involvement are 
                                               
153 Freeman and Lazear 1983: 39. 
154 Freeman and Lazear 1983: 50. 
155 See for example D Kershaw, ‘No End in Sight for the History of Corporate Law: The Case of Employee 
Participation in Corporate Governance’ (2002) 2 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 34; J Michie and C 
Oughton, ‘Employee Participation and Ownership Rights’, (2002) 2 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 34. 
156 H Hansmann and R Kraakman, The End of History of Corporate Law, (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 
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seen as misguided experiences that forces companies to remain with a less than efficient 
result.157 
The evolutionary theory of Hansmann and Kraakman was contested in the ground158 
that evolution is not a unidirectional process, but an open-ended one where the possibility of 
reform exists.159 Deakin argues that the evolutionary theory proves not more than the winning 
model was able to adapt to a certain past environment the best. It does not mean however, that 
this model is the most optimal or that it would be the most suitable one for present or future 
markets. 160  Deakin’s argument emphases the importance of adaptability: he states that 
corporations adjust to specific market conditions without any quest for optimality. Adaptation 
is a long process which is shaped by historical conditions. Thus, according to Deakin, 
institutional survival, or even supremacy, is not decisive.161 
Theories related to path dependency suggest that the predominance of suboptimal 
corporate governance systems excluding employee involvement has no reference to 
efficiency. Boyd and Richerson argue that market participants have a natural tendency to 
adopt the practices of the majority, assuming that this is the optimal choice. They named this 
phenomena “frequency dependent bias”, whereas the preconception is based only on the 
frequency of the practice and not an efficiency evaluation. 162  Correspondingly, Kahan and 
Klausner imply that markets have a natural preference for the present state and oppose 
changes, regardless of the efficiency associated to the existing model. Such status quo may 
not only be present due to the blind imitation of other firms, but also to the high costs of the 
implementation of an even superior form of governance.163 
The effects of path dependency in corporate governance were well studied in the 
different works of Roe.164 Roe explains the different factors lying behind path dependence, 
such as culture, politics and legal systems; therefore opting-out from the established system is 
extremely difficult despite the existence of more efficient alternatives. Thus, the high 
transition costs of deviation may lock out socially desirable innovations.165 
Together with Bebchuk, Roe further argues that significant sources of path 
dependency can be detected in corporate ownership and corporate rules of the different 
countries even though their economies might be quite similar to each other.166 Two types of 
path dependency were identified by Bebchuk and Roe, one of which is efficiency based. It is 
argued that even assuming that a country’s legal regulations were created solely for higher 
                                               
157 Wanjiru Njoya, ‘Employee Ownership and Efficiency: An Evolutionary Perspective,’ (200Ő) Ind. Law J. Vol. 
33. No 3, 214. 
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159 Njoya, supra 214. 
160 S Deakin, ‘Evolution of our Time: A Theory of Legal Memetics’ (2002), University of Cambridge, Working 
Paper No. 2Ő2; in support of A Alchian, ‘Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory’ (19ő0) ő8 J of Pol. 
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161 Deakin, 2002, supra, 25. 
162 R Űoyd and P J Richardson, ‘Culture and the Evolutionary Process’ (University of Chicago Press, 1985). 
163  M Kahan and M Klausner, ‘Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd 
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efficiency, the already existing patterns of ownership and governance influence the relative 
efficiency of the rules. The discussion illustrates that the ‘natural selection’ by itself will not 
eliminate inefficient structures as long as player recognize it as optimal for their own 
operation. In an example Bebchuk and Roe made, even if in Germany employee co-
determination laws changes and make a dual corporate board optional rather than mandatory, 
as long as labour leaders and other players benefit from co-determination and they have the 
power to resist changes, the existing model will survive regardless of its efficiency. The 
reason is that not only value maximization and self-interest govern the choice of decision 
makers regarding corporate governance, but culture and ideology as well. Even though 
increasing global competition should discourage companies from following inefficient 
models, globalization so far has not resulted either in the obliteration of outdated models or in 
standardization. Another example of Bebchuk and Roe is the case of the European Company. 
Even though the European Commission has been promoting the idea of Societas Europea, 
arguments between the Member States over matters like employee involvement are still 
continuing. Their analysis demonstrates that regardless of how easy is to impose standardized 
rules by the central political will countries remain to follow their already existing patterns. It 
should not be overlooked either, as they argue further, that escaping from an inefficient 
system by reincorporation is extremely costly. 
Further to the above arguments, it could be noted that the lack of effective employee 
involvement might not be due to the inefficiency of the instrument, but to the path-
dependency of the national corporate governance systems. Thus, expecting corporations 
incorporated in national systems which do not traditionally encourage employee involvement 
to voluntary adopt such system would be futile. 
 
III Property and Human Capital Theories 
 
Property rights theories in economy have addressed the problem of specification of individual 
rights that determines how costs and rewards are allocated among the participants of the 
organization.167 As it was stated above, firms have been seen as legal fictions, a nexus of 
contracts, whereas individual behaviour in organizations, like managers, employees or stock 
owners is greatly affected by these contracts. 
Specific attention has been given to contracts determining the relations between 
owners and managers, more precisely to those which are separating ownership and control.168 
The separation of ownership and control leads to an agency relationship, where the principal 
engage another person, the agent, to perform services on behalf of the principal which 
includes the delegation of decision making authority to the agent. Delegation of authority to 
agents (managers) leads to agency cost, which occurs as the sum of the monitoring 
                                               
167 Started with Ronald űoase’s theory and was extended by Alchian, Demsetz and others. 
168 Jensen and Meckling, supra, 1976 at 6. 
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expenditures by the principal, the bonding expenditure of the agent and the residual loss. In 
public companies the agency cost is borne by the shareholders, as owners bear the residual 
risk in the firm. In this model employees are not owners, as they do not bear the residual risk, 
since they decided not to shoulder the residual risk and to remain at arm’s length by 
contracting for a fixed sum by way of return.169 Thus, as claimed by Jensen and Meckling, it 
is efficient to vest ownership in shareholders and not in employees. 
Property theories disregard two social and economic considerations. First, in years of 
economic constraints employers (managers) increasingly tend to share the residual risks 
arising from economic uncertainty with employees by lowering wages, deteriorating working 
conditions or reducing the level of health and safety protection. This forced participation in 
economic risks indeed lower costs, but leaves the gate open to different forms of exploitation. 
Second, knowledge-intensive production greatly relies on highly skilled employees with 
significant firm-specific knowledge. Many economic theories suggest that specialized 
investments could gain a critical importance in determining the boundaries of firms and the 
allocation of risks, rewards, and control rights within firms. 
In his seminal work on human capital, Becker explores the training investments 
employer and employees would make.170 According to his argument, in a competitive labour 
market employers are only be willing to invest in firm-specific trainings and not in those that 
are aiming to improve the general skills of their employees, as they will not be able collect the 
returns from the latter investment. The reason is that employees will be able to use the general 
knowledge at other companies if they choose to exit, whereby the specific knowledge will 
discourage them from leaving the employer. The firm-specific human capital will only make 
employees more productive at their original employers.171 Thus, it would bring the employer 
and the employee to be in a ‘bilateral monopoly position’.172 The firm-specific knowledge 
increases employee’s bargaining power173 as replacing workers with special skills will impose 
high costs on the employer. It is also argued that in knowledge-intensive industries, like at 
automotive companies, employees are typically paid on an hourly basis and several incentives 
are available to reduce turnover, while, by contrast, employees in the garment industry are 
often treated similar to subcontractors and additional benefits are seldom offered to them.174 
Margaret Blair argues for combining property and human capital concepts. 175  She 
proposes that if ownership involves the right to make decision (control rights) and the owner 
receive whatever is remaining after all payments specified by other contract have been paid, 
all parties who invested in the firm, including shareholders and employees, should share the 
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rights entangled in ownership.176 Naturally, human capital is not easily tradable and neither 
the firm nor any of its participants can own it. Nevertheless, she argues further, where firm-
specific human capital is important, property rights need to point toward employee control of 
the firm or at least participation in management. Otherwise employees, having the fear that 
the employer strips them off from the rents earned by the assets, will underinvest their human 
capital to the firm. Such action could negatively affect competitiveness, especially in 
knowledge-intensive production. 
Though the idea of risk-sharing has quickly (re)gained popularity, employees’ right to 
involvement in decisions that significantly affect their daily living has not yet attracted that 
much recognition, not even as mean to retain skilled workforce. 
 
IV Human Resource Management Theories 
 
Human resource management deals with policy areas like selection, training, job design, 
compensation, performance appraisal, communication, and employee relations. Employee 
involvement, from a human resources management view, acknowledges that employees and 
employers have different but legitimate interests in the employment relationship. Managers 
are no longer seen as the sole custodians of authority, and employees are able to bring their 
workplace experiences to the decision-making table, therefore decisions are better supported. 
Involvement in decision making provides employees with an opportunity to examine 
management’s motives and the consequences of various options before settling on a binding 
decision.  Thus, it has long been in the scope of human resource management researches and 
has been studied from an organizational efficacy point of view,177 and has been argued to 
have both negative and positive impacts. Findings suggest that at workplaces where 
employees had a greater amount of influence on decision making both the satisfaction level 
and productivity of workers are higher. 178  However, it has been also argued that the 
magnitude of the positive effects of employee involvement is so small that it casts doubts 
about the overall practical benefits of the instrument. 
The usual critical standpoint of employee involvement from human resource 
management point of view is related to the effects of the traditional agency problem,179 which 
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negatively influences the organizational outcomes. Kandel and Lazear argue that the 
delegation of decision making rights to workers increases the agency problem as the more 
participants are involved, the more sluggish the decision-making process becomes. The 
increased costs, the time and the efforts to coordinate the decisions are likely to have negative 
effects on the overall performance of the firm.180 
On the other hand, the findings of Leana suggest that involvement increases the 
employee’s commitment and trust, reduces alienation and resistance towards changes. These 
factors motivate employees to work harder, which leads to increased productivity. Also, 
participation programs could enhance organizational performance by providing information to 
managers that is not otherwise revealed to them with autocratic management methods.181 
Further to Leana’s findings, Űrown and űregan demonstrate that information sharing and 
involvement in decision making successfully reduce organizational change cynicism. 182 
However, it has been increasingly being recognized that when the different techniques of 
information sharing and participation are not accompanied by the sincere intention of 
management to involve workers to decision making, employees quickly lose interest in 
employee involvement. This ‘voluntary’ withdrawal from participation could lead to the false 
impression that employees are not interested in involvement. 
 
V Behavioural Economic Theories 
 
Behavioural economics is a method of economic analysis that applies psychological insights 
into human behaviour to explain economic decision-making.183  It gained attention in the 
1950, as a new direction in microeconomics and after the financial crisis in 2007 it has 
become mainstream. Formerly, descriptive microeconomics was relatively uninterested in the 
behaviour of individual economic agents, unless if it was necessary to provide a foundation 
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for macroeconomics. The normative microeconomics did not need a theory of human 
behaviour either, from its perspective it only had relevance how people ought to behave, not 
how they do actually behave. Thus, the classical economic theories of markets with perfect 
competition and rational agents were considered as deductive theories that did not require 
contact with empirical data once their assumptions were accepted.184 
 Combining psychology with economic models has brought a completely new 
perspective. Rather than correlating statistical data, or interviewing and surveying people on 
their views, it uses psychological experiments to test how people react to particular changes to 
their environment. Behavioural economics tried to offer an answer to the question, why 
‘individual economic agents’ behave seemingly unreasonable, eg, acting against their self-
interest? It has affected the theories of firms as well, and promoted that firms should aim for 
satisficing, rather than maximizing their profits.  The notion of satiation did not play a role in 
classical economic theories, while it enters rather prominently into the treatment of motivation 
in psychology. As Herbert A Simon explains the revelation, “[i]n most psychological theories 
the motive to act stems from drives, and action terminates when the drive is satisfied. 
Moreover, the conditions for satisfying a drive are not necessarily fixed, but may be specified 
by an aspiration level that itself adjusts upward or downward on the basis of experience. If we 
seek to explain business behaviour in the terms of this theory, we must expect the firm's goals 
to be not maximizing profit, but attaining a certain level or rate of profit, holding a certain 
share of the market or a certain level of sales. Firms would try to <satisfice> rather than to 
maximize.”185 
 Behavioural economists have influenced labour law in basically four major fields: the 
effect of fair pay on the motivation to work; the effect of security in pay on productivity; the 
relevance of participation rights and job satisfaction in the workplace; and the differences 
between opting in and opting out of workplace schemes such as occupational pensions.186 It is 
argued that researches concerning the above questions confirm that labour rights which 
correct inequality of bargaining power, protect security in pay, and promote workplace 
participation are able to redress considerable market failures. In this subchapter I will devote 
attention to studies related to participation, as well as to those which examine the effect of 
opting out in compulsory workplace schemes. 
 
A Behavioural Economics and Participation 
 
Probably the first experiment which had implications to workplace participation was the 
‘Howthrone experiment’ conducted by Elton Mayo at the Howthrone Works of the Westerns 
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Electric Company in 1924.187 Mayo’s experiment competed with the ‘scientific management’ 
theories of Taylor.188 While Taylor wanted to prove that he could influence productivity by 
changing working patterns, break times and monetary incentives, treating workers as a sort of 
‘intelligent gorillas’, Mayo’s studies, by contrast, wanted to influence productivity by 
recording reactions, opinion and thoughts of workers. The intended major aim of the 
Hawthorne experiment was to check the effect of lighting intensity on production. However, 
due to technical problems, the very research did not lead to any results, so they continued the 
experiments with work times and break times. The observers were instructed to consult 
workers when they would prefer to have breaks and what sort of meals they would want. 
Productivity went up significantly when meals were given and brakes were introduced, but 
even more curious, productivity continued to improve even after these benefits were 
removed.189 
Though Mayo did not get what he wanted from his experiment, later his data have 
been studied and have continued to be studied today.190 It was first Herbert A Simon who 
drew conclusion for behavioural economics, soon followed by sociologist Philip Blumberg.191 
They both concluded that the productivity of Hawthorne workers did go up because they 
could genuinely participate in workplace decisions, in a way which was construed more the 
mere information and consultation. This could serve an explanation why workers continued to 
work productively even though the offered benefits were taken away.192 
 The conclusion of Simon and Blumberg was reinforced by a series of experiment 
conducted recently by Dan Ariely, Emir Kamenica and Drazen Pralec at Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology and Harvard University.193 In the first test at MIT a group of students 
were asked to find at least ten occurrences of two ‘s’ together on sheets of paper with random 
letters printed on them. They would be paid 55 cents for the first sheet, and 5 cents less for 
each subsequent sheet. They could all stop working whenever they felt like it, so that the 
participant had to determine whether the diminishing return warranted the continued work. 
The participants’ work was, however, handled in three different ways. In the first group, when 
the ‘ss’ were found, the participant was instructed to write their name on the paper, and the 
experiment observer would file the sheet in a folder (‘Acknowledged’). In the second group, 
the participant was not told to write down a name, and the observer simply put the sheet on 
the top of a big stack of papers (‘Ignored’). In the third group, the observer promptly put the 
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sheet of paper through a shredding machine (‘Shredded’). The result was that more 
participants kept working longer when their work was acknowledged. The ‘Acknowledged’ 
participants completed an average of 9.03 sheets, the ‘Ignored’ participants 6.77 sheets, and 
the ‘Shredded’ participants completed 6.3Ő sheets on average. It is captivating, however, that 
the performance of those who were ignored was almost as unproductive as people whose 
work was shredded. 
In the second experiment, a group of test subjects at Harvard University were asked to 
assemble Lego figures called ‘Űionicles’. The participants were paid $2 for the first one and 
then 11 cents less for the next one, and so on, until the participant was paid 2 cents for the 
twentieth Bionicle. At some point, each participant would find it ceased to be worth their time 
to continue building. Again, the participants were divided into two groups with different 
conditions. The first group of participants would build their Bionicles and the observer in the 
room would put the Űionicles under the table. The Űionicles’ of second group of participants 
were immediately dismantled by the observer in the front of participants’ eye. Thus, these 
participants would have to rebuild Bionicles that had just been built and then dismantled. 
Every participant was paid on the same scale. When the Bionicles were not dismantled, the 
average number built was 10.6, and when they were dismantled, the average number built was 
7.2.  
Ariely et al concluded that people, whose work is ignored, disparaged, discredited, 
feel less motivated to keep working because they see that continued effort produces more 
harm than reward. There are many ways in which people at work could be acknowledged. 
Company managements can simply ensure that they foster a culture of recognition, and ensure 
that people in the organisation are not left behind. They also suggest that the results may also 
have prescriptive implications for educating labourers about the goals of their work. This 
implies participation through work councils, representation on the company board and 
collective bargaining by trade unions.194 
B Behavioural Economics and Opting-out in Compulsory 
Workplace Schemes 
 
Sunstein asks in a thought-provoking article that if workers ‘wanted’ to, why not let them give 
up of the right to a fair dismissal or the right to not be discriminated against on grounds of 
age, or to join a trade union?195 The answer to all of these ideas would seem to be that an opt-
out would amount to the abolition of the right, and a minimum floor of rights which rectify 
inequality of bargaining power promote economic productivity: a route to human 
development.196 Mitigating inequality of bargaining power between employers and workers, 
who enter the workplace as isolated individuals, has always been the role of labour law.197 
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To maximize the protection of information and consultation rights of employees, there 
is a reoccurring idea on works council that would make compulsory at workplaces to set up 
and operate works councils.198 Regulations concerning the setting up a works council are 
mostly constructed as lex imperfecta, meaning that the violation of the regulations is not 
sanctioned; or, if we consider having no information or consultation provided to workers a 
sanction itself, as lex minus quam perfecta. Also, statistics show that there are much less 
works councils operating compared to the number of workplaces where employees would be 
able to set up their representative organ.199 The arguments go as if it was compulsory to set up 
a works council at every workplaces which otherwise meet the legal requirement (usually 
related to the size of the undertaking or the establishment 200 ); there were a significant 
increment in the number of works council operating. 
This inspiration might be routed in two principles of human choice that had been 
acknowledged by economic theory for some time, but which behavioural economics had 
confirmed. First, people have a tendency to think more in the immediate rather than in the 
long term. Second, that people have a tendency to prefer the status quo to change. Regarding 
the first issue, it is argued that employees do not recognize the potential benefit of setting up 
an information and consultation body for themselves during regular business operation, and 
they could easily become unarmed when participation suddenly appears to be more important, 
like in the course of downsizing or other business turmoil. In 1848, John Stuart Mill had 
contended in Principles of Political Economy that while laissez faire was the best general 
principle, several important exceptions have to be recognised. One of these exceptions was 
‘when an individual attempts to decide irrevocably now, what will be best for his interest at 
some future and distant time’ because we tend to make better decisions when “judgment is 
grounded on actual, and especially on present, personal experience.”201 Mill was concerned 
with contracts for a long term, or for perpetuity, and argued that such contracts should not be 
enforced. This prediction could be justified by the principle is applicable to compulsory 
pension savings, where younger people would not predict their future need and save, because 
the decision to not have saved would be irrevocable in later life.202 
Regarding the second part of the argument, since people tend to prefer status quo to 
change, the compulsory model of works council would be anyway operated. Richard Thaler 
and űass Sunstein wrote in their popular book ‘Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, 
Wealth, and Happiness’ that default rules may be set according to what society deems 
                                               
198 Probably the strongest advocate of this idea in Hungary is T Prugberger, see, I Horváth and R Rácz (eds) 
(2004) 71. 
199 On the issue of ’no right to information and consultation without representation’ see, E Ales ’Information and 
Consultation within the Undertaking’ in T Űlanke, E Rose, H Voogsgeerd and W Zondag (eds) Recasting 
Worker Involvement? Recent trends in information, consultation and co-determination of worker representatives 
in a Europeanized Area (Groningen, 2009, Kluwer) 10.   
200 For example the scope of Directive 2002/14/EC defines that the Framework Directive shall apply, according 
to the choice made by Member States, to: (a) undertakings employing at least 50 employees in any one Member 
State, or (b) establishments employing at least 20 employees in any one Member State; whereas Member States 
shall determine the method for calculating the thresholds of employees employed. See, Art 3 of Directive 
2002/14/EC. 
201 See, J S Mill, ‘Principles of Political Economy’ (7th edn 1909) Book V, ch IX, 7-10.  
202 See further L Hannah ‘Inventing Retirement: The Development of Occupational Pensions in Űritain’ (űUP 
1986). 
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desirable, but individuals may be allowed to ‘opt out’ if they choose.203 They quoted the 
example of the Swedish Privatization Plan, a ‘pro-choice’ plan of social security which 
allowed participants at almost every stage to opt-out from the default settings. As the savings 
of those who decided to stick to the default fund was significantly higher, this model is 
considered by the authors as an important lesson to learn about the limitations of freedom of 
choice. According to Thaler and Sunstein, one of the strongest conclusions to be drawn from 
the Swedish example is that default rules can save on transaction costs, by anticipating what 
most parties could and should reasonably expect in standardised types of bargains. If people 
are bias toward the status quo, default rules in the right place correct a significant market 
failure because it saves on transaction costs. But also, the option of opting-out acknowledges 
that private parties may legitimately want something else. 204 
Whereas the default setting with opting-out options could be justified in many areas of 
labour law, I argue that it is not suitable to facilitate employee involvement. A well written 
template contract of employment, or a model union constitution could promote understanding 
and best practice. As with company legislation, the parties would be free to agree to their own 
rules so long as the minimum rights were complied with. A ‘nudge’ would be a complement 
for compulsory minimum standards. 
But when one applies the same scheme to works councils, the conclusions of the series 
of experiments conducted by Ariely et al. should be remembered. Whereas the output of 
‘Acknowledged’ participants was much better, there were no significant differences recorded 
between the results of the ‘Ignored’ and of the ‘Shredded’ groups. Also, it was underlined in 
the Howthrone-experiment as well, that genuine participation generated the better 
productivity. Only by setting up and operating works councils may facilitate information and 
consultation at a workplace, it would not be guaranteed that employees could exercise their 
right to participate.   
A research conducted by experts of SEEurope205  on disclosure of information by 
European Companies in 2012 showed that companies in which reporting to employees or to 
their representatives exceeds the legal minimum are scarce.  It was shown that access to non-
financial data has remained a managerial prerogative throughout the EU. In addition, it was 
found that workforce and workplace conditions are not seen as a key part of sustainability by 
the management. In the field of codetermination on working conditions less than 10 per cent 
of the companies provided even partial information. Items going beyond the workplace, 
including issues related to sustainability were not reported at all.206 
At the companies examined, sustainability was clearly linked to the corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) policies and non-financial reporting was often treated as a PR tool to 
develop this responsibility. However, even in this sense, these tools were mostly used to fulfil 
                                               
203The concept of ‘nudge’ or ‘choice architecture’ is about what to do once it is decided that there is no market 
failure to warrant changes of mandatory rules, and this seems to be most of the time; see, R Thaler and C 
Sunstein ‘Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness’ (2008). 
204 Thaler and Sustein (2008), 145-156. 
205 The SEEurope Network – organized by the European Trade Union Institute – was founded in 2003 to observe 
the transposition of the SE legislation and its practical impact on businesses and industrial relations. The network 
involves legal, economic and industrial relations experts from the European Economic Area (EU member states 
plus Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein). Over the years the network has produced a broad range of publications, 
including country reports, case studies and topical reports. 
206 Cremers 2013:22 
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the needs of shareholders and less focused on those of the employees. Particularly in Greece 
and Bulgaria it was found that even those companies who have voluntary put on international 
reporting obligations are reluctant to disclose information related to environmental issues, 
health and safety matters at work, business strategy and marketing. The recent financial crisis 
has brought another aspect to non-financial reporting: European Companies tend to 
increasingly consider űSR and sustainability as a ‘luxury’ in times when elements of 
traditional social dialogue are in stake. Parallel to this phenomenon, they show significantly 
less respect for human rights, labour standards and environmental consciousness.  
  In my views, the above research underlines the importance of genuine employee 
participation over the role of compulsory workplace settings. The mere obligation to provide 
information on pre-set matters and consult employee representatives does not create dialogue. 
Űy creating dummy institutions to put a rubber stamp on employers’ decisions could 
simultaneously be a pretext for abolishing basic labour or human rights. But the obligation to 
protect the right of participation cannot be vested solely to the state actor or the employer. 
Genuine participation also requires the duty of understanding of the importance of 
involvement and of activity on the employees’ side. 
 
VI  Employee Involvement during the Economic Crisis in the 
European Union  
 
After reviewing some of the theories arguing for the positive correlation between economic 
development and involvement in decision making processes now I turn to the practical 
evaluation of participation in workplaces. As it was discussed above, the positive effect of 
employee involvement has been heavily contested. 
While the theoretical discussion has been going on for many decades, the economic 
crisis has provided a solid reference point for researchers to study the interrelatedness of 
firms’ performance and the different forms of social dialogue from 2007 onwards. Though the 
negative consequences of an economic turmoil typically reach the labour market with delay, 
this time the effects were almost immediately visible, forcing social partners to act quickly. 
Despite the fact that the crisis was described as an ‘omnipresent phantom in the autonomous 
European inter-professional social dialogue,’ 207  the various forms of social dialogue at 
national, sectoral and company level have been proven to be effective instruments in 
mitigating the negative social and economic impacts of the crisis.208  
                                               
207  S űluwaert, I Schömann and W Warneck (2010), ’The European interprofessional and sectoral social 
dialogues and the economic crisis’ in Benchmarking Working Europe 2010 (Brussels, 2010, ETUI), 75.   
208 űluwaert, I Schömann, ‘European social dialogue and transnational framework agreements as a response to 
crisis?’ (2011) Ő ETUI Policy Űrief.   
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Many researches have been conducted since the outbreak of the economic crises.209 I 
selected four recent studies examining the performance of companies during the crisis, 
conducted by the ILO and stakeholders.210 These studies were selected on the basis of their 
approach towards the issue of employee involvement. The European Commission conducted a 
‘Fitness űheck’ on the effectiveness of the information and consultation right of employees in 
the EU. However, problems highlighted by stakeholders, were considered as “insignificant” 
by the report.211 Selecting the studies, I wanted to get a better insight on stakeholders’ view, 
and also looked into surveys which have not been frequently analysed. Also, I considered 
ILO’s view unbiased on the issue. 
Whereas the differences in methodology and scope make it impossible to fully 
compare their findings, it is unquestioned by their findings that social dialogue in general and 
enterprise level dialogue in particular has had measurable positive effect in combating the 
detrimental impacts of the crisis and it was positively associated with better social 
performance by companies. Most recently, Segol et al. argue that a sustainability analysis of 
large European companies listed on the stock market in 2012 demonstrated that in almost all 
cases companies with employee representation performed better than those without.212  
Triomphe et al. and Glassner and Galgóczy emphasise the importance of plant-level 
negotiations over sectoral or national level social dialogue. Plant-level bargaining was found 
to be relatively free from the often politicized negotiations between trade unions and 
employers’ associations or governments.213 Triomphe et al. as well as Segol et al. put a 
special emphasis on the role played by European Works Councils (EWC). Whereas EWCs are 
important elements of transnational social dialogue214 at company level, and in some cases215 
stimulating results were delivered by them, there are important limitations on the scope of 
their actions which need to be highlighted. Triomph et al. stress the ineffectiveness of 
instruments of EWCs in forcing employers to provide sufficient information in a timely 
manner and the slowness of EWCs responses in the decision-making process. Segol et al. 
                                               
209  See for exampleGlassner and Keune (ILO, 2010), ‘Negotiating the Crisis’ ; Eurofund (2012) ‘Social 
Dialogue in times of economic crisis’; Eurofund (2012) ‘Workplace social dialogue in Europe’. The results of 
these surveys were taken into consideration in the drawing up of the ‘Fitness űheck’ ;see, SWD (2013) 293 final, 
19. 
210 ű E Triomphe, R Guyet and D Tarren, ‘Social Dialogue in Times of Global Economic Crises’ (Eurofund, 
2010), V Glasner and Ű Galgóczy, ‘Plant-level responses to the economic crisis in Europe’ (ETUI-REHS, 
2009), I Guardiancich (ed) ‘Recovering from the crisis through social dialogue in the new EU Member States: 
the case of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia’ (ILO (EC), 2010); B Segol, M Jepsen and P 
Pochet (eds) ‘Benchmarking Working Europe 2014’ (ETUI-ETUC, 2014,).   
211 SWD (2013) 293 final, 13. 
212 űompanies’ performances related to environmental protection was also much more positive at those which 
had any forms of employee involvement. Thus, they suggest, strengthening of employee involvement could also 
significantly contribute to companies’ sustainability. See, Segol et al. supra 110.   
213 Triomph et al. supra 10.   
214 Social dialogue is a very ambiguous term in literature, especially in the rhetoric of the European Commission 
(http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/socialdialogue.htm) (for the 
criticism of that vague understanding of the term see, Ű Keller and Ű Sörries in Űob Hepple ‘Labour Laws and 
Global Trade’ (Hart Publishing, 200ő), űhapter 9.). In this article I use this term in accordance with the ILO 
definition, meaning that ‘social dialogue includes all types of negotiation, consultation or simply exchange of 
information between, or among, representatives of governments, employers and workers on issues of common 
interest relating to economic and social policy.’  
215 Schering Plough, Deutsche Post, DHL, ThyssenKrupp, Hewlett Packard and EDS; see, Triomphe et al. supra 
7.   
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warn that the information and consultation rights of EWCs are often not respected. Moreover, 
the situation has worsened as the recent labour law reforms triggered by the crisis undermine 
workers’ rights across Europe to information and consultation, especially during collective 
redundancy and transfer procedures. 216  Continued deregulation not only constitutes a 
backward step in workers’ protection, but “undermines any remaining hopes of European 
social integration.” 217 
All of the quoted studies point out a major difference between the factors hindering the 
institutional, political and legal framework of social dialogue in the old and the new Member 
States. It is clear that most new Member States experienced severe external pressures to 
restructure their public finances, as the Council of the European Union issued several 
Excessive Deficit Procedures218 and the pressure on the governments’ side to meet austerity 
plans often overrode the demands of organized labour. Hence, CEE countries did not only 
experience political instability like their Western counterparts, but also abrupt changes in 
social partnership that coincided with the fiscal consolidation measures in the region. 
However, the ILO study states that, despite the unconstructive circumstances, social dialogue 
was still used as a debate forum by all of the countries under examination, with the exception 
of the atypical cases of Romania and Hungary where social dialogue technically broke down.  
Social dialogue, as the ILO study argues further, has been able to function and forge 
adequate responses to the crisis through national social pacts and collective agreements at 
various levels, except in cases where these forums have been prevalently overridden by 
governmental unilateralism, as happened in those Western and Eastern European countries 
most affected by the economic, debt and political crises (such as Ireland, Greece, Spain, 
Hungary and Romania). The countries examined in his research demonstrate diversity both 
institutionally and socio-economically. The ILO study demonstrates that the crisis exerted the 
worst impact on Slovenia, which entered a double-dip recession in 2012, but was almost 
entirely avoided by Poland. In both of these dimensions, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria are 
considered intermediate cases.  
It is important to emphasise that all studies point out the weaker possibilities for 
employees to enjoy participatory rights at small and medium size companies219 (SME).220 
                                               
216 For example in Spain and France the time given to EWCs for consultation in case of collective redundancy 
was drastically cut back, whereas in UK the consultancy period for transfer of undertakings was changed to its 
detriment. See, Segol et al. supra, 93.   
217 Segol et al supra, 68.   
218 The excessive deficit procedure is governed by Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, under which the Member States are obliged to avoid excessive deficits in national budgets. When the 
Council decides that an excessive deficit exists in a Member State, it firstly makes recommendations to the State 
concerned, with a view to rectifying the situation within a given period. If the Member State fails to comply with 
these recommendations, the Council may instruct it to take appropriate measures for reducing the deficit. If 
necessary, the Council has the option of imposing penalties or fines and of inviting the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) to reconsider its lending policy towards the Member State concerned.   
219 The EU uses two main factors to determined whether an enterprises falls into the category of  SME : the 
number of employees and the either the turnover or the balance sheet total; for the threshold see, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/sme-definition/index_en.htm 
220 Ales argues that the right to information could be seen as an individual right, in the sense that it should be 
unconditionally enjoyed by every employee (see, Ales supra, 13). Critical on this view, B Bercusson ’The 
European Social Model Comes to Britain’ (2002) ILJ 209-44. Csilla Kollonay Lehoczky argues that the 
limitation (or even exclusion) of small employers is justified on the grounds that the formal mechanisms of 
information and consultation would mean a disproportionate financial burden on SMEs, and that the attributes of 
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SMEs employ between half and two-thirds of the total working force of the EU, 221  yet 
institutionalised forms of employee involvement are not common in these companies. On the 
other hand, it would be difficult to argue that employees working for SMEs are not entitled to 
equal level of information compared to those working for large multinational corporations 
(MNC), or that they do not deserve to be consulted. While at small companies the more 
informal relationship between employees and employer makes it easier to exercise the right of 
information and consultation, the argument that establishing information and consultation 
processes at medium sized companies would put too much burden on employers have to be 
treated with caution. As it was demonstrated above, weaker involvement results in weaker 
protection level, leading to discrimination between employees based on the size of their 
employer.222 
The growing inequalities in incomes and the rising shares of populations at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion 223  demonstrate that austerity measures signify a roll-back of 
national social protection. Deregulation – rooted in the European Union’s liberal approach to 
social legislation and becoming a part of the European governance process – affected 
individual and collective labour law in all member states. Despite the restricted rights in the 
arena of collective labour law and strategies pursued by multinational companies to challenge 
employee representatives to coordinate their activities across borders, the different forms of 
employee involvement have demonstrated significant contributions in mitigating the negative 
effects of the crisis. Thus, it is time for the European Union to rewind its current practice and 
make regulations concerning information and consultation rights more coherent, enforceable 
and inclusive for SMEs. 
 
VII  Democracy, Freedom and Development 
 
In this section I summarise the common elements in the theories of Hugo Sinzheimer and 
Amartya Sen related to human dignity, democracy and participation. Though their 
background and respective eras of living are quite different – regarding the topic, the most 
important writings of Sinzheimer, a German lawyer and academic, pioneering in the field of 
labour law, were connected to the Weimar Republic and the creation of its Constitution,224 
whereas Sen, an economist who was brought up in the times of partition in India and has 
                                                                                                                                                   
small workplaces provides smooth access to information for employees without establishing special procedures 
(see, The Fundamental Right of Workers to Information and Consultation under the European Social Charter, in 
F Dorssement and T Blanke (eds), The Recast of the European Works Council Directive (Antwerp, 2009, 
Intersentia) 15).   
221 Eurostat 2014.   
222 For a detailed analyses on employee involvement at SMEs, see, A Wilkinson, T Dundon and I Grugulis 
(2007) ‘Information but not consultation: exploring employee involvement in SMEs’ 18 Int. J. of Human 
Resource Management 7. 
223 Eurostat 2014.   
224 Sinzheimer’s career was painfully abrupted in 1933, when he was forced to emigrate to the Netherlands. In 
1940 he was captured and taken to a concentration camp. After his release he was forced to retreat into hiding 
underneath a friend’s roof in the Netherlands. He died shortly after the liberation of the Netherlands in 19Őő.   
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spent most of his working life in USA, elaborated his ideas on development and freedom 
around the 1980-90s and was subsequently awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1998 – 
their work has, at least in my view, many points in common. Human dignity for Sinzheimer 
and human capabilities for Sen are special values which allow individuals freedom from 
subordination or deprivation and to live meaningful lives. To achieve such freedom both 
theorists emphasise the role of participation; in other words, involvement in decision-making 
on matters affecting one’s life. Participation is only possible in democratic surroundings and 
the state has an indispensable role to safeguard democratic settings.  
The significance of democracy appears central to the theories of both Sinzheimer and 
Sen. A further common element is the distinction between political, social and economic 
democracies. Sinzheimer compared economic democracy to political democracy and noted 
that they are similar in the sense that they both guarantee freedom to individuals vis-á-vis 
power (capital), and they both enable individuals to participate in the creation of a common 
will. 225  In Sinzheimer’s views, economic democracy has two complementary pillars: the 
autonomous regulation of the industrial actors (employers’ associations, trade unions, works 
councils) and the rights of workers to participate in the management of the economy.226 
In the workplace, this participation is crucial for employees to be freed from the 
unilateral and often exploitative will of employers. Sinzheimer argued that involvement in the 
formation of their economic conditions empowers employees with real freedom in their 
employment, which they otherwise cannot enjoy in the process of negotiating their individual 
contract due to the imbalance of power between the contracting parties. 227 On a Kantian 
recognition of human dignity,228 Sinzheimer argues that the democratization of the economic 
sphere is necessary for freeing employees from subordination in employment relations.229  
Sen, challenging the “Lee Thesis”,230 asks the question of what should be more urgent 
for policy makers: to eradicate poverty, or to guarantee democratic rights (for which poor 
people have little use anyway)? Sen’s answer to this question is very straightforward: 
economic development and liberty are interconnected. Separating them or prioritizing one 
over the other is entirely the wrong approach. Without freedom, including the opportunity to 
participate in decision-making on matters affecting the main areas of an individual’s life there 
is no economic development. Likewise, economic development fosters individual and social 
freedom.  
                                               
225 Hugo Sinzheimer, Das Wesen des Arbeitsrecht, in Arbeitsrecht und Rechtssoziologie: gesammelte Aufsätze 
und Reden (1976), quoted by Ruth Dukes ‘Constitutionalizing Employment Relations: Sinzheimer, Kahn-
Freund, and the role of Labour Law‘(2008) 3ő Journal of Law and Society 3, 346.   
226 Hugo Sinzheimer, Eine Theorie des Sozialen Rechts (1936) XIV Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, quoted by 
Ruth Dukes supra 347, see also Michel Coutu, With Hugo Sinzheimer and Max Weber in Mind: The Current 
Crisis and the Future of Labour Law, (2012-2013) 3Ő űomp. Lab. L& Pol’y J, 608.   
227 Dukes, supra 346.   
228 Kant has phrased the principle of human dignity in the archetypal maxim that what possesses dignity must not 
be treated purely as a mean but also as an end in itself; for more on Kant’s approach to human dignity see, O 
Höffe ‘Kant’s innate right as a rational criterion for Human Rights’ in L Denis (ed) Kant’s Metaphysics of 
morals: a critical guide (Cambridge, 2010, CUP), 71 ff.   
229 Dukes, supra 345.   
230 Sen argues against the ‘Lee Thesis’, named for President Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, which states that 
denying political and civil rights is acceptable if it promotes economic development and the general wealth of 
the population (Sen, 1999:15). He rightly insists that we should approach political freedoms and civil rights not 
through the means of eventually achieving them (GDP growth) but as a direct good in their own right. Freedom 
is also good because it creates growth. See, O'Hearn 'Amartya Sen's Development   
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While the interconnectedness of the different types of democracies is unquestioned by 
the authors, there is an important difference in their views: the role of economic 
democracy. 231  While Sinzheimer treats economic democracy as a supplement to political 
democracy, Sen argues that political liberty and civil freedoms are directly important on their 
own and no further justification is needed for their existence in terms of their positive effects 
on the economy.232 In his view, the loss of freedom in the absence of employment choice or in 
a tyrannical form of work can itself constitute a form of deprivation.233 Human capability 
stands centrally in Sen’s theory. It refers to the substantive freedom of people to lead lives 
which they have reason to value and to enhance the real choices they have.  
To explore further the connection points between participation, freedom and economic 
development, I look into details of the above theories regarding the role of state control and 
capital, and the value of individual freedom and human dignity for society. 
 
A The Role of Law  
 
As it was discussed above, according to Sinzheimer, an economic constitution 
(Wirtschaftsverfassung) could put labour in equal power position to capital (property) by 
enabling labour to make decisions together with property. However, for Sinzheimer the role 
of law was twofold: to facilitate the autonomous regulation of the economy and the workplace 
as one of its elements, and also to set limits on its processes. 234   Although Sinzheimer 
emphasized the importance of autonomous law,235 he argued that the economic field should 
not be entirely freed from state control and that the state should be allowed to create norms 
whenever it is necessary.236 State control would ensure the protection of workers from the 
‘untrammelled jurisdiction of the employer and even from the control of the worker 
himself.’237 Thus, in Sinzheimer views, labour law could serve as a tool to free workers from 
the abuses of employer power and thereby contribute to the democratization of the economy.  
Sen argues that the significance of democracy is in three distinct virtues, one of which 
is the constructive role of democracy in the sense that it creates values and norms. In his 
opinion it is crucial to safeguard the conditions and circumstances that contribute to the reach 
of economic processes.238  
                                               
231 A Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford, 1999, OUP), 3, 16. (n 13), 147.   
232 Sen (1999) 3, 16.   
233 Sen (1999), 113.   
234 M Coutu, With Hugo Sinzheimer and Max Weber in Mind: The Current Crisis and the Future of Labour Law, 
3Ő űomp. Lab. L.& Pol’y J. 60ő 2012-2013, 607.   
235 O Kahn-Freund, Hugo Sinzheimer, in Lewis and űlarke, quoted by Dukes supra 3Ő7; see also R Dukes ‘Hugo 
Sinzheimer and űonstitutional Function of Labour Law’ in G Davidov and Ű Langille (eds) ’ The Idea of Labour 
Law’ (Oxford, 2011, OUP).   
236 H Sinzheimer, Das Ratesystem (1919), quoted by Dukes supra 348.   
237 H Sinzheimer ‘The Development of Labour Legislation in Germany’ (1920) 92 Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Social and Industrial Conditions in the Germany of Today, 35.   
238 A Sen (1999) 158.   
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A shared point for both Sinzheimer and Sen is the important, yet not exclusive, role of 
material wealth; they both consider it as a means and not as a purpose of achieving individual 
or organizational goals. While on one hand, Sinzheimer acknowledged the importance of 
capital as the material basis of life, on the other hand he considered it as a means to serve 
humans. Therefore, he denied that capital provides the employers’ unlimited power over 
employees and argued that whereas the employers’ right to command workers at a workplace 
is inherent in the notion of capital, it is important to identify the limits of the power arising 
from private property. 239  Sen also recognizes the importance of GNP growth and the 
increment of one’s income as means to expanding individual freedom. However, he also 
emphasizes that other determinants, like social and economic arrangements, are also 
necessary for freedom, and that the removal of poverty, tyranny, poor economic opportunities 
and intolerance is inevitable for development. 
 
B Individuals and Society  
 
For Sinzheimer, employees constitute an important part of the society as a whole. In his work 
he points out that workers serve their employers directly, but the society indirectly; thus, the 
society owes an equivalent return for their services. The equivalent return is protection in the 
employment relationship. 240  For him, protecting individual employees is of essential 
importance with regard to the society, as the ‘working power of man is not only an individual 
but also a social asset.’241 In seeing development as freedom, Sen argues that the role of social 
support and public regulation also has to be considered. For Sen, it is important to recognize 
individual freedom as a social commitment, as he sees it, individual freedom quintessentially 
as a social product. He demonstrates the possible contributions of various societal institutions 
to improve and safeguard the substantive freedoms of individuals. And as a return to society, 
he argues, by exercising individual freedom, people contribute to development rather than 
being mere passive recipients of social benefits.242 
 
  
                                               
239 H Sinzheimer, Grundzuge des Arbeitsrechts (1927), quoted by R Dukes, Constitutionalizing Employment 
Relations: Sinzheimer, Kahn-Freund, and the Role of Labour Law (2008) 35 Journal of Law and Society 3, 346.  
240 H Sinzheimer, The Development of Labour Legislation in Germany,   
241 Ibid.   
242A Sen, (1999) xii, 31.   
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Chapter 3 
Employee Involvement as a Human Right Issue in 
Europe 
 
Robert Dahl argues that “people involved in [certain kind of human] association possess a 
right, an inalienable right to govern themselves in democratic process.”243 It is also argued 
that if democratic decision making is required in state level, then it is also justifiable at 
workplace level. The voice of workers is traditionally represented by trade unions.244 The 
right to be involved in issues related to the workplace gained recognition much later and its 
gradual and partial acknowledgement is still much dependent on political regimes. Even 
though it was already realized after the First World War that economic prosperity and social 
democracy cannot be achieved without the protection of the dignity of the workers 245 , 
employee involvement was only incorporated in human rights instruments in the late 1980s, 
and notably, only in European human rights instruments. 246  The controversy about the 
acknowledgement of labour rights as human rights is even more palpable regarding the right 
to be involved in decision making at the workplace. This chapter first analyses the paradox of 
labour rights as human rights in general, and then reviews the existing hard and soft law 
instruments concerning the right of employee involvement. 
 
I Human Rights Nature of Labour Rights 
 
Features of the globalized economy have several adverse effects on working conditions, 
economic standards and collective rights. The new trends also highlighted that working 
conditions and patterns of economic and social conditions are highly interdependent. Thus, 
need for better protection of the workers has emerged in the past decades. Even though 
workers’ rights are acknowledged as human rights and appear in all major human rights 
instruments, relatively little attention has been devoted to them compared to the forces of 
globalization.247  
                                               
243 Robert Dahl, Preface to Economic Democracy, University of California Press, 1985 
244 Alan Űogg and Tonia Novitz, ’Investigating Voice at Work’ (201-2012) 33 Comparative Labour Law and 
Policy Journal, 323. 
245 Hugo Sinzheimer, Grundzuge des Arbeitsrechts (1927). 
246 The three human rights instruments that provide for the right to involvement are the European Social Charter, 
the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers and the European Charter of Fundamental 
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It is argued that “advocates of human rights and labour rights ‘run on tracks that are 
sometimes parallel and rarely meet.”248 The paradox is rooted in the different purposes and 
personal scope of the legal fields. While human rights are primarily oriented toward limiting 
the power of the state, labour rights are predominantly aiming to limit the power of private 
actors in the market. Regarding human rights, the principal right-holders are individuals while 
labour rights are more collectively orientated. As oppose to human rights, which are universal 
and possessed by all human beings by virtue of their humanity, the entitlement in case of 
labour rights can be defined as the set of rights that humans possess by virtue of their status as 
workers.249 However, this status is rather fluid and the identity of the beneficiaries of labour 
rights is contested.  
 
A Collectives as Right-holders 
 
According to Alexy, normative questions can be divided into ethical and legal-doctrinal 
questions. The former one would address why individuals have rights and which right they 
have; the latter one would deal with the question whether a legal subject has particular rights 
within a legal system. 250  In the first case there is no doubt whether the legal system 
acknowledges a certain right, but whether the norm that stipulates it is applicable to a given 
individual. In the second case the existence of the right in question is also doubtful. 
Regarding Alexy’s fist preoccupation, the personal scope of the right to involvement 
requires a closer inspection. The beneficiaries of the participatory rights are the employees (in 
plural).  The human rights instruments providing for the right to involvement also stipulate 
that employees are those who are recognized as such under the national legislations or 
practices of the member states or contracting parties. In this regulatory technique there are 
two questions of interest. One is whether employee involvement is an individual or a 
collective right; the other one is whether the vague personal scope affects the level of 
protection the legal instruments could provide. 
The scope of right-holders forms an essential element of collective right theories.251 
Whereas the theories themselves vary greatly, it seems to be that a consensus is reached 
regarding the defining criteria for collective right: the ultimate interest that the right serves, 
and the nature of the right-holder.252 With other words, when a collective right is repelled, in 
any case it is the group, rather than any particular individual, who is wronged. 
On the other hand, it is a striking question whether the group of employees employed 
by an undertaking is the same in nature as other collectives subject to collective rights, for 
example trade union members? Trade unions are legal entities with representatives, they 
usually have a solid internal structure and registered membership. Thus, both the trade union 
                                               
248  V. A. Leary, The Paradox of Workers’ Rights as Human Rights, in Human Rights, Labor Rights and 
International Trade, L. A. Compa and S. F. Diamond (eds) (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 22. 
249 K Kolben ‘Labour Rights are Human Rights?’ (2010) ő0 Virginia Journal of International Law 2, ŐŐ9. 
250 Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, 111-15. 
251 See for example Hart, Mcűormick, Várady or Raz. 
252 Miodrag (2012), 119. 
61 
 
and its members could easily be identified as right holder. The collective of employees on the 
other hand is a part of the undertaking, it lacks internal structure as they position within the 
undertaking is defined by the unilateral decision of the employer; and the group has no 
influence on its membership either. Moreover, individuals could perform work in great many 
ways for an undertaking. Due to its diverse nature, even in state socialist legal theories, the 
idea that the collective of employees has a special legal nature could not find solid support.253  
Of course, not all collectives could be defined by regulated admissions or membership 
fees, such as ethnic minorities. On the other hand, the collective of employees is different 
from these groups; as oppose to ethnic minorities, it is unlikely that the membership plays a 
constitutive role in the members’ life in terms of adopted values and life perspectives.254 Also, 
while social recognition is necessary for the membership of these groups,255 it is not required 
for employees, as their ‘membership card’ is provided by the contract based on which they 
perform work for the employer. Another striking difference is that while the cessation of the 
‘membership’ in collectives pretty much depends on the decision of the right-holder, 
employment could be terminated by the unilateral (and often arbitrary) decision of the 
employer.  
 
B Employee Involvement as a Human Right 
 
Regarding the latter presumption of Alexy, the human right nature of employee involvement 
has long been questioned. The ‘older brother’ of participatory rights, the right to bargain 
collectively gained recognition in a much less contested way and now is acknowledged by 
most major human rights instruments. 256  To the contrary, employee involvement first 
appeared in 1988 in the Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter.257 A year later, 
the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers also incorporated it,258 and 
subsequently it appeared in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Union. However, 
the right to involvement does not appear in human rights instruments outside of the aegis of 
Europe. The low recognition could raise concerns whether the right to involvement is a fully 
fledged human right, however, both the European Social Charter and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU are indispensable human rights instruments of the European 
region and their importance is unquestioned.  
The European Social Charter is a human right convention of the Council of Europe, 
which establish a wide range of economic and social rights that are crucial for human dignity. 
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Due to its wide geographic coverage, its role is indispensable in promoting human rights 
across the European continent. The CFREU addresses issues which form the core of labour 
law and industrial relations in Europe: freedom of association (Article 12), right of collective 
bargaining and collective action (Article 28), workers’ right to information and consultation 
within the undertaking (Article 27), freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in 
work (Article 15), prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work (Article 
32), fair and just working conditions (Article 31), non-discrimination (Article 21), equality 
between men and women (Article 23), protection in the event of unjustified dismissal (Article 
30). Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 the CFREU has the same 
legal value as the European Union treaties. Thus, inclusion of the right to information and 
consultation in this instrument signifies the stance of employee involvement as a fundamental 
human right. However, the question whether it is an individual or a collective right has to be 
addressed. 
 The right holders regarding employee involvement needs attention. Article 27 of 
űFREU states that “workers or their representatives” must be informed and consulted. Thus, 
where no representative could be found on an appropriate level, then workers, either 
individually or as a group, have to directly informed or consulted. Neither the right to be 
represented, nor the duty to establish a standing body can be found in Article 27.  That means 
the right to information and consultation is vested in individuals, who, when the 
circumstances require so, could form a representative body for themselves. However, the 
possibility to elect a standing consultative body does not affect the individual nature of 
employee involvement as a human right. Thus, the right to information and consultation 
should be unconditionally enjoyed by every employee, with a possibility to exercise it with 
the assistance of a competent and standing representative body.  
The right to information and consultation is special from another aspect as well. 
Whereas information and consultation is a right must be guaranteed to employees, in fact, as 
Ales points it out, it rather represents a duty for an employer to provide this right. Thus, as the 
very core of the right, it requires an employer to be active in delivering information and 
consultation.259 
 
II Employee Involvement in the International Labour 
Organization Norms 
 
The term ‘workers’ participation’ as used by the ILO could be seen participation in decision-
making at the enterprise level. The Philadelphia Declaration (now an Annex to the 
űonstitution of the ILO) calls on the ILO to draw up programs to promote ‘the cooperation of 
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management and labour in the continuous improvement of productive efficiency’. 260  To 
implement this call, the ILO has created series of general principles. However, no convention 
has been adopted on information-consultation; thus, the Organisation uses soft law 
instruments. The normative framework of the ILO on information and consultation contains 
recommendations and declarations – measures which do not have the binding force of the 
conventions and are not subject to state ratification.  
 
A Recommendations 
 
The ILO addressed the issue of information and consultation in numerous recommendations. 
Recommendation Number 94 (1952) on Cooperation at the Level of the Undertaking indicates 
that it is necessary to promote the consultation and collaboration between employers and 
workers at company level for issues of common interest which are not covered by collective 
bargaining or which are not normally the subject of other procedures which establish working 
conditions. Recommendation Number 113 (1960) on Consultation (Industrial and National 
Levels recommends appropriate measures for efficient consultation and collaboration to 
promote a mutual understanding and good relations, to develop the economy, to improve 
working conditions and to raise the standards of living. Recommendation Number 143 (1971) 
on the Workers’ Representatives affirms the need of a consultation, before the dismissal of a 
workers’ representative becomes final. 261  Recommendation Number 129 on the 
Communications within the Undertaking (1967) is even more explicit on the rights and 
obligations of social partners concerned by the restructuring and the rules which are supposed 
to guide the information-consultation process. It indicates the necessity of ensuring a climate 
of comprehension and reciprocal trust at company level, as well as the importance of timely 
communication and consultation.262 The recommendation also lists a whole series of themes 
to be included in information-consultation process at company level, and especially 
concerning working conditions (like hire, transfer or termination). The overall situation of the 
company and the explanation of decisions which directly or indirectly affect the situation of 
the personnel are also addressed by the document. 
The question of information-consultation is better clarified in one of the chapters of 
Convention Number 158 (1982) (accompanied by Recommendation No 166) on 
redundancies. This document deals specifically with the matter of economic, technological, 
structural or similar redundancies. In the event of such cases, the recommendation specifies 
that the employer should provide the concerned workers’ representatives, in good time, with 
all relevant information, including the reasons behind the envisaged redundancies, the number 
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and the categories of workers likely to be affected and the period over which these are 
expected to be implemented, in order to limit the negative effects of the action. 
 
B Declarations 
 
Declarations are resolutions of the International Labour Conference used to make formal and 
authoritative statements. Although declarations are not subject to ratification, they are 
intended to have a wide application and contain symbolic and political undertakings by the 
member States. 
Adopted in 1998, the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
is a commitment by governments, employers' and workers' organizations to uphold basic 
human values. The Declaration covers four fundamental principles and rights at work, one of 
which is freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining. 263  The Declaration and its Follow-up provides three ways to help countries, 
employers and workers achieve full realisation of the Declaration’s objective. Firstly, there is 
an Annual Review composed of reports from countries that have not yet ratified one or more 
of the ILO Conventions that directly relate to the specific principles and rights stated in the 
Declaration. This reporting process provides governments with an opportunity to state what 
measures they have taken towards achieving respect for the Declaration. It also gives 
organizations of employers and workers a chance to express their views on the progress made. 
Secondly, each year a Global Report provides a dynamic and objective worldwide picture on 
the current situation of the principles and rights expressed in the Declaration. It serves as a 
basis for determining priorities for technical cooperation. Technical cooperation projects are 
designed to address identifiable needs in relation to the Declaration and to strengthen local 
capacities thereby translating principles into practice. 
The Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy (MNE Declaration)264 offers guidelines to MNEs, governments, as well as to 
employers' and workers' organizations in areas of employment, training, conditions of work 
and life, and industrial relations. Its provisions are reinforced by certain ILO Conventions and 
Recommendations which the social partners are urged to bear in mind and apply, to the 
greatest extent possible. The MNE Declaration provides for no specific ways of monitoring. 
Even though ILO regularly collects data to monitor and analyse changes in actual working 
conditions and the laws which regulate them, such activity mostly contributes to identifying 
the gaps between law and actual conditions. It is a tool used to assist ILO in developing more 
effective policy responses. However, it does not aim to serve as an instrument to monitor the 
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actual employers’ activity or support workers or workers’ group with their individual 
complaints against the employer who fails to adhere to the instrument. 
C Summary 
 
Regarding the binding force of these measures it shall be noted that recommendations and 
declarations, do not have the binding force of the conventions and they are not subject to state 
ratification. Declarations and resolutions of the International Labour Conference used to make 
formal and authoritative statements. Although declarations are not subject to ratification, they 
are intended to have a wide application and contain symbolic and political undertakings. 
However, none of them are capable of promoting employee involvement as an enforceable 
right. Despite the fact that the regulators are well respected supranational non-state actors, 
these soft law measures have no binding force, monitoring, or adjudication in the background, 
thus, these measures are not suitable to provide uniform protection to the right to information 
and consultation. 
 It is interesting to note that while the ILO did not adopt a convention on information 
and consultation within the undertaking, the revision of such standard setting has been 
reoccurring. In 2011 the Governing Body of ILO stated on its 312th session that in order to 
meet the challenges of globalization and rapidly changing markets, business are increasingly 
seek for adjustments at workplace which could accelerate their competitiveness.265 According 
to the Governing Body it would be essential to provide standards meeting the new needs 
regarding social dialogue, thus, it is recommended to revisit ILO related recommendations, 
including Recommendation No. 129 on Communication within the Undertaking. It was 
suggested that the 2014 would be dealing with the matter; however, it was eventually not 
included in the agenda. 
 
III The European Social Charter 
 
The European Social Charter (ESC) is a human right convention of the Council of Europe, 
which establishes a wide range of economic and social rights that are indispensable for human 
dignity. Article 21 of ESC provides for the right to information and consultation, and Article 
22 specifies the right to participation in determining working conditions. 
The 1961 original text of European Social Charter did not contain regulations 
regarding employees’ right to information and consultation. In 1988 the Additional Protocol 
however enlarged the scope rationae materiae of the Charter and added four new articles, 
among which the right to informed and consulted and the right to participation in determining 
of working conditions were incorporated. The personal scope of the Additional Protocol was 
                                               
265 See, GB.312/INS/2/, 6 ff. 
66 
 
exactly the same as the European Social Charter of 1961. The Revised European Social 
Charter of 1996 addressed a specific involvement issue, the right to information and 
consultation in the case of collective redundancies. The right to consultation is stipulated by 
Articles 6, 21, 26 and 29, while the right of co-determination is set forth by Article 22. 
The following section will examine first the unspecified involvement rights of Article 
21 and 22, and then the concrete involvement issue of Article 29 of the Revised European 
Social Charter. 
 
A Unspecified Involvement Rights 
 
The European Social Charter is a human right convention of the Council of Europe, which 
establishes a wide range of economic and social rights that are indispensable for human 
dignity. Due to the wide geographic coverage,266 its role is indispensable in promoting human 
rights across the European continent.  
Reflecting the substantive as well as the time-phase difference between the freedom to 
bargain collectively (guaranteed by Article 6)267 on the one hand and the fundamental right to 
be involved in managerial decisions on the other, the latter was added later and now is 
regulated by Articles 21, 22 and 29 of the Revised Charter. Article 21 and 22 are in general on 
involvement while article 29 guarantees the right to information and consultation in the 
specific situation of collective redundancies.268 
Article 21 provides for the right to information and consultation on the situation of the 
enterprise and on planned decisions with a potential impact to the employment situation. In 
order to make involvement meaningful, employees or their representatives have to be 
consulted in a good time on the proposed decisions269.  
Article 22 is not on the company situation, it is on working conditions and gives more: 
it provides for the right to “take part” in the determination and improvement of working 
conditions. Taking part in the protection of health and safety, in organizing social and cultural 
services as well as in the supervision of observation of all these is expressly mentioned. “Part-
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taking” in these activities evidently must mean more than mere information and consultation; 
however, “co-determination” is not required by the űharter. 
Some of the features of Articles 21 and 22 are common, such as the legal framework 
and the personal scope.270 Regarding the legal framework, under both articles the Contracting 
Parties undertake to promote the right to information and consultation by adopting or 
encouraging provisions that enables the involvement of the workers or their representatives in 
accordance with their national legislation and practice. The Explanatory Rules specify that 
these measures should be effective and adequate.271 Neither Article 21 nor 22 requires the 
Contracting Parties to establish co-determination rights for the employees, even though the 
meaning of the expression of ‘the right to take part’ used for Article 22 is less elaborated. The 
notion suggests that under Article 22 a more active role should be given to employees’ 
representatives with the aim of being engaged in a dialogue with the employer.   
With regard to the personal scope, both Articles are applicable for undertakings 
operating for gain, therefore public servants and employees of public bodies are excluded 
from their scopes. The Charter enables the Contracting Parties to further exclude employees 
working for spiritual or ideological undertakings as well as for small-sized employers. In case 
of the exemption of small undertakings it is argued that the specific personal and material 
resources that are required to fulfil the provisions of information and consultation would mean 
a disproportionate burden for small enterprises. The Explanatory Report also provides an 
explanation of the notion of workers or their representatives, applicable for both Articles 21 
and 22.272 According to this specification, the right to information and consultation could be 
exercised either by trade union representatives or representatives freely elected or otherwise 
chosen by the employees of the given enterprise. There is no restriction on overlapping 
functions of employee representatives; they could be at the same time trade union officers too. 
While respecting the importance of autonomous regulations, the Committee repeatedly 
emphasises that the right to information and consultation ought not to be restricted only to 
workers who are covered by collective agreements. 
 
i The Right to Information and Consultation (Article 21) 
 
The European Social Charter renders Contracting Parties to adopt or encourage measures 
enabling workers to have access to certain information about their employer as well as to be 
consulted on matters related to their employment. Article 21 first specifies the right protected 
then allows the exclusion of certain enterprises from the scope of the provision. Under 
Paragraph 1 it is provided for that workers or their representatives, in accordance with the 
Contracting Parties national legislation or practice, have the right to be informed regularly or 
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at appropriate time and in a comprehensive way about the economic and financial situation of 
the undertaking employing them.273 Also, they have the right to be consulted in a good time 
on proposed decisions which could substantially affect their interest, particularly on those 
decisions which could have an important impact on their employment situation in the 
undertaking.274 
It is important to see the difference between the provisions of sub-paragraphs a) and b) 
of Paragraph 1. Whereas sub-paragraph a) only provides for the mere (passive) right to 
receive the necessary information specified; sub-paragraph b. provides for the bilateral, 
therefore active process of consultation.  Paragraph 1 also provides for special restrictions 
regarding confidential information stating that certain information which could be prejudicial 
to the undertaking may not be disclosed or subject to confidentiality.275 Paragraph 2 of the 
Additional Protocol enabled Contracting Parties to exclude employers employing less than a 
certain number of employees from the scope of Paragraph 1 by national legislation or 
practice. This Paragraph was not incorporated to the body text of the Revised Charter, 
however, the Appendix upholds this possibility.276 
The Appendix to the Charter277 defines the term workers representatives as persons 
who are recognized as such under national legislation or practice. National legislation or 
practice has to be understood as the case may be, in addition to laws and regulations, 
collective agreements, other agreements between employers and workers’ representatives, 
customs, as well as the relevant case law. An undertaking is defined as a set of tangible and 
intangible components, with or without legal personality, formed to produce or provide 
services for financial gain, and with power to determine its own market policy. 
 
a Case-law on Employee Threshold 
 
The Additional Protocol only entered into force in 1992, thus relevant case-law is not overly 
extensive. Article 7 of the Additional Protocol has already provided for that the requirements 
of Article 2 of the Additional Protocol are satisfied if great majority (80 per cent) of the 
workers is protected under its provisions. However, workers excluded in accordance with 
Paragraph 2 of Article 2 were not taken into account in establishing the threshold for workers 
concerned. This means that Article 2 of the Additional Protocol was only applicable to 
undertakings that pursuit financial gain. The ‘great majority’ rule has been upheld by Revised 
Charter with regard to both Articles 21 and 22. 
Conformity to Article 21 was first examined in Cycle XIII-3.278 In its conclusions the 
European Committee of Social Rights 279  (hereinafter the Committee) stated that only 
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employees in the public sector are in principle exempted from the provisions of Article 21, 
and in the public sector it is only applicable to workers, who are employed by publicly-owned 
enterprises. The most important aspect examined by the Committee has been whether the 
great majority of the workers are covered and benefited from the right to information and 
consultation. Other questions posed to Contracting Parties have included whether consultation 
covers all areas that Article 21 provided for, and whether workers or their representatives 
have the right to appeal in cases when the provisions of the article were breached. 
Since 2007 the Committee while deciding on the conformity with Article 21 of the 
Charter has been referring to the minimum framework of Directive 2002/14/EC and to the 
seminal CGT judgment of the European Court of Justice.280 Directive 2002/14/EC applies 
according to the choice made by Member States, to undertakings with at least 50 employees 
or establishments with at least 20 employees in any one EU Member State. Furthermore, 
when assessing compliance with Article 21,281 the Committee considers in accordance with 
the CGT-case that all categories of employee regardless of their status, length of service or 
workplace must be taken into account when calculating the number of employees covered by 
the right to information and consultation. 
Italy has been in non-conformity with the Charter regarding Article 21 since the XIV-
2 revision cycle.282 The Committee has been repeatedly asked for more information on the 
structures, procedures and arrangements of information and consultation processes and the 
nature of information given to workers.283 Italy’s report submitted for the XIX-3 revision 
Cycle stated that the rules and procedures for appointing and electing trade union 
representatives applicable to employees on permanent contracts also apply to those on fixed-
term contracts, as long as the contract is for more than nine months. The Committee 
considered that the information given in the report on the proportion of employees entitled to 
be informed and consulted within their enterprise is not satisfactory. It therefore came to the 
conclusion that Italy is still not in conformity with the Revised Charter.  
Regarding Croatia, in revision cycle XIX-3 284  the Committee asked questions in 
general on the scope of űroatia’s legislation, and in particular on the calculation of these 
minimum thresholds. In its previous conclusion the Committee had asked for the estimated 
proportion of the labour force which enjoys the right to information and 
consultation. However, the report submitted to answer that question contained no information 
as to the question posed. Thus the Committee reiterated its question.285 In its Conclusions, the 
Committee stated that the situation in Croatia is not in conformity with Article 21 on the 
ground that it has not been established that legal provisions governing the information and 
consultation of workers cover all categories of workers and all undertakings.286 
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With regard to Greece, the űommittee concluded that the country’s report fails to 
provide information regarding the proportion of workers out of the total workforce covered; 
the Committee therefore reiterated its question. The report described the role and functioning 
of the works council (Council of the Employees) and stated that the works council 
responsibilities regarding information and consultation of workers are exercised only if there 
is no trade union functioning in the enterprise and these issues were not subject of a collective 
labour agreement. In its previous conclusion the Committee held that trade unions thus had a 
monopoly on representing workers for the purpose of information and consultation. 
According to the Committee, it had the possibility that a works council representing 
a majority of non-unionised employees would be deprived of the right to be informed and 
consulted, while this right would be granted to a trade union representing only a minority of 
employees. The Committee further pointed out that despite the existence of legislation on 
works councils since 1988, very few works councils have actually been established in 
practice.287 
Norway’s case is quite particular. In Norway the right to information and consultation 
is mainly governed by collective agreements. In the private sector this right is embodied, inter 
alia, in the national collective agreement between the confederation of Norwegian business 
and industry (NHO) and the Norwegian trade union confederation (LO). In firms, this right is 
primarily vested in locally elected trade union representatives (shop stewards) but also in 
bipartite works councils, which must be established in enterprises with more than 100 
employees. Works councils may also be established in smaller enterprises. Besides that, there 
are several basic private sector agreements that were very similar to the one between the NHO 
and the LO. The 2005 amend of the Work Environment Act also includes provisions similar 
to the LO-NHO "basic agreement" regarding employees' right to information and consultation 
within the enterprise. Other branch legislation includes specific provisions on this subject, 
such as the Joint Stock Company Act, which applies to all companies with more than 30 
employees. The 2005 act requires employers to inform and consult employee representatives 
in enterprises with more than 50 employees. In 2004, around 250 000 workers in total were 
officially covered by a collective agreement. There were also approximately 600 collective 
agreements in the private sector at the same period. All workers, even if they are non-union 
members, can be covered by a collective agreement. This applies to workers at enterprises 
bound by a collective agreement. Based on case-law and agreement practice these enterprises 
are obliged to apply the agreement on unorganized employees in the enterprise comprised by 
the scope of the agreement. In addition, according to a survey conducted by Statistic Norway 
from 2004, 77 per cent states that they are covered by a collective agreement, including the 
non-union workers. The current report states that during the reference period, approximately 
52 per cent of all workers in the private sector who are not covered by the LO-NHO "basic 
agreement" were though covered by a collective agreement. In total, 70 per cent of all 
workers in Norway were officially covered by a collective agreement during the same period, 
which means that despite the fact that social dialogue is quite advanced in Norway, the 
coverage still does not meet the ‘great majority’ requirement. 
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b Case-law on Enforcement 
 
The Committee asks the Contracting Parties what sort of remedies workers or workers’ 
representatives has when their right to information and consultation under Article 21 of the 
Revised Charter has been infringed, particularly with regard to information considered by 
employers to be confidential. Enforcement methods usually contain the right to apply, either 
to court or arbitration, imposition of fines. The amount of the penalty is rather diverse, 
ranging from EUR 6.5288 to EUR 50000.289 
In rare cases national regulations provide for the nullity of the employer’s decision 
violating the information and consultation processes. For example in Croatia a decision 
rendered by the employer contrary to the provisions of the Croatian Labour Code on 
consultations with the works council is null and void.  
In case of Greece, with a decision of the Minister of Employment and Social 
Insurance, it is possible, after a justified proposal of the competent Labour Inspector, to 
impose on the employer a temporary pause of the operation for a time interval longer than 
three days or even a permanent pause of the operation of the particular productive procedure 
or of the department, or of the whole of the enterprise or undertaking. 
In Moldova’s case, the űommittee found that the situation in Moldova is not in 
conformity with Article 21 of the Revised Charter on the ground that it has not been 
established that sanctions are applicable in case employers fail to fulfil their obligation to 
inform and consult workers within the undertaking. 
 
ii The Right to Take Part in Determination of the Working Conditions and 
Working Environment (Article 22) 
 
Article 22 has similar structure to Article 21. First it lists the areas in which participation has 
to take place, and then provides for the exclusion of certain undertakings. Under Paragraph 1 
Contracting Parties undertake to adopt or encourage measures enabling workers or their 
representatives, in accordance with national legislation or practices to contribute to the 
determination and the improvement of the working conditions, work organization and 
working environment; to the protection of health and safety within the undertaking; to the 
organization of social and socio-cultural services and facilities within the undertaking and to 
the supervision of the observance of regulations on the above measures.  For example the 
Committee underlined in this context that the workers’ right to take part in the determination 
and improvement of the working conditions and working environment implies that workers 
                                               
288 Estonia 
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may contribute, to a certain extent, to the employer’s decision making process.290 Paragraph 2 
allows Contracting Parties to exclude undertaking under a certain size regarding the number 
of employees. Appendix 3 clarifies the term social and socio-cultural services and facilities 
stating that it refers to facilities for workers provided by some undertakings such as welfare 
assistance, sports fields, rooms for nursing mothers, libraries, children’s holiday camps and 
the like. Appendix 3 also sets it clear that Article 22 does not affect either the powers and 
obligations of the Contracting Parties regarding the adoption of health and safety regulations 
for work places, or the powers and responsibilities of the respective monitoring bodies. 
 A major difference between Articles 21 and 22 is that Article 22 applies to all 
undertakings, whether private or public.291 The Committee in case of Croatia repeatedly asked 
how employee participation in the determination and improvement of working conditions and 
working environment takes place in undertakings of the public sector. Regarding working 
conditions, work organisation and working environment, the Committee regularly asks 
information on employee representation on company board too.  
 
a Case-law on the Relation to Collective Bargaining 
 
The most recent case-law related to Article 22 was related to the compliant of General 
Federation of employees of the National Electric Power Corporation (GENOP-DEI) and 
űonfederation of Greek űivil Servants’ Trade Unions (ADEDY) against Greece.292 GENOP-
DEI and ADEDY challenged that the situation in Greece is not in conformity with Article 22 
Para 1a on the grounds that Greek law293 made it possible for a collective agreement at 
enterprise level to derogate from the provisions on remuneration and working conditions set 
out in a collective agreement concluded at branch level. It was argued that such regulation 
may encourage the systematic deterioration of working conditions, which is in breach of 
Article 22 Para 1a. The Committee of Ministers in their Resolution294 concluded on non-
application of Article 22 Para 1a.295 The conclusions on collective bargaining of the report on 
the high-level mission to Greece296 of the International Labour Organization (ILO) have been 
taken into account. However, it came to the conclusion that Article 22 in general and, in 
particular, paragraph 1a, does not concern the right to collective bargaining. 
 
  
                                               
290 Conclusions for Armenia, XIX-3. 
291 Revision cycle XIX-3, document ID 2010/def/HRV 
292 Complaint No. 65/2011. 
293 Section 13 of Act No. 3899 of 17 December 2010. 
294 Resolution CM/ResChS(2013)2. 
295 By 14 votes to 1. 
296 Athens, 19-23 September 2011 
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B Specific Rights for Information and Consultation 
 
While Articles 21 and 22 provide for information and consultation right in general, Article 29 
of the Revised Charter guarantees the right for all employees to be informed and consulted in 
collective redundancy processes. In this regard, information and consultation need to cover 
the ways and means of avoiding collective redundancies or limiting their occurrence and 
means of mitigating its negative effects. 297  The Contracting Parties could introduce 
accompanying social measures aiming to redeployment or retraining redundant workers to 
meet the requirement set forth by Article 29. 
 Though, according to the Explanatory Report the relevant EU Directives were 
examined in the drafting process, the term of collective redundancy is not specified by the 
Charter.298 The Committee during the first conclusion cycle concerning Article 29 interpreted 
collective redundancy as a layoff affecting several workers within a period of set by the law 
and decided for reasons which have no relevance to the workers as individuals, but are related 
to a reduction or change in the operation of the undertaking.299 
 Unlike for Articles 21 and 22, the purpose of the consultation is provided for by 
Article 29. Also, it is required that sufficient dialogue should take place between the employer 
and the employees or their representatives with regard to the redundancy as well as to the 
mitigation of its effects. Thus, it is necessary for the employer to provide adequate 
preliminary information, including the reasons for redundancy, planned social measures, the 
order in which the redundancies will be made, the criteria for being made redundant. If such 
process is not taking place, the Committee concludes on the non-conformity. 300  This 
requirement also sheds light on the importance of the timing of the consultation. However, 
what qualifies as a ‘good time’ varies greatly among űontracting Parties from seven days to 
three months.301 Also, public authorities have to be involved in the procedures, however their 
role – whether it is the mere information on the redundancies or involvement in the 
negotiations – is undefined. 
 
IV  Human Rights Instruments of the European Union 
 
It has been long argued that the Europeanization of industrial relations plays an indispensable 
role in the strengthening and the further development of the social dimension of the European 
integration. As a part of the integration process, first the Community Charter of the 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (CCFSR) and subsequently the Charter of 
                                               
297 Also in the Explanatory Report, footnote 79. 
298 Explanatory Report, Para 109. 
299 Conclusions 2003 and 2005, Statement of Interpretation on Art 29. 
300 For example Moldova (Conclusions 2010) or Sweden (Conclusions 2007). 
301 Conclusions 2003. 
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Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) recognized the rights of workers to 
information and consultation. The approach of Articles 17 and 18 of CCFSR demonstrates the 
early regulatory techniques of the EU in the social field: specifying the issues in which 
workers are entitled to be informed and consulted, such as major technological changes, 
restructuring, collective redundancies. 302  CFREU demonstrates the shift away from this 
approach by referring to Community law and national laws and practices. 303  The new 
regulatory technique reflects better the very different legal, social and labour relations 
backgrounds of the Member States. Thus the paradigm shift indeed helped the EU to make a 
move and to push through long-standing proposals. The following section first provides an 
overview on the regulations of CCFSR, and then analysis the progress, or sometimes the 
retreat, the CFREU has achieved in the promotion of the right to information and consultation 
as a human right. 
 
A The Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of 
Workers 
 
The Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers was adopted in 1989 
by all Member States except the United Kingdom. The Charter was seen as a political 
instrument containing "moral obligations" aiming to guarantee certain social rights in the 
countries concerned. The primarily scope of the Community Charter concerned the labour 
market, vocational training, social protection, equal opportunities and health and safety at 
work. The Charter was followed up by action programmes and specific legislative proposals. 
The CCFSR could be seen as the precursor of the Charter of Fundamental Rights regarding 
employee participation. 
Article 17 of CCFSR stipulated that information, consultation and participation for 
workers must be developed along appropriate lines, taking account of the practices in force in 
the various Member States. Article 17 underlined the transnational character of the 
involvement processes, stating that they had to apply especially in companies or groups of 
companies having establishments or companies in several Member States of the European 
Community. Article 18 prescribed that these processes must be implemented in due time, and 
listed specific cases which had to be treated with scrutiny, such as technological changes 
which, from the point of view of working conditions and work organisation, have major 
implications for the work force are introduced into undertakings; restructuring operations in 
undertakings or in cases of mergers having an impact on the employment of workers; 
collective redundancy procedures; and finally, again in connection with the transnational 
importance of information and consultation, in situations when trans-frontier workers in 
                                               
302 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (1989), Arts. 17-18. 
303 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01) Art. 27. 
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particular are affected by employment policies pursued by the undertaking where they are 
employed.   
The Community Charter of 1989 only had declaratory status, however it is claimed 
that it had three effects which was expected to emerge for the EU Charter. 304  First, the 
Member States’ stronger attachment to fundamental social rights as defined in the 1989 
Community Charter, which appears in Article 151 of the TFEU (ex Article 136 of the TEC). 
Secondly, the űommission’s Social Action Programme was directly linked to the declarations 
of the Community Charter. Finally, CFREU was expected to be used by the European Court 
of Justice as an interpretative guide in litigation concerning social rights. 
Despite the high hopes attached to the CCFRS, the social policy dimension had not 
become a priority for the reform agenda, 305  which, as it was argued, endangered the 
enlargement of the EU and undermined institutional reforms. Therefore, the adoption of the 
CFREU had great importance regarding the social dimension of the EU, as fundamental 
labour and social standards are determined by the economic and political context which forms 
their content. Social and labour rights could be developed only when they find a place on the 
űommunity’s integration agenda. Thus, the inclusion of social and economic rights related to 
working life into the CFREU confirms that these are to be considered fundamental to the EU 
social model, what it means to be an EU citizen. 306 
 
B The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
 
The Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (CCFSR) had already 
stipulated that information, consultation and participation for workers must be developed 
alongside appropriate lines, taking account of the practices in force in the various Member 
States. These provisions can be considered a precursor of Article 27 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the Charter of the European Union (CFREU) The continuing 
significance of the institution is illustrated by the structure of űFREU: workers’ right to 
information and consultation appears in the “Solidarity” chapter, preceding Article 28, on the 
“classic” right of collective bargaining and collective action. 307   The implication of this 
chapter is that the traditional individual and liberal rights, and the social rights, which create 
networks of solidarity among the citizens of the EU have fundamental importance for the 
European Union.  Thus the right to information and consultation is a fundamental right in the 
context of the EU, and Article 27’s reference to national laws and practices implies that the 
                                               
304 Ű. Űercusson (ed) ‘European labour law and the EU űharter of Fundamental Rights’ (Űrussels, 2002, ETUI) 
14. 
305 See, ICG 2000. 
306 Bercusson, supra, 27. 
307 While the literature is evidently more addressing Article 28, this might be considered evident in the light of 
the “contemporary” Laval and Viking decisions (see, ű-341/05 Laval un Partneri [2007] ECR I-11767 and C-
438/05 The International Transport Workers’ Federation and The Finnish Seamen’s Union [2007] EűR I-  
10779), however, the importance of the Article 27 rights is not-questioned. For a more detailed analysis see 
Silvana Sciarra ‘Viking and Laval: Collective Labour Rights and Market Freedom in the Enlarged EU’ (2007-
08) 10 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 563 ff.  
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Member States are obliged to maintain at least the mandatory standards of information and 
consultation provided by statutory law or by collective agreements. 
Article 27 provides that “workers or their representatives must, at the appropriate 
levels, be guaranteed information and consultation in good time in the cases and under the 
conditions provided for by űommunity law and national laws and practices.”  
On one hand, it is apparent from the phrasing of Article 27 that the employer has the 
obligation to inform and consult either the worker directly, or the worker’s representatives. 
Providing direct information and consultation to individual workers could be considered an 
‘appropriate level’ only in very small companies or establishments. Also, restricting the right 
for workers or their representatives to a right only for the individual workers would contradict 
the guarantee of the freedom of association in Article 12 of CFREU.  On the other hand, the 
view that the guarantee of information and consultation to workers’ representatives applies 
only to works councils and not to trade union representatives is also contested, as not all 
Member States of the EU operate a so-called “dual-channel” system, which distinguishes 
between representatives elected by the workforce in the establishment and trade union 
representatives. Thus, interpretation suggests that workers’ representatives shall include trade 
union representatives together with works councils.  
The aim of Article 27 is to protect the interests of the individual worker against the 
dominant position of the employer in situations in which those interests could be substantially 
affected. Apart from the need to protect workers in extraordinary situations, such as collective 
redundancies and transfers of undertakings, Article 27 also reflects the difficulties associated 
with globalization of the economy and the increased importance of transnational companies 
and mergers of undertakings. Such trends could effectively weaken national traditions of 
workers’ involvement in the decision-making process. 
The CFREU addresses issues which form the core of labour law and industrial 
relations in Europe: freedom of association (Article 12), right of collective bargaining and 
collective action (Article 28), workers’ right to information and consultation within the 
undertaking (Article 27), freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work 
(Article 15), prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work (Article 32), 
fair and just working conditions (Article 31), non-discrimination (Article 21), equality 
between men and women (Article 23), protection in the event of unjustified dismissal (Article 
30). Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 the CFREU has the same 
legal value as the European Union treaties. Therefore inclusion of the right to information and 
consultation has great significance for employees of the Member States. 
Workers’ right to information and consultation appears right as the first article in the 
Solidarity chapter of CFREU. The implication of this Chapter is that the traditional individual 
and liberal rights and social rights creating networks of solidarity among the citizens of the 
EU have equal importance for the European Union. Thus the right to information and 
consultation is an elementary right in the context of the EU, and Article 27’s reference to the 
national laws and practices implies that the Member States are obliged to maintain at least the 
mandatory standards of information and consultation provided by statutory law or by 
collective agreements. 
Article 27 provides that workers or their representatives must, at the appropriate 
levels, be guaranteed information and consultation in good time in the cases and under the 
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conditions provided for by Community law and national laws and practices. This provision is 
rooted in already existing sources in EC law, such as Directives 98/59/EC (collective 
redundancies), 77/187/EC (transfers of undertakings) and 94/45/EC (European works 
councils).308 It is noteworthy that this approach of induction used by the EU was just the 
opposite that of the űouncil of Europe’s deductive method, whereas the general obligations of 
information and consultation appeared first, followed by specificities of collective 
redundancies. 
The previous wordings of the Article reveal the quest for the common denominator 
during the legislative process. The scope of information and consultation is confined to 
“matters which concern them within the undertaking” was deleted in the final text, thus 
potentially increased the scope of information and consultation to include matters beyond the 
undertaking. Thomas Űlanke considers the reference to ‘workers or their representatives’ to 
be a major regression from the earlier formulation of ‘workers and their representatives’. He 
also argues that the new wording contradicts the Community acquis in other directives.309 
Earlier references of Article 27 to ‘all levels’ were replaced by the requirement to apply “at 
the appropriate levels” which could also be considered as step back compared to the initial 
intention of the legislator.  On the other hand, the phrasing ‘information and consultation in 
good time’ was inserted at a later stage, suggesting that the information must be given and the 
consultation procedure must occur prior to the final decision of the management. 
It is apparent from the phrasing of Article 27 that the employer has an obligation to 
inform and consult either workers directly or their representatives. Direct information and 
consultation of individual workers could be considered as an ‘appropriate level’ only in very 
small companies or establishments. Also, restricting the right for workers or their 
representatives to a right only for the individual workers would contradict the guarantee of the 
freedom of association in Article 12 of CFREU.310 On the other hand, the view that the 
guarantee of information and consultation to workers representatives applies only to works 
councils and not to trade union representatives is also contested, as not all Member States of 
the EU operate a so called dual-channel system, which distinguishes between representatives 
elected by the workforce in the establishment and trade union representatives. Thus 
interpretation suggests that workers’ representatives shall include trade union representatives 
together with works councils.311 
Similarly to the provisions of the European Social Charter, Article 27 is not based 
either on co-determination. Instead, the aim of Article 27 is to protect the interests of the 
individual worker against the dominant position of the employer in situations in which those 
interests could be substantially affected. Apart from the need to protect workers in 
extraordinary situations, such as collective redundancies and transfers of undertakings, Article 
27 also reflects to the difficulties associated with globalisation of the economy and the 
increased importance of transnational companies and mergers of undertakings. Such trends 
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could effectively weaken national traditions of workers’ involvement in the decision-making 
process.312 
Blanke argues that Article 27 has as much or more to do with the protection of human 
dignity specified in Article 1 of the CFREU than with traditional social rights and the 
objective of democratisation of the economy. “As such it promises greatly to expand the 
scope both of traditional social rights and of practices of democratisation, to encompass 
threats to workers’ dignity in the many new forms these threats assume in a globalised 
economy, society and environment.’313 
Despite the fact that employee involvement signifies a very narrow part of human 
rights, and perhaps it is safe to say that its recognition is rather low, its importance shall not 
be overlooked. The significance of employee involvement in the development of democratic 
institutions is enormous. The estrangement of people from the handling of their own affairs at 
a workplace in a long run will lead to the abdication of not only the employees but the citizens 
towards participation which is a real danger to democracy. Thus, employee involvement shall 
be seen as essential to issues of social justice, human rights and democracy and must be 
promoted as such. 
 
V Interim Conclusions 
 
The research questions regarding this chapter were (Q1) What are the most influential 
economic theories concerning employee involvement?; (Q2) What was the impact of employee 
involvement on mitigating the negative effect of the economic crisis? and (Q3) How employee 
involvement is addressed in human rights instrument? 
The economic input of employee involvement has been researched for decades, many 
hypotheses exist on both sides, aiming to prove either the inefficiency or the efficiency of 
employee involvement. The economic analysis of employee involvement started with the 
emblematic question of Jensen and Meckling asking “if co-determination is so efficient, why 
do managers not choose it voluntarily?”314 I showcased various theories which prove wrong 
the presumption of the efficiency theory and argue that employee involvement has positive 
effect on establishments and enhance directly or indirectly competitiveness. I also looked into 
the possibility to make employee involvement compulsory at workplaces. Whereas the default 
setting with opting-out options could be justified in many areas of labour law, I argue that it is 
not suitable to facilitate employee involvement.  In my views, the Howthrone-type researches 
show the importance of genuine employee participation over the role of compulsory 
workplace settings. Genuine participation requires the duty of understanding of the 
importance of involvement and of activity on both the employers’ and the employees’ side. 
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I compared the views of Hugo Sinzheimer and Amartya Sen on the interrelated nature 
of economic, political and social democracy, as well as on individual freedom. Sinzheimer 
argued that involvement in the formation of their economic conditions empowers employees 
with real freedom in their employment, which they otherwise cannot enjoy in the process of 
negotiating their individual contract due to the imbalance of power between the contracting 
parties. 315  On a Kantian recognition of human dignity, 316  Sinzheimer argues that the 
democratization of the economic sphere is necessary for freeing employees from 
subordination in employment relations. 317  Sen, challenging the “Lee Thesis”, 318  asks the 
question of what should be more urgent for policy makers: to eradicate poverty, or to 
guarantee democratic rights (for which poor people have little use anyway)? Sen’s answer to 
this question is very straightforward: economic development and liberty are interconnected. 
Separating them or prioritizing one over the other is entirely the wrong approach. Without 
freedom, including the opportunity to participate in decision-making on matters affecting the 
main areas of an individual’s life there is no economic development. Likewise, economic 
development fosters individual and social freedom.319 Regarding (Q2), I selected four recent 
studies320 examining the performance of companies during the crisis and all of them argued 
that despite the crisis, social dialogue at national, sectoral and company levels have been 
proven to be effective instruments in mitigating the negative social and economic impacts of 
the crisis. 321 
Concerning (Q3) I concluded that he ‘older brother’ of participatory rights, the right to 
bargain collectively gained recognition in a much less contested way and now is 
acknowledged by most major human rights instruments. 322  To the contrary, employee 
involvement first appeared in late 1980s and only in European human rights instruments. The 
low recognition could raise concerns whether the right to involvement is a fully fledged 
human right, however, both the European Social Charter and the Charter of Fundamental 
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Rights of the EU are indispensable human rights instruments of the European region and their 
importance is unquestioned.  
The European Social Charter is a human right convention of the Council of Europe, 
which establish a wide range of economic and social rights that are crucial for human dignity. 
Due to its wide geographic coverage, its role is indispensable in promoting human rights 
across the European continent. The CFREU addresses issues which form the core of labour 
law and industrial relations in Europe. Thus, inclusion of the right to information and 
consultation in this instrument signifies the stance of employee involvement as a fundamental 
human right. I also came to the conclusion that despite the fact that at times it is exercised by 
standing representative bodies, employee involvement is an individual human right which 
should be enjoyed unconditionally by all employees. 
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PART III 
GLOBAL EXTENSION OF DEMOCRATIC 
PARTICIPATION 
 
Chapter 1 
Transnational Model of Participation 
 
I  Introduction 
 
The trend of globalization has brought many new challenges to business management. The 
competition has become fiercer, and the quest for profit maximization has made large 
concerns spur on social dumping to continuously fight for yet lower production costs. Such 
practices often lead to human rights violation at workplaces. The frequency and the severity 
of these malpractices tend to be higher in premises where national laws are less protective and 
the influential power of workers is low. However, if we acknowledge that the right to 
participate is a human right with substantial effect on economic competiveness, it seems to be 
crucial to extend this right to employees working outside of the European Union. 
 Building up on the Weimar traditions, the European Union has developed an 
outstanding framework for employee involvement, which is at the same time capable to 
protect employees’ right and suitable to meet business needs. However, due to the lack of 
regulatory power of the EU, European based multinational companies are not obliged to 
respect these protective rules of the EU. MNCs tend to draw up internal codes of conducts 
(COC) to promulgate minimal standards to be applied by their subsidiaries and 
subcontractors. These internal rules however are often proved to be non-efficient in most of 
the fields they intend to regulate, including to halt human rights violations, to improve 
working standards, or to enhance the voice of workers. Moreover, these company statues do 
not form a ground for liability when the rights of workers are violated. 
  While the EU considers employee involvement as a prerequisite for the success of the 
restructuring and adaptation of undertakings to the new conditions created by the 
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globalisation,323 it explicitly reserves the right to the employees working within the territory 
of the European Union. Since human rights are indivisible and universal, it raises the issue of 
how the existing level of protection provided by the EU could be transferred to subsidiaries of 
Europe-based MNCs located outside of the territory of the European Union. The following 
chapter first introduce what are the currently available regulations which promote employee 
involvement on a global scale, then, the participation framework of the European Union will 
be examined with an eye to the possibility to extend the application of the participation 
framework to non-European business operations. Finally, the shortcomings of the European 
regulations will be analysed and the pitfalls of Directive 2002/14/EC are demonstrated 
through the case of Hungary, where the regulations regarding employee involvement were 
recently changed to the detriment of employees. 
 
II International Standards for Employee Involvement 
 
Formation of regulations is no longer an exclusive domain of states and governmental 
authorities, the role of non-state actors in standard setting is increasingly diverse. 324  The 
characteristics of this method of norm setting are that the process is not unilateral but often 
international and the formation of regulations is at least partially taken over by the private 
sector, particularly in areas where governmental efforts failed, or where stakeholders are 
concerned that international treaties do not adequately took their interest into account.325 This 
section will examine the various soft law measures promoting employee involvement on a 
global scale. 
 
A OECD Guidelines 
 
The OECD Guidelines aim to ensure that the operations of multinational enterprises are in 
harmony with government policies, to strengthen the basis of mutual confidence between  
enterprises and the societies in which they operate, to help improve the foreign investment 
climate and to enhance the contribution to sustainable development made by multinational 
enterprises. The Guidelines are a comprehensive catalogue of social and economic norms and 
multinational enterprises and their subsidiary companies are expected to carry out their 
business activities in line with these principles. They are supposed to be applied not only 
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within the territory of OECD but world-wide, especially in developing countries.326 Thus, the 
Guidelines have an important role to play in promoting observance of these standards and 
principles among multinational enterprises, consistent with applicable laws and 
internationally recognised standards. 
The Guidelines are originated back to 2000 and were reviewed in 2011. The 
Guidelines are recommendations jointly addressed by governments to multinational 
enterprises, they provide principles and standards of good practice consistent with applicable 
laws and internationally recognised standards. The 2011 updates enhanced the binding nature 
of the Guidelines by adding that the countries adhering to the Guidelines make a binding 
commitment to implement them in accordance with the Decision of the OECD Council on the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Furthermore, matters covered by the 
Guidelines may also be the subject of national law and international commitments.  
The 2011 updates extended the reporting obligations of the multinational enterprises. 
The aim was to encourage improved understanding of the operations of multinational 
enterprises. The revision underlines the importance of clear and complete information on 
enterprises to a variety of users ranging from shareholders and the financial community to 
other constituencies such as workers, local communities, special interest groups, governments 
and society at large.  
The updates make further suggestions and encourage the corporations to communicate 
additional information that could include a value statements or statements of business conduct 
intended for public disclosure including information on the enterprise’s policies relating to 
matters covered by the Guidelines; policies and other codes of conducts to which the 
enterprise subscribes; information on internal audit, risk management and legal compliance 
systems; and information on relationships with workers and other stakeholders.  
Chapter V 327  of the Guidelines deals with employment and industrial relations. 
According to its provisions, enterprises should, within the framework of applicable law, 
regulations and prevailing labour relations and employment practices; and also within the 
framework of applicable international labour standards 328 provide information to workers’ 
representatives. Such information is needed for meaningful negotiations on conditions of 
employment and which enables employees to obtain a true and fair view of the performance 
of the entity, or where appropriate, the enterprise as a whole. The revised text adds that 
enterprises shall also promote consultation and co-operation between employers and workers 
and their representatives on matters of mutual concern. 
The Guidelines provide for that the multinational enterprises shall observe standards 
of employment and industrial relations not less favourable than those observed by comparable 
employers in the host country. The 2011 updates of the Guidelines also aim to provide 
directions for cases when multinational enterprises operate in developing countries. It obliges 
the enterprises to provide the best possible wages, benefits and conditions of work, within the 
framework of government policies. These should be related to the economic position of the 
enterprise, but should be at least adequate to satisfy the basic needs of the workers and their 
families.  
                                               
326 OECD 21 
327 Previously Chapter IV. 
328 Added by the 2011 amends. 
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  The Guidelines provide for similar process for collective redundancies to the one 
described in the respective EU Directives, stating that reasonable information shall be given 
to representatives of the workers about their employment and their organisations, and, where 
appropriate, to the relevant governmental authorities, and co-operate with the worker 
representatives and appropriate governmental authorities so as to mitigate to the maximum 
extent practicable adverse effects, preferably prior to the final decision being taken.  
 The OECD Guidelines are often compared with the ILO MNE Declaration. 
Distinctions between the function and aim of the two instruments are made in the 
Commentary of the Guidelines. The Commentary specifies that while the ILO MNE 
Declaration sets out principles in the fields of employment, training, working conditions, and 
industrial relations, the OECD Guidelines cover all major aspects of corporate behaviour. The 
OECD Guidelines and the ILO MNE Declaration refer to the behaviour expected from 
enterprises and are intended to be parallel and not to conflict with each other. The ILO MNE 
Declaration can therefore be of use in understanding the Guidelines to the extent that it is of a 
greater degree of elaboration. However, the responsibilities for the follow-up procedures 
under the ILO MNE Declaration and the Guidelines are institutionally separate.  
The Guidelines are supported by a unique implementation mechanism of National 
Contact Points (NCPs), agencies established by adhering governments to promote and 
implement the Guidelines. NCPs assist enterprises and their stakeholders to take appropriate 
measures to further the observance of the Guidelines. They provide a mediation and 
conciliation platform for resolving practical issues that may arise with the implementation of 
the Guidelines. However, the NűP’s action does not always satisfy its clients. The activity of 
the Swiss NCP was widely criticised in the Triumph International case, questioning the 
efficiency and the unbiased nature of OECD monitoring capacity. The below case also 
demonstrates that European companies, trusted for promoting human rights and safeguarding 
labour rights – like Triumph International –  use double standards for their employees 
working at overseas subsidiaries regarding participation. 
 
i The Triumph Case 
 
One of the key features of the textile industry – one of the principal industries in the global 
economy – is that labour-intensive production is increasingly allocated to countries with 
cheap wages and lax labour standards, especially to countries of South Asia. Triumph 
International, headquartered in Germany is presented in 120 countries employing over 44,500 
people worldwide; its turnover exceeds 1.9 billion euro. The company set up a EWC for its 
European branches in 1996. Triumph International owns about 60 per cent of the production 
sites in its supply chain, which is considered as a very high ratio in the garment industry. In 
December 2009 a coalition of labour unions, NGOs and labour support groups filed a 
complaint against Triumph International for carrying out massive layoffs without consulting 
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unions in the Philippines and Thailand. The majority of the workers who were laid off were 
union members, including union leaders. The case could be summarised as follows. 
Triumph International’s subsidiaries in the Philippines (TIPI) decided to close down 
its factory in July 2005, resulting in 1663 workers losing their jobs. TIPI had a collective 
agreement effective with the local union, however, the ‘separation money’ offered to the 
workers was not in line with the provisions of the collective agreement. However, TIPI 
warned the union that if they had planned any organized action against the decision, they 
would have withdrawn their offer on the separation money and would sue individually all the 
workers involved. The trade union refused to accept the offer, claiming that no information 
had been given to them on the closure. The factory was eventually closed down and severance 
payment was paid to the workers.  
Few years later in August 2009, nearly 2,000 workers were suddenly retrenched at 
Triumph's Thai factory (BFT), including 13 out of 19 union representatives, cutting the 
factory's workforce in half. The Thai factory paid severance payment to the workers, but not 
according to the Thai Labour Relations Law and the effective collective agreement between 
concluded with the workers’ representative trade union. 
The union and its affiliates filed inquiries to many international organizations, 
including the Delegation of the European Commission in the Philippines, but received no 
acceptance. In December 2009 the Unions turned the case to OECD and asked the Swiss NCP 
to set a concrete timeline for handling this case, as well as to facilitate communication and 
exchange between the parties in an impartial, transparent and objective manner. Although 
Triumph initially appeared to be open to the NCP process, the company subsequently refused 
to enter any mediation meetings in which the issue at the core of the complaint would be 
discussed. The NCP refused to hold meetings in Thailand or the Philippines and was also not 
willing to provide funding to help bring the victims to Switzerland or for translation of key 
documents. According to one of the complainants, ‘the NűP performed the bare minimum of 
forwarding the letters between Triumph and the unions, but never made any constructive 
proposal to facilitate a mediation meeting or to investigate independently the case.’329  
In its final statement, the NCP did not make any determination as to whether the 
OECD Guidelines have been breached by Triumph, nor does it make recommendations to 
enhance implementation of the Guidelines. As a summary of the proceeding, the NCP stated 
that ‘[the] parties concerned had a different understanding on the objectives of the proceeding 
and it was therefore not possible to reach such an agreement. In view of this situation, the 
NűP sees no possibility to further contribute to the solution of the conflict.’330 The end of the 
procedure was indeed abrupt and questioned the ability of the Swiss NCPs to perform its role 
as an unbiased mediator. 
The lesson learnt from the Triumph case should be that the impact of OECD 
Guidelines on economical and social sustainability is relatively low. It is welcomed that the 
OECD takes part in the discussion of employee involvement and that the revised Guidelines 
refer to ILO norms. On the other hand, the Guidelines are merely recommendations, which 
                                               
329  http://oecdwatch.org/news-en/swiss-ncp-fails-to-resolve-labour-dispute-over-triumph2019s-mass-dismissals-
in-asia; retrieved on 24 August, 2013 
330  Closing Statement: Specific Instance regarding Triumph in the Philippines and in Thailand (Berne, 14 
January 2011) page 3. 
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make the effective application of the provisions quite questionable. It is even more uncertain 
how the Guidelines could be enforced in the non-Member Countries of the OECD. On the 
other hand, it is apparent that even European MNCs are bypassing its regulations due to the 
lack of effective enforceability.  
 
B Informal Methods to Enhance Information and Consultation on a 
Global Scale 
 
Adopting the transnational approach of the international instruments facilitating employee 
involvement, management and labour have tried to initiate different methods to enhance 
cooperation. A research conducted on global employee representation at transnational 
companies 331  mapped four different forms of transnational structure for employee 
representation on an undertaking level: World Company or Group Councils; World Works 
Councils; extended EWCs; global information committees. Due to scarce data in this field, I 
will only examine World Works Councils and extended EWCs in particular. 
In case of World Works Councils, standing bodies are operating on bilateral terms, 
and their operation is based on the agreement of employee representatives and central 
management. Probably the best known example for World Works Council (WWC) is 
Volkswagen. At Volkswagen (VW) efforts to include employees on a global scale date back 
to the 1970s.332 The EWC agreement concluded in 1992 (two years before the Directive was 
adopted) served as a blueprint for WWC set up in 1999, consisting representative from all 
companies in which VW has the predominant stake. 333  The guiding principles of the 
agreement between the central management and trade unions reflect well the approach of 
management towards employee participation.334 The structure and mode of operation allows 
both sides to see a contribution towards global cooperation and joint resolution of the possible 
conflicts by constructive dialogue and cooperative resolution of economic, social and 
ecological challenges.335 Unlike most WWCs, the one at VW is still quite active.336 
The extension of the EWCs including non-European participants contains two models: 
the one based on agreement, where the central management agrees to hold plenary EWC 
                                               
331 Stefan Rüb, World Works Councils and Other Forms of Global Employee Representation in Transnational 
Undertakings, Hans  Űöckler Stiftung, Arbeitspapier őő, 2002 
332 Solidarity among German workers towards South African fellow employees suffering from the oppressive 
regime was outstanding in the 1980s. 
333 At the time the research was conducted it was 40 production operations worldwide. 
334 These are: compatibility with social responsibility and competitiveness, securing compatibility as an aim of 
social dialogue, commitment on the trade union’s end to cooperate and commitment on the management side to 
respect freedom of association and freely and democratically elected employee representatives in all parts of the 
VW group. See, Rüb, 2002, 23. 
335 Agreement for Cooperation between Volkswagen Group Management and the Volkswagen Group Global 
Works Council from 20 May 1999. 
336 See press releases on the WWC agreement between VW and UAF in October 2013. 
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meetings and the one with the independent decision of the employee side, which is solely for 
internal meetings. An example could be Danone’s case: the international union of the food 
sector managed to conclude an agreement with the central management in 1996, agreeing that 
a consultative committee representing Danone workers from all European countries would be 
informed about the strategic decision of the company.337 Even though the agreement was 
concluded before the substantive enlargement of the EU, it is striking that a clear distinction 
was drawn between European and non-European countries, the latter are simply represented 
by the trade union, and are not members of the committee. 
Information committees offer the most limited form for global employee 
representation, mostly dealing with ad-hoc specific issues. However they could be important 
signs from the management side, marking the initial acceptance of global employee 
representation as a part of management. 
Unfortunately, both the historical development and the current status of global 
employee representation forms are poorly documented. As far as it could be tracked, some of 
the forums rarely meet after their establishment, sometimes only once in five years or even 
less often.338 The limited financial resources, management opposition, language barriers and 
poorly defined powers were the most frequently reported obstacles of global cooperation. It 
was concluded by the above mentioned research that global structures for employee 
representation in transnational undertakings are still in their infancy. 
Having reviewed the above findings, it could be observed that one of the major 
impediments resulting in poor stability and lack of continuity is the absence of solid 
regulatory background. Soft law regulations are unable to ease the dependency on the 
willingness of management to play an active role in participation, to disclose information or 
finance the activity of global representative bodies. The quoted research showed that 
representative bodies at companies with solid traditions in participation and pre-existing 
patterns of employee participation could carry on a significantly better performance.  339  
While the different soft law mechanisms could successfully facilitate cooperation on a 
global scale and could also contribute to lowering the resistance of management concerning 
employee involvement, it has to be noted that without enforceable legal framework, these 
mechanisms could not provide sufficient guarantees for participation. It is the state’s 
responsibility to create hard legal norms. However, the Sinzheimerian principle of economic 
democracy ought to be respected: legal norms are to protect labour, yet at the same time it has 
to respect the autonomy of economic actors. 
 
  
                                               
337 Information concern economic and financial information, technological projects, major investment decisions,  
organizational issues, training, health and safety, environmental issues, equal opportunities, trade union rights 
and others mutually agreed upon. See: Agreement on the Constitution of an Information and Consultation 
űommittee for Danone, 11 March 1996, in: Rüb, 2002, ő1. 
338 Even at Volkswagen group, the World Group Committee had a 7-year long brake in the 1980s. See, Rüb, 
supra, 21. 
339 Mostly German and Japanese undertakings. See, Rüb, supra, 6. 
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Chapter 2 
Possibilities of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the 
EU 
 
Since the existing regulatory framework could be considered ineffective, a directive with an 
extraterritorial scope would be needed. I take the liberty to make up an experiment regarding 
the possible extension of the personal scope of Directive 2002/14/EC on Information and 
Consultation together with Directive 2009/38/EC on the European Works Council. It will be 
examined whether in theory the extension of the scope could ensure that all employees 
employed by a European multinational company have sufficient access to information and are 
consulted on matters relevant to their employment. Both directives are equally important in 
that sense, as Directive 2009/38/EC is the ‘agent’ which enables employees to have access to 
information and serves as a forum for consultation.340 Even though the EU is reluctant to refer 
to extraterritorial jurisdiction, there is an example for external action in environment 
protection. The EU’s policy on environmental issues also has a dual character: it encompasses 
human rights and trade-related elements, and could therefore serve as a reference point. 
Before elaborating on the possibility how to extend the application of the respective EU 
Directives through their personal scope, I briefly introduce the two legal measures. 
 
I Employee Involvement in the European Union 
A Information and Consultation 
 
The Directive on informing and consulting the employees was the pioneer legal instrument in 
which the EU made obligatory to all Member States to provide adequate measures for 
employees to obtain regular information and consultation on their employing undertakings. In 
that sense the Directive indeed signified a vital complement to the higher degree of 
harmonization of social laws in Europe and has had major impact in countries with 
voluntarist341 tradition or in those (mostly new) Member States where employee involvement 
                                               
340 Art 1. 2 of Directive 2009/38/EC. 
341 Such as England or Ireland 
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had not become a genuine part of industrial relations. 342  The adoption of Directive 
2002/14/EC has had a great significance on national level information and consultation issues 
in the Member States. The adoption of the Directive was not overly smooth due conflicts of 
the different national industrial relation systems.343 The Renault case344 gave new impetus to 
the proposals and eventually the Directive was adopted in 2002. 345 The Directive provides for 
minimum requirements applicable throughout the Community 346  and leaves the practical 
arrangements to be defined and implemented in accordance with national laws and industrial 
practices.347 The objective of the Directive is to establish a general framework for informing 
and consulting employees in the European Union. The Directive provides for a right to be 
informed and consulted, thus it is not mandatory: if employees do not request it, employers 
are not obliged to provide information or consult employees.348  
 Information is defined in Article 2(e) as transmission by the employer to the 
employees’ representatives of data in order to enable them to acquaint themselves with the 
subject matter and to examine it. Employees’ representatives are those who are defined as 
such by national laws and/or practices. Thus, Member States are allowed to use not only 
standing bodies but also individual representatives. Consultation means the exchange of views 
and establishment of dialogue between the employees’ representatives and the employer. 
The employer is obliged to provide sufficient information in good time and at an 
appropriate level on the undertaking generally,349 conduct timely information and consultation 
sessions on specific issues in particular, like where there is a threat to employment or which 
could lead to substantial changes in the organisation.350 Article 4 of the Framework Directive 
specifies that consultation has to take place: (a) while ensuring that the timing, method and 
content thereof are appropriate; (b) at the relevant level of management and representation, 
depending on the subject under discussion; (c) on the basis of information supplied by the 
employer in accordance with [the notion of information] and of the opinion which the 
employees' representatives are entitled to formulate; (d) in such a way as to enable employees' 
representatives to meet the employer and obtain a response, and the reasons for that response, 
to any opinion they might formulate; (e) with a view to reaching an agreement on decisions 
within the scope of the employer's powers [concerns information and consultation on 
decisions likely to lead to substantial changes in work organisation or in contractual 
                                               
342 In the case of Hungary for example even though that the Labour Code of 1992 created the institution of works 
council, it has not got well rooted in the corporate sector and therefore could not fulfill its role. For more on that 
see Attila Kun, The ‘dual’ representation of workers at the workplace level in Hungary, Studia Iuridica 
Caroliensia IV, 2009, 89-113. 
343 Especially the differences between single channel and dual channel system made the adoption difficult. See, 
ű Űarnard, ‘EU Employement Law’ (2012) 685-686. 
344 The French car manufacturer, Renault closed its plant in Vilvoorde, Belgium without prior information and 
consultation of the employees. As the Commission pointed out, the existing legal regulations were not enough 
protective, if they did not guarantee the right to information and consultation prior to the decision of the 
employer. 
345 OJ L 080, 23/03/2002 P. 0029 – 0034. 
346 Art. 1.1. 
347 Art 1.2. 
348 C Barnadrf, supra, 685. 
349 Art. 4.2.(a) 
350 Art. 4.2.(b)-(c) 
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relations].”351 It is also provided for that the representatives of employers and employees shall 
work in a spirit of cooperation.352 
Recital 7 of the Directive emphasises the importance of social dialogue and mutual 
trust between the employers and their employees in improving risk anticipation and 
flexibility. It also states that the promotion of employee involvement facilitates the 
undertakings’ competitiveness. Recital 9 further stresses the significance of timely 
information and consultation for companies to compete better in a global environment. Recital 
13 declares that the existing legal frameworks for employee involvement both at Community 
and national level pursued an excessively a posterior approach to the process of change. 
The Member States could apply the Directive either to undertakings employing at least 
50 employees in any Member State, or to establishments employing at least 20 employees in 
any Member State.353 
 
B European Works Council 
 
Directive 94/45/EC354 introduced European Works Councils or alternative procedures in order 
to ensure information and consultation for employees of multinational companies on the 
progress of the business and any significant decision at European level that could affect their 
employment or working conditions. This Directive was repealed and replaced in 2009 by 
recast Directive 2009/38/EC. 355 To overcome some of the shortcomings arising from the 
insufficient measures of the relevant legal instruments,356 especially of those related to the 
unequal treatment of employees concerning procedures for informing and consulting on a 
transnational scale, the recast Directive adopted measures to enhance dialogue to make it 
possible to employees to anticipate and manage changes related to the undertakings.357 
The recast Directive pursues a two-stage approach for transnational information and 
consultation process for community scale undertakings or group of undertakings. The first 
step is based on the voluntary agreement of labour and management, while the second step, 
when no agreement could be reached, is the application of the mandatory provisions provided 
for by Article 7 and elaborated by the Annex of the Directive. Section II of the EWC 
                                               
351 Article 4 of Directive 2002/14; emphasis added. 
352 Art. 1.3. 
353 Article 2 (a) of the Directive defines undertaking as a public or private undertaking carrying out an economic 
activity, whether or not operating for gain, which is located within the territory of the Member States. Article 2 
(b) defines establishment as a unit of business defined in accordance with national law and practice, and located 
within the territory of a Member State, where an economic activity is carried out on an ongoing basis with 
human and material resources. 
354 OJ [1994] L122/28. 
355 Directive 2009/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 OJ L 16.5.2009 28-44. 
356 Apart from Directive 2002/14 as referred above, see Directive on Collective Redundancies (Council dir. 
75/129/EEC (OJ [1975] L48/29) amended by Council Dir. 92/56/EEC (OJ [1992] L245/13) and Directive on the 
Transfer of Undertakings (Council Dir. 77/187/EEC (OJ [1977] L61/26, amended by Directive 98/50 (OJ [1998] 
L201/88) and consolidated in Directive 2001/23 (OJ [2001] L82/16) 
357 Directive 2009/38/EC, recitals (10)-(15). 
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Directive provides for the establishment of a European Works Council or an Employee 
Information and Consultation procedure. Negotiations are put in focus with the aim to activate 
central management or employees.358 The parties either could decide to set up a European 
Works Council by concluding an agreement on the scope, composition, function and term of 
service of an EWC; or could agree to implement an Information and Consultation Process 
(ICP) instead, a less formalized form of employee involvement.359 Whether a EWC or an ICP 
is established, the minimum requirements provided for by the Directive do not need to be 
incorporated into the agreement.360 
In the spirit of autonomy, the parties are entitled to determine the nature, the 
composition, the function, the mode of operation, the procedures and the financial resources 
of a EWC.361 If an agreement is reached, it means that the parties are almost free to set the 
content on the information provided to the employees as long as it meets the requirements of 
the Directive. In case the parties consent to set up a EWC, the agreement shall include the 
details of the undertakings covered by the agreement; the composition of the EWC; the 
number of members; the allocation of seats and the term of office; the function and procedure 
for informing and consulting the EWC, the venue, frequency, and the duration of meeting of 
the EWC; the financial and material resources to be allocated to the EWC; the duration of the 
agreement; and the procedure for its renegotiation.362 
In case the parties decide to set up an ICP instead, they ought to specify the methods 
by which the employees’ representatives have the right to meet and discuss the information 
transmitted to them. The data must contain information on transnational matters considerably 
affecting the employees’ interest. 
Article 8.1 provides for regulations on confidential information. It allows Member 
States to adopt national regulations providing that members of special negotiating bodies or of 
European Works Councils and any experts who assist them are not authorised to reveal any 
information which has expressly been provided to them in confidence. The same could be 
applied to employees’ representatives in the framework of an information and consultation 
procedure. Article 8.2 states that each Member State could provide, in specific cases and 
under the conditions and limits laid down by national legislation, that the central management 
situated in its territory is not obliged to transmit information when, according to objective 
criteria, it would seriously harm the functioning of the undertakings concerned or be 
prejudicial to them. However, the concept of confidentiality is not well addressed. Whilst 
Article 8.1 provides for that confidential information must not be revealed to third parties, it 
does not specify either what type of information can be considered as confidential for the 
purpose of this Article or who these third parties are.363  Thus, it is the national legislator who 
has the opportunity to define the notion of confidentiality. It is suggested that this provision 
must be read strictly in the light of the principles of transparency and mutual trust. Otherwise 
the objective of the EWC Directive would be inverted and a EWű would become a ‘secret 
                                               
358 Art. 5.1. of Directive 2009/38/EC. 
359 Art 4.1. of Directive 2009/38/EC. 
360 Art. 6.4. of Directive 2009/38/EC. 
361 Recital (19) of Directive 2009/38/EC. 
362 Art. 6. of Directive 2009/38/EC. 
363 Picard (2010:111) 
92 
 
club whose members were sworn to secrecy’. 364  Another aspect of confidentiality was 
highlighted in the Grongaard case.365 The Court ruled that the Directive on Insider Dealing366 
precludes the employees’ representative from disclosing confidential information to any third 
party, unless such disclosure is made in the normal course of his employment, profession or 
duties, unless there is a close link between the disclosure and the exercise of his employment, 
profession or duties and that disclosure is strictly necessary for the exercise of that 
employment, profession or duties. However, due to the lack of related cases, it has not been 
addressed whether informing employees would be in a scope the exercise of duties of the 
employees’ representative.  
The two stage process of the EWC Directive was designed with an aim to encourage 
employers to be open to employees’ initiatives.367 By reaching an agreement an employer can 
avoid the mandatory provisions which are formulated with a penalizing nature. However, the 
requirements do not create the impression that the procedure provided for by the Annex is 
equal to a ‘worst-case scenario’. The subsidiary requirements provide for one information and 
consultation meeting per year, based on the written report drawn up by the central 
management.368 Information shall cover the structure, the economic and financial situation of 
the business; the probable development of the business, production and sales; the employment 
situation and future trends; the investments and substantial changes concerning the 
organization of the business; the introduction of new working methods or production 
processes; the transfers of production; and the mergers and cutbacks or closure of 
undertakings or collective redundancies.369 The list is indeed lengthy. On the other hand, since 
these data are combined for many compulsory and voluntary reports transnational 
undertakings are otherwise bounded by,370 neither the quality nor the quantity of information 
put an excessive burden on the employers.  
 
  
                                               
364 Ibid. 
365 Cf. Case C-384/02 Grongaard [2005] ECR I-9939 
366 Dir. 89/592, now Dir. 2003/6 
367 Barnard, 2012. 
368 See Annex 2. In addition to this, a select committee compromising of no more than five members of the EWC 
shall be set up. This committee can be informed of important decisions matters significantly affecting the 
employees’ interest, like collective redundancies, factory closures and so forth. Upon its request, the select 
committee has the right to meet the management as soon as possible.  
369 Annex 1.(a). 
370 For example the Global Reporting Initiative on sustainability. For checklist see 
https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/English-Lets-Report-Template.pdf (retrieved on August 13, 
2013) 
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C New Directions in the Employee Involvement Policy of the EU 
 
Reflecting to the recent financial crisis and its effect to businesses, the Opinion of the 
European Economic and Social Committee 371  (EESC) states, that adopting a multi-
stakeholder approach involving the investors, employers and employees and a positive 
approach towards efficient social dialogue is necessary to mitigate the negative effects of the 
crisis. The EESC opinion recalls that business sustainability also strongly relies on the 
different forms employee involvement, such as information, consultation and, where 
applicable, co-determination too. To achieve a good business management concept, the voice 
of employees has to be respected in business decisions. This obligation also follows from 
Article 27 of the EU’s charter of Fundamental Rights, making employee involvement a part of 
the legal framework of European democracy.372 
The EESC urges the European policy-makers to create appropriate incentives and 
improve the requisite legal framework with no interference with the national competences 
though. Further, the EESC implies that European company law shall cater more for employee 
involvement. The role what employee involvement could play in regaining economic 
competitiveness underlines the need for corrective actions against the short-term of corporate 
values and for increased corporate transparency.373 It is suggested that a sustainable company 
is centred on the principle of ‘fair relationship’, which is a part of the multi-stakeholder 
management approach. 
The Opinion outlines possible new directions to improve employee involvement rights 
on a transnational level. The standpoint of the opinion is to safeguard national diversity to 
keep European businesses competitive while standardizing of divergent definitions to ensure 
consolidation and provide for more legal certainty. 374  Setting obligatory employee 
participation in company boards and creating binding minimum standards for restructuring are 
also key elements of the proposal.375 
 Though the Opinion envisages an innovative approach to mitigate the negative effects 
of economic turmoil by strengthening the role of employee involvement in business 
management, it only focuses on business activities located on the territory of the European 
Union. Such limited personal scope overlooks that transnational companies often operate 
subsidiaries outside of the Member States. The activity of these undertakings significantly 
contributes to the overall performance of the group. To mention one aspect, transnational 
companies often benefit from the cheap labour force and low influential power of the 
employees working in non-Member States. While acknowledging that the different albeit 
generally lower standards of the non-EU countries constitute a competitive edge for most 
European multinationals, consolidation of  the business practices cannot be complete if it does 
                                               
371 Opinion of the EESC on Employee involvement and participation as a pillar of sound business management 
and balanced approaches to overcoming the crisis, SOC/470, Brussels, 20 March 2013. 
372 Ibid, 2.3, 2.4. 
373 Ibid, 2.5, 2.6. 
374 Ibid, 4.2. 
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not reach out to the branches situated outside of the European Union. To overcome this 
discrepancy, I propose to change the personal scope of the regulations regarding employee 
involvement. 
 
II Extension of the Personal Scope of the EU Directives 
 
A Personal Scope and Transnational Character  
 
In terms of personal scope, three important points has to be considered to investigate further 
the possibility of its extension. One is the definitions provided for by Directive 2009/38/EC. 
According to the Directive, a ‘community-scale undertaking’ means any undertaking with at 
least 1,000 employees within the Member States, and at least 150 employees in each of at 
least two Member States; a ‘group of undertakings’ means a controlling undertaking and its 
controlled undertakings; and a ‘community-scale group of undertakings’ means a group of 
undertakings with the following characteristics: at least 1,000 employees within the Member 
States, at least two group undertakings in different Member States, and at least one group 
undertaking with at least 150 employees in one Member State, and at least one other group 
undertaking with at least 150 employees in another Member State.376  The Directive also 
provides for the definition of a controlling undertaking: for the purposes of the Directive, a 
‘controlling undertaking’ means an undertaking which can exercise a dominant influence over 
another undertaking (the controlled undertaking) by virtue, for example, of ownership, 
financial participation, or the rules which govern it. The ability to exercise a dominant 
influence has to be presumed, without prejudice to proof to the contrary, when an 
undertaking, in relation to another undertaking directly or indirectly: (a) holds a majority of 
that undertaking’s subscribed capital; (b) controls a majority of the votes attached to that 
undertaking’s issued share capital; or (c) can appoint more than half of the members of that 
undertaking’s administrative, management, or supervisory body.377 
Two is the scope of the Directive. The EWC Directive is not only applicable to 
undertakings or groups of undertakings which are located within the territory of the EU, but 
also addresses non-European businesses by stating that the mechanisms for informing and 
consulting employees in undertakings (or groups of undertakings) operating in two or more 
member states shall encompass all establishments, regardless of whether its central 
management is located inside or outside of the territory of the Member States. The aim of this 
extension is the protection of the European workforce, and it does not constitute 
extraterritorial legislation as it refers to business activities which take place within the EU. 
                                               
376 Art 2. 1 (a)-(c) of Directive 2009/38/EC.  
377 Art 3.1-2. of Dir 2009/38/EC. 
95 
 
Three is the notion of transnational character. According to the Directive, those 
matters have a transnational character which concern the entire undertaking or group, or at 
least two Member States. These include matters which are of importance to the European 
workforce in terms of the scope of their potential effects or which involve transfers of 
activities within the Member States. 
To ensure that the right of information and consultation is effectively realized at 
subsidiaries of the Europe-based multinational companies which are located outside of the 
territory of the EU, the personal scope of Directives 2002/14/EC and 2009/38/EC should be 
expanded in a way that encompass all branches which are under the control of the controlling 
undertaking domiciled in the EU. The notion of a controlling undertaking in its current form 
could create a link to subsidiaries located outside of the EU territory. Regarding 
transnationality, as it was argued above, in reality the impact of these ‘third country 
subsidiaries’ are of great significance for the multinationals. Therefore issues related to their 
activity, or which involve transfers of activities between the operations, have an increased 
importance for the entirety of the workforce in terms of the scope of their potential effects’. 
All branches then should be included in the concept of the transnational character of a matter. 
It may be argued that the enlarged territorial scope would constitute a competitive 
disadvantage to European multinational companies and therefore would encourage businesses 
to move their seats outside of the Member States. However, if the statements of the Recitals 
of the Directives and the EESC Opinion were true, then that would, on the contrary, ensure 
even higher level of competitiveness for European undertakings. There is a global tendency 
for industrialization to push national industrial relations (including labour law systems) 
toward uniformity or "convergence."378 The more workers’ participation is promoted, the 
more it supports the idea of cooperation, participation and joint responsibility.379 The findings 
of Manfred Weiss have to be remembered here: if democratisation of the economy is 
understood as an element which promotes and stabilises democracy in the society as a whole, 
workers should have a similar chance to influence decisions by which they are affected.380  
 
B Competency of the EU 
 
The scope of competences of the European Union has been expanded by a doctrine of the 
implied powers, developed by the CJEU, which has the last word on competence issues.381 
The doctrine of implied powers indicates that the EU can either originates its powers 
expressly promulgated in the Treaties, or its competences can be implied.382 For example, 
                                               
378 M Weiss, ‘Convergence and/or Divergence in Labor Law Systems? : A European Perspective’ (2006-2007) 
28 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 469 . 
379 M Weiss, ‘Workers’ Participation: Its development in the European Union’ (2000) 21 Indus L. J. Juta, 738. 
380 Ibid, 745-746. 
381 Case 104/81 Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641, paragraph 17, and Case C149/96 Portugal v Council [1999] ECR 
I8395, paragraph 34, also referred to in the ATA case (para 34). 
382 T Delereux, ‘The European Union in international environmental negotiation: a legal perspective on the 
internal decision-making process’ (2006) 6 Int Environ Agreements, 234. 
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Article 3ő2 (1) TFEU states that ‘[if] action by the Union should prove necessary, within the 
framework of the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the 
Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the 
European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures.’ 
Such an expansion of the competences, especially in the field of employment and 
industrial relations, is not free from controversy. On the other hand, the international scope of 
the activity of the European Union have to be guided by principles which have inspired its 
own creation, development, and enlargement, and which seek to advance in the wider world: 
democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, 
and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.383 Implied 
powers exist where “internal power has already been used in order to adopt measures which 
come within the attainment of common policies,”384 yet are not limited to common policies, 
but cover all Treaty objectives.385 The importance of employee involvement either (or both) 
as a human right or (and) as a tool to enhance economic competitiveness is significant 
regarding democracy.386 Moreover, back in 2001, the European Commission proclaimed that 
a ‘more coherent and consistent approach’ to human rights in its internal and external policies, 
with a view to promoting ‘human rights and democratisation commitments in external 
relations’ consistent with the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights is needed. 387  Thus, a 
possible action to enlarge the scope of Directives 2002/14/EC and 2009/38/EC would fulfil 
the above requirements and therefore could justify extraterritorial jurisdiction. There are only 
rare occasions when the European Union – usually critical on the issue – exercising 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. One of these exceptional cases was Directive 200/101/EC related 
to environment protection. I refer to this case as a possible example to protect a fundamental 
right and which could also be impactful for labour legislation. 
 
  
                                               
383 Art 205 of TFEU and Art 21 of TEU. 
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 Sinzheimer believed that political and social democracy could only exist if they are accompanied by economic 
democracy. In his view, economic democracy has two complementary pillars: the self-regulation of the industrial 
actors (employers’ associations, trade unions, works councils) and the rights of workers to participate in the 
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C The Example of Environmental Protection 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has derived state duties even with an extraterritorial 
dimension, to protect human rights against corporate violations in the field of environmental 
protection. These rights include adopting appropriate measures to regulate pollution issues, 
ensuring an informed decision-making process, providing access to information about 
dangerous activities, and enabling public participation in decision-making processes.388 Under 
these conditions, the ECHR confers rights on victims to have the domestic law enforced 
against corporate actors, and to have the judgments of national courts upheld. Since Article 6 
(2) of TEU provides that the EU accedes to the European Convention of Human Rights, the 
imposed duty of the Convention to protect human rights against certain violations that are 
committed outside of the territory of the Contracting States is applicable for the EU as well. 
On the other hand, EU environmental law (such as the environmental law of the Member 
States) does not apply extraterritorially. One important exemption is Directive 2008/101/EC 
on EU Emission Trading Scheme.389 
 Based on the provisions of Directive 2008/101/EC, as of January 2012, the EU 
Emission Trading Scheme 390  is applicable to all flights arriving and departing from EU 
aerodromes, including flights departing to or from third countries.391 The aim of the regulation 
is to effectively reduce greenhouse gas emission. When the Directive was challenged by the 
Air Transport Association of America and Others,392 the European Court of Justice rejected 
the claimants and held that, while the Directive cannot be applied to aircrafts registered in 
third states that are flying over third states or high seas, when the aircraft is in the territory of 
one of the Member states the aircraft is subject to the unlimited jurisdiction of that Member 
State and the EU.393 Thus, if the regulatory background is connected to an internationally 
recognized goal (such as reducing emissions in the context of the Kyoto Protocol, of which 
both the EU and its Member States are members), activities conducted within the territory of 
the EU can be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Member State and the EU, even with regard 
to a third country actor. 
Regarding its legitimate basis, the Emission Trade Directive relies on the ‘effects 
principle’ which tends to support the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in commercial 
cases. The effect principle offers justification in cases when a foreign conduct produces 
substantial effects on the territory of a State.394 
As the Court laid down in the ATA case, commercial activity, in the instance of 
Directive 2008/101/EC, air transport could be carried out in the territory of the European 
Union only on condition that third parties comply with the criteria that have been established 
                                               
388 p 21-22 
389 See also Aviation Directive 2008/101, Electrical and Electronic Waste Directive 2012/19. 
390 Emission Trading Directive 2003/87 
391 Para. 16. Directive 2008/101. 
392 ECJ Case C-366/10 
393 Ibid, paras 122-125. 
394  It should be noted though that the effect principle is not universally accepted as a valid basis for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, see, the definition of Extraterritoriality in MPEPIL. 
98 
 
by the EU and which were designed to fulfil specific objectives (in the ATA case, 
environmental protection). 395  Though in cases of employee involvement the commercial 
activity, eg, the activity of a subsidiary, will not be directly carried out in the territory of the 
EU, the operation will indirectly have an influence on the European market. It could be a 
product manufactured outside of EU and sold in the EU, or, more generally, it could be 
manifested by the profit which flows from business activity and which appear in the books of 
the ‘parent’ company. Since the right to information and consultation is recognized as a 
fundamental right by CFREU, it can be assumed that its protection will constitute a value 
similar to that of environmental protection.396 
 
  
                                               
395 Ibid, Para 128. 
396 While the analogy between the nature of employee involvement and environment protection may not be 
strikingly new, I could not find any references in the literature concerning the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the 
respective regulations. 
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III Interim Conclusions 
 
The research question I try to answer in this section is (Q4) If employee involvement is a 
fundamental human right, thus, in that sense, has a universal value, what measures have been 
taken to promote it outside of the European terrain? The significance of employee 
involvement has been gradually growing in the European Union. The learning curve from the 
1980s has been very long indeed, and during these decades many of the initial problems have 
been addressed in the amends of the Directives addressing the right to be informed and 
consulted.397 The change in the regulatory technique allowing more room for Member States 
for transposition with regard to the different traditions in industrial relations caters better for 
employee involvement and the strengthened legal status of the CFREU symbolizes its 
importance as a human right. 
However, enjoyment of the right has not been guaranteed to all; absent fiat, employee 
involvement has not penetrated to subsidiaries of European multinationals located outside of 
the territory of the EU. To mitigate the regulatory gap, both international organizations and 
multinational enterprises have developed regulatory solutions. What legitimizes the norm-
setting exercises of non-state actors are more transparent decision-making processes and the 
possibility of representing a broad range of views. Indeed, soft law, voluntary codes of 
conduct, and other non-binding instruments have an important role in facilitating employee 
involvement. However, voluntary actions have proven to be insufficient, and thus cannot be 
substitutes of enforceable legal instruments. Exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction by the EU 
might be a step towards filling the regulatory gap. However, the creation of a norm with 
extraterritorial scope would only address the issue of prescriptive jurisdiction, leaving the 
questions of adjudication and enforcement without an answer. 
 Expanding the personal scope of Directives 2002/14/EC and 2009/38/EC would, in my 
view, contribute to the recognition of the right to be informed and consulted both as a human 
right and as a tool for enhancing the economic competitiveness of European multinational 
companies. As a human right, it would be just and fair to provide the same rights (and duties) 
to every employee of a given corporation regardless of their location, as human rights are 
universal. Employee involvement can be seen as a tool for democratization,398 thus, it would 
also support the democratization of industrial relations in the host countries. The expansion 
would create stronger ties between the headquarters and their third-country subsidiaries, and 
could serve as a tool for combating human rights violations caused by multinationals.399 As an 
economic tool, the employer would benefit from the feedback and innovative ideas of its 
employees in a larger pool than before. By improving the employment conditions for workers 
                                               
397 Apart from Directives 2002/14 and 2009/38 as referred above, see Directive on Collective Redundancies 
(Council dir. 75/129/EEC (OJ [1975] L48/29) amended by Council Dir. 92/56/EEC (OJ [1992] L245/13) and 
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398 See for example Dukes, supra 345 
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worldwide, European companies could be better trusted and evaluated by consumers and 
therefore their market positions would be stronger. 
It has to be also noted that multinational corporations are not traditional subjects of 
international law, and it is controversial as to which national law is able to impose direct 
duties on them; thus they often “fall through the cracks of the international regulatory 
system.” 400  The picture becomes even more complicated by adding that multinational 
corporations are increasingly reliant on their supply chains, which are only connected to them 
through civil law contracts. Therefore enforcement of any corporate norms binding to the 
parent company in its supply chain is close to impossible. 
The competence of extraterritorial jurisdiction may be exercised by way of 
prescription, adjudication, or enforcement. Prescriptive jurisdiction is the authority to lay 
down legal norms, adjudicative jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide competing claims, 
and enforcement jurisdiction stands for the authority to ensure compliance with the 
regulator’s norms. 401  While it was argued that the specific importance of employee 
involvement may justify the unilateral decision of the EU to decide on its own competence to 
exercise jurisdiction beyond its territory, such justification could only refer to prescriptive 
jurisdiction. To ensure the effective compliance with a norm, issues of adjudicative and 
enforcement jurisdiction shall be addressed too—however, their analysis would go well 
beyond the scope of the current paper. 
However, I would rather the interim conclusion be positive and forward-looking. 
Observations Sinzheimer made on the function of labour law are important to be remembered 
here. Protection of employees has essential importance to society, as the working power of 
man is not only an individual but also a social asset.402 The worker serves the employer 
directly, but also serves society indirectly, argues Sinzheimer further, and thus society owes 
the worker an equivalent return for his service, and this equivalent return is the protection 
itself. On a Kantian recognition of human dignity,403 for Sinzheimer the democratization of 
the industrial sphere through the economic constitution might have brought equality and real 
freedom for workers—freedom which is not manifested in the way that freedom of contract 
allowed exploitation, but freedom from subordination in employment relations. The right to 
employee involvement has to be kept protected both as a fundamental right and a tool to 
enhance economic competitiveness. Moreover, this protection cannot be limited to the 
territory of the European Union in the context of globalization. The recognition of the 
humanity of workers through involvement ought to be seen as a shared responsibility of 
global economic actors 
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Chapter 3 
Problems related to the European Participation 
Model 
 
I Overview 
 
The main purpose of Directive 2002/14/EC is to set up a framework for an effective 
information and consultation procedure.404 In accordance with the EűJ’s case law on ‘effet 
utile’, during the process it ought to be ensured that the employees are entitled to formulate 
their opinions, to have response together with the related reasoning from management to their 
ideas and to participate in decision-making processes related to employment. 405  Having 
considered the advantages of social dialogue, Article 5 of the Framework Directive provides 
the opportunity for Member States to entrust management and labour at an appropriate level, 
including the level of the undertaking or establishment with the right to define freely the 
practical arrangement of the information and consultation procedure. Effectiveness is further 
guaranteed by the timely and adequate ways – meaning the appropriate level and the fashion – 
of the information and consultation process.406 However, since a fairly broad area is provided 
for the Member States for transposition, it can be observed that the domestic solutions often 
tone down the text and spirit of the Directive.407 The below areas could be of concern with 
regard to the principles of equal treatment unified protection of employees of the European 
terrain. 
The most problematic areas where inequality could seriously harm the principles of 
participation are the protection of employee representative and the sanctions imposed on 
employers in case of violation of the right to information and consultation of employees. 
According to Article 7 of the Directive, employee representatives shall enjoy adequate 
protection to perform properly their roles. However, the vague wording of the Directive does 
not provide distinct criteria whether the protection shall include favourable working 
conditions, paid working time or prohibition of dismissal.  Some of the Member States 
apparently used this room to reduce the level of protection where possible. For example in 
Poland employees’ representative supposed to carry out their tasks outside working hours, in 
Ireland it is unclear whether employees’ representative are entitled to any earnings for the 
time spent for exercising their role, in Bulgaria only trade union members enjoy protection, 
                                               
404 Arts. 1. 1-2. of Directive 2002/14/EC. 
405 Art. 4.4. of Directive 2002/14/EC. 
406 Arts. 4.1 and 4.3. of Directive 2002/14/EC. 
407 Notably in Poland; see: Schömann (2006) supra 28. 
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while in the Czech Republic no protection is provided at all.408 Thus, ambiguity in domestic 
laws leads to great inequality. 
The Framework Directive indicates that effective, dissuasive and proportionate 
administrative and judicial procedures and sanctions ought to take place in case of the 
infringement of the obligations. 409  With other words, Member States are free to choose 
between civil and (or) criminal sanctions.410 However, the regrettable lack of precision of the 
Directive makes it difficult for domestic courts to judge the threshold where the action of the 
employer impedes the right of information and consultation. Especially at times of economic 
constrain, labour courts tend to adopt a restrictive interpretation. 411  Again, national 
legislations provide for various sanctions. In some Member States a fine can be imposed on 
the employer who violates the right to information and consultation. However, both the 
process and amount vary greatly. Regarding the fines the difference is striking, the fine 
imposed could be in the range from EUR 6.5 to EUR 50,000. Such differentiation for the 
same action is hardly justifiable. 
In űroatia a decision rendered by an employer contrary to the law’s provisions on 
consultations with the works council is null and void. In case of a violation by an employer 
of the information and consultation obligations a fine of HRK 31,000 to 60,000 (EUR 4,217 
to EUR 8,163) is imposed on an employer as a legal person.412 In case of Denmark, employers 
who fail to inform and consult workers in accordance with the applicable rules may be fined 
as well. In Greece a failure to comply with the obligations emanating from the provisions of 
the decree results in enforcement of administrative penalties.413 On an employer who violates 
the provisions of the Labour Law fine for each violation, from EUR 500 up to EUR 50,000 is 
imposed.  Temporary pause of the operation of a particular productive procedure or a 
department, or even an enterprise or undertaking is possible for a time interval up to 3 days. In 
addition, the Minister of Employment and Social Insurance (after a justified proposal of the 
competent Labour Inspector) is entitled to impose on an employer a temporary pause of the 
operation for a time interval longer than three days or even a permanent pause of the 
operation of the particular productive procedure or of the department or of the departments or 
of the whole of the enterprise or undertaking. With regard to Bulgaria, a recent amend to the 
Labour Code have raised the sanctions applied in case of violation of the labour legislation 
with penalties from 10,000 to 15,000 BGN (EUR 5,113 to EUR 7,669) and in case of a 
repeated violation, the penalties applied are from 20,000 to 30,000 BGN (EUR 10,226 to 
EUR 15,339). In Estonia employers who violate this right may be sanctioned with 
administrative fines ranging from 100 to 6000 Estonian Kroons (EUR 6.5 to EUR 385). In the 
case of Italy the provincial labour directorates, which are part of the ministry of labour and 
social protection, are responsible for enforcing employees' right to information and 
consultation. Employers who fail to respect this right are liable to fines ranging from EUR 
3,000 to EUR 18,000. Regarding Romania, employers who fail to meet the obligation to 
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inform and consult their employees are liable to a fine of RON 1,000 to 20,000 (about EUR 
245 to EUR 4,907), while offenders who have failed to meet the requirement to establish 
consultation procedures with workers’ representatives are liable to a fine of RON 2,ő00 to 
25,000 (about EUR 613 to EUR 6,133). Lastly, in the event that the information provided by 
employers is incomplete or incorrect and hence prevents workers’ representatives from 
adopting an informed opinion with a view to future consultation, the statutory fines range 
from RON 5,000 to 50,000 (about EUR 1227 to EUR 12,267).414 
In other Member States fines cannot be imposed, but employees or their 
representatives could seek judicial and/or administrative remedies. For example in Belgium 
any body representing employees or any individual employee may take a case to the courts 
alleging failure to respect the obligations imposed by the relevant legislation. In Bulgaria each 
representative of the workers or employees elected, whether being a representative of a trade 
union organization or not, is entitled to lodge a claim in the court.415 
To conclude, it is safe to say that though Directive 2002/14/EC was crafted with the 
best intention and manoeuvred rather well between the fairly different interests and traditions 
of industrial relations of the Member States, the sometimes vague wording and the ample 
room for national transpositions resulted in a variety of domestic systems with very different 
level of actual rights and obligations. Practically, such a flexible framework is not suitable to 
provide equal level of information and communication for workers of the European Union. 
The case of Hungary well illustrates that the flexibility provided by the Directive allows 
Member States to form the national systems almost arbitrary after the transposition. Hungary 
used all the opportunities for flexible interpretation given by the Directive to the detriment of 
employees during the re-codification of the national regulations, and now its compliance with 
the Directive is rather questionable in areas of protection of employee representatives and of 
adequate sanctions. First I provide a brief overview on the democratic transition regarding 
employee involvement, then analyse the current national regulations in Hungary. 
 
II Evaluation of Information and Consultation Rights in the 
European Union 
 
As a part of the 2010 work Programme416 an evidence-based survey was conducted by the 
European Union on the effectiveness of information and consultation rights of employees in 
the European Union. 417 In particular, Directives 98/59/EC on collective redundancies, 
2001/23/EC on transfer of undertakings and 2002/14/EC on a general framework of 
information and consultation was examined. 
                                               
414 Law No. 467/2006. 
415Articles 7§2 and 7§a of the Labour űode 
416 Commission Work Programme 2010 COM (2010) 135 final. 
417 The so called “Fitness űheck” see, űommission Staff Working Document, Fitness űheck on EU Law in the 
area of Information and Consultation of Workers, SWD (2013) 293 final, hereinafter, Fitness Check. 
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 On one hand, the general findings of the survey emphasise that evidence suggest that 
the mentioned directives address stakeholders’ needs, as they are, among others, suitable to 
increase trust between management and labour, to involve workers in decisions affecting 
them, to protect workers, to contribute to increased adaptability, and to improve staff and 
company performance. It was also underlined that especially Directive 2002/14/EC was found 
capable to effectively promote workplace performance and to improve management and 
anticipation of change.418 On the other hand, especially based on the reports of stakeholders, it 
was pointed out that the actual efficacy of the Directives in general and Directive 2002/14/EC 
in particular depends on several factors, especially the industrial relations system and social 
dialogue traditions of a Member State,419 the size of an establishment and the attitudes of 
labour and management were mentioned. The EU seems to be satisfied with the results, 
conferring the information and consultation system to be “relevant, effective, coherent and 
mutually reinforcing.”420 
 The opinion of the European Economic Social űommittee’s opinion,421 referred to by 
the Fitness Check points out the urgent need of a more effective formulation of information 
and consultation rights in EU, and suggested the serious reconsideration of the various 
definitions of information and consultation rights for greater standardisation.422 
 However, the Fitness űheck refers to stakeholders’ complaint on the transposition of 
the Directives concerning the specific terms, such as ‘establishment’, ‘good time’, 
‘appropriate timing, method and content’ or ‘with a view to reaching an agreement’ as 
“insignificant.”423 Also, the report treats the inherent flexibility of the notion of ‘employee 
representative’ as one the strengths of the Directives.424 
 The assessment also suggests that consultation is less likely to take place and tends to 
cover operational issues, like working time or work organisation, rather than business 
strategies. And evidence was also found that the arrangements concerning the working time, 
benefits and resources concerning employee representatives vary greatly among Member 
States. 
I believe that these problems are far from insignificant. The case of Hungary 
represents very well that the ambiguity of provisions could lead to serious harm in national 
legislations. The vague wording of Directive 2002/14/EC allowed the Hungarian lawmaker to 
adopt a new employee involvement system, which is by and large meets the formal 
requirements of the Directive, but bypasses its objectives. 
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III The Case of Hungary 
 
A Introduction 
 
Political changes were rather rapid in Hungary, between 1988 and 1992 key legislative 
movements laid down a completely new system, including industrial relations. Act No XXII 
of 1992 – the third Labour Code – was based on the principle of freedom of association and 
strived to create genuine, democratic form of participation. As a part of the reforms, works 
councils were institutionalised, although it is argued that the introduction of works councils 
was lacking genuine historical origins or theoretical foundations.425 The original idea of the 
new works councils was based on the German dual-channel system; however, eventually it 
became a significantly weaker institution than its model. Works councils and trade unions 
were provided similar, sometimes competing rights at workplace level, 426  creating a 
“horizontal dual-channel system.”427 
On one hand, the formulation of the third Labour Code was naturally subject to 
political debates and the implementation of a dualistic model of participation indeed was a 
result of a political compromise. On the other hand it is important to note that in the midst of 
the crisis of industrial relations428 the provisions of Act No XXII of 1992 on participation 
were still probably the best what trade unions could have achieved in safeguarding their 
former positions at workplace-level. 
The decisions of the Constitutional Court concerning trade unions also shaped the 
reforms of industrial relations and had important impact on the bargaining position of trade 
unions.429 In Decision No 8 of 1990430 the Constitutional Court granted the petitioner who 
claimed the right of the trade unions to represent employees without authorization violated the 
Constitution.431 The Constitutional Court argued the socio-economic environment where the 
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representation of employees fell within the exclusive competence of the trade union of the 
related sector has radically changed as part of the political transformation process, and the 
representation of the employees' interests has now been placed upon a pluralistic basis.432 
Section 15 Paragraph 2 of Act No XXII of 1992 governed two kinds of representation rights 
of the trade unions. One of which was to represent an employees in issues related to her/his 
living and working conditions, in the name of and on behalf of employees in the absence of a 
special authorization. The Constitutional Court did not find the disputed provision 
unconstitutional either under Article 4 or Article 70/C (1) of the Constitution,433 but rendered 
its decision considering the provisions of Article 54(1) of the Constitution on the right of 
disposal. The right of disposal is an integral part of the right to human dignity declared in as a 
natural right of which no one may be deprived. The Constitutional Court stated that the right 
of disposal is a "general right to personhood", which encompasses various aspects of 
personhood, such as the right to free personal development, the right to free self-
determination, general freedom of action or the right to privacy. On the basis of the disputed 
provision, argues further the Constitutional Court, it may not be ruled out that the trade union 
may choose to exercise its right of representation in spite of an employee's explicit request to 
the contrary. The risk of infringing upon the employee's interest is at its greatest when the 
non-trade-unionist employee's personal matters are concerned. That was the primary reason 
why the provision in question had to be annulled. Even though it was rightfully claimed that 
the decision of the Constitutional Court was based on a stereotypical image of socialist-style, 
paternalistic trade unions alienated from workers, rather than a recognition of genuine trade 
union functions, from another point of view this decision could be considered as an important 
step in acknowledging the personal freedom of workers. 
The rights of trade unions and works councils regarding information and consultation 
were not clearly formulated resulting in a rather controversial dual channel model, especially 
Section 21 Para 2, Section 22 and Section 68 on right information and consultation considered 
to be confusing by creating different stances for works councils and trade unions at 
workplaces.434 Trade union representativeness was tied to the results of the works council 
election, further enhancing their horizontal interdependence. This regulation, as András Tóth 
and Carla Frege pointed out, blurred the line between collective bargaining and consultation 
and gave an opportunity to employers to avoid bargaining with trade unions.435 The result was 
first that employers did not have prevailing counterparts at the bargaining table, second, that 
they were not interested in providing higher standards in employment relationships than the 
                                                                                                                                                   
subjected to revision in the new Labour Code at the time when re-regulating trade union rights. The President of 
the National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions failed to submit his opinion in time. 
432 Pursuant to Article 70/C (1) of the Constitution (Act No XX of 1949) everybody shall have the right to form 
an organization with others with the aim to protect their economic and social interests or to join such an 
organization.  
433 Art 4 provides for the trade unions' right to engage in the protection of interest and representation, which 
appears also in the former Constitution, to other organizations formed for the protection of interests. 
434 For a detailed analysis on information and consultation rights in Act No XXII of 1992 see, A Tóth ‘The 
Inventions of Works Council in Hungary’ 3 European Journal of Industrial Relations 2, 161-81; and A Tóth, ‘ 
Üzemi tanácsok, szakszervezetek és munkáltatók’ available at http://econ.core.hu/kiadvany/csopak/7.pdf; 
especially pages 237 ff. 
435 ű Frege and A Tóth ‘If You are Hunted, You Haven’t Time to Enjoy the Landscape Paper for the IV. 
European Regional Congress of the Industrial Relations Associations. Dublin, 1997; quoted by A Tóth ’ 
Szakszervezetetek…’ 2Ő7. 
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minimum requirements of the Labour Code. Thus, collective agreements could not become 
genuine sources of labour law, and anti-union inclination of employers was generally high. 
Notwithstanding, researches had controversial findings on the relationship between works 
councils and trade unions.436 It was unquestioned on the other hand, that trade unions got 
works councils under their influence.437 
The above stated problems had a significant impact on the new Hungarian Labour 
Code, which came into effect on July 1, 2012. Since the new Labour Code put the provisions 
of its predecessor into perspective, I will only elaborate on the regulations of 1992 Labour 
Code in the light of the novelties introduced by its successor.438 
 
B Employee Involvement in the New Labour Code 
 
The new Labour Code of Hungary,439 while generally maintaining the democratic principles 
of its predecessor concerning works councils, has brought substantive changes to industrial 
relations. 440  The structure of the Labour Code suggests that the lawmaker intended to 
emphasise the importance of works councils, even to the detriment of trade unions: many of 
the former rights of trade unions are now allocated to works councils. Whereas it has to be 
generally welcomed that the confusion regarding trade union and works council rights of the 
previous Labour Code is mostly cleared away, the success of the re-codification is not 
uncontested. Despite the fact that trade union’s former information and consultation rights are 
now delegated to works councils, they are not empowered by the necessary powers to 
effectively exercise these rights. Before elaborating on the new function of works councils, it 
is indispensable to revisit some of the general changes introduced by the 2012 Labour Code 
with regard to industrial relations. 
The economic plans drawn up by the government after the landslide victory of the 
current conservative governing party Fidesz and its politically subordinated ally, KDNP 
(Christian democrats) emphasise the role of labour regulations in general and collective 
labour law in particular in economic development and the importance of autonomous 
regulations in the world of work.441 However, these sources refer to both individual and 
                                               
436M Ladó and F Tóth ’Üzemi tanács: munkaharc helyett munkabéke’ (199Ő) 11 Mozgó Világ, 19–33; M Ladó 
and F Tóth (eds) ’Helyzetkép az érdekegyeztetésről. 1990–1994 (ÉrdekegyeztetĘ Tanács Titkársága, 1996, Phare 
Társadalmi Párbeszéd Projekt: Űudapest); S Kisgyörgy and L Vámos ’Az üzemi tanácsok választásának és 
müködésének tapasztalatai’ (script) (ÉT-PHARE Szociális Dialógus Program, 199Ő, Űudapest). 
437  L Neumann ‘űircumventing Trade Unions in Hungary: Old and New űhannels in Wage Űargaining’ 
3European Journal of Industrial Relations 2, 183-202. 
438 For a very detailed analysis of the dual channel system under Act No XX of 1992 see, A Kun, ‘The ‘dual’ 
representation of workers at the workplace level in Hungary’ (2009) Studia Iuridica űaroliensia IV, 89-113. 
439 Act No I of 2012. 
440 Regarding collective labour law, the new Labour Code has major detrimental effect on trade unions; however, 
the analyses of this area would definitely stretch the limits of the current paper. 
441 Points 2, 10 and 11 of the ministerial reasoning; the Hungarian Economic Reform program, the so called 
‘Széll Kálmán Plan’ is available at http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nrp/nrp_hungary_en.pdf, Hungarian 
Labour Plan is available only in Hungarian at 
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collective autonomy as new and forward-looking ideas to reform Hungarian labour law. This 
undistinguished point of reference disregards the historical fact that the strengthening of 
individual autonomy would rather was a step backwards. It is by and large unquestioned that 
the origins of labour law dates back to times when the state actor started controlling the 
autonomy of parties entering to an employment relationship to protect the weaker party, the 
employee. The reinforcement of collective autonomy would indeed be a progressive idea, 
much needed to support industrial relations in Hungary. Collective autonomy – as oppose to 
individual autonomy – is an effective tool to control the unilateral regulating power of 
employers. It should also be noted that the referred documents consider employee 
involvement one-sidedly, only as a tool of economic development, and disregard its human 
right nature. 
The other goal of the referred economic plans, to encourage social partners to enter 
into collective agreements, however, is difficult, if not impossible to achieve through the new 
Labour Code. Now there are tremendous regulations in the Labour Code which allow 
collective agreements (and even individual labour contracts) to alter from the Code to the 
detriment to workers. However, the standards stipulated by the Labour Code are already 
providing for minimum requirements, any detriments could effectively jeopardize the living 
standards and the dignity of employees. Trade unions would possibly be not willing to take up 
negotiations under these conditions.442 
The lawmakers preference toward works councils over trade unions could be detected 
in the new regulations allowing  works councils to (upon the absence of a representative trade 
union) to conclude a workplace agreement covering all aspects of a collective agreement bar 
the issue of wages. However, this regulation signifies a severe misunderstanding on the nature 
of participation. In the following chapter I elaborate on the major novelties introduced by the 
2012 Labour Code on employee involvement. 
The ministerial reasoning regarding the changes related to participation rights is rather 
brief. However, the drafters of the law published an academic review on the new directions of 
regulation, which could be referred as a standpoint of interpretation, even though some of the 
ideas were not reflected in the adopted version of the Labour Code.443 The summary argues 
that the previous regulatory regime of employee involvement clearly failed. This failure could 
be explained by the wrong initial concept regarding the dual channel model: the numerous 
overlaps in trade union and works council rights, which completely lacked solid dogmatic 
foundations, did not serve the purposes of employee involvement, but only fuelled academic 
debates. The paper even questions the necessity of the dual channel system and calls for the 
abolishment of the participation rights of trade unions. 444 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
http://brdsz54.hu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=249:nemzeti-munkaterv-szell-kalman-
terv&catid=84&Itemid=476 (both documents were last retrieved on 20 July, 2014). 
442 For a more elaborated analysis on the perception of the new Labour Code towards individual and collective 
autonomy see, űs Kollonay Lehoczky, KérdĘjelek egy vegyes származású újszülött vonásai felett, in A Kun (ed) 
Az új Munka Törvénykönyve dilemmái című tudományos konferencia utókiadványa: KRE ÁJK, 2011. december 
13. (Űudapest, Károli Gáspár Református Egyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Kara, 2013). 
443  Gy Berke et al, ’Tézisek az Új Munka Törvénykönyve Szabályozási Koncepciójához’ (2009) 2 Pécsi 
Munkajogi Szemle. 
444 Ibid, 157-158. 
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C Election and Dissolution of Works Council 
 
Before elaborating on the election rules set forth by the new Labour Code, it is important to 
take a note on the changes related to the representativeness of trade unions. The former 
Labour Code tied the right of concluding a collective agreement to the results the trade union 
achieved on works council election. Act No XX of 1992 stipulated that those trade unions 
were entitled to conclude a collective agreement with the employer, whose candidates had 
received more than half the votes in the works council election.445 If more than one trade 
union maintained a local branch at a given employer, a collective agreement could only have 
been concluded jointly by all the trade unions, provided that the candidates of such trade 
unions had jointly received more than half the votes in the works council election. If the 
above conditions for having the trade unions jointly conclude a collective agreement were not 
fulfilled, the so called representative trade unions had the right to conclude a collective 
agreement446 together, provided the candidates of such trade unions have jointly received 
more than half the votes in the works council election. If the conditions for having the 
representative trade unions jointly conclude a collective agreement were not fulfilled either, 
the trade union whose candidates jointly had received more than sixty-five per cent of the 
votes in the works council election became entitled to conclude a collective agreement.447 In 
that respect, representatives were those trade unions, whose candidates received at least ten 
per cent of the votes in the works council election.448, 449 
  This mixed system where the trade unions’ right to conclude a collective agreement 
was tied to the results of the works council election was a result of an unfortunate trade-off.450 
This mechanism made the boundaries of collective bargaining and participation blurry. In 
2003 (eleven years after the former Labour Code came into effect) a nation-wide study 
showed, that at workplaces where both trade union and works council operated, majority of 
the trade union officers believed that works councils ripped off trade unions from the 
                                               
445 Major changes concerning the rules of the election were introduced by Act No LV of 1995. 
446 Another important right of trade unions related to representativeness was the right to contest any unlawful 
action taken by the employer (or his failure to act) by way of demurrer if such action directly affects the 
employees or the interest representation organizations of employees. See, Section 23 of Act No XX of 1992. 
447 If, in the cases set forth in Paras 2 and 3 of Section 33 of Act No XX of 1992, the trade union or the 
candidates of the trade union did not receive more than half the votes in the works council election, negotiations 
may be held for the conclusion of a collective agreement, however conclusion of the agreement is subject to 
endorsement by the employees. The employees shall vote on such endorsement (Section 33 Paras 6-7 of Act No 
XX of 1992). 
448 If more than one works council was elected at an employer, the results of each works council elections had to 
be combined for the determination of representativeness. A trade union in which at least two-thirds of the 
employees of the employer in the same employment group (profession) are members was also construed as 
representative. See, Section 29 of Act No XX of 1992. 
449 This rule was introduced by Act No XIII of 1993 (Section 7 Para 2). 
450 T Prugberger, A kollektív munkajog intézményei, a munkavállalói érdekképviselet és participációs jogok 
tartalma, mechanizmusa és érvényesülése a jogharmonizációs jogalkotási követelmények tükrében, in, I Horváth 
and R Rácz (eds), Tanulmányok a munkajog jövőjéről (Űudapest, 200Ő, Denzoprint),7ő; Kisgyörgy-Pataky-
Vámos: Helyzetkép az üzemi tanácsokról (Űudapest, 2003, FES); Ű Űenyó, ‘Tekinthetjük-e jelentéktelennek a 
munkavállalók részvételét Magyarországon’ (2003) Ő7 Munkaügyi Szemle 1-2. 
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participatory rights, which traditionally belonged to them.451 It was also argued that due to 
these regulations, trade unions are only interested in the election, but not in the effective 
operation of works councils. Such a misconception on the dual-channel system is not 
uncommon in post-communist countries.452 However, the Hungarian lawmaker did not help to 
ease the confusion by creating a clear demarcation line between the function and rights of 
trade unions and works councils. The new Labour Code abolished the mixed system of trade 
union representation, which is definitely a change which could be considered fortunate in my 
views, however, dissent opinions exist. Most notably, Professor Kollonay-Lehoczky argues 
that the former system ensured that the collective agreements concluded at workplaces could 
genuinely represent the interest of employees employed at a given establishment.453 
 It ought to be also noted that the Hungarian regulations empower the whole workforce 
employed by the given undertaking without prejudice to their status of employment to 
participate in the works council elections.454 However, in this threshold temporary agency 
workers are not included. It raises the question that temporary agency workers right to 
participate is not guaranteed. However, it is argued that temporary agency workers are not 
employed by the receiving undertaking.455 Thus, the national regulations have complied with 
the ‘great majority’ rule of the European Social űharter, which requires that at least 80 per 
cent of the employees concerned are guaranteed this right. 
 
i Election and Appointment 
 
Employees could be represented by an employee representative, a works council, a central 
works council, or – as a new feature of the 2012 Labour Code – by a corporate-level works 
council.456 An employee representative or a works council has to be elected if, during half-
year prior to the date when an election committee was established, the average number of 
employees at the employer or at the employer’s independent establishment or division is 
higher than fifteen or fifty, respectively. The number of works council member is 
proportionate to the size of the division represented by the works council.457 A division of the 
                                               
451 Kisgyörgy-Pataky-Vámos: Helyzetkép az üzemi tanácsokról (Űudapest, 2003, FES), 9. 
452 See more on the topic in I Guardiancich (ed) ‘Recovering from the crisis through social dialogue in the new 
EU Member States: the case of Űulgaria, the űzech Republic, Poland and Slovenia’ (ILO (Eű), 2010). 
453 Cs Kollonay-Lehoczky, KérdĘjelek egy vegyes származású újszülött vonásai felett, in A Kun (ed) Az új 
Munka Törvénykönyve dilemmái című tudományos konferencia utókiadványa: KRE ÁJK, 2011. december 13. 
(Űudapest, Károli Gáspár Református Egyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Kara, 2013). 
454 Section 47 Para 1 of Act No XX of 1992 and Section 239 of Act No I of 2012. 
455  For a more elaborated argument see, G Kártyás, ’Irányelv-tervezet a munkaerő-kölcsönzésről’ (2008) 4 
Munkajog – Kérdések és Válaszok. 
456 Section 236 Para 1 of Act No I of 2012. 
457 Three, if the number of employees does not exceed one hundred; five, if the number of employees does not 
exceed three hundred; seven, if the number of employees does not exceed five hundred; nine, if the number of 
employees does not exceed one thousand; eleven, if the number of employees does not exceed two thousand; 
thirteen, if the number of employees is more than two thousand. A new works council member shall be elected if 
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employer has to be considered independent if the head of the establishment is vested with 
competence which concerns the works council’s rights of participation.458 This independence, 
thus, does not require physical (geographical) separation: divisions located at several places 
could belong to one works councils and, if the employer’s representative is vested with one or 
more competences stipulated by Section 264459 of the Labour Code, multiple works councils 
could be elected at the same division. Works councils are elected for terms of five years.460 
The justified expenses incurred in connection with the election of the works council is borne 
by the employer.461 
 Concerning active election rights, all workers employed by the employer and working 
at the given fixed establishment have to be entitled to participate in the election of works 
council members. This latter requirement is a novelty of the 2012 Labour Code, formerly it 
was only required for eligibility.462 Members of the works council have to be elected by secret 
ballot and popular vote. Eligible employees have to have one vote.463 
Regarding passive election rights, employees nominated as works council members 
have to have legal competency464 and must have been employed by the employer – other than 
newly formed employers – for a period of at least six months, and have to work at the given 
fixed establishment.465 Persons exercising employers’ rights, those who are relatives of the 
employer’s executive officers or are members of the election committee cannot be elected.466 
For the purposes of electability, employers’ rights are construed as entitlement to establish, 
amend and terminate employment relationships.467 
Regarding the requirement of having legal competency, at an establishment where 
only employees with either no or limited legal competency are employed (which is 
theoretically possible due to Section 212 of the Labour Code), employees would be deprived 
to exercise their right to information and consultation. Neither the European Social Charter, 
nor Directive 2002/14 contains any provisions regarding the legal competency of employee 
representatives; thus, it would be fortunate to think over whether this restriction is really 
necessary. 
A candidate may be nominated by at least ten per cent of the employees eligible to 
vote or by at least fifty employees eligible to vote, or by the local trade union branch 
represented at the employer. An election has to be declared valid if more than half of those 
eligible to vote have participated. To this end, an employee eligible to vote cannot be counted 
– provided that she/he did not participate in the election – who, at the time of the election, was 
incapacitated to work due to illness or was on leave of absence without pay.468 
                                                                                                                                                   
the number of employees and the number of works council members are not consistent with the above provisions 
for at least six months due to an increase in the number of employees. 
458 Section 236 Para 2 of Act No I of 2012. 
459 See above at the part concerning the operation of works councils. 
460 Section 236 Para 3 of Act No I of 2012. 
461 Section 236 Para 4 of Act No I of 2012. 
462 See, Section 46 and Section 47 Para 1 of Act No XX of 1992. 
463 Section 243 of Act No I of 2012. 
464 See, Section 2:8 of Act No V of 2013. 
465 Section 238  Para 1 of Act No I of 2012. 
466 Section 238 Para 2 of Act No I of 2012. 
467 Established by Para 30 of Section 175 of Act CCLII of 2013, effective as of 15 March 2014. 
468 In the event of an invalid ballot, the election shall be repeated within a period of ninety days. The new 
election may not be held within a period of thirty days. The second election shall be declared valid if more than 
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Nomination of candidates has to be construed valid if the number of candidates 
reaches the number of members that can be elected to the works council.469 The persons 
receiving the highest number of votes, or at least thirty per cent of the valid votes are 
construed as having been elected members of the workers’ council.470 In the event of equality 
of votes, the length of the employment relationship with the employer has to be taken into 
consideration. Persons receiving at least twenty per cent of the valid votes are regarded as 
substitute members of the works council.471 
To approach the issue of election from a different angle, if there are not enough 
candidates who received thirty per cent of the valid votes, the works council cannot be 
established. It means, that the lawmaker actually punishes establishments with ‘overly active’ 
employees, as if there are too many candidates running for the office, it could easily happen 
that the votes are fractured as much that not enough candidates could meet the threshold. This 
regulation is certainly discouraging. 
 
ii Central Works Council and Corporate-level Works Council 
 
The new Labour Code maintained the option of works councils to form a central works 
council in case there are more than one works councils operates at an employer.472 Members 
of the central works council have to be delegated by the works councils from among their 
members. Central works council may not have more than fifteen members.473  
 A novelty of the new Labour Code is the introduction of corporate-level works 
council.474 Central works councils or, in their absence, works councils may set up a corporate-
level works council at a recognized475 or de facto group of companies.476 Members to such 
                                                                                                                                                   
one-third of those eligible to vote have participated. The nominee receiving the highest number of votes, or at 
least thirty per cent of the valid votes shall be declared an elected member of the works council. If the repeated 
election is declared invalid, a new works council ballot shall be held after one year at the earliest. 
469 Section 242 of Act No I of 2012. 
470 An election shall be declared invalid if the required number of candidates did not receive thirty per cent of the 
votes cast. The nominees having received thirty per cent of the votes shall be declared elected members of the 
works council. A new election shall be held within a period of thirty days to fill the remaining positions. For the 
new election, new candidates may also be nominated up to the fifteenth day prior to the election. The second 
election shall be declared valid if more than one-third of those eligible to vote have participated. The nominees 
receiving the highest number of votes, or at least thirty per cent of the valid votes shall be declared elected 
members of the works council. Persons receiving at least fifteen per cent of the valid votes shall be regarded as 
substitute members of the works council. If the repeated election is declared invalid, a new works council ballot 
shall be held after one year at the earliest. 
471 Section 246 of Act No I of 2012. 
472 Section 250 Para 1 of Act No I of 2012. 
473 Section 250 Para 2 of Act No I of 2012. 
474 Section 251 Para 1 of Act No I of 2012. 
475 Section 3:49 of the Civil Code (Act No V of 2013) defines the notion of recognized group of corporation as a 
form of cooperation featuring a common business strategy between at least one dominant member that is 
required to draw up consolidated annual accounts and at least three members controlled by the dominant member 
under a control contract. A group of corporations may consist of limited companies, private limited-liability 
companies, groupings and cooperative societies. If a group of corporations is led jointly by several legal persons, 
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works council have to be delegated by the central works councils or the works councils from 
among their members. Number of members of the corporate-level works council is limited in 
fifteen.477 
 The regulations concerning corporate-level works council are aligned with those of the 
group of companies stipulated by the Civil Code. The rules of cooperation have to be laid 
down within the group of companies by the works council having the right to adopt decisions 
relating to employees and by the corporate-level works council.478 Section 3:50 Paragraph 3 
of the Civil Code stipulates that the autonomy of the controlled companies of the group may 
be restricted in the manner and to the extent specified in the control contract with a view to 
achieving the common business objective. The control contract has to provide for the 
protection of the rights of the controlled members, and for the protection of creditors’ 
interests. That provides for that decisions regarding participation are made on the level of the 
controlling company. General provisions pertaining on works councils apply to a central 
works council and to a corporate-level works council.479 
 Procedures for informing and consulting employees in a European Works Council 
were introduced by Act No XXI of 2003 480 to satisfy the obligation concerning the 
transposition of Directive 94/45/EC. The Act sets forth regulation regarding the applicability 
of the Hungarian rules for the election of a works council. The Hungarian rules have to be 
applied when the central management of a Community-scale undertaking or group of 
undertaking is located in Hungary. The Hungarian regulations have to be also applied 
regarding the protection of employee representatives if the registered office of the controlling 
company is not situated in a Member State, but the management of a fixed establishment or 
company operating in a Member State and controlled by the central management is situated in 
Hungary, or a Community-scale undertaking or a group of undertaking has a representative 
agent in Hungary; or if the Community-scale undertaking or controlled undertaking 
employing the greatest number of employees in Hungary.481 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                   
they shall enter into an agreement to determine the one enabled to exercise the rights of the dominant member in 
accordance with the control contract. 
476 If the conditions for the control contract prevail for at least three consecutive years, at the request of either of 
the parties with legal interest the court may order the de facto dominant member and the controlled companies to 
conclude the control contract and to apply to the court of registry for the registration of the group of 
corporations. If a group of corporations de facto operates for at least three consecutive years, the court - at the 
request of either of the parties with legal interest - shall have authority to apply the regulations governing the 
relations between the managements of the dominant member and the controlled member even in the absence of a 
control contract and without being registered as a group of corporations. See, Section 3:62 of Act No V of 2013.    
477 Section 251 Para 2 of Act No I of 2012. 
478 Section 251 Para 3 of Act No I of 2012. 
479 Section 250 Para 3 and Section 251 Para 4 of Act No I of 2012. 
480 Amended by Act No CV of 2011. 
481 Para 4 of Section 1 of Act No  XXI of 2003. 
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iii Dissolution of Works Councils and Termination of Mandate 
 
a Dissolution of the Works Council 
 
The new Labour Code by and large retains the regulations concerning the dissolution of 
works councils stipulated by its predecessor.482 However, some important changes should be 
noted. Firstly, the reasons of dissolution of a works council are partially changed. The works 
council has to be dissolved a) if the employer is terminated without succession; b) if the 
condition under Subsection (2) of Section 236 no longer applies; c) if its mandate expires; d) 
upon resignation; e) if it is dismissed; f) if its membership decreases by more than one-third; 
g) if the number of employees drops below fifty or decreases by at least two-thirds; h) if the 
results of the election were annulled by the court; and i) in all other cases prescribed by 
law.483A ballot has to be held with regard to the dismissal of a works council, if so proposed 
in writing by at least thirty per cent of the employees eligible to vote. The ballot has to be 
declared valid upon the participation of more than half the employees eligible to vote. More 
than two-thirds of the valid votes are required for dismissal. The provisions pertaining to the 
election procedure have to be applied to the dismissal of a works council.484 
A new regulation is that a motion for dismissal may not be filed for the second time 
within a period of one year.485 The more precise wording of Section 254 guarantees the 
continuity of the operation in case the mandate of a works council is dissolved on the grounds 
specified in Paragraphs b)-c) and f)-g) of Section 252. Upon such event the old works council 
remains in force until the new works council is elected, or for up to three months from the 
time of dissolution.486 
 
b Termination of Mandate 
 
The regulations on termination of the mandate of a works council member did not change 
substantially. The mandate of a works council member has to be terminated a) if the member 
loses her/his legal competency; or b) upon dissolution of the works council; c) if the member 
becomes a relative of an executive of the employer; d) upon resignation; e) upon dismissal.487 
                                               
482 Sections 55-58 of Act No XX of 192. 
483 Section 252 of Act No I of 2012. 
484 Section 253 Paras 1 and 4 of Act No I of 2012. 
485 Section 253 Para 3 of Act No I of 2012. 
486 See Section 56 Para 1 of Act No XX of 1992: If the workers' council is dissolved on account of the reasons 
set forth in Paragraphs c)-g) of Subsection (1) of Section 55, an employee representative or a workers' council 
shall be elected within three months following such dissolution. 
487 Section 255 of Act No I of 2012. 
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These regulations are in line with those of the eligibility for being elected set forth by Section 
238 Paragraph 2. 
 Regarding dismissal, a ballot has to be held with regard to the dismissal of a works 
council member if so proposed in writing by at least thirty per cent of the employees eligible 
to vote. The ballot has to be declared valid upon the participation of more than half the 
employees eligible to vote. More than two-thirds of the valid votes are required for dismissal. 
A motion for dismissal may not be filed for the second time within a period of one year. The 
provisions pertaining to the election procedure have to be duly applied for the dismissal of a 
works council member. 
A novelty in the regulations is that upon termination of the mandate of a works council 
member, an substitute member has to be appointed according to the ranking by the number of 
votes received.488 
 
c Merger, Demerger and Transfer of Economic Entities 
 
Directive 2001/23 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the 
safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts 
of undertakings or businesses stipulates that in case the undertaking, business or part of an 
undertaking or business preserves its autonomy, the status and function of the representatives 
or of the representation of the employees affected by the transfer has to be preserved on the 
same terms and subject to the same conditions as existed before the date of the transfer by 
virtue of law, regulation, administrative provision or agreement, provided that the conditions 
necessary for the constitution of the employee's representation are fulfilled. However, this 
provision does not supply if, under the laws, regulations, administrative provisions or practice 
in the Member States, or by agreement with the representatives of the employees, the 
conditions necessary for the reappointment of the representatives of the employees or for the 
reconstitution of the representation of the employees are fulfilled. Where the transferor is the 
subject of bankruptcy proceedings or any analogous insolvency proceedings which have been 
instituted with a view to the liquidation of the assets of the transferor and are under the 
supervision of a competent public authority, Member States may take the necessary measures 
to ensure that the transferred employees are properly represented until the new election or 
designation of representatives of the employees. If the undertaking, business or part of an 
undertaking or business does not preserve its autonomy, the Member States has to take the 
necessary measures to ensure that the employees transferred who were represented before the 
transfer continue to be properly represented during the period necessary for the reconstitution 
or reappointment of the representation of employees in accordance with national law or 
practice. Moreover, if the term of office of the representatives of the employees affected by 
the transfer expires as a result of the transfer, the representatives have to continue to enjoy the 
                                               
488 Section 257 of Act No I of 2012. 
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protection provided by the laws, regulations, administrative provisions or practice of the 
Member States.489 
 The new Hungarian Labour Code maintains to satisfy the above requirements490 by 
stipulating that upon a merger of economic entities or, if there is a works council operating in 
each one of the entities, a new works council have to be elected within three months from the 
date of merger. If only one of the entities in question has a works council, works council 
member have to be elected within three months for providing representation to the 
unrepresented employees of the other entities. Upon the demerger of economic entities, a 
works council has to be elected for the new economic entities within three months from the 
date of demerger.491 These measures apply respectively in case of transfer of enterprise.492 
 
D Competencies and Responsibilities of Works Councils 
 
Substantive changes were introduced concerning the role of works councils. While the general 
provisions related to Chapter XX on Works Councils suggests – in line with the relevant 
section of the ministerial reasoning – that the function of works council is to promote 
cooperation between employers and employees and to facilitate participation in decision 
making,493 Section 262 Paragraph 1 providing for the powers and responsibilities of works 
councils states that the role of works councils is to monitor compliance with the employment 
regulations. The ministerial reasoning further explains that this change in the new Labour 
űode is justified by “international standards.”494 It is regrettable, however, that the ministerial 
reasoning does not specify which international standards are being referred to, as works 
councils are traditionally the instruments of participation495 and they rights generally do not 
enable them to effectively control employers’ practices, which would require powers 
dissuasive enough to prevent employers from malpractice. 
Moreover, the protection of works council members was narrowed down, and it is 
only the chairperson of a works council who is protected against unfair dismissal. This 
regulation is suitable to effectively withhold regular works council members to stand up for 
workers’ rights.496 This issue will be further elaborated later in this chapter. 
 As it was pointed out, the compromised solution of the Labour Code of 1992 was 
unnecessarily blurred the lines between the powers and responsibilities of trade unions and 
works councils by providing rights of information and consultation to both. Now these rights 
are solely vested in the works councils. However, it ought to be noted that trade unions are 
                                               
489 Art 6 of Council Directive 2001/23/EC, Official Journal L 082, 22/03/2001 P. 0016 – 0020. 
490 The implementation of the EU Directives was first made by Act No XIV of 2001. 
491 Section 258 of Act No I of 2012. 
492 Section 258 Paras 3-4 of Act No I of 2012. 
493 Section 235 Para 1 of Act No I of 2012; ministerial reasoning concerning Sections 235-37 of the Labour 
Code. 
494 Ministerial reasoning concerning Section 262 of the Labour Code. 
495 C Barnard, European Labour Law (Oxford, 2012, OUP) 659. 
496 Remedies related to this protective rule will be discussed later within this chapter. 
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traditionally in a better position to monitor employers’ practices and working conditions, as 
works councils are instruments of mutual cooperation and participation in decision making. 
 
i Information and Consultation Rights 
 
Section 262 Paragraph 2 provides for that to the extent required for their responsibilities, 
works councils are entitled to request information and to initiate negotiations, with the reason 
indicated, which the employer may not refuse. The notion of information is provided for by 
Section 233. For the purpose of Part III, ‘notification’ means transmission of information 
specified by law as related to industrial relations or employment relationships in order to 
enable the recipients to acquaint themselves with the subject matter and to examine it, and to 
formulate an opinion to prepare for consultations, and ‘consultation’ means the establishment 
of dialogue and exchange of views between the employer and the works council or trade 
union.497 These definitions are the same as provided for by Directive 2002/14/EC, which is 
referred by the ministerial reasoning.498  
To the extent required for their responsibilities, works councils is entitled to request 
information and to initiate negotiations, with an indication on its reason. The employer must 
not refuse the initiative of the works council. Even without special request of the works 
council, the employer has to provide information to the works council in every six month on 
matters affecting the employers economic standing; changes in wages, liquidity related to the 
payment of wages, the characteristic features of employment, utilization of working time, and 
the characteristics of working conditions; the number of workers in employment and the 
description of the jobs they perform. 
Paragraph 2 of Section 233, which states that “[c]onsultation shall take place with a 
view of seeking an agreement, in such fashion as consistent with the objective thereof and 
ensuring: a) that the parties are properly represented; b) the direct exchange of views and 
establishment of dialogue; c) substantive discussions.” Regarding the issue of timing, the only 
specification is provided for by Section 264 Para 1 of the Labour Code stating, that employers 
have to consult the works council at least 15 days prior to passing a decision in respect of any 
plans for actions and adopting regulations affecting a large number of employees. The quality 
of the dialogue is supposed to be further protected by the provisions of Paragraph 3 of Section 
233, which prohibits the employer to carry out the proposed action during the time of 
consultation, or for up to seven days from the first day of consultation, unless a longer time 
limit is agreed upon. In the absence of an agreement the employer has to terminate 
consultation when the said time limit expires. 
The scope of the plans or actions that requires consultation especially covers the 
following matters: proposals for the employer’s reorganization, transformation, the 
                                               
497 Section 233 Para 1 Points a) and b). 
498 Article 2 Points (f) and (g) of Directive 2002/14. 
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conversion of a strategic business unit into an independent organization; introducing 
production and investment programs, new technologies, or upgrading existing ones; 
processing and protection of personal data of employees; implementation of technical means 
for the surveillance of workers; measures for compliance with occupational safety and health 
requirements, and for the prevention of accidents at work and occupational diseases; the 
introduction and/or amendment of new work organization methods and performance 
requirements; plans relating to training and education; appropriation of job assistance related 
subsidies; drawing up proposals for the rehabilitation of workers with health impairment and 
persons with reduced ability to work; laying down working arrangements; setting the 
principles for the remuneration of work; measures for the protection of the environment 
relating to the employer’s operations; measures implemented with a view to enforcing the 
principle of equal treatment and for the promotion of equal opportunities; coordinating family 
life and work; other measures specified by employment regulations.499 
 Both the ministerial reasoning and the Commentary of the Labour Code500 emphasise 
the importance of confidential information. According to Section 234 Paragraph 1, the 
employer is not obliged to communicate information or undertake consultation when the 
nature of that information or consultation covers facts, information, know-how or data that, if 
disclosed, would harm the employer’s legitimate economic interest or its functioning. 
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section 23Ő mirror employers’ prerogative as the obligation of the 
employees’ representatives, stating that the representatives acting in the name and on behalf 
of works councils or trade unions are not authorized to disclose any facts, information, know-
how or data which, in the legitimate economic interest of the employer or in the protection of 
its functioning, has expressly been provided to them in confidence or to be treated as business 
secrets, in any way or form, and are not authorized to use them in any other way in connection 
with any activity in which this person is involved for reasons other than the objectives 
specified in the Labour Code. Any person who is acting in the name or on behalf of the works 
council or trade union has to be authorized to disclose any information or data acquired in the 
course of his activities solely in a manner which does not jeopardize the employer’s legitimate 
economic interest and without violating rights relating to personality.501 
 The notion of ’business secret’ or, in the wording of the new űivil űode, ’trade secret’ 
is defined by Section 2:47 of the (new) Civil Code. 502  Trade secret includes any fact, 
information and other data, or a compilation thereof, connected to economic activities, which 
are not publicly known or which are not easily accessible to other operators pursuing the same 
economic activities, and which, if obtained and/or used by unauthorized persons, or if 
published or disclosed to others are likely to imperil or jeopardize the rightful financial, 
economic or commercial interest of the owner of such secrets, provided the lawful owner is 
not subject to actionability in terms of keeping such information confidential. Commercial 
secrecy has to also apply to technical, economic and other practical knowledge of value held 
in a form enabling identification, including accumulated skills and experience and any 
                                               
499 Section 264 of Act No I of 2012. 
500 K Kardkovács (ed), Az új munka törvénykönyvének magyarázata [Commentary on the New Labour Code] 
(Budapest, 2012, HVG-ORAC), 433. 
501 Amended by Point e) of Para 34 of Section 175 of Act No CCLII of 2013 in accordance with the new Civil 
Code. 
502 Act No V of 2013. 
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combination thereof, if acquired, used, disclosed or published in violation of the principle of 
good faith and fair dealing. It is noteworthy that according to Paragraph 3 of Section 2:47, the 
breach of commercial secrecy has to not be relied on as against a person who has obtained 
trade secrets or know-how from third parties in good faith, in the course of trade for 
consideration. These regulations are in line with the provisions of Article 6 of Directive 
2002/14/EC, Article 8 of Directive 2009/38/EC as well as Article 21a of the Revised 
European Social Charter, which allow employers to withhold certain information which could 
be prejudicial to the undertaking or which are confidential. 
 
ii Co-determination 
 
The new Labour Code brought significant changes related to works councils’ co-
determination right. Firstly, the subject area of co-determination was curtailed. Section 263 
stipulates that the employer and the works council make decisions jointly concerning the 
appropriation of welfare funds. Whereas the previous Labour Code provided co-determination 
right to works council related to the appropriation of welfare funds, and the appropriation of 
welfare institutions and real estate property of such nature, as specified in the collective 
agreement.503 Thus, the new Labour Code eliminated the co-determination right concerning 
the appropriation of welfare institutions and real estate property, and it ceased to link these 
rights to the provisions of the collective agreement effective on a workplace. On one hand, the 
limitation of the subject matter is not explained by the ministerial reasoning, and, in my 
views, it was not justified by the case law related to the previous Labour Code either. On the 
other hand, ceasing the linkage with the provisions of the collective agreement should be 
welcomed. 
First, because it clears the boundaries between trade unions and participation. Second, 
Section 65 of the previous Labour Code led to controversial interpretations. The question 
referred to the court in case EBH 2004.1148 was, whether the works council had the right of 
co-determination related to the utilization of welfare-related real estate property in the 
absence of a specific provision of a collective agreement. The űourt’s decision was in the 
affirmative. However, when Section 65 of Act No XXII of 1992 was amended in 2007,504 it 
became clear that the lawmaker interpreted this question in a manner contrary to the quoted 
ruling of the Supreme Court. Act No XIX of 2007 did not amend the text itself, but edited the 
existing sentence that changed the interpretation in a way that the works council shall not 
                                               
503 Section 65 Para 1 of Act No XXII of 1992, amended by Section 1 of Act No XIX of 2007. In 1992 the Labour 
Code originally provided co-determination right to works councils to the adaption of the health and safety 
regulations, however, the related provisions were incorporated in Act No XCIII of 1993 on Employment Safety 
and Health. This amendment was controversial, as the provisions of Act No CXIII of 1993 did not make the 
election of a health and safety committee compulsory; thus, in case the employer did not agree with the election 
of such committee, the works council would have no right of co-determination on safety and health issues. For a 
more detailed analysis see T Prugberger, op cit, 76 ff.  
504 Section 1 of Act No XIX of 2007. 
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have the right to co-determination in the absence of specific provisions on the subject matter 
laid down by a collective agreement. 
 Secondly – and more importantly – the legal consequences of the breach of the works 
council’s right on co-determination were changed. While the previous Labour Code deemed 
any action taken by an employer violating the co-determination rights void,505 the new Labour 
Code does not stipulates so. 
As no explanation is given by the ministerial reasoning for the change, an inspiration 
to make such a substantive change on the sanction could be found in the highly politicized 
ruling of the Labour Court in the Budapest Airport case, which delayed its privatization 
process. 506 The former Labour űode stipulated that employers’ measures which violated the 
co-determination or consultation rights of the works council were void. In the Budapest 
Airport case the Court had to decide whether the transaction related to the privatisation of 
Budapest Airport and ruled the transaction void because the management had failed to consult 
properly the works council under Section 65 Para 3 of Act No XXII of 1992. 
The privatisation process in Hungary started in the late 1980s; however, companies 
with certain strategic importance remained to be owned by the Hungarian state, for example 
those being vital for public transportation, like the Budapest Airport Co (Budapest Airport 
Rt). The Privatisation Act required that at least 25 per cent plus one share of Budapest Airport 
remain in state ownership. Nevertheless, the Hungarian Privatisation and State Holding 
űompany (Állami Privatizációs és VagyonkezelĘ Rt, ÁPV Rt.) decided to sell the shares of 
Budapest Airport over this limit, issued a call for tenders in June 2005 and shortlisted the 
potential buyers. 
The works council of Budapest Airport challenged the privatisation at the labour court 
on grounds that – among other complaints – the works council had not been informed or 
consulted appropriately on the privatisation tender, therefore the transaction had been void. 
The court upheld the works council’s claim. In its ruling, the court referred to Section 6ő of 
the Labour Code of 1992, which required employers to consult the works council prior to 
taking a decision in respect of plans affecting a large group of employees, including the 
employer's privatisation. Section 67 of that Labour Code stipulated that any action by an 
employer in breach of the provisions of Section 65 is void. 
The ruling triggered controversial comments in both business and academia. Those 
who disagreed with the űourt’s decision argued that the Labour űode did not specify any 
obligations for the employer’s owner regarding the duty of consultation, even if the decision 
or the action influences the working conditions of the employees. The Labour Code stated that 
the power to inform and consult the works council was vested in the employer, not in the 
owner, regardless of the entity of the decision maker, therefore an action of the owner of the 
employer (in this case ÁPV Rt.) could not be deemed void under Sections 6ő and 67 of the 
Labour Code of 1992. Another legal argument was that the Labour Court did not have the 
competence to decide on civil law issues, such as the validity of a privatisation tender. 
                                               
505 Section 67 of Act No XXII of 1992. For a more detailed analysis on the void measures of employers see, T 
Gyulavári and A Kun, ’Munkáltatói jogalkotás? A munkáltatói szabályzatok szerepe a munkajogi 
szabályozásban’ (2012) 3 Magyar Jog, 1ő7-69. 
506 Ruling of the Municipal Labour Court No 2.Mpk. 50.329/2005/9-I. 
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Despite of the criticism, the ruling in the Budapest Airport case was considered as a 
landmark decision, reinforcing the strongest power of works council, the right for co-
determination. Arguments in favour of the labour court’s ruling emphasised that participatory 
rights must be enforceable in all cases, including commercial transactions. Nonetheless, those 
sections of the Labour Code having transposed the EU Directive on transfers of undertaking 
refer clearly to the superior organisations’ decision making and maintains the information and 
consultation duty of the management. Moreover, Act No XXXIX of 1995 on Privatisation 
also stipulated detailed procedural rules for information and consultation. Previous court 
rulings related to selling companies’ social welfare facilities were also cited, as examples for 
the co-determination right of works councils in civil law matters. After all, the Courts of 
Appeal 507  upheld the decision of the Labour Court. 508  Having regard to the changes 
introduced by the 2012 Labour Code it is doubtful that the Court would rule the same today in 
the Budapest Airport Case, as the works council could only file a claim to state that the 
employer’s action violated the right of co-determination, the Court most probably would not 
deem the action void. 
Formerly, the content of the co-determination was also heavily debated. Most notably 
it was questioned whether the works council had co-determination right with regard to the 
sales of a welfare property. The law stipulated that the works council had co-determination 
rights concerning the utilization of welfare-related real estate property. 509 Irén Tatár argued 
that the right to sell in its nature is a different, yet superior right compared to the right to 
utilize, thus, the co-determination right of works councils did not covering this area.510 In 
contrast, Tamás Prugberger argued that the income resulted from sales is a specific form of 
utilization, thus it was involved in the scope of co-determination.511 
However, the issue of the legal consequences of the breach of the works council’s 
right on co-determination is striking. Without dissuasive sanctions and proper remedies, 
participation rights are not safeguarded. In general there are two types of enforcement 
methods used by Contracting Parties of the European Social Charter under Article 21: 
administrative fine and nullity of the employer’s decision violating the rights of information 
and consultation. It is worth to remember here again, that the European Committee of Social 
Rights found that Moldova is not in conformity with Article 21 of the Revised Charter 
regarding the sanctions applicable in case the employer fails to fulfil its obligation to inform 
and consult employees within the undertaking. 
The former Labour Code of Hungary stood on the ground of nullity. However, as the 
relevant case law demonstrates, the interpretation of nullity was heavily contested. 
Undoubtedly, the meaning of nullity is hard to understand in many cases. For example, what 
would be the decision in a theoretic case when the employer makes unilateral decision over 
                                               
507 It was ruled by the then Municipal űourt (FĘvárosi Űíróság). 
508 Eventually, the repeated tender was won by BAA International Ltd, the value of the bid was 464.5 billion 
HUF (around 1.5 billion EUR). For a more detailed explanation on the lawsuit see, G T Fodor and L Neumann at 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2005/09/feature/hu0509101f.htm 
509 Section 65 Para 1 of Act No XX of 1992. 
510  T Prugberger, R Tománé Szabó and I Tatár, Az üzemi és közalkalmazotti tanács Nyugat-Európában és 
Magyarországon (Budapest, 1994, MOSZ). 
511 T Prugberger, A kollektív munkajog intézményei, a munkavállalói érdekképviselet és participációs jogok 
tartalma, mechanizmusa és érvényesülése a jogharmonizációs jogalkotási követelmények tükrében, in, I Horváth 
and R Rácz (eds), Tanulmányok a munkajog jövőjéről (Budapest, 2004, Denzoprint), 77. 
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the welfare fund – say, purchases music concert tickets for the employees? In case of nullity, 
what would be the consequences of infringing the co-determination right of the works 
council? Should the employer take back the tickets? What would happen if, by the time the 
court rules the case, the music concert is already over? Should the money spent on the tickets 
be paid back, even though the employees enjoyed the concert, despite they had wished to 
listen to different genre of music or to have meal vouchers instead? 
Imposition of an administrative fine would make the situation easier to understand. 
However, monetising the breach could easily lead to malicious employment practices, as it 
would be easier to treat the potential fine as an additional cost item during the decision-
making process.  It is also argued, that the most severe punishment for a business is when the 
decision-making process needs to be repeated in a relatively short timeframe, therefore it is 
more dissuasive than fines. This is well demonstrated by the Budapest Airport case. 
Regarding the nature of the subject matter of consultation rights,512 I believe that a system 
which contains both of the elements, nullity and an administrative fine would serve the 
interest of employees the best. Labour courts could be entitled to decide which sanction to be 
imposed based on the nature of the violation. 
  
E Workplace Agreement 
 
One of the most contested collective labour law related regulations of the new Labour Code is 
that works councils are now enabled to conclude a workplace agreement in subject matters 
designated to collective agreements, except the issue of wages. Such workplace agreements 
may be concluded on condition that the employer has not concluded a collective agreement 
covering the given workplace, or there is no representative trade union at the employer which 
is entitled to conclude a collective agreement. 
The reason why this regulation signifies a severe misconception on the nature of 
employee participation and works councils could be summarized as follows. Even though 
works councils represent employees’ interest, they are not a part of the collective bargaining 
process, but are instruments of employee involvement in decision making. Collective 
bargaining transforms decision making processes and the collective agreement, as a result of 
the bargaining, merges the will of the two contracting parties. In contrast, through 
participation the decision making process becomes more democratic, yet the decision itself 
will remain a unilateral act of the employer. 513 It is especially true in the case of the 
Hungarian works councils which do not possess as strong competences as their counterparts 
in Germany or in Austria.514 Moreover, works councils have a nature of a public law, rather 
                                               
512 Section 264 Para 2 of Act No I of 2012. 
513 See, űs Kollonay Lehoczky, KérdĘjelek egy vegyes származású újszülött vonásai felett, in A Kun (ed) Az új 
Munka Törvénykönyve dilemmái című tudományos konferencia utókiadványa: KRE ÁJK, 2011. december 13. 
(Űudapest, Károli Gáspár Református Egyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Kara, 2013). 
514 It shall be also noted that in the case of the Weimar works councils, the right to monitor was introduced to 
keep soviets outside of the workplaces; see Part II Ch 1. 
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than a private law instrument, which was not denied by the lawmaker either.515 Thus, works 
councils could never become contractual partners of employers.  
This is not the first time that this misconception appears in the Hungarian Labour 
Codes. Firstly, as it was discussed in length in a previous chapter, the labour law regulations 
of the state socialist era empowered trade unions with participatory rights, which resulted in a 
confusion regarding the roles and responsibilities of the two institutions. Secondly, an 
amendment of the 1992 Labour Code introduced a similar solution in 1999, which was 
eventually taken out from the Labour Code in a relatively short time. Originally workplace 
agreement was introduced by an amendment of the Labour Code in 1995, which allowed 
works councils and employers to conclude an operative agreement on issues pertaining to the 
rights of a works council and its relations with the employer. 516  This scope was largely 
extended by the radical changes of Act No LVI of 1999. The amend allowed employers and 
works council to regulate issues, in the absence of trade union representation at the 
workplace, which were subject matters of a collective agreement. Both the general and the 
specific parts of the ministerial reasoning remained silent on the reasons why such a drastic 
amendment was necessary. The Hungarian trade unions did not find the matter justifiable 
either. They argued that works councils were not meant to be protecting employees’ interest 
against the employers, and they were defenceless at the bargaining table as they lacked the 
necessary toolkit to pressurize the employer, most importantly, works councils were (and still 
are) not allowed to organize a strike.517 Such workplace agreements were repealed once a 
collective agreement effective on the workplace was concluded. 
On one hand, Act No LVI of 1999 introduced an instrument fundamentally alien from 
the newly established Hungarian works councils. Such a measure revoked the state-socialist 
mechanism which had put trade unions in similar shoes, whereby they had been supposed to 
represent employees’ interests against that of the employer’s and at the same time, to exercise 
their participatory rights.  On the other hand, the amendment restricted the scope of unilateral 
decisions of employers in issues like working time banking, the order of work,518 matters 
pertaining the employees’ health, culture or welfare, as well as improvement of their living 
conditions. In the absence of a collective agreement, these areas were subject to internal rules, 
unilaterally drawn up by the employer. Thus, workplace agreement might have been able to 
increase employee control over these issues. However, due to the continued contest of trade 
unions, the concerned regulations were taken out from the Labour Code – as silently as they 
were introduced – by Act No XIX of 2002.519 
To distinguish between the right to bargain collectively and the right to participate, the 
principal differences between Articles 6 and 22 of the Revised Social Charter ought to be also 
                                               
515 Point 2-4 of the ministerial reasoning states that the provisions of Rome I cannot be applied in the case of 
employee participation, as these regulations are not based on private law. Similar opinion was formed by Gy 
Kiss, Gy Űerke, Z Űankó and E Kajtár,  A munka Törvénykönyve hatása a gazdasági versenyképességre (as a 
part of TAMOP 2.ő.2 program, ’A partnerség és a párbeszéd szakmai hátterének megerĘsítése, közös 
kezdeményezések támogatása’, Pécs, 2010), 211 ff. 
516 Section 64/A of Act No XX of 1992. 
517 Works councils had to remain unbiased in relation to a strike organized against employers. Consequently, 
they could neither organize a strike, nor could support or impede a strike. The term of works council members 
participating in a strike were suspended for the duration of the strike. See, Section 70 of Act No XX of 1992. 
518 Section 119 of Act No XX of 1992. 
519 Section 14 Para 4 of Act No XIX of 2002, effective of 2 July, 2002. 
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mentioned. Despite of the overlap of their material scope, there are substantial differences in 
their stances. The consultation process set forth by Article 6.1 of the Charter with relation to 
the right to bargain collectively does not establish any rights or duties; it refers to an exchange 
of views of parties on an equal footing in a situation where the conflicting interest of the 
bargaining parties are to be confronted. In contrast, Article 22 of the Charter grants an 
enforceable right to consultation to workers in a vertical, unequal situation, where the 
managerial prerogatives of an employer are recognized.520 
As Kollonay well summarises the new situation, instead of increasing the terrain of 
collective autonomy, the right of works council to conclude such workplace agreements is 
nothing more than a rubber stamp on the unilateral action of employers to drawn up working 
conditions.521 Not to mention, the model of vesting participatory and bargaining rights in such 
way solely to one party has already failed, in fact, twice in the history of Hungarian Labour 
Law. 
 
F Remedies 
 
The protection of workers' representatives was first safeguarded by ILO Convention No 135. 
According to its provisions, workers’ representatives in the undertaking have to enjoy 
effective protection “against any act prejudicial to them, including dismissal, based on their 
status or activities as a workers' representative or on union membership or participation in 
union activities, in so far as they act in conformity with existing laws or collective agreements 
or other jointly agreed arrangements.” The űonvention further specifies the term workers' 
representatives, it means “persons who are recognised as such under national law or practice, 
whether they are (…) elected representatives, namely, representatives who are freely elected 
by the workers of the undertaking in accordance with provisions of national laws or 
regulations or of collective agreements and whose functions do not include activities which 
are recognised as the exclusive prerogative of trade unions in the country concerned.”522 
 This notion was adapted by the European Social Charter: “[w]ith a view to ensuring 
the effective exercise of the right of workers' representatives to carry out their functions, the 
Parties undertake to ensure that in the undertaking: they enjoy effective protection against acts 
prejudicial to them, including dismissal, based on their status or activities as workers' 
representatives within the undertaking.” 523  The same requirement appears in Directive 
2002/1Ő/Eű: “Member States shall ensure that employees’ representatives, when carrying out 
                                               
520 For a more detailed analysis on the differences and similarities of Articles 6 and 22, see, Cs Kollonay 
Lehoczky (n …), 6-8. 
521 See, űs Kollonay Lehoczky, KérdĘjelek egy vegyes származású újszülött vonásai felett, in A Kun (ed) Az új 
Munka Törvénykönyve dilemmái című tudományos konferencia utókiadványa: KRE ÁJK, 2011. december 13. 
(Űudapest, Károli Gáspár Református Egyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Kara, 2013). 
522 C135 - Workers' Representatives Convention, 1971 (No. 135), Articles 1 and 3b. 
523 Article 28 of the Revised European Social Charter. 
125 
 
their functions, enjoy adequate protection and guarantees to enable them to perform properly 
re duties which have been assigned to them.”524  
All of the above mentioned instruments state that the protection is due to the effective 
exercise of the right of workers’ representative to carry out their function. This notion has 
utmost importance regarding the new Hungarian Labour Code. The former Labour Code 
provided protection against unfair dismissal of all trade union officers and works council 
members without prejudice to their positions within the trade union organization or the works 
council respectively. However, the new Labour Code unnecessarily narrows down the scope 
of protection to a specified number of trade union officers and to the chairperson of the works 
council. Section 26 Paragraphs 3 and Ő stipulate that the works council’s consent is required 
for terminating the employment relationship of the chairperson of the works council by 
notice, or for temporary reassignment. 525  If the works council does not agree with the 
proposed action, the statement shall include the reasons therefore. Failure by the works 
council to convey its opinion to the employer within the above specified time limit shall be 
construed as agreement with the proposed action. 
The new provisions are not satisfying the requirements set forth by the ILO, the 
European Social Charter and the EU Directive, because all members of the works councils are 
actual employee representatives, not only the chairperson of the works council, therefore, they 
would deserve the same level of protection. 
The Labour Code allows employees, employers and local trade union branches 
represented at the employer to bring an action in connection with the nominations, the 
procedure and the result of the works council elections.526 The court hears the case within 
fifteen days in a non-litigious proceeding. The decision of the court may be appealed within 
five days from the date of delivery of the decision; in this case the court of the second 
instance delivers its decision within fifteen days. In its decision the court could annul the 
results of the election if it finds any substantive infringement of the relevant procedural 
regulations, meaning that the infringement might have had an impact on the outcome of the 
election.527 It follows from this provision that in case the complaint does not related to issues 
of nomination, election procedures, or result of the election, it is regarded as conflict of 
interest; therefore, it cannot be a subject matter of a lawsuit.528 
 In a recent case the Curia judged that claims related to the alleged infringement of the 
procedural rules of the election have to be filed separately in each and every action during the 
election and that the 5-day deadline is also counted separately in these cases. In the same 
lawsuit the Curia also judged that Section 249 Paragraph 2 only provides for cases when the 
results of the election could be repealed.529 The question that might arise is that if the Court 
does not annul the results of the election, what would be an impact of a decision which merely 
states the violation of the procedural rules? 
 
                                               
524 Art 7 of Directive 2002/14. 
525 Section 53 of Act No I of 2012. 
526 Section 249 Para 1 of Act No I of 2012. 
527 Section 249 Para 2 of Act No I of 2012. 
528 Supreme Court Decision No BH 2013.79 (the decision was based on Section 43 Paras 1 and 3 of Act No XX 
of 1992). 
529 Curia Decision No EBH2014. M.13. 
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G Information and Consultation Rights in case of Collective 
Redundancies and Transfer of an Undertaking 
 
As it was discussed above, the new Labour Code designates information and consultation 
rights to works councils. However, there are two areas in particular when this solution raises 
concerns regarding the effectuality of information and consultation rights. More precisely, in 
the collective redundancy and transfer procedures employees are (to different extent) deprived 
of their information and consultation rights in the absence of works council. 
 Regarding collective redundancies, Section 72 Paragraph 1 of the Labour Code 
stipulates that in case the employer is planning to carry out collective redundancies, it shall 
initiate consultation with the works council. The negotiation may lead to an agreement; 530 
however the employer’s duty of consultation does only due up to 1ő days from the initiation 
of the consultation. The Labour Code only refers to the content of the agreement in one 
aspect, namely that it may contain the scope of workers affected by the termination of 
employment relationships,531 and it does not refer to any sanction or remedies may due upon 
the infringement of the agreement, eg, a termination of an employee against the rules accepted 
by the parties.532 However, this agreement ought to be considered as a workplace agreement, 
and its violation has to have the legal consequence of unlawful termination. 533  This 
assumption however, is rather weak as a possible remedy.  
 Concerns arise with regard to cases when there is no works council operating at an 
establishment in question. Since the Labour Code only refers to the duty of consultation with 
the works council, strict interpretation of the text suggests that in absence of works council, 
notwithstanding, even a trade union is present at the establishment, there is no such obligation 
on the employer’s side. 
Directive 98/59/EC provides for that workers' representatives means the workers' 
representatives provided for by the laws or practices of the Member States.534 This notion is 
rather vague, allowing Member States to interpret it in line with their national industrial 
relations’ traditions. At the first glance, EU law does not inspire Member States to create new 
forms of representation system, but the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
specifically made mandatory for the United Kingdom to establish adequate representation for 
workers where it had not been existed with regard to collective redundancies.535 The Court set 
forth that,  
[the Directive 77/187/EEC on transfers of undertaking] require[s] Member States to 
take all measures necessary to ensure that workers are informed, consulted and in a 
                                               
530 See Article 2.1 of Directive Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to collective redundancies (Official Journal L 225, 12/08/1998 P. 0016 – 0021). 
531 Section 76 Para 1 of Act No I of 2012. 
532 Act No XXII of 1992 specifically invoked the consequences of unlawful termination is such cases; see, 
Section 94/F Para 1 of Act No XXII of 1992. 
533 On a similar opinion T Gyulavári (ed) Munkajog [Labour Law] (Budapest, 2013, Eötvös Kiadó), 228-229. 
534 Article 1b of Diretive 98/59/EC. 
535 Commission v United Kingdom; see, Case C-382/92 and Case C-383/92 [1994] ECR I-2453, 2479. 
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position to intervene through their representatives in the event of collective 
redundancies [or the transfer of undertaking]. 
 Member States’ laws and practices for the designation of workers’ representative 
must ensure that they are able to sufficiently protect employees’ interest under 
circumstances like collective redundancies or transfers.536 Thus, the aim of the regulation is 
to provide adequate voice for workers during these procedures. The Hungarian Labour 
Code clearly fails to achieve this goal. As argued above, the right to information and 
consultation is an individual right and employee representatives are to facilitate the 
process. Even in the absence of a standing body, individual employees shall not be 
deprived of their basic right to gain information concerning a workplace, especially 
regarding issues severely and possible disadvantageously affecting their employment, such 
as collective redundancies. A possible solution to overcome this shortcome would be that 
trade union officers or, in the absence of a trade union at the establishment, ad-hoc 
representatives elected by all employees employed at a given establishment could take up 
the task to negotiate with the employer. 
 A similar gap concerning information and consultation right could be detected with 
regard to the regulations of transfer of an undertaking. Section 38 Paragraph 2 provides for 
that in case of transfer of undertaking, the employer needs to inform employees in writing 
about the date or proposed date of the transfer, the reason of the transfer, the legal, economic 
and social implications of the transfer concerning employees, and any measures envisaged in 
relation to the employees. However, Section 264 Para 1 stipulates that the employer is 
required to consult the works council 15 days prior to the decision making regarding any 
plans for actions and adopting regulations affecting a large number of employees; whereas 
Para 2 point b) specifically mentions transformation and reorganisation of the business as 
such. 
Again, this regulation means that in the absence of works council, employees are not 
consulted, only informed, about the employer’s decision. 537  On an analogous way to the 
above reasoning, the Labour Code violates Directive 2001/23/EC on the transfers of 
undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses does not provide for adequate 
protection of workers during the transfer if there is no standing body elected. Also, it is a 
mystery, why trade unions are not referred by the law with regard to the procedure of transfer 
as possible representatives of employees. Thus, a revision of the regulation would be 
necessary, providing for that trade union officers or, in the absence of a trade union at the 
establishment, ad-hoc representatives elected by all employees employed at a given 
establishment have to be consulted by the employer with regard to the issues related to the 
transfer of undertaking. 
    
 
 
                                               
536 B Bercusson, European Labour Law (Cambridge, 2009, CUP), 63. 
537 Directive 2001/23/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of 
employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings Article 2c provides for that "representatives of 
employees" and related expressions shall mean the representatives of the employees provided for by the laws or 
practices of the Member States (Official Journal L 082 , 22/03/2001 P. 0016 – 0020). 
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III Interim Conclusions 
 
The Research question I tried to answer in the chapter was (Q6) whether the provisions of the 
new Hungarian Labour Code comply with the European norms, such as the European Social 
Charter and Directives 2002/14/EC and 2009/38/EC? The new Labour Code successfully 
cleared away most of the confusion originated in the horizontal dual channel model of Act No 
XXII of 1992; however, my findings concerning the rights of works councils are rather 
negative.  
The new Labour Code clearly favours the instruments of employee participation to 
those of collective bargaining. However, the preference of the lawmaker is by and large 
exhausted in declarations and, in fact, works councils do not possess stronger rights than 
before. The preferential treatment of works council come across not as empowering the works 
councils with more right, rather, as a weakening of the trade unions while works councils 
remains the ‘diluted’ version of the German model, having no considerable power. I would 
summarise the problematic parts of the new Labour Code as follows. 
 There is a fundamental misconception of works council to state that the function of 
works council is to monitor the compliance of employers’ practices with the employment 
regulations. The existing rights of works council are not sufficient to provide effective control 
over employers. The protection of employee representatives is not sufficient. Whereas it is 
uncontested that ‘regular’ members of works council deemed employee representatives (for 
example the regulations concerning confidential information are binding on them), only the 
chairperson is protected against unfair dismissal. This practice obviously goes against the 
requirements set forth by Directive 2002/14 and violates Article 22 of the European Social 
Charter as well as the provisions of ILO Convention No 135.538  
Even though the scope of consultation was enlarged compare to that of the previous 
Labour Code, the right of co-determination was curtailed. The available remedies are not as 
effective as they were before. The new Labour Code introduced substantial changes to the 
system of remedies in case an employer violates the right of consultation or the right of co-
determination of works councils. While the former Labour Code rendered these unlawful 
actions void, the rule of thumb of the new Labour Code has changed. If an employer violates 
the rights to information and consultation, a works council could initiate a non-litigious 
proceeding within five days of the alleged infringement of its consultation or co-
determination rights. The Labour Court decides the case in 15 days. The sanctions related to 
the unlawful practices of employers, eg, the violation of information, consultation and co-
determination rights are not dissuasive enough to prevent the malpractice of employers. 
As Professor Kollonay argues, sanctions and remedies are indispensable instruments 
and “a sine qua non of the information and consultation rights as genuine and enforceable 
human rights.” 539  Forth, without dissuasive sanctions and proper remedies, the right to 
conclude a workplace agreement covering subject matters of a collective agreement is not a 
sign of empowerment of works councils, but a rubber stamp on the workplace rules unilateral 
                                               
538 Hungary ratified ILO Convention No 135 in 1972. 
539Kollonay, Fundamental…, 30. 
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drawn up by employers. Thus, I would highly recommend restoring the provisions of the 
former Labour Code regarding two issues. One is the nullity of employers’ measures which 
are adopted with the violation of the co-determination right of the works councils. I would 
even prefer to extend this sanction with regard to the violation of consultation rights. I believe 
that imposing a fine (which is a common sanction in other EU Member States, as it was 
discussed earlier) would not fit well the traditions of Hungarian industrial relations. The other 
issue with regard I find the provisions of the 1992 Labour Code better is the protection of 
works council members and I believe that the system of full protection should be restored. 
As a conclusion, it would be required to review the provisions concerning works 
councils. Whereas revision of some regulations would require redesigning the industrial 
relations, revisiting sanctions and extending the protection to work council members would be 
easily achievable, yet immediately required to meet the conditions set forth by EU Directives 
and the European Social Charter. However it might occur as an overwhelmingly strong 
statement in a doctoral dissertation, the new Labour Code – in line with other legislative 
measures concerning social dialogue540 –had a significant share in the process which has 
gradually turned collective labour law into vaudeville in Hungary.  
As a normative conclusion, it would be required to review the provisions concerning 
works councils and information and consultation rights of employees in cases of collective 
redundancies and transfer of an undertaking. One is that adequate protection of employee 
representatives need to be ensured. Thus, protection against dismissal and temporary 
reassignment should cover all trade union officers and members of the works council. Two, is 
that dissuasive remedies have to be implemented in case of violation. It could be an 
administrative fine or nullity of the employer’s action, with discretion power of labour courts 
over imposing the adequate one based on the nature of the infringement. Three, employees 
need to have sufficient information and consultation in cases of transfer of an undertaking and 
collective redundancies. Employer’s obligation to consult and negotiate cannot be restricted to 
cases when works council is present at an establishment. The right to information and 
consultation is an individual right of every single employees at an establishment, of which 
they shall not be deprived in the absence of a works council. Tying the right to be consulted to 
the existence of works council is especially dubious with regard to the new rules of election of 
works councils. It shall not be the aim or consequence of any labour regulations to punish 
employees for not electing a standing body for their representation, but to encourage and 
facilitate employee involvement, yet to ensure that employees could exercise their right to 
information and consultation, and by that means, that they are effectively have access to 
information and are being consulted with regard to issues significantly affecting their worklife 
and employment. These modifications are also required to meet the conditions set forth by EU 
Directives and the European Social Charter. 
 
 
                                               
540 Most notably Act XCIII of 2011 on the National Economic and Social Council (Nemzeti Gazdasági és 
Társadalmi Tanács), which abolished tripartite social dialogue in Hungary, or, as a matter of fact, social 
dialogue per se. Another example could be the Permanent Consultation Forum (Versenyszféra és a Kormány 
Állandó Konzultációs Fóruma), which was not even established by a legal instrument. For a similar opinion see, 
J Radnay, ‘Munkajogunk helyzetéről’ (2010) 9-10 Gazdaság és Jog, 33. 
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PART IV 
 
NON-DEMOCRATIC MODELS OF PARTICIPATION 
 
Introduction 
 
It is widely accepted that the different models of employee involvement are influenced by the 
different traditions of industrial relations. Also, many studies prove that political democracy 
and workplace democracy are deeply interconnected.541 However, it is much less researched 
how the social perception of democratic values influences employee involvement. My third 
hypothesis was: 
H3  PARTICIPATION IS SUBJECT TO SIMULTANEOUS RECOGNITION OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 
AND THE FORCE OF SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON THE EXTENT AND REACH OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM. 
Recognition of individual freedom is only possible in democratic environment. The right to 
information and consultation is an individual right, in a sense that it should be enjoyed 
unconditionally by every employee, and which is exercised by the representative body of 
employees542 and it is not possible to have genuine participation in regimes which deny the 
existence or even question the importance of individual freedom. Thus, the simultaneous 
recognition of individual freedom and to the force of social influences on the extent and reach 
of individual freedom are equally important. 543 The social embededdness of individual 
freedom as a democratic value is much dependent on cultural traditions. 
 Japan provides a suitable case of study of the connections between democracy and 
culture. It is a country with a stable constitutional democracy; politically the country has been 
constitutionally and electorally democratic since the end of the Second World War. However, 
democracy in Japan (like in all countries) is far from perfect, and ideal conceptions are in 
contrast to realities. The regulatory concept concerning political and social institutions is 
                                               
541 See for example, Diamond, M.A. and Allcorn, S. ‘Surfacing perversions of democracy in the workplace: A 
contemporary psychoanalytic project’ (2006) Psychoanalysis, űulture & Society; Haque, M.S. ‘Threats to 
workplace democracy’ (2000) 2 Peace Review, 12; Harrison, J.S. and Freeman, R.E. ‘Democracy in and around 
organizations: Is organizational democracy worth the effort?’ (200Ő) Academy of Management Executive; 
Turner, L. ‘Participation, democracy and efficiency in the US workplace’ (1997) 4 Industrial Relations Journal, 
28, 309-313. 
542 E Ales ‘Information and űonsultation within the undertaking’ in Recasting Worker Involvement? Recent 
trends in information, consultation and co-determination or worker representatives in a Europeanized Arena’ 
(Kluwer, 2009) 13. Similarly, Otto Kahn-Freund argued that the right to strike is an individual right; see, O 
Kahn-Freund ‘The Right to Strike: Its scope and limitations’ (Strasbourg, 1974, Council of Europe), 5 ff. 
543 A Sen, ‘Development as Freedom (1998), xii. 283-89. 
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similar to that of the Western models, however, it emerges form a fundamentally different 
cultural tradition. 
 Under the Meiji Constitution544democracy was not a principal value of the political 
system, and the Constitution was to facilitate national cohesion and centralized authority.545 
Japan desperately needed to industrialize and modernize quickly to protect its sovereignty 
from imperial Western powers; thus, a political institutional system serving a cohesive 
government with minimal opposition was seen as the best means to achieve this goal. After 
Japan’s surrender, the American occupying forces aimed to transform Japan to a peaceful 
democracy by establishing fundamentally different political, social and economic conditions. 
One of the most important changes was a new constitution, replacing imperial fiat by popular 
sovereignty. On one hand, as a result, Japan’s contemporary constitution provides one of the 
world’s most extensive catalogues of citizens’ rights.546 On the other hand, daily practices 
reveal many specific examples in which realities fall short of the constitutional ideal. Three 
major aspects are usually mentioned in this context: social discrimination, gender equality and 
the intrusion of the State.547At the same time, Japanese education system promotes conformity 
over individuality. 548  Despite the constitutional guarantees, the Japanese parliament is 
contested to be the highest organ of state power, and claimed to be instead the highest ratifier 
of decisions made elsewhere, like business, bureaucracy and political parties.549 
My research interest here was what are the connection points of a circumvented 
political democracy and that of a decision making processes at workplaces. My assumption 
here was that without democratic culture on a micro-environment, such as a workplace, 
democracy cannot flourish on a higher level either; therefore, the system that governs 
employee involvement does influence political democracy. The research question I examined 
under this chapter is How traditional decision-making patterns at workplaces influence 
employee involvement in Japan? (Q7). 
 The state-socialist model of participation in Hungary constitutes an interesting 
research area for many reasons. First, I aim to demonstrate that participation is a genuine and 
natural need of employees. Participation movements were not linked to property rights, it 
arose as an ordinary need to boost productivity and control business activity to increase firms’ 
income for mutual benefit of owners and workers. Second, the Hungarian Communist Party 
noticed the potential power of shop committees very early and used all possible tools to get 
them under their influence. This effort proves that employees are able to demonstrate 
significant weight in both economics and politics through participation. However, the early 
                                               
544 The Meiji Constitution prevailed in Japan from 1889 unitl 1947. 
545 T J Pempel, ‘Japanese Democracy and Political Culture: A Comparative Perspective’ (1992) 25 Political 
Science and Politics, 5. 
546 Among the most prominent ones: right to equality and the absence of discrimination (Art. 14), public officers 
are elected through secret ballot based no universal suffrage (Art. 15), The right to petition for political changes 
(Art. 16), the right to freedom of conscience (Art. 19), religious freedom (Art. 20), right to free speeches, press 
and expression (Art 21), freedom of residence and occupation (Art. 22), academic freedom (Art. 23), the right to 
a minimum standard of a wholesome and cultured living (Art. 25), the right to an equal education (Art. 26.), the 
right to workers to organize and to bargain collectively (Art. 28), the right to access to courts (Art. 35). 
547 See, for example, E Krauss and T Ishida, Japanese Democracy, (Pittsburgh, 1989, University of Pittsburgh 
Press), G McCormack and Y Sugimoto, Democracy in Contemporary Japan (Armonk, 1986, Sharpe). 
548 K Ferber, A siker ára, 2nd Edition (Budapest, 2014, Syllabux). 
549 T J Pempel, ‘Japanese Democracy and Political Culture: A Comparative Perspective’ (1992) 25 Political 
Science and Politics, 11. 
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years of employee participation after the Second World War has been rather under-
researched. Here my aim is to fill this gap in the history of employee participation in 
Hungary. 
Third, employee participation and political participation, as argued above, are 
interconnected in many ways. Genuine involvement in the conduct of business protects the 
human dignity of workers, as through participation decisions are not made above their heads. 
Employees in such way could experience the efficacy of democratic decision making. 
However, when participation is used merely as a window-dressing and employees are ripped 
off their involvement rights, anger and sense of betrayal are soon followed by political 
passivity. When one is disappointed in her power to form her micro-environment, such as a 
workplace, it is hard to believe that efforts would be paid out on a larger scale. Likewise, 
when democratic values are not respected in the political field, grass root movements 
fostering democratic decision making would also likely to be suppress sed. Hungary’s case 
explains this well: participation movements had great importance in politically tense historical 
moments, such as the recovery period after the Second World War and the 1956 revolution. It 
was widely believed that democratic control over workplaces and democratic political regime 
are interconnected. However, after democratic movements were turned down, citizens by and 
large became politically passive and parallel to this, as employees they also lost interest in 
participation at workplaces. The historical perspective helped me to observe these phenomena 
in unbiased. Also, the rich materials of the Trade Union Archives and the Institute of Political 
History offered an enticing research challenge. 
What interested me in this context was in connection with the state-socialist model 
was whether participation could function in a genuine manner in an autocratic regime? (Q8) 
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Chapter 1 
The Japanese Model of Participation 
 
The rapid economic growth in Japan, also known as the ‘Japanese economic miracle’ has 
gained much attention all over the world. Indeed, the Japanese GDP got doubled and then 
tripled in the 1960s compare to the years following the Second World War.550 The ‘life-long 
employment’ model widely used in Japan significantly contributed to this success. I examined 
whether socio-cultural reasons, especially the surviving feudal patterns in decision making 
processes could influence employee involvement model of contemporary Japan. I found this 
issue particularly interesting. The Japanese value system of ‘wa’ promotes a non-conflictual 
dispute resolution and cherishes the harmony of interests in decision making. However, as it 
was pointed out by Otto Kahn-Freund, it is a fake belief that industrial relations could ever 
become harmonious due to the inherent differences of interest between labour and 
management and conflict is not only natural but also necessary to resolve these contradictions. 
It could be assumed that the outstandingly peaceful industrial relations in Japan after the 
1970s are due to the ‘wa’ spirit on workplace level. 
Japan has gone through rapid economic and political transformation after the war, but 
such change was not accompanied by the evolvement of democratic values in the society.551 
However the legislative environment has changed noticeably in favour of employee 
participation over the years, deficiency in workers’ influencing ability is still remarkable. The 
‘life-long employment’ system, a flagship institution of Japanese labour market, completely 
lacks democratic decision making processes and its underlying philosophy has attempted 
employee participation to gain acceptance in the corporate culture. On the other hand, 
possibly due to the weak perception of democracy in a society as whole, employees working 
outside of the life-long employment system have not been able to implement participation 
rights at their workplaces either, despite the fact that the legal environment has persuaded 
labour and management to include such institution more fully to their decision making 
processes. 
However, the ‘democratic ethos’ surrounding the wa principle has faded in my eyes. 
Both my desk researches and personal experiences with traditional Japanese enterprises made 
me think that the long praised decision making process at workplaces are neither democratic 
nor harmonious. I believe that employees’ behavior at workplaces is chiefly motivated by 
fear. A fear of being stigmatized by representing personal preferences over communal ones, 
the fear of discharged from the group for going against its alleged interest or ultimately of 
                                               
550 G Űai ’Japan's Economic Dilemma: The Institutional Origins of Prosperity and Stagnation’ (New York & 
Cambridge, 2001, Cambridge University Press). 
551 See for example, M Schalber, ’The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia’ 
(OUP, 1985); M E. Caprio and Y Sugita, ’Democracy in Occupied Japan: The U.S. Occupation and Japanese 
Politics and Society’ (Taylor and Francis, 2007); űJ űoyne, ’After War: The Political Economy of Exporting 
Democracy’ (Stanford University Press, 2008). 
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losing a stable job. In the patriotic workplace environment the assumed answer is always 
given together with the question and it is hard not to agree with it. Conflicts do exist under the 
surface but it is not advised to take them up. However, before getting to the analysis 
concerning participation, it is necessary to provide a brief introduction to the Japanese 
employment system in general. 
 
I  Introduction to the Japanese Employment System 
 
Customarily Japanese employment system could be characterized by four major, deeply 
interconnected elements: life-long employment system, enterprise-based trade unions, 
cooperation-oriented industrial relations, cultural traditions. While these elements are 
interrelated, due to the subject matter of the current thesis, special attention is given to the 
nature of the industrial relations. In that sense, the nature of the industrial conglomerates 
(kaisha), still dominant on the labour market,552 has utmost importance. 
The most important ‘battlefield’ for collective bargaining is the enterprise, and trade 
unions generally represent so called ‘regular’ employees, working with the frame of the life-
long employment system. Despite of the numerous incidents, Japanese industrial relations 
have been rather peaceful in the last decades.553 Among other factors, here three have to be 
mentioned: one is the influence of the Japanese Productivity Centre on economy and 
industrial relations. Established in 1955, the aim of the Centre has been to improve the output 
of Japanese economy and to enhance the market position of Japanese companies on a global 
scale. The support of such movement within the Japanese society, including that of the trade 
unions, has been great.554 Cooperation between management and labour is one of the key 
elements of the policy pursued by the Productivity Centre, as industrial peace largely 
contributes to greater productivity. Two is the role of Shunto, the spring wage offensive. Most 
of the wage negotiations are taking place every year in April and May in Japan. Started in 
1955, its aim is to coordinate enterprise-level wage negotiations across firms and industries. 
First, the national labour organizations and industry-wide trade union federations set the goal 
for wage increases555 and the negotiation times for each industry based on the conditions of 
the national economy. Then the leading enterprise union negotiate the wages within the frame 
                                               
552 However, the number of people working for large conglomerates has been gradually shrinking; it is about 
20% of the total workforce. Paralel to this phenomenon, the proportion of regular employees has been also 
getting lower, in 2010 around 60% of the total workforce enjoyed the benefits of traditional employment.  See, 
the JILPT’s annual research at http://www.jil.go.jp/english/lsj/general/2013-2014/2-5.pdf (last retrieved on 
November 13, 2014) 44 ff. 
553 For a detailed explanation on the pluralist trade union system and the types of conflicts see, J Hajdú, ‘A japán 
munkaügyi kapcsolatok sajátosságai a kezdetektĘl 199ő-ig’ (Szeged, 2006, Pólay Elemér Alapítvány) 18 and 98 
ff. 
554 See, J Hajdú, op cit, 18. 
555 It has to be noted that in the past five years there was an agreement between the representatives of employers, 
trade unions and the government, that no wage increament could be implemented due to the fragile status of the 
Japesen economy. For a detailed analysis see, http://www.jil.go.jp/english//lsj/general/2013-2014/4-3.pdf (last 
retrieved on November 13, 2014), 116 ff. 
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set by the national organizations, after which the remaining unions do their negotiations, 
following the pattern. Since the recommended wage increment is set on a higher level, the 
enterprise-based unions do not need to take up a fight with the employers on salaries. This 
pattern has been largely contributed to industrial peace in the past decades. Three is the 
cultural tradition of ‘wa’, the golden rule of harmony, implying a peaceful unity and 
conformity within a social group, in which members prefer the continuation of a harmonious 
community over their personal interests.556 
The characteristics of the Japanese society, homogeneity, non-confrontation dispute 
resolution, collective decision-making patterns and social unity in recognizing the importance 
of economic growth of the nation also have utmost importance in forming industrial 
relations.557 
Major legal instruments governing employment relations are Article 27 and 28 of the 
Constitution, declaring the right to work, labour union rights and the policy of formulating 
work standards, the right of workers to organize and to act collectively. Together with Article 
13 on the right of personal autonomy, Article 25 on the right of livelihood, Articles 22 and 29 
on liberty of contract and guarantee of property, they effectuate basic rights in the field of 
labour relations. The primary legal standards governing individual labour relations include the 
1947 “Labour Standards Law,” the 198ő “Law Respecting the Improvement of the Welfare of 
Women Workers, Including the Guarantee of Equal Opportunity and Treatment between Men 
and Women in Employment,” the 1976 “Security of Wage Payment Law,” the 1972 
“Industrial Safety and Health Law,” and the 19Ő7 “Workers’ Accident Compensation 
Insurance Law.” The most important piece of legislation concerning collective labour law is 
the 1949 Act on Trade Unions.  
  
II Development of Industrial Relations  
 
The political and economic democratization principally driven by the Occupation forces after 
World Word II was not accompanied by the democratization of the society and the lack of 
societal changes prevented the development of industrial democracy.558  
Essays on Meiji restoration often point out how smooth the transition was to 
capitalism: the end of shogunate is intertwined with economic changes; the industrial growth 
and modernization brought massive development to infrastructure and production 
accompanied by waves of migration from the countryside to the urban centres; the openings 
of the ports and the reforms in the monetary system explained the emerging importance of 
                                               
556 ű Genzberger, ‘Japan Űusiness: The Portable Encyclopedia for Doing Űusiness With Japan’ (199Ő, World 
Trade Press) 155. 
557 See, J Hajdú, op cit. 81. 
558 M E űaprio and Y Sugita, ‘Democracy in Occupied Japan: The US Occupation and Japanese Politics and 
Society’ (2007, Taylor and Francis). 
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urban merchants.559However, regarding the internal relations of the production units, much 
less development and modernization could be traced. The feudal relations were deep-rooted in 
the society and tied production methods to the commodity production patterns with its master-
servant relations, and, together with the restriction on labour movements, deprived the 
labourers to establish their own rights and protection system to counterbalance capital’s 
power. The power of the head of household included over its labourer made the enjoyment of 
any such right dependent of the goodwill of social superiors560. 
After the death of Emperor Meiji, without the existence of ‘citizenry’, the traditional 
patriarchal characteristic of the society was rapidly re-established561 and supplemented the 
ideology surrounding the tennosei: the imperial system based on the divine power562 of the 
emperor, characterised by loyalty and filial piety. 563  Not so surprisingly, the few labour 
regulations existed were almost all about prohibition;564 most remarkably, the freedom of 
association was banned and sanctioned by criminal measures.  
To counteract the negative impact of the high turnover, the large-scale businesses had 
started to develop personnel policies, at first the seniority based wage system, on which basis 
the ‘Japanese Employment System’ eventually emerged. 565  Although not yet overly 
sophisticated, this system offered considerable alternative to the patriarchal relationship, 
which was based on devotion and gratitude towards the owner of the business. 
Factory workers could not hope for much support from trade unions. Even before the 
ban on trade unionism, organized labour’s approach was quite different from the European 
pattern. A petition drawn-up by the Japan Railway Company illustrates well the disparity: 
“[we] humble workers, do sincerely feel that deep gratitude for the many life-sustaining 
benefits the company has bestowed upon its workers must be expressed. However, pressed by 
circumstances ... [we] humbly point out that it would be most fortunate if the Company would, 
on the basis of its consideration of the situation, judge the above points.”566  The major 
achievements of the union were the Factory Law in 1919 and its revision in 1923, and the 
Labour Disputes Conciliation Law in 1926, was a de facto recognition of unions was 
replacing the previous system whereas police had been the agent for conciliation.567 However, 
strikes were soon prohibited; union activity was first restricted in 1936 than replaced by the 
‘industrial patriotic units’ in 1939, one of the indications of the dark valley of the 1940s.568 
Overall, after the total defeat of Japan in World War II, reforms initiated by the 
Occupation were thrown onto a relatively immature system of industrial relations. The major 
pieces of labour legislation were not products of a gradual, bottom-up developments and 
                                               
559 For example J Hirscheime and T Yui, ‘The Development of Japanese Business (Allen and Unwin, London, 
1981). 
560 Woodiwiss (1992:28) 
561 Ibid. 
562 The Meiji Constitution defined the Emperor (Tenno) as "sacred and inviolable" with its first chapter stressing 
the Tenno as the symbol of an unbroken imperial lineage dating back to the world's creation 
563 More on constitutional loyalty: Yukio 1918:46-47 
564 A partial exception form general prohibition was a small number of skilled workers in some of the large 
enterprises in shipyards and ironworks, who were relatively free to resign and they had the possibility to bargain 
– individually - over their wages. (Woodiwiss 1992:37) 
565 Woodiwiss (1992:51) 
566 SE Marsland, The birth of Japanese Labour Movement, University of Hawaii Press, 1989, p. 94. 
567 D Űaker ’The Trade Union Movement in Japan’ (1965-66) 23 International Socialism, 19-26. 
568 Association for Serving the Nation – Sangyo Hokokukai or Sampō 
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therefore their impacts on the unprepared workers and capital was unique too. The 
Occupation’s labour policy, alongside the economic reconstruction, was a part of the 
defeudalisation process.569 It included the total demilitarisation and the transformation of the 
social and economic forces that had had a major role in the “imperialist adventure” of 
Japan.570  Reforms encouraging the development of peaceful and democratic forces were 
implemented, yet industrial recovery was secondary on the SűAP’s agenda until 1948.571 
 
A “Schoolhouses of Democracy” - The Trade Union Law  
 
Changing the industrial relations was on the top priorities for SCAP in 1945.572  General 
MacArthur believed that trade unions are “schoolhouses of democracy”, and re-establishing 
them would help preventing future aggression and supply workers with democratic ideals, as 
well as serve as a general index of political liberalisation.573 Obstacles were cleared away 
soon. The reactionary patriotic units were abolished and former political prisoners, among 
whom there were many prominent labour activists, were released in October 1945. The 
Labour Union Law was said to be modelled after the American Wagner Act.574 However, the 
right to organise, bargain collectively and strike had already been existed due to the Factory 
Law, and dispute conciliation had also been established by the Labour Disputes Conciliation 
Law.575 On the other hand, as it was discussed above, these rights were neither deeply rooted 
in the society, not well protected by the state. 
The newly enacted law had a revolutionary impact on the long-repressed labour 
movements. In a couple of months, unionisation rate surpassed the pre-war peak and the 
upsurge had been continued until 1949, when the unionisation rate was more than 50 per 
cent.576 After the surrender, the corporate leaders, still under the shock of total defeat, had not 
developed a coherent economic vision. Trade Unions, on the other hand, via shop-floor 
activities, managed to create their own voice in how to run the company, brought up plans for 
industrial recovery, and pressed for higher wages. 577  Trade Unions had major impact on 
reordering the economy, and through their members they had decision making power in the 
everyday work, effectively realising economic democracy.578. 
                                               
569 Takemae 2003:307 
570 Ibid. 
571 In 1948 the pressure of the Cold War made it unquestionable that the United States interests were best 
supported if Japan had become a powerful player of the world market. 
572 Supreme Command of Allied Powers 
573 Takemae 2003: 311 
574 National Labour Relations Act 
575 Yet not on a prefectural level, which was established by the 1945 Trade Union Law 
576 The number of the union members was around 7 million workers. Schonberger 1989:115 
577 Takemae 2003:314 
578 Members of the Labour Division rapidly recognized that the enormous success of unions was in fact the result 
of the desperate conditions workers faced. The inflation rate after the surrender was 987 per cent, which had 
dramatic effect on real income. Food shortage led to massive street demonstrations. Brutal working conditions, 
especially in mines, where majority of the workers were non-Japanese escalated and workers actions were 
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General MacArthur, who had impressively claimed that history of labour movement 
had not seen such a rapid development in such a short time-frame, on 20 May, warned 
Japanese people that such mass movements, often resulted in violence were against both 
orderly governance and the purpose and security of the Occupation. SCAP promptly drafted a 
harsh public security ordinance, sentencing those who are engaging in ‘act prejudicial to 
Occupational objectives’ to prohibitive fines and prison terms of up to 10 years at hard 
labour.579 The ‘schoolhouses of democracy’ seemed to be shut down. The formal prohibition 
of the strike was a turning point in the Occupation.580 It was a denial of workers basic right, 
which had just been declared by the Occupation two years before. The reasoning, that the 
Japanese economy and society was not mature enough to deal with the general work-stoppage 
recalls the patriarchal rhetoric of the tennosei.  
 
B Labour Laws in the Post-war Era 
 
The same patriarchal tone is detected by Woodiwiss in the way how the New Constitution of 
Japan581 declares the rights and duties of workers.582 Articles 25-28 deal with the right to 
work, stating that “[in] all spheres of life, the State shall use its best endeavours for the 
promotion and extension of social welfare and security, and of public health.” Woodiwiss 
claims that in such legal environment, other labour laws, namely the Labour Relations 
Adjustment Law of 1946 and the Labour Standard Law of 1947 had no choice but follow the 
pre-war state partiarchalism.583 
The Labour Relations Adjustment Law (LRAL) starts off with a rather imperative 
language584 stating that in the name of industrial peace and economic development, labour 
shall only exercise the rights outlined in the Trade Union Law as an ultimate solution. 
Therefore, as Woodiwiss points it out, the employment relation in Japan remained very much 
a status relation rather than a contractual one.585 
Labour reforms carried out by SCAP were influenced by the ideology of New Deal.586 
They supposed to be built on the already existing patterns of union representation, leaving 
very little space for other means of workers’ involvement. The Labour Standards Law (LSL), 
effective of September 1, 1947 was a set of minimum standards, providing for a broad and 
                                                                                                                                                   
suppressed by the Japanese police. Japanese government officials and business leaders were much afraid that 
under such conditions Communists would take over labour movements, and they were determined to support 
American policy makers to stop the radicals. 
579 Imperial Ordinance No 311, issued on 12 June, 1946. 
580 Takemae 2003:320-321 
581 Also drafted by SCAP 
582 Woodiwiss 1989: 102 
583 More on the legislation: Toyoda 2007:68 
584 Woodiwiss 1989:110 
585 Woodiwiss 1989:111 
586 Takemae 2003:324 
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detailed protection of workers,587 which could be explained by the fact that no such regulation 
had existed in the pre-war era.588 In 1947 the Labour Division also adopted other measures in 
order to modernize employment practices. It contained the Unemployment Insurance Law, 
and the amendment of the Workman’s űompensation Insurance Law to complement the 
compensation of the victims of the industrial accidents and diseases with regulations related to 
a mandatory health insurance programme. 
Though the Labour Standard Law together with the other elements of the labour 
legislation has been modified throughout the years, it has never been made an explicit move 
in favour of the life-time employment system. Based on the text of the laws the emergence 
and popularity of the system could not be explained or even be understood. 
 
III Specific Issues of the Japanese Employment System 
 
The Japanese employment system (or ‘life-time employment system’) is usually characterized 
by the seniority based promotion and wage systems and the enterprise-based trade unions. 
The methods by which the promotion and wages are determined have been heavily discussed 
in numerous scholarly papers,589 however, the sociological background of group dynamics are 
not commonly examined in these analyses. The key to understand the nature of employee 
participation lies in the fundamental mechanisms of groups therefore analysis from the 
perspective of sociology is vital.  
 
A Corporate Groups 
 
According to Nakane’s comprehensive analysis on Japanese society,590 it shall be assumed 
that workplaces have dedicated role in the employees as well as their families’ life. Nakane 
argues that the kinship which is normally seen as a basic unit of human attachment is replaced 
                                               
587 Covering the labour contract, notice period, wages, holidays, health and safety regulations, protection of 
female and juvenile workers, training, accident compensation, a disciplinary code and dormitory regulations 
588 The Labour Standard Law was not originally planned by SCAP. It was eventually resulted from the joint 
efforts of Teramtoto Kosaku, a social bureaucrat of the Welfare Ministry and Golda G. Stander, the head of 
Division’s Wages and Working űonditions Űranch of the Labour Division. Rumour had about it that the act was 
later called “the baby of Teramoto and Stander.”  
589 For an insightful overview see, T Araki, Labour and Employment Law in Japan (Tokyo, 2002, JILPT), 17 ff; 
and T Hanami, Labour Relations in Japan Today (Tokyo, 1976, Kodansha International) 19 ff. 
590 Nakane 1972 
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in Japan by a personalised relation to a corporate group based on work.591 In the post-war 
society the company is conceived as a household institution (ie) and all the employees are 
qualifying as members of the ‘household’, having the employer as its head. As one becomes a 
member of the family by birth, an employee becomes a member of the company by 
employment, and such event – considered as a second birth – is surrounded by a spectacular 
ceremony.592 
The family embraces its members as a whole; likewise the company engages the 
employees’ whole personality not only the capacity during working hours, and readily takes 
responsibility not only for the employees but for their families as well. 593 This is called 
marugakae, which could be translated to English as ‘under patronage’. The company has a 
fairly patriotic approach towards the employees, providing workplace security and more or 
less steady employment conditions. As a return, the employer requires unconditional loyalty 
to the group (eg, the employer) and sacrifice of the employee’s ties to other groups, including 
emotional participation594 – as the Japanese proverb reflects this phenomena quite adequately: 
no one can serve two masters. The Japanese concept of such ‘one-ness’ refers to the ultimate 
integrating power of the group which restricts the behaviour of its members, including that of 
the leader himself.595 
However it is crucial to make a careful decision who is eligible to become a member 
of the group. Practical knowledge or theoretical understanding are secondary for hiring, 
moreover, cognitive skills too are seldom measured.596 Applicants – usually university or 
college students in their final year – taking the company’s test are ranked by their cooperative 
spirit, sense of balance and executive ability – skills indispensable for survival. 
 
B Derukuiwa Utareru – The Nail That Sticks Out Shall Be 
Hammered Down 
 
The vertical relations among the group members have principal significance in creating group 
cohesion, resulting in a delicate and complex system of ranking. One’s place in the hierarchy 
could be based on various factors:597 age, time of entry into the organisation, length of service 
and the like. The vertical relations define the individual’s place within the group. One can 
clearly find his position at the workplace by knowing who is senior (sempai), junior (kohai) or 
                                               
591 Nakane 1972:4 
592 Freshmen participate in a ceremony when they officially become a member of the company, usually gathering 
in the main hall of the company to listen to leaders’ speeches which is often followed by the company’s anthem. 
After the ceremony a general introduction to the company’s values takes place, such principles should be 
memorized and followed with respect. 
593  For example established companies provide company housing, hospital benefits, family recreation 
opportunities and monetary gifts for family events such as marriage, birth or death. 
594 Nakane 1972:8 
595 Nakane 1972:14 
596 It is also in line with the Japanese on-the job training system. 
597 This can be detected not only in the companies’ structure, but also in the field of academia or art. 
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equal (douki) to him – categories which would be blended to simple term of colleague in the 
Western word. Once the rank is established, it is applied to all circumstances regarding social 
life and individual activity.598  Originated in the specificity of Japanese language, not knowing 
the internal relations of the group makes it impossible even to speak to fellow workers. 
Albeit stable, a system based on unchangeable social manners is rigid. Institutional 
position and title defines the employee’s position in the company599 and individual traits or 
achievements are overlooked. It links to one of the characteristics of the Japanese 
employment system, which is addressed as the ‘seniority based promotion and wage systems’. 
With other words, wages are not related to either individual or to the company’s performance 
(like sales, profit or market share growth) but correlate with the employee’s position in the 
company, while promotion is directly linked to the years of continued service.600  
Extreme consciousness on hierarchy affects intra-group communications. A rank-and-
file employee is not supposed to talk directly to a manager or a director, skipping the 
immediate supervisor.  Junior members carefully avoid any open confrontations with their 
superiors. The avoidance of the expression of one’s negative opinion rooted in the fear that it 
may disrupt the harmony of the group, which could easily jeopardize one’s position within the 
group.601 Therefore the expression of opinion in a group is pretty much determined by the 
group member’s position which negatively influences the limits of freedom of speech. 
Opposing the majority could lead to isolation within the group602 and could be subjected to 
various disciplinary measures.  
The disciplinary measures implemented for breaching the rules depend on the grade of 
violation of the group harmony. For example, in a milder case, the regular employee is 
assigned to branch which is far away from the headquarter, more severe breach of the rules 
might be resulted in being transferred to a subsidiary of the parent company – in most cases 
with considerably inferior working conditions. The next step is when the employee is 
dismissed, or in the worst case is subject of disciplinary discharge.603 
As a part of marugakae, violations of the rules and duties of the employee status 
contains a special cohort: misconduct in one’s private life. The Supreme űourt has 
widespread precedents related to disciplinary punishment in that area. Though, disciplinary 
discharge is only valid if it is proven that the employees words and deeds in the private life 
                                               
598 Nakane 1972: 26-28. 
599  Therefore in the society too: a superior in one place remains superior in every social interactions, in 
restaurants, at home, in the street; even when the wives of the employees meet, they are adjusting their manners 
to the rank of the husbands at the company, 
600 On the other hand, certainly there are not as many managerial positions at a company as many employees. 
Therefore the companies operate with a rather complex internal structure with several layers filled with great 
many deputy-managers and the like. Most of these positions do not bear real authority and decision making 
power. Though it is commonly known that these employees titles do not in reality reflects to their importance in 
the company, the still growing salaries are somewhat compensating the slight social disgrace. 
601 Nakane 1972:35. 
602 The sometimes extreme manifestation of “bullying” among students in elementary or secondary school (or 
even at the university) is another example for isolation. A further historical proof goes back to the samurai era, 
when households breaching the rules of the village community were deprived from the community’s help which 
was a question of life and death. The Japanese proverb ‘one can live without cousins but not without neighbours’ 
reflects the importance of the acceptance (and supremacy) of the group.  
603 Disciplinary discharge is the capital measurement of disciplinary measures. It is normally carried out without 
notice and without payment of the allowance in lieu of a notice, and all or part of the retirement allowance is not 
paid. For further details see: Sugeno 2002:423 
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are directly related to the enterprise’s activities, or cause a loss in the society’s estimation of 
the enterprise.604 Disciplinary punishment could be exercised for violation of the duty of 
loyalty too. An employee would violate his duty for example by participating in a boycott of 
the employer’s manufactures, or distributing handbills attacking the company.605  
Due to the above described specificities together with highly company specific 
professional knowledge resulted from the on-the-job training system makes re-employment 
hardly possible, coupled with the psychological and emotional burden of being a newcomer in 
a group. 
Following Nakane’s theory on the fundamental structure of the vertical organization, 
after a newcomer enters a group, due to the rigid hierarchy already established, the new 
member cannot change his relative position within the organization, and the individual’s 
group participation is regulated by his relation to the other group members.606 In marugakae, 
spending time with co-workers after business hours or during the weekend in pubs or on 
sports events are important to build up a social capital, which capital is manifested in higher 
salary and position.607 The later stage and to the lower position one enters, the lesser chances 
that he will ever become an established member of the new group. 
 
C Leadership and Decision Making Processes 
 
The difficulties of channelling one’s opinion upwards in the hierarchy would lead to 
organization inefficiency if it was not counterbalanced by the excessive power of top-down 
communication.608 The authority of the seniors is unquestionable and juniors ought to carry 
out orders without the slightest sign of hesitation. Refusal or even questioning is a trace of 
disloyalty and considered as a violation of the group integrity.609  Therefore, the mobilizing 
power of the leaders is quite outstanding.610 
                                               
604 For example in the Koketsu Chugoku Shisha case (Supr. Ct. 1st Petty Bench, Feb 28, 1974, 28 Civ. Cases 66) 
the employee was lawfully subjected to disciplinary discharge for getting drunk during the night and forcing 
himself into somebody’s private residence, as it caused an “exceptional harm to the company’s social 
reputation”. In the Nihon Kokan case (Supr. Ct. 2nd Petty Bench, Mar. 15, 1974, 28 Civil Cases 265) the 
discharge of the employee who was arrested and prosecuted for participating in a demonstration opposing the 
expansion of the American Army base was judged void, as the employee was “only one of 30,000 employees”, 
and his sole action did not cause exceptional dishonour to the company. 
605 Kansai Denryoku, Supr. Ct. 1st Petty Bench, Sept. 16, 1983, 1094 Judgments 121 – the distribution of the 
handbills in company housing violated enterprise order, because of the danger that it would provoke employee 
disloyalty (emphasis added). Sugeno 2002: 435 Note 39. 
606 Nakane 1972:41 
607 Marosi 1985:61 
608 Nakane 1972:52 
609 On decision making processes in academia see Ferber 2012:152-153 
610 Japanese employment contract hardly define the scope or location of the job. The reasons why an employee is 
not hired for a specific job but as a member of the company are various yet linked to the mobilization power of 
the management allowing them to transfer the employees to job content or work location spanning for substantial 
period of time to meet business needs without modification of the contract. It is also linked to the generalist-
oriented management policies related to the on-the-job trainings. 
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Any popularity or recognition awarded to the individual shall be enjoyed by the group 
and not the individual and no individual popularity shall exceed that of the senior or boss, 
otherwise the harmony of group is breached.611 Individual freedom of action is also limited by 
the radius of the group, actions shall always be for the group and decision making is allowed 
only in direction provided for by the group. Someone who contributes little can remain 
comfortably within the group as long as he remains loyal to it.612 Thus a capable member 
might encounter difficulties when he wants to remain the part of the group. Leadership could 
be attained by either waiting for one’s turn in the seniority ladder or by leaving the group and 
forming a new one.613 
On the other hand, the leader of the group is far from autocratic. In fact, the better and 
stronger the leader, the more strongly he is able to tie the subordinates emotionally. In this 
paternalistic relation protection is repaid with dependence, affection with loyalty.614Another 
characteristic of the system is that the weaknesses of the leader are counterbalanced by the 
strengths of his subordinates.  Since promotion in the life-time employment system is based 
on length of service and not on individual merits, it is not essential for the superior to be 
outstanding in terms of skills. Thus the leader is never independent or separable from the 
group, but a part of the organization up to the point that he has almost no personal identity and 
surrenders himself for the interest of the group.615 
This mutual dependence is manifested in the consensus-looking decision making 
system of ringi-sei. In ringi-sei the decision making right is not dedicated to a specific 
member of the group, but all input is seemingly considered before the final conclusion. Thus 
the leader does not directly force his will on juniors but let them present their ideas freely for 
discussion. In case of disagreement, the leader mediates between the opposing factions to find 
group consensus. Given the strong ties of senior and junior members of the group, the 
majority opinion quickly emerges without logical examination of the given problem. Group 
cohesion is strong, therefore no individual liability (not even that of the leader) is presumed in 
case of mistakes. 
Though it is often labelled as democratic decision making process, due to the 
interdependence of the group members and their leader, balance and stability within the group 
can only be maintained on the expense of the minority.616 The marugakae does not allow 
individuals to take their own actions or decision, as in every moment they are controlled by 
the group. Joint decision making blurs the boundaries of leadership and – at least on the 
surface – enhances group cohesion. Yet the lack of clear responsibilities and liability 
indirectly increases the individual’s dependence on the group. 
  
                                               
611 Japanese put a lot of emphasis on group harmony or wa, the harmonious integration of group members which 
has multiple layers. 
612 Nakane 1972;83 
613 Nakane 1972:49 
614 Nakane 1972: 64 
615 Nakane 1972:57, 69. In fact there is no Japanese expression for leadership, it is explained by the senior-junior 
(oyabun-kobun) relationship. 
616 Nakane 1972:53 
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IV  Employee Participation 
 
Industrial relations in Japan are quite decentralized; most of the bargaining is taking place on 
enterprise-level. The trade Union Law defines what a collective agreement is by stipulating 
that a “collective agreement between a trade union and an employer or an employers’ 
organisation concerning conditions of work and other matters which is put in writing and is 
either signed by or with names affixed with seals by both of the parties concerned”.617 Even 
though the collective agreement usually is an outcome of collective bargaining, the law does 
not require the collective agreement to be a result of a collective bargaining. Thus, collective 
agreement concluded in other types of negotiations like joint labour management 
consultation, mediation, settlement and the like could, to the extent possible be recognized as 
satisfying the above definition.618 Likewise, there is no sharp demarcation line between the 
institutions of collective bargaining and joint labour-management consultations, the two major 
forums where negotiations take place. 
 The functions of an enterprise-based collective agreement, which is the predominant 
form in Japan, are threefold. One is to establish and to secure standards of treatment of 
workers in the employment relationship for a prescribed period of time, two is to establish the 
rules concerning the relations between unions and employers, and three is to systematize 
various types of union participation in certain management decisions.  
 Another important aspect to be mentioned is the legal regulation of work rules. Work 
rules – practically drawn up by employers regularly employing ten or more employees619 – 
have a powerful function to the working life of employees at a workplace. Various conditions, 
such a wages or working hours could be uniformly established by an employer, thus the 
lawmaker introduced a guarantee system which aims to protect workers against the unilateral 
will of an employer. These are that the works rules have to be made known to employees, 
there are statutory limits regarding the content of the work rules, most notably the supremacy 
of collective agreements over work rules, also there is administrative supervision to ensure 
that those limits are observed, and that work rules need to reflect workers’ opinion, requiring 
those opinions to be requested in the course of formulating such rules.620 
 However, these guarantees are rather week, especially with regard to the procedure 
which supposed to ensure employee involvement in the drawing up of the work rules. In 
drawing up and changing the work rules, the employer is required to ask the opinion of a trade 
union organized by a majority of the workers at the workplace concerned, where such trade 
union exists, or of a person representing a majority of the workers, where such trade union 
does not exist (so called majority representative).621 It is compulsory to submit the work rules 
to the labour administration authority, and an indispensable item of the submission process is 
                                               
617 Section 14 of Act of 1 June, 1949 The Trade Union Law (労働組合法 (rodo-kumiaho)). 
618 K Sugeno, Japanese Employement and Labor Law (Tokyo, 2002, Univeristy of Tokyo Press and Univerity of 
California Press) 578. 
619 Section 89 Para 1 of the Labour Standards Law 
620 K Sugeno, supra, 110. 
621 Section 90 Para 1 of the Labour Standards Law. 
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the document setting forth the opinion of the trade union or the employees’ representative. 
Though the employees’ opinion is channeled in and made express even at the administrative 
authority, this right only obligates the employer to request the employees’ opinion, while the 
employer does not need to discuss the content of the work rule with the employees’ 
representative nor the employer is bound to their opinion by all means.622 
The Labour Standard Law (LSL)623 allows employers to regulate issues related to 
basic elements of working conditions to the detriment of employees once a labour-
management workplace agreement is concluded. The labour-management agreement is a 
written agreement between an employer and a trade union organizing a majority of workers in 
a workplace, or, in the absence of such union, the majority representative. Under LSL labour-
management agreement could produce special effects on the field of workers’ savings, 
deduction made form wages, working-hours averaging system, flex-time system, leaves, 
overtime and holiday work, special work time calculation system when the work is performed 
outside of the regular workplace, discretionary work system, payment during leave. The clear 
distinction between collective agreement and labour-management agreement is that the latter 
one does not have a normative effect, but it is limited to the legal effect of exempting from 
standard regulations established by the LSL. This is especially important as the subject matter 
of collective bargaining is rather wide in Japan; any matter dealing with the enterprise that an 
employer has the discretion could be a subject of bargaining.624 Section 16 of the Trade Union 
Law provides for that the normative effect of a collective agreement conferred to the 
standards concerning conditions of work and other matters relating to the treatment of 
workers. Collective agreements continue to have a contractual effect even after their 
normative effect has been achieved by legislation.625 Any parts of an individual employment 
contract contravening to the stipulations of a collective agreement are void and those parts are 
governed by the collective agreement’s standards.626627 
It ought to be also noted that there is no such system as works council, through which 
employees or their representatives could be involved in decision making processes.628 The 
only possible way for employee involvement is through the joint labour-management 
consultation. The Japanese system completely lacks the “German-type” of participation 
forms, the right to information and consultation is not recognized as such. The possibility to 
influence the employer’s decisions is vested in enterprise-based trade unions and it is not 
provided for by statutory regulations, but merely an informal mechanisms.629 
 
  
                                               
622 The concerns regarding the institution of majority representative will be discussed later on. 
623 Also, labour-management agreement could be concluded under the Employment Insurance and the Nursing-
Care Leave Act, for details see the part on Majority Representative. 
624 K Sugeno (2002) 563. 
625 T Hanami and K Fumito, Labour Law in Japan (2011, Kluwer Law) 35-37. 
626 Section 16 of the Trade Union Law. 
627 Persons covered by a collective agreement’s normative effect are only the members of the trade union that is 
party to the collective agreement. (Except Sections 17 and 18 of the Trade Union Act). 
628 J Hajdú, op cit. 1ő8. 
629 However, some initiatives were taken both by employers’ associations and trade union federations. Ibid. 
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A Joint Labour –Management Consultations 
 
As mentioned earlier, there is no well-defined difference between collective bargaining and 
joint labour-management consultation (rodo kyogo kai), the latter one could be considered as 
a special form of enterprise-based negotiations between employers and trade unions, or put it 
differently, a vehicle for sharing information and promoting mutual understanding between 
the parties.630 
 Typical examples, according to Kazuo Sugeno for subject matters for joint labour-
management consultation are: pre-collective bargaining to gauge each other’s intentions; 
negotiation that substitute collective bargaining and aimed at resolving issues, procedures 
involving participation in the operation of the enterprise that are designed to discuss matters 
of management and production that are distinct form the subject of collective bargaining; pre-
event consultation before personnel matters, although these are subject to collective 
bargaining after the event. The overlaps between collective bargaining and joint labour-
management consultation could be explained by the wide range of possible subject matters of 
collective bargaining. However, it is also argued that the tone of negotiation greatly differs: 
while trade unions tend to be more confrontational during collective bargainings, joint labour-
management consultations are characterized by cooperation and mutual understanding.631 
Another significant difference between the two systems is that no statutory regulations 
are governing joint labour-management consultation, however, if parties agree, the rules 
concerning collective bargaining could be acknowledged as binding on joint labour-
management consultation and failure of adhering to them could provide a basis for an 
employer to refuse collective bargaining with a trade union. Also, if the procedure was 
established in labour-management agreement, their violation gives rise to liability in 
damages.632 Agreement on such is established pursuant to agreement between an employer 
and a trade union, by a contract, a memorandum of understanding, or the like. These 
agreements share the following characteristics: the subject matter and procedures of the 
consultations must conform to the parties’ agreement; no dispute acts may be attempted in 
connection with the consultation; the goal of the consultation is not necessarily reach an 
agreement; while parties often limit themselves to presenting information and acquiring an 
understanding of each other’s intentions, they also reach agreements that are usually honored; 
the subject matter of the consultations need not be confined to the subject of collective 
bargaining.633 
 
B Other Forms of Employee Involvement 
                                               
630 K Sugeno, ‘Japanese Labour Law’ (Tokyo, 1992, Tokyo University Press), Ő7ő. 
631 J Hajdú, op cit. 1ő3. 
632 K Sugeno, ‘Japanese Employment and Labour Law,  (Tokyo, 2002, űarolina Academic Press – University of 
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In Japan approximately 90 per cent of the labour unions are enterprise-based. The declining 
unionization rate634 has led to the deterioration of the function of the collective negotiations 
for improving working conditions. 635  However, in a slow-growth market with highly 
diversified employment patterns, collective voice of the workers has particular significance in 
mitigating the adverse effects of the sluggish economy. Thus other means of employees’ 
collective influential voice systems than trade unions have attracted attention. Two 
instruments, the majority representative and labour-management committee will be discussed 
under this section. 
 
i The Majority Representative 
 
Labour Standard Law incorporated the institution of ‘majority representative’ already at the 
enactment of the law. The majority representative is independent from the trade unions and is 
elected by the workers with a ballot. Notwithstanding the rules of the election and the 
qualification of the majority representative were originally not provided for by the law. 
Instead, standards were established in a ministerial ordinance which was later incorporated to 
the LSL.636 The revised regulation in brief states that the majority representative must not 
hold a supervisory or managerial position and must be chosen by voting or a show of hands. 
An explanation of the duties and responsibilities of the office shall be given to the workers 
before the election.637 
Although it is supposed to ensure that the majority representative bear the confidence 
of majority of the workers – including managers and supervisors too – with group dynamics 
described above, it is very unlikely that the employees could freely express their opinions and 
get engaged in a frank discussion with the majority representative. 
From the beginning, the majority representative’s has a consultative role; in the 
absence of trade union representing majority of the workers the employer has to present the 
work rules newly set or modified. The majority representative could provide his opinion but it 
is not binding on the employer. According to the 1947 version of LSL, agreements concerning 
overtime or work on holidays could be concluded with the majority representative.638 
The 1952 revision of the labour code provided for that an agreement has to be 
concluded between the majority representative and management on the commissioned 
management of workers’ savings,639 payroll deduction,640 and payment of wages during paid 
                                               
634 After a peak of 55.8per cent in 1949 it maintained a steady 35per cent until the mid 1970s, than it has been 
steadily declining, as of 2006 the rate is 18.6per cent (organizing 10 million workers). 
635 Wage negotiations are outside of the scope of enterprise-based unions as it will be explained later.  
636 1998, Labour, No. 45. More on the history of incorporation could be found in Sugeno 2002: 86 
637 Lab. Enf. Regs. Art. 6-2 
638 Also only in the absence of trade union representing majority of the workers. 
639 Article 18 Para 2 
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holidays under the Health Insurance Act.641 Later on other acts than LSL introduced new 
regulations too. The Industrial Safety and Health Act enacted in 1972 provided for that the 
employer ought to have the input of the majority representative on the health and safety 
improvement plan642 and half of the members of the safety and health committees has to bear 
the recommendation of the majority representative. 643 The 1978 revision of the Workers’ 
Property Accumulation Promotion Act stated that an agreement ought to be concluded on the 
establishment and amend of a property accumulation fund.644 
The 1987 modification of the LSL and then consequently adopted regulations of the 
Employment Insurance Law, the Child-care and Nursing-leave Act allowed the employer to 
conclude a written labour-management agreement with specific effects.645 It means that the 
employer is deregulated or relieved of the Law’s standards by concluding such an 
agreement.646 Under the agreement for example the employer is allowed to deny a request for 
child-care leave.647 Worker Dispatching Act as well as the Law Concerning Stabilization of 
Older Persons also provides consultative rights of the employee representative. If a labour 
management agreement satisfies the requirements of a collective bargaining agreement, the 
agreement has the normative effect of a collective agreement under the Trade Union Act. 
When the flexible working hour system was introduced in 1987, it was provided for that a 
labour-management agreement is to be concluded with the majority representative; alongside 
the labour-management committee was introduced.  
 
ii The Labour-Management Committee 
 
A labour-management committee is composed by the representatives of the employer and the 
employees of the workplace. Half of the committee members are nominated by the majority 
union or in its absence the majority representative for a designated term. The establishment of 
the committee shall be duly reported to the Chief of the Labour Standards Inspection Office. 
Minutes ought to be taken on the meetings of the committee and employees of the workplace 
have to be given access to them. Resolutions of the committee are adopted with the consent of 
all committee members and have to be announced to workers in the same ways as collective 
agreement648 and have to be filed at the Chief of the Labour Standards Supervisory Office.649 
                                                                                                                                                   
640 Art 24 Para 1 
641 Art 39 Para 6 
642 Art 78 Clause 2 
643 Art 17 Para 4; Art 18 Para 4; Art 19 Para 4 
644 Arts 7-8 and 7-25 
645  Managing workers’ savings, deducting of wages, adopting different working hours averaging systems, 
adopting a flexitime-system, adopting regulations on simultaneous vacation system, adopting discretionary 
working system, adopting scheme for fixed annual leave, and payment of wages for annual leaves.  
646 Sugeno 2002:85 
647 Child-care and Nursing-care Leave Act Art 61 Para 1; Art 12 Para 2 
648 Art 10 
649 Only those which are related to overtime and rest-day work 
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Labour Standard Law provides for the protection of committee members against 
disadvantageous treatment by the employer.650 
By the resolution of the labour-management committee, the employer is allowed to 
defer from the standards on maximum working hour set forth by the law or the collective 
agreement,651 which indeed promotes the decisions of the committee to powerful management 
instruments.652 The success of the committee as a participatory instrument is based on the 
actual representative power of the committee.653 
To conclude the analysis on the role of the majority representative, it is apparent that 
concentration of such power in a hand of an officer, whose legitimacy is clearly doubtful and 
therefore is unable to become a genuine actor of employee participation, could severely 
jeopardized the bargaining rights of the employees. This is even more striking in the light of 
the union coverage which shows that factually 90 per cent of the enterprises have no labour 
union.654 Interestingly, the 2012 report of the Japan Institute of Labour Policy and Training 
reflects well on the adverse issues arising from the lack of transparency and fairness in the 
election and decision making processes and urges the lawmaker to establish corrective 
measures.655  
 
C Direct Participation – Quality Circles 
 
Partially due to the in-built rigidity of the wage system under the life-time employment 
system, labour productivity of Japanese manufacturing industries was the lowest of ten major 
OECD countries in the 1970s.656 However, competitiveness of a firm or an industry is also 
depends on the quality of products or services and Japanese companies has attracted increased 
attention in this connection. 
Scientific quality control was first introduced during the pre-war times,657 but sincere 
efforts to implement statistical methods were made only after SCAP provided guidance to 
telecommunication companies658 to improve reliability of their services.659 Then the know-
how was spread among companies who wished to get rid of the ‘cheap and low-quality’ label 
which had previously been a tag of Japanese products. The Industrial Standardization Law of 
                                               
650 Art 24-2-4 Para 8 
651 LSL revision of 1998 
652 Instruments include variable scheduling systems (Art 32-2 Para 1, Art 32-4 Para 1), flexitime system (Art 32-
3) and discretionary scheduling system (Art 38-2 Para 2), work-time averaging (Art 32-5 Para 1), overtime and 
rest-day work (Art 36, Art 39 Paras 5, 6; Art 34 Para 2) 
653 Araki *:3 
654 JILPT Survey on the Framework of Employee Relations, Employment and Retirement, 2005; in accordance 
with JILPT Survey on the Establishment and Modification of Working Conditions and Human Resources 
Management 2005 
655 Uemura at all 2010:39 
656 Watanabe 1991:58 
657 National Railway Corporation and some private sector companies like Toshiba were pioneering the new 
method. 
658 For example to Japan Department of űommunication (today’s NTT) 
659 Watanabe 1991:61 
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1949 provided for the inspection of both manufactured products and methods of analysis. The 
Japanese Union of Scientists and Engineers (JUSE) was formed to encourage companies’ 
participation and to improve standardization. The enthusiasm on the industrial side was 
beyond imagination. Majority of the enterprises put serious efforts in workers’ education and 
training in the beginning of 1950s, later during the decade a study team was sent to United 
States to further analyse the leading methods, and JUSE launched a journal on latest 
developments in 1962.660 
The accumulated rise of quality circles in the 1960s could be explained as the 
companies’ response to the mounting shortage of qualified labour (especially engineers and 
technicians) in the rapidly expanding economy.661 However, Watanabe argues that the low 
growth period after the oil shocks of 1970s triggered the real organizational changes at 
majority of the established companies.662 
According to the Japanese Industrial Standard (JIS), the term ‘quality’ is interpreted in 
the broadest sense to mean ‘everything that can be improved’. Thus quality is not only 
associated with products and services or the way how machines are operated, but also include 
all aspects of human behaviour.663 Thus participation in the quality circles (QC) is usually a 
part of the worker’s duty and the activity tends to extend further beyond regular working 
hours and usually is unpaid. 
Quality Circles appear as the basic form of employee participation, a forum that unites 
shop-floor workers, first-line supervisors, section and middle managers and trade union 
officers who freely and informally discuss issues of production and possible development of 
work conditions. It is claimed that the operation and themes of activity of the QC is based on 
the workers spontaneous choice and surveys show that improvements of productivity and 
quality, working conditions, development of human relations are usually on agenda. 
The Japanese way of operating QC is often compared to its Western counterparts that 
tend not achieve equally high results on productivity improvement. The difference in efficacy 
is often explained by the detached nature of the Western QC; it is argued that since the 
companies do not try to promote the movement as an integral part of corporate management, 
workers quickly become disillusioned and their enthusiasm gets quickly extinct.664 As oppose 
to the Japanese methods, where advice and guidance on establishment of a QC are provided 
by either the unit manager or a special person designated as QC promoter, than workers select 
their circle leader among the participants, who are either chosen to become members or 
volunteer to do so, and as a result, 83 per cent of the total workforce is ‘happily’ participating 
in the QC activities.665 
As Watanabe sharply points out, the unremunerated, voluntary participation of 
workers shall not be explained with some Confucian devotion to group harmony, but merely 
based on economic motivation: an uncooperative attitude would result in a poor evaluation of 
                                               
660 Goldstein 1985:505 
661 Japan’s net GDP growth was double digit until the first oil crisis. 
662 Watanabe 1991:64 
663 Watanabe 1991:62 
664 Watanabe 1991:63 and Cole 1984:222 
665 According to the statistics of the Labour Ministry (1990), in line with JUSE’s report, 2.Ő million workers 
participate in the activity of the more than 300 thousand circles, and 60per cent of the respondents marked on the 
questionnaire to be ‘very happy’ or ‘happy’ with that fact. 
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the employee and endanger not only the chances of promotion or bonuses, but the individual’s 
position within the group.666 
 
D New Directions in Corporate Governance  
 
The international competitiveness made the Japanese keiretsu a highly successful player of 
the economy until the end of 1980s. In the latter half of the decade, the Japanese economy still 
had 5 per cent of real economic growth, which was reflected in the financial and securities as 
well is in the companies’ value. Japanese companies were acquiring foreign businesses and 
assets, encouraged by the impact of the strong yen. However, in 1990 when the ‘bubble 
burst’, stock prices and land values immediately began to fall. Thereafter, Japan has been 
experiencing a deepening recession.667  
Parallel to the economic stagnation, the number of employees working outside of the 
life-time employment system has been growing and now accounted about 35 per cent of the 
total workforce.668 The ratio of ‘regular employees’ has fallen from 80 per cent to 65 per cent. 
The number of new hires by the companies featuring life-time employment has been 
decreasing, and the proportion of regular employees at the 15-24 age groups is even lower.669 
Traditionally, women are not participants of the life-time employment system. From the 
viewpoint of the system operating with exceptionally costly ways of training regular employees, 
women, who tend to devote ‘the peak of their capacity’ to their families and drop out for many years 
to raise children670 are not worth the investment as their training would never be returned to the 
company.671 Although in the years of economic stagnation many women have had to (re)enter the 
labour market,672 though, mostly still in non-regular forms.673 
                                               
666 Also, most companies launch some kind of merit system to remunerate those workers whose contributions 
were significant for productivity improvement. Watanabe 1991: 75 
667 The changes in the labour market are intertwined with many other socio-economic issues, such as the well 
known problem of the aging population; however, in this article it would be difficult to address all aspects. 
668 In the meanwhile, unemployment ratio has been growing too, from about 3per cent in mid-1990s, it went up 
to 5.6per cent by 2009. 
669  39.4 per cent among high-school graduates and 57per cent among university graduates. Source: Japan 
Institute for labour Policy and Training, The changes in the labour market are intertwined with many other socio-
economic issues, such as the well known problem of the aging population; however, in this article it would be 
difficult to address all aspects. In: Current status of Youth Employment, Data series 61. 2012. 
670 The per capita nursery places are extremely low in Japan. Some places have a lucky draw to decide who will 
be accepted, some make interviews for parents before decision making. 26per cent of the pre-school age children 
attend day-care and 44.6per cent of the working mothers use such service. Source: Zhou, Osihi, Ueda: Childcare 
System in Japan in: Journal of Population and Social Security, vol.1. 
671 Without training though, it is impossible to be promoted to a higher level position and obtain better salaries. 
The wage difference between men and women is around 33 per cent, the gap is significantly bigger than in the 
US or Europe. 
672  The number of double-income households surpassed the number of singe-income households in 1995. 
Though the proportion of women in the total number of workforce has been double since 1985, it is still very 
low, only 15per cent. The share of women in leadership positions overall is extremely low, in the corporate 
sector 3.6per cent of the managers are female. Sources: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 
Labour force Survey; Study on Women’s Participation in Policy and Decision-making 
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The traditional life-time employments system has had no instruments to address the 
changes of the labour market. Thus, changing the employment policy has become a critical 
issue among Japanese companies. Human resource management techniques frequently used 
by Western multinational corporations were implemented in the 1990s to tackle the 
discontinuance of economic growth. 
The most forthcoming novelty in Japanese companies’ human resource management 
policy in the early 1990s was the introduction of a performance-oriented employee 
assessment and compensation system, the seikashugi. It is argued that for the implementation 
of seikashugi system, the emphasize of wage policy shall be on business results rather than on 
variables such as skill, knowledge or effort, and short term business results shall be put ahead 
to long-term ones.674  Focusing on the individual employee’s short-term performance was 
strikingly new to traditional Japanese companies. 675  Seikashugi was rapidly gaining 
popularity, on average 53 per cent of the companies introduced the system by 2004, and the 
ratio among large companies employing more than 1000 employees was 83 per cent.676 
Criticism against seikashugi was growing just as rapidly. One report – based on first-
hand experiences – claimed that after the implementation of seikashugi employees lost their 
ambition and the vitality of the organization diminished. This experience was backed-up with 
a research showing that companies are not putting effort in motivation, while another 
provided evidence that in most companies the shift to seikashugi was not properly 
communicated and many employees did not have any information on the new system. 
Additionally it was argued that based on the cooperation principle of game theory, such 
system discourages outperforming employees.677 
Indeed, introducing an evaluation system which puts competition ahead of cooperation 
out of the blue could easily affect employees’ morale. With no clearly articulated paradigm-
change in the values, employees loose black lines to be followed and could easily feel 
defenceless against management policies. Moreover, the traditional enterprise-based 
unions,678 with a toolkit specialized for the protection of the seniority-based wage system, 
could not offer any valuable support, neither the immature participation instrument, the 
‘majority representative’. 
Furthermore, critics pointed out another side-effect of seikashugi. To summarize the 
argument, the Japanese industry’s competitive advantage is the high-quality goods which 
other companies cannot imitate, thus the primary interest of Japanese companies is to retain 
highly skilled workers who has the ability and experience to execute such strategy. More 
specific skills allow higher degree of differentiation from the competitors. Therefore, 
companies invested in its employees in a long run through OJT, and the primary instrument to 
retain the manpower is the seniority based wage system. Yet, seikashugi just contradict to the 
                                                                                                                                                   
673 Making up 57.4 per cent of the total part-time workforce.  
674 Okunishi, Yoshio: [Conditions of introducing seikashugi-based wage system] Based on Labour Situation in 
Japan and Analysis, Detailed Exposition 2009/2010 
675 Miyajima 2008:356; Tatsumichi 2007:80; 
676 Tatsumichi 2007: 83 
677 Tatsumichi 2007: 83-84 
678 with a steadily declining unionization rate 
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basic strategy of Japanese businesses, as its breaks the “psychological contract” with the 
employees by interfering with their long-term expectations.679  
To overcome this paradox, majority of the Japanese companies while introducing the 
seikashugi system, still maintains the life-time employment system. According to a survey,680 
69 per cent of the companies answered that they aim to maintain life-time employments 
system for as many employees as possible, 21 per cent considered limiting the system to 
selected workforce and only 9 per cent declared that it is not a priority issue for the 
management. Combination of these data with those on the implementation of the seikashugi 
system reveals that 30 per cent of the companies maintain seikashugi together with life-time 
employment.681 
 
IV Industrial Relations and Democratic Values  
 
Internal democracy of the unions is a central part of democracy studies all over the word, and 
Japan with the Occupation’s manifest influence on industrial relations is not an exemption.  
More than 60 years after the end of the war, not too many workers remember either the pre-
war organizational relations or the drastic changes of the 19ő0s, most of today’s union 
members and leader have been raised in a democratic environment. Does it mean that 
democracy and democratic values have become inherent part of their lives? Or, does it mean 
that contemporary union activities reflect to these principles? 
Industrial relations are guarded by the principle of free bargaining, meaning that both labour 
and management enjoy freedom of association and autonomy including collective action 
through bargaining. The major arena to exercise such freedom is at enterprise level.682 Their 
activities cover negotiations with management to improve living and working conditions of 
workers, members’ activities within the union and external relations, such as campaigns and 
lobbying. 
Bargaining matters are very broad, it is generally accepted that unions have rights to 
bargain even on management issues, and only those topics are excluded which are clearly 
beyond the management scope, such as political issues or affairs of other companies.683 
The primary organization at national level for unions representing employees is Rengo 
(Japanese Trade Union Confederation), while on the employers’ side the main organization is 
Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation). However these organizations are well 
established and unite great number of affiliates, social dialogue is not restricted to the 
channels provided by them. Since the 1970s informal ways have been gaining excessive 
                                               
679 Tatsumichi 2007: 85 
680 Attitude to long-term employment for regular workers. Labour situation in Japan and Analysis: Detailed 
Exposition 2009/2010 p. 107 
681 And named as “New Japan Type” of companies by the researchers 
682 90per cent of the unions are organized at enterprise level, as it was demonstrated above. 
683 Hanami 1989:285 
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popularity and methods developed outside the official routes are widely praised and examined 
internationally.684 
The oldest among informal bodies is Sanrokon. It held its first meeting in January 
1970. It has about 25 members, including trade union representatives, business leaders, 
government representatives and even academics.685 According to its inauguration document, it 
does not have a tripartite structure common for social dialogue. Sanrokon is not a formal 
decision making body either, but claims to be a forum for free discussion which provides 
opportunities for the government to present economic policies and for labour and 
management to make requests and proposals for the government. 686  Sanrokon with a 
continuous operation of 40 years mirrors the development of social dialogue very well. 
However, there are other organizations which are taking an active role in forming industrial 
relations, like the Labour Policy Council that operates numerous sub-commissions and work 
groups, or the Minimum Wage Council. Apart from the tripartite (or tripartite-looking) 
organizations, there are countless forms of bilateral formations. 
Even though the bargaining subjects are already broad, the informal channels of social 
dialogue with their voluntary, constructive and non-invasive nature have opened the door for 
topics which were originally non-mandatory. By this means, now parties are free to discuss 
technically all matters relevant for industrial relations - an admired practice worldwide.  
Despite of the great many informal opportunities, employee involvement is generally 
very low, especially on levels higher than the enterprise. This is commonly explained with the 
lack of legal basis for employee involvement in general and work councils in particular.687  
The importance of workplace-level involvement is primary for those who belong to 
the life-time employment system. During the ordinary course of one’s career, industry or 
national level negotiations make little effect, as they unlikely to have an interference with the 
external labour market. Thus enterprise-based unionism best represent the regular employees’ 
interest to achieve the best possible working conditions for the internal labour market. 
However, the most apparent pitfall of enterprise-based unions is the weak bargaining power. 
To overcome this shortfall, a compensatory system has been developed, the Shunto. The 
Shunto, or with other words, the ‘spring wage offensive’ is a mechanism to coordinate 
enterprise based collective bargaining for wage increase across companies and industries.688 
Seemingly, employees have little to worry about: unions (where exist) are able to bargain on 
almost everything, wages are taken care by Shunto, informal ways of social dialogue unify 
labour and management. 
The ‘Japanese miracle’, the rapid growth of the economy and striking success of 
Japanese companies on both domestic and international markets after the wartime destruction 
directed much attention to Japanese industrial relations, which are often characterized as 
harmonious. The consensus-oriented decision making processes of management was also put 
                                               
684 Araki 1993-1994:146 
685  Including the president and vice-president of Rengo (the latter doubles as president of Sanrokon) and 
president of Nippon Keidanren. 
686 Recently was on agenda of requests: cutting taxes, improving vocational training, upgrade social insurance, 
quicker enactment of laws; Sanrokon has made proposals to the government only twice since 1970, the first one 
was related to consumer prices and the second one to inflation measures. 
687 Hanami 1989:286 
688 Araki 1993:145, for Shunto in general see Sugeno 2002:553 
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into spotlight as a backbone of economic democratization. However, recent works of Japanese 
and Western scholars tend to question the generalization that harmony and consensus are able 
to describe or to explain the industrial relations in Japan.689 
The term ‘democracy’ means the same to Japanese workers as to their Westerns 
counterpart: a form of equality, a voice in political processes, freedom and individual 
participation in politics. What differs is the meaning ascribed to these notions.690 The SCAP 
treated unions as “schoolhouses of democracy” and even officers consider unions as the 
“foundation of Japanese democracy”.691  
The unions’ general meetings are held usually twice a year. The carefully planned and 
predictable structure of these gatherings in itself bans spontaneity and since the agenda leave 
no space for open discussions, the contribution of the workers’ is restricted to their mere 
physical participation on the venue. 692  The order of speeches is also pre-set: first Diet 
members (if any), leaders of affiliated labour movement organizations, then officers of the 
enterprise union deliver their speeches. Proposals are already printed out and handled to the 
participants. 
As Turner’s research shows, union meetings are default setting of the group-
interaction described in the first part of this paper. Union officers are pursuit of personal 
power and status accumulated over union hierarchy, while rank and file employees have not 
much of choice but to listen carefully during the union gathering and remain silent. Since the 
hierarchical relations set the rules for the discussions, the conversation is one-way. Even rank-
and-files who dare to express their opinions suppose not to disagree openly with their 
supervisors and should use the ‘correct language’. Union leaders on the other hand often use 
attitude and language which shows inequality for the inferior of the workers.693  
The threat that someone becomes the one who disturbs the harmony of the group could 
easily be converted to monetary loss. This personal insecurity was detected by Turner too; 
workers often explained their passivity by the ultimate fear of losing their jobs and therefore 
of endangering their (and their families) livelihood.694 
Űased on Nakane’s analysis on group dynamics it is easy to see that such environment 
does not nurture open discussions and eventually leads to apathy of the workers towards 
union activity, which is widely recognized among union leaders too. Rank and file workers 
seeing themselves as victims of traditional powerlessness topped with a concrete experience 
of weakness within their unions are enough to the develop political passivity. 
As Turner explains, “[the] consequence of these self-images is a feeling of political 
sovereignty in the abstract sense of belief in the ideals of democracy, but with a very low 
level of political efficacy in their daily encounters with the political processes within their 
own unions.”695  This sense of powerlessness contributes to the fact that employees feel 
themselves rather like subjects than participants. Frustration occurs when decision are made 
                                               
689 This section relies on the fieldwork of Christena Turner, an anthropologist and Adjunct Associate Professor 
of University of California, San Diego; she is the director of UCSD's Program in Japanese Studies. 
690 Turner 1989:302 
691 Turner 1989:309 
692Turner 1989:318 
693 Turner 1989:317 
694 Note that households with one income were in gross majority until recently. 
695 Turner 1989:314 
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by the employer affecting the daily life of the employees, without sincere consultation and 
tension between labour and management remains, but well covered by the indirectly forced 
silence of the former one. Anger and betrayal are, in turn, lead to apolitically. 
 
V Summary 
 
The research question concerning this chapter was (Q7) was how the traditional decision 
making patterns influence employee Involvement in Japan? Japan has been treated as the 
fortress of industrial democracy mostly because of the well-established informal ways of 
participation. However, in reality it is much hindered by the lack of actual democratic conduct 
within the workplace units, including trade unions. The Japanese life-time employment 
system, such as the long-lasting feudal patterns, the paternalistic benevolence of the employer, 
and the traditionally submissive behaviour of the employees and the controversial nature of 
decision making would not encourage genuine participation either. The exaggerated hopes in 
the reinforcement of the informal ways of participation are only able to masquerade the 
inherent conflicts between labour and capital, but cannot substitute the genuine democratic 
decision making processes. As Otto Kahn-Freund warns us, the false belief of “unity”, 
meaning that there are not really two sides of the industry, would easily lead to suppression of 
trade union activity and paternalistic attitude of the employer towards its employees, yet there 
is no possibility to eliminate the conflicts – the immanent ingredients of all industrial 
societies.696 
Another question is whether a conflict-free industrial relation would be beneficial for 
its participants? I believe that the answer is negative. Conflicts are essential elements of 
democracy of all kinds, social, economic, political or industrial. In addition to the latter one, 
Kahn-Freund further argues that any approach to understand the relations between labour and 
managements is fruitless without the recognition and articulation of the divergence of their 
interest.697 
Not denying the importance of joint accountability and collective achievements as an 
ethical integrating power of the community under certain circumstances,698 the principal of 
personal responsibility shall however be emphasised. To empower human dignity one must 
not accept that anyone else has the rights to impose personal values on others without that 
person’s endorsement.699 However, as Kahn-Freund stated elsewhere, freedom is ambiguous 
and misleading in labour relations, as the employees’ will is only legally, but not socially free; 
thus the principal purpose of labour law is to support the balance between the power of 
management and labour. Nevertheless, legal regulations are secondary in influencing the 
                                               
696 Kahn-Freund 1972:20 
697 Ibid. 18. 
698 Dworkin 1998:455 
699 Ibid. 
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forces of the labour market, and can only make a modest contribution to the degree of 
effective organisation of the workers.700  
Japan is an excellent example to demonstrate how little effect the text of the law has 
on workplace democracy. The Japanese labour law system – greatly influenced by the 
Occupation forces – calls for an egalitarian social structure: trade unions are uniting both 
management and rank-and-file workers and the letter of the law insures different forms of 
participation. On the other hand, despite of the numerous efforts companies have made to 
adopt a more open corporate culture by introducing human resources management ideas from 
the West, there has been no noticeable breakthrough to achieve genuine participation. 
By the beginning of the 21st century 34.6 per cent of the total workforce701 is being 
employed outside of the life-time employment system. For them the trade unions tend not 
offer any protection, as the unions’ solutions are solely built up to shield the regular 
employees, often against the non-traditional workforce. 702  Moreover, there is slowly but 
steadily growing number of workers, usually from the younger generations, who do not wish 
to participate in the life-time employment system.  Due to its in-built rigidity, the system 
cannot handle the growing number of workers who do not fit the original pattern, apart from 
labelling them as atypicals or freeters. Adding that 90 per cent of the companies do not have 
trade union representation at all,703 altogether over 16 million people have no access even to 
formal protection against managerial power. However, without democratic workplace culture 
these workers do not have confidence that they are capable to protect their interest. They are 
treated as rule-breakers and there is no agreed social outline how to set up their own 
protective mechanisms. 
To achieve industrial democracy a balanced labour regulatory environment and 
flexibility which provides space for social dialogue are prerequisites, yet alone are insufficient 
measures. Self-confidence and individual responsibility cannot be developed without cutting 
the ties to paternalistic corporate cultures. 
  
  
                                               
700 Kahn-Freund 1972:3-16 
701 Not including those who work in the agriculture and fishery sectors. 
702 Hungler 2011 
703 Source: Labour Force Survey, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2006 
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Chapter 2 
Participation during State-Socialism in Hungary 
 
I Workers’ participation in Hungary from 19ŐŐ to 19Ő9 
 
A Grass-root Participation Movements 
 
Fights were still raging in the Western part of Hungary when in late 1944 workers set about 
re-starting production in the unserviceable factories through the shop committees [üzemi 
bizottság]. The Hungarian Communist Party soon recognised the potential in institutions 
based on workers’ participation, and tried its best to harness it as fast as it could. 
Until the year of turn 704  it launched attacks employing a varied set of tactics to 
augment its influence, and kept strengthening its powers systematically in enterprise level 
participatory institutions. These years saw first the blurring of the limits, and then the gradual 
elimination of shop committees’ participatory functions, and trade unions’ interest 
representation roles. The official communist party rhetoric marketed the process as the 
maximisation of workers’ interest representation; however, the actual objective was the 
termination of the democratic institution of participation. 
Re-starting production became increasingly urgent in the last weeks of the war. It 
almost goes without saying that the workers contributing to re-starting a factory also wanted 
title to manage the same facility. In many instances the elected shop committees 
spontaneously prior to the appearance of the decree on the creation of such shop 
committees.705 Meanwhile the most necessary departments were set up in the Ministry of 
Industry; however, the most important body of communication between shop committees and 
workers – until the government moved to Budapest – was the Trade Union Council. It 
happened rather frequently that the Ministry of Industry appointed company directors relying 
on the opinion of the Trade Union Council. The Trade Union Council gave its 
recommendations based on two criteria: “the company should come under the management of 
                                               
704 The year of turn was 1948 when the Hungarian Communist Party forced a merge with the Social Democrats 
to form the Hungarian Working People’s Party with the leadership of Mátyas Rákosi, which marked the onset of 
undisguised Communist rule in Hungary. 
705 The minutes often, even at the elections – perhaps out of habit – call it its previous name, and later corrected 
it in hand to factory committee or shop committee. See, Archives of the Institute of Political History 
(Politikatörténeti Intézet, hereinafter PIL) PIL 27Ő. f. 20/ 21. Ę.e.  
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a good professional, and possibly our reliable comrade.”706 That was important for a number 
of reasons. On the one hand, the Trade Union wished to maintain its clout in the shop 
committees. On the other hand, however, it was also important for the workers as in many 
cases they were unwilling to cooperate with former managers or workers who had served the 
Nazi system. In such cases the recommendation of the Trade Union Council was a guarantee 
concerning the candidate in the elections. 
The shop committees maintained a relationship as close as they could with the Trade 
Union Council, and turned to it – in addition to technical assistance (supply of power, and 
coal) – also for organisational/operational advice. The Trade Union Council did its best to 
establish contact with each factory, and to provide effective help with the shop committee 
elections. The rights and obligations of shop committees were laid down by Minister of 
Industry Decree No 50.100 of 1945, issued on 17 February 1945 prescribing that all 
employers employing more than 50 must elect a shop committee. The decree requires the 
shop committee’s authority to include the control of factory management and production, 
settling wage related issues, and to take charge of welfare and social questions, and authorised 
the shop committee also to represent the interests of the workers in disputes with the 
employer. However, the language of the law fell far short of clarifying the role of shop 
committees. 
Organising the country’s reconstruction was hindered by the uncertain legal situation, 
and so the need for re-regulation emerged in the spring. The Trade Union Council drafted a 
new decree joining forces with the shop committee, and economic experts; it set up a Shop 
Committee Secretariat, and conducted a questionnaire-based survey, and even organised a 
shop committee congress, a rather heroic undertaking in the spring of 1945. As a result of 
hard preparatory work on 5 June 1945 the Minister of Industry issued a new decree on shop 
committees,707 which brought doubtful results despite being driven by the best intentions. 
i Legal Framework 
 
The reason for issuing the decree was to “gain appreciation to work as one of the most 
important factors of production, and to re-start the currently inoperative companies, ensure 
continuity of their operation, and [to organise] economic life after the war.” 
The Decree referred the election of shop committees in the competency of trade unions 
(given their experience in this field).708 The employer was therefore under obligations to 
secure both personnel and infrastructure.709 The election list had to be made to ensure that 
each trade (eg, carpenter, blacksmith) as well as each category (officials, engineers, section 
managers) should be represented.710  In the elections the workers and the officials of the 
enterprise voted for a different set of candidates, but the members elected participated jointly 
                                               
706  Ibid. supposedly also on the basis of the template which was distributed among the members of shop 
committees by the Trade Union Council. 
707 Decree 55 000/1945. IpM, 5 June 1945. 
708 Section 2 Para 2. 
709 Section 2 Para 4. 
710 Section 2 Para 5. 
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in the work of the committee.711 The size of the committee depended on the number of 
employees at the company.712  
 
Committee members performed their duties during working hours, and their wages 
were not allowed to be lowered on account of their activity in the shop committee, and no 
other disadvantageous action was permitted against them for the same,713 moreover, they were 
subject to a redundancy ban, and even in the event of downsizing their dismissal was only 
possible subject to approval by the trade union.714 Members of the shop committee all took an 
oath of impartiality in their proceedings, which also bound them for confidentiality.715 The 
decree required the costs incurred by the works committee' to be covered by the employer.716 
The Decree gave authority to shop committees regarding all issues related to work 
(wages, working time and resting time, and helping employees enforce their rights deriving 
from the working relation); employees’ common economic and welfare related interests 
(family protection, health related equipment, occupational safety issues, accident prevention); 
cultural and welfare matters; disciplinary issues (amicable settlement of labour disputes); all 
issues of working conditions, working schedules, working morale, and working discipline 
with a view to promote better, more economical, and more effective production; introduction 
of new working methods; controlling the plans and the progress of production at the factory.  
717 
While already the repetitions in the Decree and its general phrasing made the works 
committees’ competence difficult to understand, it also left numerous issues unregulated in 
respect of specific rights. Contemporary minutes718 demonstrate that the National Industrial 
Grievance Committee experienced enormous difficulty trying to decide how to settle 
production related disputes, or how to interpret the difference between Paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
Section 16, ie, the question whether the chairperson of the shop committee was responsible 
for directing the company, or only the shop committee.719 Decision in a particular issue often 
dragged on for months, thereby partly preventing flawless operation, and partly exacerbating 
the working relation of the employer, and the shop committee. 
The above suggests that the works committee’s thus established encountered a variety 
of difficulties. The Trade Union Council tried to capitalise on their legally uncertain position 
                                               
711 Section 2 Para 7. 
712  Section 2 Paras (8)-(9): with employee representatives: representing 20-150 employees: 3 ordinary, and 
supplementary members, with 150-200 employees 4 ordinary members, and 4 supplementary members, and 
above 200 employees 1 ordinary member, and 1 supplementary member for each 200 employees, and above 
1000 employees 1 ordinary member, and 1 supplementary member for each 500 employees with the restriction 
that their number must not exceed 25. As regards the representation of officials: 1 ordinary member, and 1 
supplementary member from 5 to 15 employees, 2 ordinary members, and 2 supplementary members from 15 to 
100 employees, 3 ordinary members, and 3 supplementary members from 100 to 200 employees, and above 200 
employees 1 ordinary member, and 1 supplementary member for each further 200 employees with the restriction 
that their number must not exceed 5. 
713 Section 5 Para 2. 
714 Section 14 Paras 1-3. 
715 Section 5 Para 1. 
716 Section 5 Para 3. 
717 Section 6 Para 1. 
718 Trade Union Archives (Szakszervezeti Levéltár, hereinafter, SZKL) 1. f. 6/7ő8. Ę. e. 
719 That issue regularly emerged at the sessions of the Trade union Council, and the party conferences of the 
MKP. 
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to maximise its influence over them. In his speech held to trade union lecturers on 12 June 
19Őő János Kádár said the following: 
 
 “The shop committees are under the general direction of the trade union movement, 
but I must note that they should be under an even closer direction of the trade unions. 
Although the shop committee is not a purely a professional organisation in the factory, 
still, regarding its operation, and its authority, it practically fills the role of the old 
trade union bodies; shop committees have exactly the same duty as the trade unions, 
namely to protect the economic interests of workers, to which a new, and in fact 
dominant task was added that they should play the controlling, and managing role in 
production. Both the [economic] and the political importance of these shop 
committee’s is particularly great.” 720 
 
The Trade Union űouncil interpreted the decree in its narrow sense, and János Kádár also 
stressed the same: “[the] task of the shop committee’s is not to manage the factory, but to 
control the way it is managed (…) the most important point of the party’s entire policy [and 
of the reconstruction] is what is created under the shop committees, ie, the cooperation721 
with the capitalists.” Paradoxically it was exactly this speech that – even if quite briefly – the 
very essence of the institution of participation came up: the cooperation of employees and the 
employer in order to promote shared economic interests. At the same time it was the first step 
on the way to blurring the limits of the activity of works committee’s and trade unions, which 
determined the relationship of the two institutions for decades to come, and greatly 
contributed to their dysfunctional operation up to the present day. 
Integration of shop committees into the trade union formed part of centralisation 
endeavours, a process that started as early as June 1945. Centralised management was 
improved by creating a shop committee trade union unit within the Trade Union 
Secretariat.722  The Trade Union Council gave the following justification for creating the 
group: “Changing the role of the trade union, the organisational change in the trade union 
movement, and especially the necessity arising from the separation of [shop committee], and 
the trade union requires that the enterprise level trade union organisation should be created 
in the factories.”723 The group’s operation already foreshadows the concept of democratic 
centralism: “Forming any local group strictly required the headquarters’ approval, and 
electing the management of the local group is only allowed in the presence of a representative 
of the headquarters. The headquarters 724  exercised control over the activity of the local 
group. The headquarters could suspend the management of the local group as soon as it 
deviated from the principles laid down in the statutes (…). The headquarters represent 
                                               
720 János Kádár: A szakszervezetek és üzemi bizottságok a gazdasági újjáépítés szolgálatában (elĘadás a vidékre 
indulók elĘtt, [Trade unions and works committees in the service of economic reconstruction (lecture to those 
leaving for the country)], script. 12 June 19Őő. PIL 27Ő. f. 20/1. Ę. e. 
721 Ibid. 
722 PIL 27Ő. f. 20/30. Ę. e. (d.n. 2Ő June 19Ő7 – 22 November 1947) 
723 Ibid. 
724 meaning: Factory secretariat of the Trade union Councils 
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themselves, and have the right of verbally contributing at the sessions and all organisational 
actions of the local group.’725 
The tasks of the trade union member of the shop committee were likewise settled in an 
internal rule: “If he experiences an irregularity, or notices some circumstance that goes 
against the trade union’s interests, he will immediately report it to the headquarters. And 
even until further action is taken, he will take measures required by the immediate 
situation.”726 
B The Brief Existence of Shop Committees 
 
It was important for MKP – also in order to increase its role in the Trade Union Council – to 
elect its own members in position at shop committee elections. The party had prepared for the 
elections well in advance. In his report of 19 December 19Őő Antal Apró informed the 
Political űommittee of MKP’s űentral Management of the work done by the shop 
committee’s that far. In his report he stresses all along that shop committee’s did not perform 
their work properly as they unnecessarily shouldered the task of supporting the workers, and 
procuring raw material and semi-finished products. He found that shop committees were 
distanced from workers having spent most of their time doing office work, and protected the 
interests not of the employees, but of the enterprise, and also offered shelter to officials with 
political convictions contrary to communism.727 They neglected issues of working procedures, 
factory morals, work discipline, and accident prevention. He likewise found a great deal to 
condemn in the area of control: few factory committees did their work with any consistency, 
and they hardly used the services of auditors to control business books even though there was 
regulation entitling them to do so. According to Apró, this could have happened because there 
was no appropriate central direction over the shop committees, and the trade unions joined the 
work of the shop committees’ too late.728 Re-election was – so Apró thinks – justified by 
political considerations, and insurance of continuity of production.729 
Antal Apró suggested that run-up to the elections and the elections themselves had to 
be performed ‘in a planned manner’ ‘involving party organisations and trade unions’ in 
accordance with the renewed agreement of the two workers’ parties concluded on January 21, 
1945.730 Also, in his report he warned MKP that on compiling the list of candidates attempts 
must be made to ensure agreement with SZDP, and care must be taken that MKP’s candidates 
                                               
725 PIL 27Ő. f. 20/30. Ę.e. 
726 Ibid. 
727 The reference is primarily to members and non-member leaders of the Smallholders Party. 
728 It is questionable in the light of the above what time Apró would have found appropriate for the purpose. 
729 And not least the fact that the mandate of the members of the shop committee was for a year (decree 
55 000/1945. IpM Section 3 Para (1). 
730 Two parties of the Trade union űouncil agrees that they would work together ‘like siblings’ on building and 
reinforcing the workers organisations. Under the agreement the MKP was given the secretary general position, 
i.e. an operative role, while the SZDP was given the role of president (its president was Miklós Vas-Witteg 
(SZDP), and its secretary general István Kossa (MKP)). For a more detailed explanation see, J Lux, A magyar 
szakszervezet történetéből (Budapest, 2008 Friedrich Ebert Foundation), 86ff. 
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should not have won excessive majority because – such a result not reflecting real power 
ratios – would have been disadvantageous for MKP. Instead, he placed the emphasis on 
maintaining ‘party discipline’, and warned of seeing ‘communists working in the management 
of important professions’ ‘come under the control of ‘tricky social democrats’.731 
MKP’s strategy crystallised around the concept of scapegoating: “It must be 
emphasized that anti-communist officers were those who hampered smooth operation. 
Examples shall be given below. The work of the outgoing works committee must be criticised 
with a few well-prepared short speeches, and contributors should also make proposals 
concerning the work of the new shop committees. (…) Workers must be warned of exposing, 
and rendering harmless agent provocateurs”732 MKP’s propaganda efforts at enterprise level 
proved successful in the capital city: in 630 factories in Budapest and its vicinity 1889 out of 
the 3700 elected shop committee were under the control of MKP, while SZDP won over only 
1725.733 
Unclear functions of interest representation led to a point where even after the shop 
committee elections workers did not have a clear picture concerning the shop committee’s 
competency. Separation from the trade union’s activity was made more difficult by 
overlapping membership; the head of the works committee, and the trade union bodies were 
often one and the same employee. Already before the elections the idea emerged that the shop 
committee decree should be amended by the Trade Union Council. The session of the 
National Industrial Grievance Committee formally requested the representative organisations 
to make proposals concerning the amendment of the decree on 30 October 1946.734 Quite 
novel proposals were put forward in the Trade Union űouncil: “The [works committee] board 
should be neither too small nor too big. (…) 7 people per trade union should be 
appointed.”735  
However, the decree has never been modified. The authority of shop committees, 
instead of being clarified, was gradually shrunk. Still in May 1946 they passed the decree on 
the creation of the industrial production council, and the production committees. 736 Thus, 
production committees [termelési bizottság] were set up, charged with the responsibility of 
elaborating new working methods, production procedures, performance standards, and wage 
payment principles to ensure increased, and more efficient industrial production.737 Both the 
employees’ and the employers’ side was allowed to delegate two members each to the 
committees. One of the members to be delegated by the employees was appointed by the 
Trade Union űouncil, and the other by the Trade Union űommittee “that controls the works 
committees of the companies concerned.” 738  That phrasing is suggestive of the 
institutionalised hierarchy between trade unions, and shop committees. It is also obvious that 
                                               
731 PIL 274. f. 20/33. Ę. e. 
732 PIL 27Ő. f. 20/30. Ę. e. 
733 Lux, supra, 86. 
734 Minutes of the session of the National Commercial Factory Decision Making Committee on 30 October 1946 
SZKL 1. F. 6/7ő8. Ę. e. 
735 Ie, not elected, but called in based on their achievements in the movement; PIL 27Ő. f. 20/30 Ę. e. Notes to the 
development of the factory committees’ work. 
736 Decree No 6.540/1946. M. E. on the Organisation, and operation of the industrial production committees [?], 
and the Industrial Production űommittee [Termelési Űizottság] (31 May 19Ő6). 
737 Ibid. 1-3.§§ 
738 Ibid. 2.§ 
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the creation of the production committees openly deprived the shop committees of their 
authority granted to them in Section 6 Paragraph 1 point e) of Decree No 55.000 of 1945. 
Production processes started up in the wake of nationalisation, and the first three-year 
plan gave workers the hope of an improving economic and social situation. Already at the 
second national congress of the shop committees739 the implementation of the three-year plan 
was the main issue. But trade unions were also looking forward with great expectations to the 
creation of the so-called planning commissioner [tervmegbízott], the new institution of 
workers’ control at workplaces. 
Government Decree No 8530 of 1947740 brought the Plans Office under the Prime 
Minister’s supervision. The latter’s mission included designing plans, controlling their 
implementation, and preparing action required for their successful completion. Decree No 
10.520 of 1947. M. E. was issued pursuant to power granted by the government decree, which 
obliged the factories to form factory plan committees [tervhivatal].741 The plan commissioner 
working in the factories was appointed by the head of the enterprise at the shop committee’s 
proposal, and such appointment was in effect until revocation. The creation of the institution 
of the plans commissioner was another move to reduce the tasks of the shop committees as 
production control had belonged under the – ever so vaguely described – authority of the shop 
committee. The task of the trade union work communities practically squared with that of the 
production committee, and the purpose in creating them was to help design the trade union’s 
uniform economic policy.742 
Creating the trade union work communities – setting the aim of increasing production 
efficiency – again resulted in a race of institutions of identical roles lost by the shop 
committee, the democratically elected body of employee control as its existence became more 
and more difficult to justify. At the same time wages continued to stagnate, moreover, with 
the raising of personal production quotas wages de facto dropped,743 resulting in worsening 
living conditions. The workers’ dissatisfaction rose,744 and their trust in their self-elected 
bodies dwindled simultaneously. 
MKP planned to mitigate the ensuing tension by embarking on political cleansing. 
They first looked for the enemies of the people’s democracy among trade union 
representatives and later the shop committees were also added to the list of institutions to be 
cleansed. As nationalisation progressed, the control function of shop committees grew more 
and more embarrassing for the centralising political powers. A note made by the Factories 
Committee of the Trade Union Council said: 
“the right that they can interfere with the management of the [privately owned] 
company, and the intention that the works committees should have the last word in every 
issue is a powerful weapon in the hands of the [shop committees]. And if now they wish to 
                                               
739 18 July 1947. 
740 Government Decree Bo 8.530/1947 on the Creation of the Plan Economy Council, and the National Planning 
Office (Magyar Közlöny (19Ő7)) 1ő8-59. 
741 Subpara. c) of para. (1) of article 1 of decree 10.520/1947. M. E. on the Plan commissioners (5 September 
19Ő7) requires the appointment of a plan commissioner at factories operating under the part plan 1.§ (1) c). 
742 Note of Ferenc Zala, head of the Economics, and Statistics Department of the Trade union Council 6 May 
19Ő7 SZKL 1. f. 6/2őŐ. Ę. e. 
743 Summary report concerning the work performed in November 1946 by the production committees. SZKL 1. 
f. 6/317. Ę. e. 
744 Work was stopped multiple times. See also: Lux, supra, 95. 
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use that weapon in nationalised factories against the employer, ie, the state, they will often 
come face to face with themselves. The shop committees should be made to understand that 
in nationalised factories the decisive issue is no longer the control of the production 
process, and the direction of the movement of goods,745 but that the program proposed 
should be complied with.”746 
That note appropriately reflects the position of the now cleansed Trade Union Council, 
and – through it – that of MKP whereby in a plan economy there was no need for the control 
function of works committees, and – through them – for the employees’ control either.747 The 
role that the Trade Union Council meant to allocate to the works committees reduced the 
latter to an unserious institution: its role was specified as solidifying work discipline, 
propagating nationalisation, and legalising the leading role of the Centre of Heavy Industry 
[Nehézipari Központ, NIK]748 . The idea of increased centralization was not uncontested, 
records suggest that many factories like Ganz, Waggon, MÁVAG, and the Weiss Manfred 
Factories were against the initiative. 749  Here the work of the shop committees was 
supplemented by popularising NIK among the workers through satisfying simpler requests 
including providing drinking cups, and keeping toilets clean. 
The role of the trade unions, too, changed. In accordance with the new guidelines, 
their main task is to organise, increase production, and organise socialist work contests, and 
rationalising work processes in the factory, completely overshadowing the role of interest 
representation. As a parallel process their independence dropped paving the way for MKP’s 
political committee to declare on June 4, 1948 that the trade unions must serve the party. Thus 
it came as no big surprise that, following the merger of MKP and SZDP, it was announced at 
the 17th Trade Union Congress that the main task of the trade unions was to cooperate with 
the party organisations, and subordinated trade unions’ work to the party unit in all areas 
deforming the true mission of trade unions for decades to come. 
The 17th Congress – after Antal Apró’s announcement on behalf of 1.6 million 
workers that “we will follow the Soviet Union’s peace policy for life and death”750 – suggested 
that the shop committee and the trade unions must be unified, and control over the shop 
committee must be made the duty of local trade union management. 751  The trade union 
committees came to existence752 with a mission practically identical with that of the shop 
committees’, apart from the latter’s supervisory function over the enterprises’ operation.  
Concerns were dismissed by István Kossa in his speech, perhaps not in an overly 
sophisticated manner: “[t]his is a trade union task, all it requires is to re-assess the trade 
                                               
745 In an attempt to act against the black economy, the shop committees followed the finished goods produced to 
the market as much as they could. 
746 PIL 27Ő. f. 20/30. Ę. e. 
747 See also Lux, supra, 97 and 99. 
748  The Centre of Heavy Industry (NIK) formed in December had the mission of holding together the 
nationalised iron, metal, and metallurgical plants, and the machine factories. After nationalising the factories 
employing at least 100 workers (the so-called ‘Good Friday nationalisation’), on 25 March 1948 the ratio of state 
ownership grew to just below 100per cent in the metallurgical industry, and above 90per cent in the iron, metal 
and machine industry. The NIK terminated in 1949. 
749 PIL 27Ő. f. 20/30. Ę. e 
750 UMFI Hungarian newsreel 33 
751 Lux (2008: 103.) 
752 Lux (2008:100) 
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union’s role”. 753   Following the 17th Congress, and simultaneously with the sector 
reorganisations, the process culminated in the creation of the trade union’s standardized 
enterprise based organisations [üzemi alapszervezetek] by the National Council of Trade 
Unions [Szakszervezetek Országos Szövetsége, SZOT] 754 in 1949, which brought the curtain 
down on shop committees once and for all.755 That was the end of the democratic institution 
of employee participation until 1992. 
 
II Workers’ űouncils Movement in 1956 
 
A Setting the Scene 
 
When the crisis of political power caused industry management to become paralysed, workers 
again took charge of direction during the 1956 revolutionary events. The workers councils 
[Munkástanácsok] established in October 1956 played a special role among the fast changing 
conditions.756 
The first workers’ council in the capital city was elected by the workers of Egyesült 
Izzó Factory on October 24, 1956, and numerous other factories followed suit. As opposed to 
the 1945 shop committee movement, this time the election of the enterprise level 
organisations was followed by units of a higher level: workers councils were at district, and 
city level, but even at the counties. It was also apparent that the units that were set up at a 
particular level strove to create horizontal relationships. 
Initially the efforts of workers’ council was focused on directing production, providing 
for the needs of workers, and taking charge of personnel issues: in several locations they 
seized the documentation of the personnel department, and started to work out a new, and 
more equitable standard, and wherever fights erupted, the factory had to be also defended. At 
several locations such as at Egyesült Izzó, the factory manager was also replaced, but in more 
extreme cases, like in Hazai Fésüsfonő és Szövőgyár (HSZF), the first days of the workers 
councils were not without bloody scenes of a retaliatory character.757  
In political questions, however, unity was by far not as strong. The workers councils’ 
flyers and notes had mutually contradictory slogans and claims. In many cases the withdrawal 
                                               
753 István Kossa (20 February 19Ő8) 
754 The Trade union Council changed names at the 17th Congress. 
755 All resolutions passed at the sessions of SZOT (National űouncil of Trade Unions) 22 February 19Ő9. in, ‘A 
SZOT teljes ülésének határozatai, 19Ő9. február 22. A magyar szakszervezeti mozgalom válogatott 
dokumentumai II. k. (SZOT Központi Iskola kiadása, d.n.) Ő70-473. 
756 E Űeránné Nemes and E Kajári, ’A munkástanácsok és a szakszervezetek (1956-1957)’(1992) 2-3 Múltunk; 
757 In HSZF, Kálmán Turner, one of the communists of the factory was murdered in his apartment. Later, in 
memory of the retaliation the KISZ organisation of the district workers militia [munkásőrség] assumed his name.  
167 
 
of Soviet troops and the restoration of general and secret voting rights were the central 
element, but there were also notes instructing workers what to do with their volumes of ‘The 
complete works of Stalin’.758 
In a matter of days the workers councils achieved decisive majority across the country, 
and were strong enough not only to take the workers on strike, but also to get them back to 
work as soon as many of them expressed confidence in the government in late October.759 
An important point in the organisation of workers councils was the convocation of the 
workers councils’ parliament on October 31, 19ő6 with the participation of the delegates of 2Ő 
large factories. The parliament accepted the basic principles of the workers councils’ rights 
and operation regulating the relationship of workers, workers councils, the director, and the 
state. Thus, it was established that the factory belongs to the workers, who pay tax and profit 
share to the state. The democratically elected workers councils were appointed as the 
company’s supreme decision making body to which the director must have reported. The 
director, who was the enterprise’s employee, was elected by the workers councils through an 
open application system. The workers councils’ decision making rights extended to approving 
the company’s plans, determining, and spending the wage budget, concluding foreign 
transportation contracts, transacting credit deals, deciding disputes concerning starting and 
terminating employment relationships, approving the balance sheet, deciding on what to do 
with the profit, and handling social issues.760 
The Basic Principles was the culmination of the preparatory work of previous months 
laying the foundations of worker self-government. It is interesting that at several points 
including planning and concluding contracts it vested authority with the workers councils, and 
through them the workers within the framework of the prevailing system. Referring the 
enterprise’s management in the competence of the workers councils was not only the worker’s 
criticism of the centralised management of the economy, but at the same time also the 
criticism of the trade unions’ activity.761 Workers councils could not, therefore, be regarded 
the continuation of the trade union movement, but are the outcome of a new grass-root 
initiative. 
Although the idea of democratising the organisation, and cutting down on red-tape 
emerged in the trade union movement, with the replacement of Imre Nagy 762  the plans 
gathered dust for almost three years, and SZOT only placed the issue of worker representation 
on its agenda in September 1956. The question of interest representation re-surfaced along 
with the involvement of workers in decision-making on living and working conditions 
                                               
758 Pittaway (2006) and Űeránné-Kajári (1992:71); on the historical role of female leaders during the revolution 
see, E Zs Tóth ’Kádár leányai – Nők a szocializmus időszakában’ [Daughters of Kádár – Women in the socialist 
era] (Űudapest, 2010, Nyitott MĦhely) 33-52. 
759 Eg, in Borsod county miners were not involved in the industrial action due to their obligation of ensuring an 
uninterrupted supply of fuel. Quoted by Űeránné-Kajári (1992:71) 
760  The workers councils’ programs was influenced by Polish and Yugoslav examples aimed at the 
democratisation of the factories, of which the contemporary press gave numerous accounts. E.g. the press 
conferences by the Information department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or articles in the daily paper 
Népszava. Quoted by Űeránné-Kajári (1992:73) 
761 Űeránné-Kajári (1992:72) 
762 Imre Nagy was a Hungarian communist politician who was appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers 
of the People's Republic of Hungary on two occasions. Nagy's second term ended when his non-Soviet-backed 
government was brought down by Soviet invasion in the failed Hungarian Revolution of 1956, resulting in 
Nagy's execution on charges of treason two years later. 
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(including the issue of work-force management). Further points discussed included the right 
of workers to make proposals, or deliberate on appointing and dismissing leading officials, 
wage related issues, and division of profit. The possibility of exclusive competence in the area 
of the work contest also appeared.763  
That Basic Principles pointed much further than the question of internal 
democratisation of trade unions, and claimed the comprehensive reform of the political 
system. A further important element was that, instead of stressing the common interests of 
state and trade union, it placed emphasis on the different approach of otherwise common 
aims. At the same time the proposal did not move away from the plan-driven, centralised 
control of production, and from the principle of the single-person company management. And 
it wished to acquire the right of participation not for some newly created independent body, 
but for the trade union.764 
Yet, workers, and political public discourse kept the issue of worker management on 
the agenda, and even the ‘PetĘfi űircle’765 and the association of Hungarian writers included 
in its program the claim of workers to manage themselves. Following SZOT’s session, in 
conflict with the draft, the transformation of the works committees began as a grass-root 
initiative.766 As SZOT was unable to influence that process to the slightest extent, overwriting 
its earlier decision, it eventually decided for the transformation of works committees,767 in the 
hope that by joining the election process it can still assume some degree of control over the 
organisation. Enterprises based trade unions became isolated despite expectations to the 
contrary because workers regarded them as a tool of centralised management, rather than an 
organ of democratic participation.768 Seeing this development, SZOT radically changed its 
previous standpoint, and started to advocate the principle of trade unions’ independence, the 
restoration of the interest representative function, and the transformation of the democratic 
trade union movement.769 
The majority of workers’ council were in support of Imre Nagy’ government formed 
on November 1, 1956, and began preparations for transforming production, and for their 
activities in the factories. Re-elections started in November in an attempt to strengthen the 
legitimacy of workers’ committees. Little information is available concerning the composition 
of workers’ committees, but scattered data suggest that both its chair and its rank-and-file 
membership came mostly from among skilled workers.770 
It is partly due to their strong internal support that workers’ councils remained 
powerful enough to maintain control over the factory following the turn of 4 November 1956. 
                                               
763 SZKL 1-2/88. 
764 Űeránné-Kajári (1992:7Ő-75) 
765 PetĘfi űircle [PetĘfi Kör] was a circle of intellectuals started off in the 19ő0s. It had a significant role in the 
preparation of the 1956 revolution. 
766 Ibid. 
767  Broadcast of Kossuth Radio on October 26, 1956; see, A forradalom hangjai at 
http://www.radio.hu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=374&Itemid=131&mode=1&date=1956.1
1.01 
768 Űeránné-Kajári (1992:76) 
769 The presidency of SZOT dissolved itself on 1 November 1956, and founded the National Association of Free 
Trade Unions. 
770 Űeránné-Kajári (1992:77) 
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They also elaborated their political program. 771 As a result both the government and the 
Soviet military command regarded them as a valid negotiation partner. The workers’ council 
of Újpest announced in their call issued on November 12, 19ő6 that they planned to create a 
Revolutionary Workers Council of Budapest772 in order to preserve the achievements of the 
national revolution.  
 
B The First Legal Regulations 
 
The government attempted to separate workers councils and so called revolutionary councils, 
and tried to handle them by different legal means. Seeing the commencement of the work of 
central as well as local units, the government decree of November 6, 1956 acknowledged the 
newly established grass-root organisations named revolutionary committees [forradalmi 
munkástanácsok]. A new decree issued on November 12, 1956 limited the rights of 
revolutionary councils to proposal making and required that they eliminate ‘counter-
revolutionary elements’ from their ranks. 
Workers’ councils, however, were recognised by the government, which strengthened 
their legitimacy, and they also managed to avoid being merged with trade unions. To 
counterbalance their power, the government allowed the chairman of the trade union to 
participate at cabinet meetings. Sándor Gáspár773 emphasised the independence of the trade 
unions in a radio speech highlighting the role of the trade union in establishing the workers’ 
councils. 
The most important rules of the operation of workers councils were laid down in 
Legislative Decree No 25 of 1956.774 The preamble of the statutory provision states that social 
democracy is only possible under the management of workers councils elected by blue collar 
workers.775 This Legislative Decree required the temporary workers councils elected in the 
first days of the revolution – often by general acclamation – should be replaced by permanent 
workers councils, but that was only possible if at least two thirds of the workers showed up at 
their workplaces. 776  This measure was firstly meant to serve as guarantee to legitimate 
representation, and secondly it was meant to promote resumption of work indispensable for 
consolidation. In factories where that condition was not met, the regulation kept in office the 
                                               
771 These included the scheduling free elections, withdrawal of Soviet troops, and releasing Imre Nagy from 
prison. 
772 The terms of revolutionary council and workers councils were used interchangeably, which corroborates the 
fact that the activity of the two institutions also overlapped. 
773 Gáspár was a politician of the űommunist Party, who later became a prominent trade union leader. 
774 Coming into force on 24 November 1956. 
775 In units not directly involved in production, and in cooperatives the option of electing workers councils was 
not available (Para (2) of Section 1 of legislative decree No 25 of 1956). 
776 Para (1) of Section 2 of legislative decree No 25 of 1956. 
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temporary workers councils until the conditions were fulfilled pursuant to the provisions 
applicable to them777 without granting them the authority ensured in the new legislation.  
The workers’ council had authority to decide on the most important issues of the 
company, including insuring continuity of production, payment of wages and benefits, 
performing of obligations toward the state, maintaining work discipline, setting the 
company’s plans, and staff size, specifying the company’s organisational structure, and 
various in-house organisations, designing corporate wage policy, managing the company’s 
finances, approving the balance sheet, and the employment, and dismissal of leading 
officials.778 779 The workers’ council was furthermore entitled to make proposals regarding the 
enterprise’s foreign trade policy. The workers council could transfer these rights to either the 
chair of the workers council or the company’s director on condition that they regularly report 
back to it, although exercising this latter right would have caused concern in the event of eg, 
the exemption of the director.780 Other than that, the workers’ council had title to determine 
the director’s tasks, and to make resolutions on issues directly affecting the workers’ living 
and working conditions – following seeking the opinion of the trade union committee – which 
resolution the director was obliged to implement. In the event of a difference of opinion 
between the workers council, and the enterprise-level trade union committee concerning the 
latter issue, the supervisory body concluded the dispute in agreement with the supreme trade 
union organ. 
To sketch the relationship network of the workers council and the company’s leading 
officials, several pieces of legislation has to be interpreted, including Council of Ministers 
Resolution No 1.077 of 1954 (IX. 21.) on the Rights and obligations of the directors of 
industrial companies, Government Decree No 7 of 1957 (I. 23.) on the Appointment and 
dismissal of leading officials of industrial companies, and Council of Ministers Decrees No 
123 of 19ő1 (VI. 17.), and No 12ő of 19ő1 (VI. 17.) on űompanies’ chief engineers and chief 
accountants. The workers’ council had co-determination right regarding the enterprise-level 
plan [részletterv]. The workers’ council was under obligations to create its own proposal on 
time, submit it for agreement, and to comply with the planning instructions. The workers’ 
council and the director made joint decisions concerning technical development and on 
modifying the production profile. The appointment or the dismissal of the enterprise’s chief 
engineer and chief accountant also required the workers council’s approval. 
A fervent debate erupted between the government and the workers’ councils in the 
course of preparing Legislative Decree No 2ő of 19ő6. The workers’ councils were of the 
view that they had to hold the right of approval concerning the appointment and the 
exemption of the company’s director (ie, they claimed that right not only concerning the chief 
engineer and the chief accountant), and the trade union supported that position. When, 
however, Legislative Decree No 25 of 1956 was promulgated, they realised that the 
                                               
777 Government resolution No 6 of 1956 (IX. 12.) 
778 Para (1) of Section 8, and Para (3) of Section 9 of Legislative Decree No 25 of 1956. 
 
 
780 Para (2) of Section 8 of Legislative Decree No 25 of 1956. 
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government had ignored the workers’ councils’ opinion, and had created the legislation with 
its original language.781 
 
C Endgame of Workers’ Self-governance  
 
The disappointment over the inconclusive negotiations between the government and the 
workers’ councils was further increased by the increasingly intensive struggle with the trade 
unions for controlling the operation of factories. The trade unions’ committees began to 
organise the re-election of the workers’ councils pursuant to applicable legislation, but the 
workers’ councils refused being supervised by the trade unions. The NKM tried to have the 
Legislative Decree on Workers’ űouncils amended at the two key points, namely the 
appointment of the company’s director, and the supervision of workers’ council election by 
trade unions. That attempt remained essentially fruitless. 
The operation of the NKM came up against even physical obstacles as it was banned 
from using its former headquarters. The copies of the planned press organ of workers’ 
council, Munkásújság [Workers’ Newspaper] were seized, and their spreading was 
disallowed. By the end of November 1956 also the tone of the negotiations changed after 
György Marosán 782  stated that whoever does not support the government is an alleged 
counter-revolutionist.783 
On December 8, 1956 a government decree ordered the dissolution of revolutionary 
committees, and other social organs of similar names’ claiming that those “revolutionary 
committees do nothing for the public good, on the contrary, where they exist, and operate, 
their activity affects detrimentally, and in fact hinders the work of the state and economic 
organs.”784 At the same time, since their creation was acknowledged by a legislative decree, 
and the dissolution was announced in a government decree, the validity of the latter against 
the legislative decree is questionable, to say the least. 
The NKM protested by publishing a memorandum, but it was obvious that the 
negotiations could not be continued. The NKM announced new industrial action at the news 
of the Salgótarján volley. In response, the government dissolved the NKM, the district, 
county, and city workers’ councils, and their leaders were detained by the police.785 It is an 
interesting phenomenon at the same time that the government’s actions concerned exclusively 
the top organisations of the workers councils, while enterprise level units received support 
along with trade unions. 
                                               
781 The workers councils announced a strike in protest, to force the government to satisfy their claims. They did 
not resume work even after their action proved to be inconclusive (except for Csepel). 
782  György Marosán was a prominent party member of MDP-MSZMP. He was a fierce opponent of the 
revolution of 19ő6. His infamous speech of December 8, 19ő6 in Salgótarján he proclaimed that military force 
was to be used to halt the revolution.  
783 Űeránné-Kajári (1992:89). 
784 Government Resolution No 17 of 1956 (XII. 8.). 
785 In January 1957 death penalty was extended also to workers on strike. 
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The trade union assured the government of its support, and called for the punishment 
of those contravening the interest of the people. 786  Almost like in compensation, the 
government helped the reinforcement of the trade unions’ positions by strengthening state 
control,787 restoring the earlier competence of personnel affairs departments, and increasing 
the powers of party organisations in the factories. That was supplemented by the instrument of 
political condemnation, whereby Government Decree No 10056 of 1956 (coded 
‘confidential’)788 required that the dismissals must be used to strengthening the professional 
and political organs. The ‘cleansing’ operations came together with action by the armed 
forces. They did their best to discredit those dismissed, and branded them as counter-
revolutionists. These measures clearly disintegrated the factory collective, and increased the 
workers’ reluctance to openly support the workers councils. 
The option of decentralisation, however, did not close immediately, factory workers 
councils did not terminate until November 19ő7, and the issue of worker’ self-management 
remained on the agenda for some time. The government issued a statement in which it 
announced that it would, following the trade union’s advice, organise a committee charged 
with preparing the democratisation of production. Representatives of the trade union 
committee, and the workers councils in the factories, and members of the NKM loyal to the 
government sat on the committee.789 
At the same time, the government, quoting economic difficulties, returned to the 
previous methods of central administration, and arrests meanwhile also began to target the 
members of the factory workers councils. Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party [Magyar 
Szocialista Munkáspárt, MSZMP]790 regulated the party policy regarding workers councils, 
which, naturally, equalled the implementation of the party’s leading role. 
No support came from the trade union’s side either. Although Sándor Gáspár, in his 
speech firmly stated that the trade union consistently sided with the workers’ councils, and 
was in favour of ensuring that workers gain control over production processes, but was not 
more specific than that. The trade union, however, gave up the principle of independence, and 
the right to strike, and supported bringing back work contests and also vindicated workers 
councils’ rights. 791 
Proposals concerning the development of workplace democracy and the creation of a 
new legislation concerning trade unionism were on the agenda of the political committee of 
MSZMP in August 1957.792 As to the first issue, it decided on the termination of workers’ 
councils and the establishment of works councils [üzemi tanács]. The second issue was not 
discussed in detail, according to the documents it was briefly decided that instruments to 
                                               
786 Űeránné-Kajári (1992:91). 
787 In numerous companies the director formerly exempted by the workers councils was re-instated. 
788 Pieces of legislation coded ’confidential’ were binding but not promulgated. Űeránné-Kajári (1992:92) 
789 Űeránné-Kajári (1992:9Ő) 
790  The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt, MSzMP) was organised from 
elements of the Hungarian Working People's Party during the Hungarian Revolution of 19ő6, with János Kádár 
as general secretary.  MSZMP was the ruling party of Hungary between 1956 and 1989. 
791 SZKL 1-2./9Ő and Űeránné-Kajári (1992:97) 
792  The author of the former was the committee elected by the political committee of the MSZMP whose 
membership was Antal Apró, JenĘ Fock and Sándor Gáspár (SZKL 1-4/396), the latter was made by the trade 
union. 
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ensure effective control of workers should be created.793 The official ideology claimed that in 
a socialist state there is no justified need for the independent protection of workers’ interests. 
In connection with that statement was the state’s ownership, and its role as a unifier of social 
interest, and the financial management in a plan economy framework.794 That, at the same 
time, also foreshadowed that trade union committees could not take over the rights of the 
workers’ councils. 
The political committee’s [politkai bizottság, PB] resolution required that the trade 
union should take charge of elaborating the rules for the works councils. Pursuant to the 
guidelines of the resolution, the milestones of the regulation were the control of the financial 
management of production companies, implementing the plan economy, strengthening the 
societal ownership of state companies, and carrying on with the principle of one-man 
leadership. The document contained provisions to grant the right of consultation  and the right 
of control to works councils, but the final wording whereby “the director is obliged to 
implement the works council’s decisions within its sphere of authority, and the works councils 
controls the implementation of the resolution” has rendered the scopes of authority 
intransparent.795 Workers’ councils were usually established first in factories using advanced 
technology, and where the most qualified groups of skilled workers were employed. Workers’ 
councils were characteristically democratically elected grass-root organisations with a clearly 
stated economic program. Leaders of workers’ councils regarded the production equipment as 
belonging to the given enterprise collective, and made a clear declaration that they had no 
intention to return the equipment to their pre-war owners (that is another proof that invalidates 
the later accusation whereby workers councils wished to have the previous system restored). 
Although the original purpose workers’ councils were the creation and operation of self-
regulation, and control by workers, they also formulated a political program as their plans 
could only be executed in a democratic political framework.796  
 
III Participation after the Revolution 
 
Government Resolution No 1086 of 1957 (XI. 17.) on Works Councils was the outcome of 
the preparatory work by the trade unions. 797  Legislative Decree No 63 of 1957 on the 
Termination of Workers Councils was announced, and Government Resolution No 1068 of 
1957. (VIII. 4.) on Production Councils was passed during the same wave of legislation. 
 
                                               
793 PIL 288. f.5 /41 
794 Űeránné-Kajári (1992:99) 
795 SZKL 1-3/333. 
796 9-10 Magyar Füzetek (Paris, 1981), 8ő-102 
797 Probably there was a formal error in the promulgation, as it was a joined legal measure of the Government 
and the Trade Union Council, thus it should have been a decree and not a government resolution. 
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A Works Councils 
 
The preamble of Government Resolution No 1086 of 1957 begins with a definition to 
workplace democracy. It says that the broadening of workplace democracy, and the increased 
involvement of workers – primarily the working class, and intellectuals involved in 
production – in directing the efforts of building the economy serves the purpose of promoting 
the enfolding of workers’ creative initiative in building the socialist system, speed up building 
of socialist economy, and contribute to the further development of social welfare, and, as a 
result of the above, further strengthen ‘people’s democracy’.798 The decree made clear the 
limits of these aims by regarding the works councils as organisations operating under the 
trade union, which is mentioned three times in the document for perfect clarity. 
A further barrier to their operation was that the lawmaker tried to make works councils 
fit to the traditional framework of the management of state-owned companies. Theoretically it 
was the works councils’ duty to involve through their activity the workers of the factory in the 
financial management of companies, in the control of production, in promoting the realisation 
of the plan economy, and the consolidation of the workers’ ownership of state companies. At 
the same time it was also expressed immediately that the shaping and operation of works 
councils must not affect the company director’s sole responsibility. Works councils had 
different authority in economic issues on the one hand, and social-cultural issues on the other. 
In the spirit of the foregoing the director’s sole authority of decision making prevailed fully in 
economic issues, and the works council only had consultation rights. Their control prevailed 
in social-cultural issues through co-determination. 
However, the right of consultation and co-determination only existed nominally, and 
was practically limited to complying with the economic plans. Works councils were entitled 
to control the profitability of the enterprise, production equipment, raw materials and financial 
assets, the implementation of technical development, the quality control, and also whether 
human resources were being used according to the economic plan. Works councils were also 
in charge to observe disciplinary issues, and whether measures brought to protect social 
property were being complied with. The system of the plan economy narrowed their right of 
consultation to an even smaller area: the opinion of the works councils had to be sought in 
questions of the company’s draft plan made on the basis of the ministry’s instructions, 
specification of the investment projects financed from the enterprise’s own assets, and from 
loans, use of financial assets earmarked for renovation, the organisational structure of the 
company, determining the main forms of remuneration, staff number, the execution of major 
innovations, and the realisation of inventions. 
In the socio-cultural area works councils were entitled to co-determination right on 
distribution of the enterprise’s  profit share, bonuses, use of amounts earmarked for social 
                                               
798 People’s democracy’ was sometimes also referred to as the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’; for a detailed 
analysis see, R J Crampton 'Eastern Europe in the twentieth century and after’ (1997, Routledge), 227 ff. 
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investments, and allocation of smock. That was all a very narrow area for enfolding workers’ 
creative initiatives. 
Andor Weltner saw the obligations of the works councils as being a two-way process. 
He maintained the position that works councils owe an obligation toward the enterprise: they 
help the director in managing the company, achieving a profitable operation, and complying 
with the law. On the other hand they had to report regularly to the workers’ collective 
concerning their activity. 
The enterprise’s director, too, had obligations vis-à-vis works councils, but that was 
formulated in a controversial manner. It was repeatedly stated that works councils’ operation 
should not limit the director’s sole managerial rights, but the director at the same time obliged 
to execute the works councils’ decisions. On top of all, the director was obliged to promote 
works councils’ operation, had to seek their opinions prior to decision making, and ought to 
facilitate their control by reporting on his activity if so required. 
It was the personal obligation of the member of works councils’ to exercise their 
statutory rights and perform their statutory obligations, and do their work in accordance with 
their qualifications (general obligation), and treat confidentially all information brought to 
their attention (special obligation).  
Government Resolution No 1086 of 1957 set works councils in the service of the plan 
economy, and used controversial phrasing concerning the relationship of the works councils 
and the enterprise’s director thereby leaving a rather limited space of manoeuvre available for 
the institution. A further limitation came from the fact that the resolution ordered to settle 
issues not regulated in the resolution along the principles of ‘democratic centralism’, and 
’mutual socialist cooperation’. Űut the principle of democratic centralism required that the 
company’s well-founded, that is legitimate interests had to be ranked above those of the 
workers, and social interest as provided by legislation superseded that of the enterprise, or 
even the workers. That principle was followed also within the trade union through the fact 
that the lower ranking trade union organ was obliged to execute the resolutions of the higher 
ranking organ.799 
There was no point for subscribers to the central ideology to advocate that common 
social interest would eventually enable the creation of common corporate and individual 
interest, and that there is no need for instruments of public law to guarantee work peace 
because “cooperation of comrades, and mutual socialist assistance are an objective necessity 
even if occasionally the opposite happens”, therefore, in a socialist establishment the work 
collective is held together by a harmony of objectively implemented and implementable 
interests.800 In reality, the ‘harmony of interests’ was usually achieved to the detriment of 
workers.  
As in the system of the plan economy there was still no need (or possibility) for real 
worker participation, the state apparatus was forced to invent empty slogans such as the hard-
to-understand explanation whereby in the socialist conglomerates “the workers’ participation 
gradually increases through the power of the objective necessity of creating harmony of 
                                               
799 Weltner (1961:478) 
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interests.”801 Given the fact that the living and working conditions of workers showed no 
apparent improvement, the effort of works councils were hardly noticeable to workers. 
Moreover, the role of the works councils operating on shop floor level, and under the auspices 
of the trade union, workers could hardly differentiate between the trade union and works 
councils. The distinction was made even more difficult by the rules applicable to the election 
and composition of the works councils. 
The ‘socialist surplus’ of employee participation came from the composition of works 
councils: representatives of the party, the trade union, the Communist Youth Alliance 
[Kommunista Ifjúsági Szövetség, KISZ] were present among its members together with the 
enterprise management, thereby further ‘improving’ harmony of interests. 802  The works 
council election regulations in fact respond to that principle. 
The trade union committee took care of the establishment of works councils, its 
membership ranged from 15 to 121, and the specific number within that broad range was 
always determined by the trade union committee. Its composition was subject to the 
requirement that ‘there should be a sufficient number of trade union officers to guarantee the 
cooperation of the trade union and the works council work, and that to also ensure that the 
‘key figures of the communist system should participate’, ie, ‘people with the appropriate 
sense of political identity’.803 
Alongside these principles, two thirds of the members of the works councils were 
delegated by the trade union, and one third of the vote was available to the workers 
themselves.804 The enterprise’s director, the chief engineer (or chief agronomist), and the 
chief accountant of the enterprise as well as a secretaries of MSZMP and KISZ were ex lege 
members of the works councils. But the law further curbed the workers’ right to intervene by 
politically ‘censoring. Only those workers were eligible (having spent at least two years 
working for the company) who were loyal ‘to the working people, and to the űonstitution of 
the People’s Republic’.805  
This, on the one hand, further increased the party’s control, and, on the other, it was 
sufficiently murky to ensure large enough grounds for political screening as the law provided 
no specific reason to recall a party functionary, while incompatibility had to be stated 
concerning all political, economic, and other activities, and behaviours that were against the 
interests of the working people. Therefore, even if a ‘flaw’ had occurred, and an unwanted 
person had become member of the works council, the committee would not have taken long to 
find out a well-founded reason to eliminate him/her. Even the rule that two-thirds majority 
was required for recalling a member of the works council had no significance at all, as that 
majority was guaranteed in the first place by the ex lege members. That composition of the 
works councils as described above could halt any unwanted action of the ‘real’ elected 
                                               
801 Ibid. Although the works of Andor Weltner, especially those written in the 1950s are viewed against an 
excessively political backdrop, and the author was palpably driven by a compulsion to conform to the 
contemporary ideology, the critical approach still exchanges a complicit glance with the reader] still surfaces at 
certain points. Thus when Weltner analyses the preamble of government resolution 1086 of 1957, he finds it 
excessive to label Hungary the ‘state of proletariat’s dictatorship’, and he believes it still happened because the 
legislator translated the Soviet legislation used for reference verbatim. 
802 Weltner (1961: 573) 
803 Weltner (1961:578-673) 
804 Government resolution 1086 of 1957 IV.  Section 13. a) 
805 Government resolution 1086 of 1957. IV. Section 14. 
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members of the works council, because all decisions required a majority of the vote, and, as 
described above, the elected members made up only a third of the works council. Even the 
operating rules of the works council did not involve a risk of error with its quarterly sessions 
as it was fully subordinated to the trade union, moreover, it was the trade union that acted 
with the works council’s authority between two sessions. 
It is likewise interesting to look at what happened if the director ever infringed the 
rights of the works council’s rights. In that case, as he was solely accountable, his action was 
effective; however his action was subject to disciplinary measures. Short of mandate, 
however, the works council could not take action against the director, and could not 
implement the disciplinary measure itself.  All it could do was to condemn the director (who 
was, in fact, its own member). The trade union was entitled to take action by turning to the 
establishment’s supervisory organ seeking it to instruct the director to observe his obligation, 
and, if the director was a party member, then even the party could take an action. These, 
however, could hardly work as genuine instruments of enforcing one’s rights if only because 
of their overly political character. 
 
B Production Councils 
 
The other institution of worker participation was the production council, created by 
Government Decree No 1068 of 19ő7. Its purpose was to involve workers in the enterprise’s 
production activity and quality control. The limitations applicable to works councils are 
clearly visible here, too: workers’ right to participate was not supposed to entail any 
restriction on central administration, or on the principle of sole responsibility ensuring its 
enforcement. Even that area was not short of political ideology: it was argued that control by 
the collective, and the one-man leadership by the director complemented each other in paving 
the way to the success of the state socialist style of economy. Through the operation of 
production councils it was hoped that the directors’ professional standards, and the workers’ 
political standards would rise, and the pace of that development determined the extent to 
which the collective of workers can participate in management. At the same time, the 
participation was severely limited by the principle of state socialist company management. 
Therefore, production councils only empowered with the right of consultation and the right to 
make a proposal.806  
The preamble of the Government Decree stated that its aim was to involve workers, 
and to increase production, which instrumentally necessitates familiarity by the workers with 
production processes.  However, the statement fell short on real competencies delegated to 
production councils: the function of production councils was to present the quarterly plans. 
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IV Workers’ Participation Following the Economic Reforms 
 
The second part of the 1960s brought significant changes to the economic sphere. A new 
labour code, Act II of 1967 was adopted, introducing important changes concerning 
participation. The 9th űongress of Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party [Magyar Szocialista 
Munkáspárt, MSZMP] held between November 28 and December 3 in 1966 decided to 
launch the economic reform program. The Party’s leading role in the economic reforms 
remained unquestioned, as János Kádár, the General Secretary of MSZMP put it ”[as] the 
Party is leading the society, it is natural that in every aspect of civil life communist have a 
leading role. This is the glorious mission, pride, and at the same time, burden of 
communists.”807 His thoughts were reinforced by Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the 
űentral űommittee of the űommunist Party of the Soviet Union (űPSU): “[e]stablishment of 
new social patterns, cultural development and the shaping of socialist mind-set are only 
possible through the leadership of the Communist Party. Socialism and the Party, such as the 
Party and the people are inseparable from each other. This is one of the most important 
conditions of safeguarding the power of socialism.”808 
In his New Year welcome note, Károly Németh, member of the Political űommittee of 
MSZMP wrote in connection with the unity of the socialist society that the completion of the 
socialist order is a shared task, and those, who are not identifying themselves with the Party’s 
program would be excluded from the achievements of the society.809 However, as Németh 
further specified the request, to blend in it was enough not to actively oppose the values of 
established system. Thus, it was far from the Rákosi regime’s ‘he who is not with us is against 
us’ policy. As Kádár argued, people should be judged by their contribution to the socialist 
society, and only those would be punished who tried to actively dismantle the system. That 
was the era of passivity, the policy ‘he who is not against us is with us.’810 
However, the economic reforms had a strong political framework. It was not advised 
to compare the reforms to those of the 1953-őő marked by the Imre Nagy’s chairmanship or 
to refer to them as an alternative of the planned economy. Also, it was also questioned 
whether the reforms could be called as ‘reforms’, Kádár and other prominent party members 
repeatedly stressed that the changes were not more than tools which made the already existing 
political and economic system work better.811 General information pamphlets distributed at 
workplaces only dealt with practical details regarding planning, export and import regulations. 
Challengers of the reforms hardy spoke in public; probably the only openly criticised aspect 
                                               
807  A Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt IX. kongresszusának jegyzőkönyve [Minutes of the 9th Congress of 
Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party] (Űudapest, 1967, Kossuth Kiadó), Ő22. 
808  A Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt IX. kongresszusának jegyzőkönyve [Minutes of the 9th Congress of 
Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party] (Űudapest, 1967, Kossuth Kiadó), 1Ő8. 
809 Népszabadság, January 1, 1967. 
810  J Kádár ’Hazafiság és internacionalizmus’ [Patriotism and Internationalism] (Budapest, 1968, Kossuth 
Kiadó) Ő42–43. 
811 Kádár addressed the economic reforms first in public in his speech at the Trade Union űongress of May 1967, 
declaring that they are only moderate changes in the economic leadership and socialist valued were to be 
preserved. See more on the political embeddedness of the reforms in, J Kádár ’Hazafiság és internacionalizmus’ 
[Patriotism and Internationalism] (Űudapest, 1968, Kossuth Kiadó) 327, 399-400. 
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of the reform program was its profit sharing scheme, declaring that an enterprise’s profit 
should be shared among directors, middle managers and workers in a ratio of 80:50:15.812 
Opponents were turned down by the official reasoning: “socialist distribution principles do 
not comply with bourgeois equalitarianism.” 813 It is noteworthy that the first provision in 
1969 was the repeal of the profit distribution scheme, one of the flagship institutions of the 
economic reforms. Workers felt so swindled and betrayed that many of them refused to take 
up the profit. Thus, 1969 onwards enterprises were ordered to calculate profit share as an 
element of the basic wage.814 
Soon it became apparent that the economic reforms were not sustainable without 
political changes. The economic independence of enterprises would have required directors to 
be appointed based on objective criteria regarding leadership and management skill and 
workers should have had a word in the selection process. The envisaged economic 
reorganization called for political pluralism, similar to the concept which had been initiated 
by Imre Nagy and to what was demanded during the 1956 revolution. However, it would have 
been difficult for the Party leaders to maintain the legitimacy of the measures after the ‘anti-
Soviet’ revolution. After 1968 the intellectuals’ opposition revived815 and by 1972 different 
ideological streams popped up even within the Party. To maintain the ‘soft dictatorship’, there 
was no other possibility than to bring the whole economic reform program to an end. 
 
A Official Framework of Participation  
 
The new Labour Code of 1967 set forth that the purpose of the Act is to regulate how workers 
could contribute to, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution (Act No XX of 
1949) and through channels of the trade union, the regulation of work and living conditions 
and how they could facilitate the improvement of the productivity of an enterprise and control 
its activity. The basic concept of the Labour Code was to enhance indirect participation 
through trade unions and leave a narrow space for direct involvement. However, the overall 
leeway of the Labour Code was not so significant. Trade unions were seemingly given an 
important role, but the structure and nature of participation was rather limited in reality due to 
the all-encompassing presence of the Party. 
 Indirect participation was envisaged through trade unions in three levels. On a national 
level SZOT had various consultation rights in the legislative process regarding the living and 
working conditions of workers. SZOT had the right to initiate new regulations, it had the right 
                                               
812 I PetĘ, ‘Beszélő évek – 1967‘(1998) ŰeszélĘ, available online at http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/1967. 
813 Népszabadság, October 11, 1967 
814 Workers were notified on their pay slips in which category they were filed, Category I stood for directors, 
Category II for mid-managers and Category III for rank-and-files; see, M Haraszti ‘Beszélő évek – 1969‘ (1998) 
ŰeszélĘ, available online at http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/1969. 
815  Most notably, an academic dispute was initiated on the different interpretations of Marx’s philosophy, 
questioning the legitimacy of ideological leadership of MSZMP (see for example the essays of M Ludassy or Zs 
Ferge, Magyar Filozófiai Szemle 1973. 1–2). These articles were heavily attacked chiefly by the Cultural 
Committee of MSZMP (see, MSZMP határozatai és dokumentumai 1971–75. (Űudapest, 1978, Kossuth Kiadó) 
and many of the philosophers and social scientists eventually were dismissed after 1973. 
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to form an opinion on the activity of the Council of Ministers; however, the opinion of SZOT 
was not binding. It also had the right to agree, meaning that ministers issued regulations on 
their own, however, concerning the operation of an enterprise, regulations of matters which 
influenced workers’ living and working conditions were void in case the relevant trade union 
did not approve it beforehand. Finally, SZOT had the right to co-regulation, which was 
different from the above mentioned right of agreement, as in that case an administrative organ 
or an enterprise issued a regulation together with SZOT.816 On industry level industrial-level 
trade unions, while on enterprise level the various basic units of trade unions (eg, trade union 
foremen, trade union group, workshop unit, etc) were empowered with participatory rights. 
 Regarding direct participation, the core legal measure of this era was Decree No 1001 
of 1965 on the democratization of production committees. 817 It provided for that production 
committees were entitled to inquire information on production plans and goals and to 
articulate their opinion on the execution of these plans. Production committees could decide 
which work competition method they prefer to use and had decision making right concerning 
the ‘Outstanding Worker’ and ‘Socialist Űrigade’ awards.  While forums of indirect 
participation were entirely brought under the umbrella of trade union movement (after 1967 
there were no more works council elections), the Party’s influence on direct participation was 
increased.818 These measures indeed did not bring workers closer to the idea of workplace 
democracy. The major ‘breakthrough’ was brought in 1977 by Act No VI of 1977 on State 
Enterprises and Decree No 1018 of 1977 on Workplace Democracy – ironically, after the new 
economic mechanism was officially abolished in 1973. 
B Changes in the Structure of State Enterprises 
 
Socialist state enterprises went under significant changes after 1968 regarding both their 
external and internal relations, and some of them survived the cessation of the economic 
reforms. The direct compulsory nature of the national economic plan was eased and factory 
management was provided with more independence regarding financial and production issues. 
These external changes influenced the enterprises’ internal relations as well. A manifest legal 
instrument of the new spirit was Act No VI of 1977 on State Enterprises. The new law 
adjusted the internal and external relations of the enterprises according to the new 
requirements and provided substantially greater freedom to management with regard to the 
allocation of the net income of the enterprise. Due to the new regulations, directors were 
believed to have more interest in effective production management of the enterprise. The 
                                               
816 An example for the right of co-regulation could be a collective agreement (see, I Hagelmayer ‘A collective 
szerzĘdés alapkérdései’ [Fundamentals of űollective Agreements] (Űudapest, 1979, Akadémiai Kiadó) 131-38). 
For a detailed description of the rights and duties of trade unions see, A Weltner ’A magyar munkajog’ 
(Hungarian Labour Law) (Űudapest, 1978, Akadémiai Kiadó), 61ff. 
817 1001/1965 (I. 16.) MT-SZOT közös határozat [Joint Decree No 1001 of 196ő (I. 16) of űouncil of Ministers 
and SZOT]. 
818 MSZMP Political űommittee’s Decision on the independence of trade union activity of May 10, 1966; see, 
MSZMP határozatok és dokumentumok 1963-1966 [Documents and Decisions of MSZMP 1963-1966] 
(Űudapest, 1968, Kossuth Kiadó), 288. 
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workers of the enterprise hence were also supposed to become more prominent ‘part-owners’ 
of social property. This increased interest of workers was transposed to reformed participatory 
regulations. 
 Act No VI of 1977 stipulated that directors of the enterprise relied on the workers’ 
collective while executing his/her duties. That was a response to the formerly way 
overstressed role of directors in the state socialist economic model, which was based on the 
‘one-man responsible direction’. Also, by formally referring to workers’ participation, a first 
step was made to separate the rights and competencies of trade unions and participatory 
instruments.819 Directors and their deputies, within their capacities, had to cooperate with the 
enterprise-level trade union and KISZ organizations, and they had to cater for workplace 
democracy.820 Regarding decisions that concern the majority of the workforce, directors were 
obliged to involve workers in the preparatory and controlling procedures. To facilitate 
workers’ participation, decision making and internal audit processes, as well as incentive 
policies had to be streamlined.821 Workers were allowed to express their opinions and to 
participate in the evaluation, and to some extent, to opine about the director as well, in 
accordance with the regulations set forth by legal measures or the code of conduct of 
enterprises.822 Specific collectives of workers were provided with co-determination rights as 
well; however, the scope of that right was not defined by Act No VI of 1977, but was referred 
to other legal instruments.823 
 
C Direct and Indirect Forms of Participation 
 
However, the regulatory framework of workplace democracy seemed to be quite flexible and 
tailor-made to potentially serve the different needs of enterprises, the punch line was provided 
for by Section 21. It set forth that the different forums of workplace democracy, the 
establishment and operation of these forums, their competences and the way of participation 
was provided by legal regulations in accordance with the principles set forth by the Council of 
Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic and the National Council of SZOT and, in some 
cases, the Central Committee of KISZ. Thus, centralization eventually overshadowed the 
enterprises’ self-government regarding participation. The regulatory scope of code of 
conducts was further curtailed by the obligation of directors to consult and seek agreement 
with the enterprise level trade union unit and KISZ, organizations which were not at all 
independents from party politics. 
                                               
819 Cs Lehoczky Kollonay ’Some Aspects of the Internal Management and Labour Relations of Socialist State 
Enterprise’ (1982), 10 International Űusiness Lawyer 1Ő. 
820 Section 19 of Act No VI of 1977. 
821 Section 20 of Act No VI of 1977. 
822 Evaluation of the directors’ work was made on an annual basis. Section 20 Paras 3-4 of Act No VI of 1977. 
823 Section 20 Para 2 of Act No VI of 1977. 
182 
 
 An amendment to the Labour Code inserted a new part to the Code on participation.824 
It first repeated Section 19 of Act No VI of  1977 and added with special emphasis that 
directors’ individual responsibility should remain regarding decisions subject to participation. 
Then it further elaborated on the specific rights of workers’ collective to submit proposals and 
observations on any significant issue related to the enterprise management or the interest of 
the collective. The workers’ collective was empowered with the right to offer an opinion or, in 
some (unspecified) cases to make a decision and to control its implementation. I am in fact 
indecisive whether the emphasized individual responsibility of a director facilitated 
participation, or, to the contrary, was proved to be an obstacle to it. 
 Further to the point on the separation of competencies of trade unions and those of 
workers’ participatory instruments, the Labour űode stipulated that workers could exercise 
their participatory rights directly and indirectly. While participation through trade unions 
remained important, new aspects were considered while reforming workers’ involvement in 
decision making, and that was the workers’ collective right as owners of the social 
property.825 The separation of competencies was most realistic on a shop-floor level by forms 
of direct participation. 
 However, not free from controversy, the power to organize direct participation was 
vested in trade unions. According to Joint Resolution No 1018 of May 7, 1977 by the Council 
of Trade Unions, the regulations regarding the establishment of enterprise forums, the rules of 
their operation, the method of workers’ participation and the subject matters of issues 
submitted to the enterprise forums had to be stipulated in an enterprise agreement, which was 
drawn up jointly by the trade unions and the enterprises’ management, within the framework 
of related legal regulations.826 Once again, the terrain of workers’ own initiatives to exercise 
their participatory rights was narrowed down. Moreover, it would be hard to imagine that 
forums like this had genuine influential power over decision making in any substantial matter. 
 Direct workplace democracy was governed by űouncil of Ministers’ Decree No 1021 
of 1973 (VI.27). The basic forums of workers’ participation were those of organized at small 
units, like brigades, workshops and departments. Special meetings could be arranged over 
topics related to women, youth, shop foremen, innovators or similar issues. The meeting of 
socialist brigade leaders was an intermediate forum between direct and indirect forms of 
participation. Such a meeting had to be convened at least once a year. Participation at any 
higher level than shop floor was indirect, effectuated through trade union organizations. These 
forums were the meetings of trade union councils and trade union officers.827 
 
  
                                               
824 Section 10/A of Act No II of 1967, amended by Legislative Decree (sic!) No 3 of 1978, effective of February 
1, 1978. 
825 Cs Lehoczky-Kollonay, ’Some Aspects of the Internal Management and Labour Relations of Socialist State 
Enterprise’ (1982), 10 International Űusiness Lawyer 1ő. 
826 Andor Weltner argued however, that participation is one of the many rights of trade unions. A Weltner, ‘A 
magyar munkajog’ (Űudapest, 1978, Akadémiai Kiadó), 60. 
827 A Weltner, ‘A magyar munkajog’ (Űudapest, 1978, Akadémiai Kiadó), ő2 and 7ő-84.  
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D Empirical Experiences of Participation 
 
As workers are not exclusively ‘economic beings’, it was particularly important that, in 
addition to achieving financial safety, their work should make sense. With the decline of 
professional improvement non-financial incentives including worker participation gained 
significance.828 An empirical research completed by Lajos Héthy829 and űsaba Makó found 
that a significant percentage of workers thought that their participation in the socialist workers 
movement was merely part of their tactic to achieve higher wages, and all they wanted was to 
ensure ‘ideological coverage’ for themselves. The inappropriate working of workplace 
democracy hindered the workers’ ability to identify with the company’s mission. The above 
also suggests that the production council would have been the key institution of democracy at 
factories. Their task was to ‘involve workers directly in managing the enterprise, and in 
finding the most practical, and most economical solution’. In theory, production councils 
granted workers the right to have their say in technical and organisational issues, and 
empowered them to shape the policy regarding financial and in-kind incentives. 
Practice reflected an altogether different picture. Interviews with workers suggest that 
production committee was a remarkably formal institution. “They present the details of 
achieving the plan of the previous quarter, any lags, absences for fraction days, and 
accidents. They say we should do a better job otherwise we cannot compete with the West. 
Then they open the floor for contributions: people say they lack appropriate [tools]. They 
answer simple questions on the spot, and difficult ones (…) in writing. Then months pass 
without anything happening.”830 
Other than discussing “primitive organisational problems”, and presenting the results 
of the work contest, issues really interesting for the workers, problems that actually affected 
their existence rarely or never came on the agenda of production councils. A large proportion 
of factory workers found it quite pointless having a hasty production council every quarter 
between two shifts; what the overwhelming majority did need was direct or indirect input in 
decisions that concerned them. 
The other cornerstone of workplace democracy was the brigade movement. The aim of 
the movement was ‘to mobilise, and utilise the company’s internal reserves through the 
activity of the people thereby increasing the efficiency of socialist economic management.’ It 
attempted to develop socialist communities that could ‘participate proactively, and 
responsibly in the company’s decision making, and the realisation of workplace democracy’ 
with the required information, knowledge, and experience.831 At the same time the socialist 
brigade movement, similarly to the operation of other institutions of workplace democracy 
                                               
828 Héthy-Makó 1972:73 
829 L Héthy and Cs Makó ‘Munkásmagatartások és a gazdasági szervezet’ (Budapest, 1972 Akadémiai Kiadó) 
830 Héthy-Makó 1972:Ő1 
831 Héthy-Makó 1972:78 
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drowned in its own formality, and/or became the cover institution of implementing individual 
interests.”832  
Workers could not have a say in the decision making process by means of the formal 
pathways created for them. Thus participation in reality was transferred to informal channels. 
A survey involving smoothening locksmiths in 1968 allows for the conclusion that 
employees, feeling unable to have an appropriate production policy, and thereby appropriate 
wages granted to them by company management at the production councils, and/or the 
brigade movement, resorted to the instrument of slow-down strikes to force the decision 
makers to change their original plans. That collective action assumed that workers had a wide-
ranging internal information channel, and harmonised, unified, and effective self-
management.833  
 
V  Participation and Politics in the 1980s 
 
The economic reform process launched in 1968 slowed down soon, so, although it brought a 
major turn compared to the Stalinist era, it remained – understandably – unable to show up 
resounding achievements. Economic reforms were given an impetus through the fact that 
COMECON countries opened their economies before the goods and credit offered by Western 
countries. Although indirectly, this had its implications also on smaller or greater human 
rights initiatives.834 Changes began to unfold in all areas of economic and political life even if 
they did not follow a straight course. That development halted suddenly in the early 1980s.835 
Official explanations blamed the slow-down of economic growth on the huge dollar 
indebtedness of the 1970s. That of course was a justified claim as debt service reached a 
dimension where exports could no longer cover the repayment instalments at the same time as 
imports required for continuous growth. Meanwhile credit became also increasingly difficult 
to come by, which naturally resulted in a slower pace of growth. A further contributing factor 
was that the financial credit offered by Western countries at the end of the 1970s enabled the 
postponement of the restructuring of the foreign trade. Economic difficulties were 
compounded by the fact that the cheap raw material reserves of the region’s most important 
trading partner, the Soviet Union were dwindling, which compelled the East-Central 
European countries to purchase some of their resources for USD instead of Rubel.  
East-European, and thus also Hungarian leaders had two scenarios for remedying the 
problem: cutting consumer spending and rekindling the economic reform process halted in the 
                                               
832 The third large group of incentives, the work contests also fell prey to formalism. A sign of that fact was that 
in assessing brigades’ performance in the contest, the almost exclusive factor was the outside appearance of the 
brigade diary, and how regularly it was updated. 
833 Héthy-Makó 1972:107 
834 For example Hungary ratified ICCPR and ICESCR in 1976 (see, Decree of Legislative power No 8 and 9 if 
1976). 
835 That was not only a problem for Hungary, but also for other countries of the CEE region, most notable 
Romania and Czechoslovakia suffered from the lack of consumer goods. 
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early 1970s. The former met with perceivable disapproval by the population, while the second 
was held back by the machinery of economic administration. In the Soviet-type economic 
administration the party functionaries as well as general directors of enterprises had good 
reason to fear that a comprehensive economic reform would undermine their own importance, 
and that the unwanted competition of a market economy would jeopardise their comfortable 
positions. In the reformed system prices, wages, and employment would have moved more 
freely, which, again, would have weakened the power of the apparatus. Two options were 
open before the top of the political élite in the early 1980s: building a mass base against the 
apparatus by satisfying consumer needs, or join forces with the apparatus, and demonstrate its 
power vis-à-vis the society by taking back political concessions. The 1982 events in Poland 
decided the dilemma in favour of the latter for all Eastern Europe.836 
Despite its serious indebtedness, Hungary was still best positioned in the region. Prices 
were rising, but through the concessions granted to it, the population could resort to the 
second economy, and managed, for some more time, maintain (and in some cases even 
increase) its income. In return, it looked at state administration as the best available in the 
region, whereby Hungary managed to avoid open conflict similar to that in Poland or 
Romania.837 
To ensure recovery, and keep as much of its public support as it could, the government 
tried to re-adjust the management system of companies in an attempt to proceed with the 
reforms that were first undertaken, and then suddenly halted. The ministries of heavy and 
light industry were merged, numerous trusts were broken down, and legislation was created to 
enable various forms of small enterprise. Yet, the country’s advantage over the other countries 
of the region rapidly melted. Masses of people could not capitalise on the second economy, 
which resulted in a growing number of those living at or under the poverty line. That process, 
on the one hand, clearly pointed at the necessity of social policy reforms, and, on the other, it 
put the complete failure of the trade union’s interest representation function in the limelight. 
The 11th Congress of MSZMP concluded that the standing of workplace democracy 
was not satisfactory.838 However the conclusion was accurate, the Congress, leveraging on the 
findings of the Party’s űollege of Political Sciences,839 decided the root cause of this failure 
was that the Party’s political influence had not been enough. Again, the Party’s all-
encompassing nature was emphasised; it was argued that the Party, considering the interest of 
the working class and the entirety of the society, has to formulate the economic and social 
goals and must lead the society in unity to achieve these goals, without which socialist 
development has not been possible. Participation was envisaged as a tool to serve this unity 
by meeting production goals, overcoming technical challenges and strengthening diligence at 
workplaces.840 It was decided that the impetus on democracy had to be given in line with the 
                                               
836 On December 13, 1982 the Polish government brutally turned down the Solidarity movement. 
837 Kis János 1982:120 (ŰeszélĘ 3.) 
838  A Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt XI. kongresszusának jegyzőkönyve [Minutes of the 11th Congress of 
Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party] (Űudapest, 197ő, Kossuth Kiadó), Ő86. 
839 MSZMP Politikai FĘiskola 
840  L Héthy ’Az üzemi demokrácia és a munkások’ [Workplace democracy and workers] (Űudapest, 1980, 
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principles of democratic centralism.841 842As the Party had effective control over all aspects of 
the society, it was understood that its influence on fostering workplace democracy would also 
be prevailing – as it was described in the Party’s decrees.843 
 The remedy offered by the Party clearly could not help the democratisation of the 
works councils. However, there was an increasing social need to restore participatory 
institutions and together with the slow destruction of state socialism, it became topical once 
again to search for genuine forms of participation. 
In his essay on the reform of labour law and workplace interest representation Ferenc 
KĘszeg 844  assumed that law had only a secondary role in regulating conditions at the 
workplace. One reason was that technical, organisational, social, and psychic systems 
attributed a role at least similar to law to other regulatory forces. KĘszeg identified as the 
other reason the informal rules driven by political interests, making special reference to the 
relations between the company managers and official party functionaries. Although no 
legislative standard other than the general thesis of the Party’s supremacy affected or 
determined the party organisation’s competence at the workplace, in actual fact the party 
organisation had massive clout in personnel issues. KĘszeg attributes that – ever weakening – 
power to the fact that labour law standards failed to clarify the question of authority at the 
workplace. The clearer the applicable statutory provisions and other rules had been the larger 
space there would have been for the organised action by employees either in the area of 
interest representation or influencing decision making. 
The double role imposed on the trade unions (execute the party’s instructions through 
their function as a transmission belt, and represent workers’ interests) resulted in failure to 
perform either, which gave central leadership the convenient position of being able to keep 
trade unions under control through compulsory party resolutions. Thus, trade unions could 
have played a workplace interest representation function only if they could gain independence 
from the party. 
Employees were depressed because of their inability to influence employers’ 
decisions, and because their employer’s decisions845 affected also their private lives. That 
called for reforms empowering employees to have a say in issues concerning their workplace, 
because employees like to be regarded as members of a community with a meaningful 
mission. And that has two elements mutually assuming each other’s presence: a democratising 
economy, and employees with a strengthening sense of identity. Some of these problems were 
resolved by the Labour Code of 1992. 
                                               
841 During the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev the original (Leninist) idea of democratic centralism was chiefly 
modified, in the 1977 Soviet Constitution, it appears as a principle for organizing the state: "The Soviet state is 
organized and functions on the principle of democratic centralism, namely the electiveness of all bodies of state 
authority from the lowest to the highest, their accountability to the people, and the obligation of lower bodies to 
observe the decisions of higher ones." 
842  A Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt XI. kongresszusának jegyzőkönyve [Minutes of the 11th Congress of 
Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party] (Űudapest, 197ő, Kossuth Kiadó), Ő67, ő00. 
843 Az üzemi demokrácia néhány elvi kérdése. Az MSZMP határozatai és dokumentumai 1967-1970 [On some 
of the theoretical issues of workplace democracy. Decrees and documents of MSZMP, 1967-1970], 384. 
844 ŰeszélĘ 11 (198Ő) 
845 For example written assessments submitted by one’s employer and the local trade union and party units were 
compulsory annexes of passport inquiry forms. 
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VI Summary 
 
The research question concerning this chapter was (Q8) whether participation could function 
in a genuine manner in an autocratic regime?My brief answer to this latter question is 
negative. The Communist Party soon recognised the potential in institutions based on 
workers’ participation, and tried its best to harness it as fast as it could. Its tactic included the 
strengthening of its powers systematically in enterprise level participatory institutions, the 
blurring of the limits, and then the gradual elimination of shop committees’ participatory 
functions, and trade unions’ interest representation roles. The official communist party 
rhetoric marketed the process as the maximisation of workers’ interest representation; 
however, the actual objective was the termination of the democratic institution of 
participation. The authority of shop committees, instead of being clarified, was gradually 
shrunk. Still in May 1946 they passed the decree on the creation of the industrial production 
council, and the production committees. 846  New institutions, production committees 
[termelési bizottság] were set up, charged with the responsibility of elaborating new working 
methods, production procedures, performance standards, and wage payment principles to 
ensure increased, and more efficient industrial production.847 
Despite of the official rhetoric, participation was regarded as a sole economic tool. 
Theoretically it was the works councils’ duty to involve through their activity the workers of 
the factory in the financial management of companies, in the control of production, in 
promoting the realisation of the plan economy, and the consolidation of the workers’ 
ownership of state companies. At the same time it was also expressed immediately that the 
shaping and operation of works councils must not affect the company director’s sole 
responsibility. The system of the plan economy narrowed their right of consultation to an even 
smaller area. 
A further limitation came from the fact that the resolution ordered to settle issues not 
regulated in the resolution along the principles of ‘democratic centralism’, and ’mutual 
socialist cooperation’. Űut the principle of democratic centralism required that the company’s 
well-founded, that is legitimate interests had to be ranked above those of the workers, and 
social interest as provided by legislation superseded that of the enterprise, or even the 
workers. That principle was followed also within the trade union through the fact that the 
lower ranking trade union organ was obliged to execute the resolutions of the higher ranking 
organ.848 
However, the all-encompassing nature of the party did not make it possible to workers 
to exercise their participatory rights in a genuine manner. The direct forms of participation 
were directly controlled by the part, and the indirect forums were brought under the auspices 
of SZOT, which served as a “transmission belt” in the realisation of party politics, thus could 
not be considered as an independent organisation operated in a democratic way. Individual 
                                               
846 Decree No 6.540/1946. M. E. on the Organisation, and operation of the industrial production committees [?], 
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847 Ibid. 1-3.§§ 
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freedom rights were largely oppressed and democratic grass-root organisations were also 
persecuted.  However, the party officials were indeed aware of its dual nature. Reform 
programs were halted halfway, when it became prominent that without democratisation of the 
society and acknowledgement of personal freedom the economic reforms could not be carried 
out.  
 
VII Interim Conclusions 
 
The importance of employee involvement – direct or indirect – in enterprises’ economic 
activity was unquestioned; however, its actual impact if it is treated solely as an economic 
tool is doubtful. Participation does not appear either in the state socialist Hungarian regime or 
in Japan as a human right. Thus, it would be necessary to briefly introduce the stance of 
human rights in both analysed regimes. 
Human rights form a comprehensive system, construed among others by political 
liberties, socioeconomic rights, workers’ rights. Japan’s approach to human rights was chiefly 
reformed after the Second World War by the Allied Powers.  It is undisputed that the Japanese 
Constitution was written by the occupying American forces and was imposed on the defeated 
country 1946.849 Before that, even though the Japanese legal system had been influenced by 
European (mostly German) codes already in the 19th century, justiciable human rights hardly 
existed. The perception on human rights is greatly determined by the Japanese value system, 
which encourages the assertion of group rights but this assertion is not so prevalent regarding 
individual rights. It is closely connected to the social norms which establish a very strong 
sense of duty, loyalty, reciprocal dependency and mutual service between the individual and 
its (work) group. As it was argued above, a group’s internal relations (both vertical and 
horizontal ones) are very tight and long-lasting, and the pressure to adhere to the group’s 
consensus is significant. Thus, ostracism, the punishment for too much deviation from the 
group’s interest is a dreaded sanction. As Japan maybe called a “feudal democracy”,  with a 
few dominant actors (such as the ruling political party, the bureaucracy, the mass media and 
the industry federations), the recognition of individual human rights which could grant rights 
to persons against these domains are not so forthcoming on the state level either.  850 
Japan ratified ICCPR and ICESCR in 1979, three years later than Hungary. However, 
the Government has refused to ratify alongside the Optional Protocol which would grant right 
to individuals to appeal to international human rights court in case one’s human rights are 
violated.851 Ratifying the Optional Protocol thus would mean that Japan would appear front of 
the international community to be failing to adhere to international norms. The Japanese 
Governments have justified this decision by a three-fold argument. First, it is claimed that the 
                                               
849 R Goodman and I Neary (eds) ‘Case Studies on Human Rights in Japan’ (Routlegde, 2013) Ő. 
850 L W Beer and C G Weeramantry ’Human Rights in Japan: Some Protections and Problems’ (1979) 1 
Universal Human Rights 3, 5. 
851 Hungary ratified the Optional Protocol in 1988; see, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4&lang=en. 
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human right protection in Japan is so good that there is no need to provide options outside of 
the domestic system. Second, granting such an opportunity would be incompatible with Asian 
custom. Third, ratification would threaten the constitutional principle of judicial 
independence.852 It is straightforward that ‘group loyalty’ would not permit citizens to use 
court to question the activity of the state. 
Regarding the state socialist era in Hungary, human rights were not recognized since 
the autocratic regime could not afford that its power to be questioned. Acknowledgment of 
human rights would have meant that individuals had been granted with the right to limit the 
state’s power.853 It was justified by a cheesy argument that since the ruling force of the 
political sphere is MSZMP, the power to provide guarantees to safeguard democracy should 
be also vested in the Party.854 
Individuals’ international legal capacity was also denied. Even though Hungary 
ratified ICCPR and ICESRC, by not ratifying the Optional Protocol of ICCPR, individuals did 
not have the opportunity to appeal to an international human rights court. Also, the ratification 
of the human rights instrument did not have practical impact; both individual and collective 
freedom rights remained severely limited, as the concept of centralised power was not 
compatible with the idea of autonomous individuals or with democratically governed 
institutions.  
Also, the notion of human rights was transposed with a different meaning both in 
Japan and in Hungary. In Hungary until 1972 the term ‘citizens’ rights’ [állampolgári jogok] 
were used instead of human rights, signifying that these are rights given to individuals by the 
state. Thus, these rights could be subject of limitations or even to withdrawal by the state. In 
Japan the term jinken is a translation invented in the mid-nineteenth century, when Japan had 
to create new terminology for imported words.855 However, the ideograph ‘ken’ originally 
meant ‘might’ or ‘strength’ and had no connection to the humanistic morality of rights theory. 
It is argued that this linguistic phenomenon has contributed to the dubious stance of individual 
rights as something which ought to imply social irresponsibility and personal selfishness.856 
It is not possible to have genuine participation in regimes which deny the existence or 
even question the importance of individual freedom. As Ales argues, the right to information 
and consultation is an individual right, in a sense that it should be enjoyed unconditionally by 
every employee, and which is exercised by the representative body of employees.857  
                                               
852 I Neary ’In Search of Human Rights in Japan’ in R Goodman and I Neary (eds) ‘Case Studies on Human 
Rights in Japan’ (Routlegde, 2013) 10-11. 
853 Marx denied the existence of human rights. He argued that human rights are individual rights which are 
harmful as they obstruct the interest of the community; see, Marx–Engels Összes MĦvei I. [űomplete works of 
Marx and Engels Vol 1] (Űudapest, 19ő7, Kossuth Kiadó), 367. 
854  A Holló ’Állampolgári jogok Magyarországon’ [űitizens’ Rights in Hungary] (Űudapest, 1979 Kossuth 
Kiadó), ő8. 
855  New words were ‘invented’ in the fields of technology, sociology, law, etc. See, L W Űeer and ű G 
Weeramantry ’Human Rights in Japan: Some Protections and Problems’ (1979) 1 Universal Human Rights 3. 
856 Ibid. See also, J Chan ’Gender and Human Rights Policies in Japan’ (Stanford University Press, 2004). 
857 E Ales ‘Information and űonsultation within the undertaking’ in Recasting Worker Involvement? Recent 
trends in information, consultation and co-determination or worker representatives in a Europeanized Arena’ 
(Kluwer, 2009) 13. Similarly, Otto Kahn-Freund argued that the right to strike is an individual right; see, O 
Kahn-Freund ‘The Right to Strike: Its scope and limitations’ (Strasbourg, 1974, Council of Europe), 5 ff. 
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What occurs to me is not whether the right of participation is acknowledged by a 
regime,858 but up to which extent individual rights are recognized. It was also argued earlier 
that the collective of employees does not form, legally speaking, a different entity from the 
members of the group. From organisational point of view it is very important how members 
of a work group feel about each other, how much they cooperate, how disciplined they are 
and so on, but even for the best collective it is not possible to achieve a legal personality or 
other legally recognized form of organisation distinctive from an employer.859 Thus, it is not 
enough if a system is devoted to group- or collective-oriented rights, what matters is the 
simultaneous recognition of individual freedom and to the force of social influences on the 
extent and reach of individual freedom. 860  As the examples of Japan and state-socialist 
Hungary demonstrates, it does not make substantial difference regarding the results, whether 
the denial is rooted in feudal patterns or a consequence of all-encompassing Party politics, 
there is no substitute for individual freedom – and individual responsibility either. As Sen 
argues, any affirmation of social responsibility that replaces individual responsibility is 
counterproductive. Therefore, the state-socialist model (regardless of the way how power was 
exercised by the Communist party and its successors) could never achieve the intended 
function of worker participation, and Japan, without a change of paradigm, would not be able 
to meet the goals set forth by legislation.  
 
 
  
                                               
858 As a matter of fact, it would be futile to make any judgments based on human rights instruments which are 
not binding on these countries, due to their territorial or personal scope. 
859 Moreover, it would make little sense to provide legal personality for the collective as it is only important in 
the external relations of a company. For a detailed argument on the topic see, űs Kollonay Lehoczky, ’Alanyok 
és viszonyok a vállalaton belül’ [Subjects and relations within an enterprise] (Űudapest, 1990, KJK) 16ő-204. 
860 A Sen, ‘Development as Freedom (1998), xii. 283-89. 
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PART V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
I Overview on Participation 
 
Participation at workplaces encompasses different mechanisms used to involve the workforce 
in decisions at all levels of an organization – whether direct or indirect – conducted with 
employees or through their representatives. In its various pretexts, the issue of employee 
involvement has been a recurring theme in economic theories, industrial relations, and human 
right instruments. Drawing on the finding of previous works in the topic, the current 
dissertation set out to analyse employee involvement from a dual perspective: as an economic 
tool, which enhances competition and also as a human right, which develops human dignity at 
workplaces. The dissertation chiefly focused on forms of direct representation. 
The right to participate in decisions affecting one’s life is a basic value in a democratic 
society. This principle should be present in all areas of civil society, encompassing political 
and economic spheres, including workplaces.861 Democratic decision-making is required at 
state level, and it is argued to be also justifiable at workplace level. 862  Involvement in 
decision-making which affects one’s life – such as issues concerning employment – is an 
essential part of human dignity.863 Without participation, workers’ alienation is inevitable at 
workplaces, which, on a long run, involves that workers also become indifferent towards 
public affairs, which is a real danger to democracy as a whole.864 Critics claim, however, that 
participation is often used as a manipulative device of management to weaken trade unions 
and control workers’ mood or morals.865 
In connection with participation I examined the notions of economic and industrial 
democracy. According to Sinzheimer, participation could enable all economic actors to jointly 
form the economic conditions of a workplace (and share related responsibility). Therefore, 
employees would be freed from subordination, and equality would be brought to the 
economic sphere. Similarly to political democracy, economic democracy could contribute to 
the emancipation of individual workers vis-à-vis economic power.866 Sinzheimer believed that 
                                               
861 Cs Kollonay- Lehoczky (ed), A Magyar munkajog II [Hungarian Labour Law II], (Budapest, Kulturtrade) 
151. (Kollonay Lehoczky n 1) 
862 R Mayer, Robert Dahl and the Right to Workplace Democracy (Spring 2001), 63 The Review of Politics, 228. 
863 H Sinzheimer ‘The Development of Labour Legislation in Germany’ (1920) 92 Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Social and Industrial Conditions in the Germany of Today.  
864 O Kahn-Freund, Trade Union Democracy and the Law (1961), 22 Ohio St. L.J. 5. 
865 For a comprehensive overview on the critical approaches arising in the 1960s, see E Rehnman, Industrial 
Democracy and Industrial Management – A critical essay on the possible meanings and implications of 
industrial democracy (London, 1968, Tanistock), especially 67-69 and 90-91. 
866 H Sinzheimer, Das Wesen des Arbeitsrecht, in Arbeitsrecht und Rechtssoziologie: gesammelte Aufsätze und 
Reden (1976), quoted by R Dukes supra 346. 
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political and social democracy could only exist if they are accompanied by economic 
democracy. 
Although they are related in many ways, industrial democracy and economic 
democracy convey different meanings. These differences are much related to diversity in 
industrial traditions. Historically, industrial democracy became an effective force within 
workers’ movement primary as an idea of representative democracy. 867  The principle of 
industrial democracy implies replacement of unilateral regulations with joint decisions on 
matters concerning the workplace or the employment conditions. Industrial democracy 
challenges both the authoritarian and bureaucratic structures of a capitalist enterprise and the 
centralized regime in the state socialist planned economies. Participation was also dissolution 
of the Taylorist-Fordist model, which favoured flat hierarchies and direct orders. Participation 
takes into account that workers are not only bearers of labour power, but members of 
democratic societies from which they derive a set of civil, political and social rights.868  
Participation in decision-making processes could exist in many different ways, starting 
from the mere right to be informed, it could also include consultation, and, the strongest 
influence could be provided by means of co-determination. Employee participation could be 
of a different nature, depending on the models of workers representation, the public or private 
nature of employment relationship, the organizational dimensions of the enterprises and 
markets, as well as the relationship between legislative and contractual sources. Naturally, 
participation reflects the industrial relations systems within which it is applied. Globalization 
of capital, product and labour markets has increased the need for effective and functioning 
models of participation.869  
Regarding terminology, the term ‘participation’ does not have a single, unambiguous 
meaning. The actual definitions include diverse notions and disciplines concerning a non-
unitary and diverse set of workers’ rights originating in laws or in agreements, or in both. The 
notion of participation (nowadays often used as synonym for involvement) in most countries 
is based on a distinction of powers and roles between employers and employees.870 Through 
the different means of participation, workers seek to influence certain decisions made by the 
enterprise employing them and may also share some the economic and financial consequences 
of these decisions. Another interpretation considers participation as a mean to modify or 
                                               
867  W Müller-Jentsch and N Levis, ’Industrial Democracy: From Representative űodetermination to Direct 
Participation’ (199ő) 2ő International Journal of Political Economy 3, 50-60. For an opinion contrary to this 
theory see, S and B Webb, ’Industrial Democracy’ (London, 1897). The Webbs considered industrial democracy 
as collective bargaining within trade unions. 
868  T H Marshall, ’űitizenship and Social űlass (űambridge, 19ő0) and W Müller-Jentsch and N Levis, 
’Industrial Democracy: From Representative űodetermination to Direct Participation’ (199ő) 2ő International 
Journal of Political Economy 3, 57. 
869 See for example A Bronstein, En aval, des normes international du travail: le role de l’OIT dans l’elabortion 
et la revision de la legislation du travail, in: JC Javillier, B Geringon (eds), Les norms internationals du travail: 
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Comparative Labour Law; J Schregele, Forms of participation in management (1976) 113 International Labour 
Review, 117-22. 
870 R Blanpain, Representation of employees at plant and enterprise level (1994, Martinus Nijhoff). 
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improve employment relationship and conditions, and in many cases, also the socio-economic 
conditions of the society.871 
The system of workers’ participation in company’s decision-making shows 
considerable differences across Europe. Neither the institutional structure nor the intensity of 
participation is on a somehow similar level, arising from differences of basic philosophy of 
industrial relations between the Member States of the European Union. As Manfred Weiss 
points it out, in view of the heterogeneous situation it would be largely unrealistic to shape the 
structure of workers’ participation identically throughout the EU, the most could be achieved 
is to approximate the systems in a functional sense.872 
Manfred Weiss also argues that if democratisation of the economy is understood to be 
a promoting and stabilising element for democracy in the society as a whole, and workers 
throughout the EU should have a similar chance to influence decisions by which they are 
affected.873 Therefore, in a globalised environment the right to participate in decision making 
had to be extended beyond national borders, and it became necessary for the EU to address 
the transnational dimension of involvement. I argued that both as an economic tool and as a 
human right, participation should not remain a privilege of European citizens, but have to be 
treated as a universal right of all workers. 
 
 
II The Dual Nature of Employee Involvement 
 
A Weimar Origins 
 
The institutionalized system of works constitution and the form of employee representation 
through works council are generally connected to the labour movements of the Weimar 
Republic. However, some rudimentary forms of such representation could be found in earlier 
stage of history. The Works Council Act was a part of the framework established by the 
Weimar Constitution.874 Article 165 of the Weimar Constitution provided for that workers and 
employees in order to look after their economic and social interests ought to cooperate with 
employers on an equal footing regarding the regulation of salaries, working conditions, as 
well as in the entire field of the economic development of the forces of production. The 
scheme provided for a parliamentary form of governance, similar to and parallel with that of 
                                               
871 See, for example K F Walker, Workers’ participation in management. Problems, practices and prospects 
(1975) 12 International Institute for Labour Studies Bulletin, 9 ff. 
872 M Weiss, ‘Workers’ participation: A crucial topic of EU’ in, R Hoffmann, O Jacobi, B Keller and M Weiss 
(eds), Transnational Industrial Relations in Europe (Hans Űöckler Stiftung, 2000), 8ő-94. 
873 M Weiss, supra, 86. 
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the political state. The detailed regulations of Factory Works Councils were promulgated in 
the Act on Works Council, but District Workers Councils and the National Economic Council 
had never been set up. 
The Act on Works Council constituted the most extensive and most important piece of 
social legislation of its times. It touched upon almost every phase of labour and social 
legislation, such as the Code of Industrial Regulations, the law concerning collective 
agreements, labour exchanges, mediation and arbitration. Even though the final text of the law 
was compromised, its significance is unquestioned.  
In the light of the provisions of the Weimar Constitution, the dual nature of employee 
involvement appears in a sprouting form in the Works Council Act. First, the concept of 
‘collective economic interest’ of the employees and the envisaged parliamentary form of 
interest representation through District Works Councils and the National Economic Council 
projects the Sinzheimerian ideal of economic democracy. Sinzheimer argued that involvement 
in the formation of their economic conditions empowers employees with real freedom in their 
employment, which they otherwise cannot enjoy in the process of negotiating their individual 
contract due to the imbalance of power between the contracting parties.875 In Sinzheimer’s 
views, the democratization of the economic sphere is necessary for freeing employees from 
subordination in employment relations, which is essential to safeguard their human dignity. 
Second, the furthering of the ‘economic aims’ of the establishment appears as a common goal 
of both labour and capital, for which they ought to strive in a cooperative manner. However, 
such cooperation was only possible if the economic aims of the establishment  were not 
identified with the profit-maximizing tendency of the employer/owner, but rather with 
efficiency and the highest possible productivity, aiming for an economic operation.876 
The concept of an economic constitution and the idea of works councils have long 
survived the overthrow of the Weimar Republic.877 The economic democracy theory was 
much more than the transfer of parliamentary forms of democracy to workplaces, but more 
importantly it conveyed the principle of democracy and the resolving of industrial conflicts 
through dialogue. The Works Council Act incorporated the duty of an employer to consider 
not only the interests of shareholders, but also those of the employees. The contemplation of 
employees’ interest improved the living and working conditions of workers, thus largely 
contributed to better social development. Participation also introduced an important limitation 
on the misuse of economic power of employers. By establishing the long-term development 
of an establishment as a shared goal of labour and capital, the responsibility for the economic 
decision was also shared between the parties, but in a proportionate manner, which created a 
productive balance of interest. When seen this way, participation was an important factor in 
the stabilisation of the economic and social order. Last but not least, the Weimar model of 
participation chiefly influenced the current employee involvement system of Germany, which 
has had further impact on the European model of participation. 
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B Employee Involvement as a Question of Economic 
Competitiveness 
 
The research questions regarding this chapter were (Q1) What are the most influential 
economic theories concerning employee involvement? and (Q3) What was the impact of 
employee involvement on mitigating the adverse effects of the economic crises? 
The economic input of employee involvement has been researched for decades, many 
hypotheses exist on both sides, aiming to prove either the inefficiency or the efficiency of 
employee involvement. The economic analysis of employee involvement started with the 
emblematic question of Jensen and Meckling asking “if co-determination is so efficient, why 
do managers not choose it voluntarily?”878 Proponents of the efficiency theory, Freeman and 
Lazear answer the above question by examining the voluntary or mandatory nature of works 
councils. Freeman and Lazear suggested that the social gains from employee involvement 
could only be maximized if the rules governing information and consultation processes are 
carefully bound the power of labour and management, as well as fit the broader industrial 
relations system in which the representative bodies function.879 
Path dependency theories have been developed after the heavily contested880 proposal 
of Hansmann and Kraakman, arguing that there is a “normative consensus” that corporate 
leaders should run the company in the best interest of their shareholders. In contrast, Roe 
argues the different factors lying behind path dependence, such as culture, politics and legal 
systems; therefore opting-out from the established system is extremely difficult despite the 
existence of more efficient alternatives. Thus, the high transition costs of deviation may lock 
out socially desirable innovations. 881 
Property rights theories in economy have addressed the problem of specification of 
individual rights that determines how costs and rewards are allocated among the participants 
of the organization. 882  Human Resource Management theories approach employee 
involvement, from an organisational efficiency point of view, acknowledging that managers 
are no longer seen as the sole custodians of authority, and employees are able to bring their 
workplace experiences to the decision-making table, therefore decisions are better supported. 
Findings suggest that at workplaces where employees had a greater amount of influence on 
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decision making the satisfaction level and productivity of workers is higher,883 and genuine 
involvement in decision making successfully reduce organizational change cynicism.884  
Regarding behavioural economics theories, Elton Mayo’s experiment was analysed 
together with a series of experiment conducted recently by Dan Ariely, Emir Kamenica and 
Drazen Pralec at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and at Harvard University. 885 
Researchers concluded that increased productivity and genuine participation in workplace 
decisions strongly correlate. 886  I also looked into the possibility to make employee 
involvement compulsory at workplaces. Whereas the default setting with opting-out options 
could be justified in many areas of labour law, I argued that it is not suitable to facilitate 
employee involvement.  
Regarding (Q2) What was the impact of employee involvement on mitigating the 
adverse effects of the economic crises? I reviewed practical evaluations of participation in 
workplaces.  I selected four recent studies887 examining the performance of companies during 
the crisis and all of them argued that social dialogue at national, sectoral and company levels 
have been proven to be effective instruments in mitigating the negative social and economic 
impacts of the crisis. 888  
I compared the views of Hugo Sinzheimer and Amartya Sen on the interrelated nature 
of economic, political and social democracy, as well as on individual freedom. Sinzheimer 
argued that involvement in the formation of their economic conditions empowers employees 
with real freedom in their employment, which they otherwise cannot enjoy in the process of 
negotiating their individual contract due to the imbalance of power between the contracting 
parties. 889  On a Kantian recognition of human dignity, 890  Sinzheimer argues that the 
democratization of the economic sphere is necessary for freeing employees from 
subordination in employment relations. 891  Sen, challenging the “Lee Thesis”, 892  asks the 
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question of what should be more urgent for policy makers: to eradicate poverty, or to 
guarantee democratic rights (for which poor people have little use anyway)? Sen’s answer to 
this question is very straightforward: economic development and liberty are interconnected. 
Separating them or prioritizing one over the other is entirely the wrong approach. Without 
freedom, including the opportunity to participate in decision-making on matters affecting the 
main areas of an individual’s life there is no economic development. Likewise, economic 
development fosters individual and social freedoms.893  
 
C Employee Involvement as a Human Right Issue 
 
The research question concerning this chapter was (Q3) How employee involvement is 
addressed in human rights instruments? To answer this question I first examined the human 
rights nature of employee involvement and found that while human rights are primarily 
oriented toward limiting the power of a state, labour rights are predominantly aiming to limit 
the power of private actors in the market. Regarding human rights, principal right-holders are 
individuals while labour rights are more collectively orientated. As oppose to human rights, 
which are universal and possessed by all human beings by virtue of their humanity, the 
entitlement in case of labour rights can be defined as the set of rights that humans possess by 
virtue of their status as workers.894 However, this status is rather fluid and the identity of the 
beneficiaries of labour rights is contested. The collective of employees is a part of an 
undertaking, it lacks internal structure as they position within the undertaking is defined by 
the unilateral decision of an employer; and the group has no influence on its membership 
either. Moreover, individuals could perform work in great many ways for an undertaking.895  
The human right nature of employee involvement has long been questioned. The 
‘older brother’ of participatory rights, the right to bargain collectively gained recognition in a 
much less contested way and now is acknowledged by most major human rights 
instruments.896 In the contrary, employee involvement first appeared in 1988 in the Additional 
Protocol to the European Social Charter. 897  A year later, the Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers also incorporated it,898 and subsequently it appeared in 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Union. However, the right to involvement 
does not appear in human rights instruments outside of the aegis of Europe. The low 
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recognition could raises concerns whether the right to involvement is a fully fledged human 
right. The regulatory technique of the European Union used for labour right in the above 
mentioned human rights instruments could also be seen as an area of concern. These 
instruments require certain level of adjustability to the national characteristics of the Member 
States. Therefore, the instruments do not define the notion of employee. However, the 
delegation of the specification the scope of the right-holders to national laws could lead to 
highly diverse practices. The uneven level of protection could therefore result in significant 
inequality not only in the relation of workers with different contracts of the same employer, 
but on international level too. Thus, such multiplicity in the actual personal scope could dilute 
the intended protection and further alleviates the recognition of employee involvement as a 
human right. 
The term ‘workers’ participation’ as used by the ILO could be seen participation in 
decision-making at the enterprise level. The Philadelphia Declaration (now an Annex to the 
űonstitution of the ILO) calls on the ILO to draw up programs to promote ‘the cooperation of 
management and labour in the continuous improvement of productive efficiency’. 899  To 
implement this call, the ILO has created series of general principles. However, no convention 
has been adopted on information-consultation; thus, the Organisation uses soft law 
instruments. The normative framework of the ILO on information and consultation contains 
recommendations and declarations – measures which do not have the binding force of the 
conventions and are not subject to state ratification.  
The European Social Charter (ESC) is a human right convention of the Council of 
Europe, which establishes a wide range of economic and social rights that are indispensable 
for human dignity. Article 21 of ESC provides for the right to information and consultation, 
and Article 22 specifies the right to participation in determining working conditions. The 
Revised European Social Charter of 1996 addressed a specific involvement issue, the right to 
information and consultation in the case of collective redundancies.  
It has been log argued that the Europeanization of industrial relations plays an 
indispensable role in the strengthening and the further development of the social dimension of 
the European integration. As a part of the integration process, first the Community Charter of 
the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (CCFSR) and subsequently the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) recognized the rights of workers to 
information and consultation.900 
The inclusion of social and economic rights related to working life into the CFREU 
confirms that these are to be considered fundamental to the EU social model, what it means to 
be an EU citizen.901 Thus, the right to information and consultation is a fundamental right in 
the context of the EU, and Article 27’s reference to national laws and practices implies that 
the Member States are obliged to maintain at least the mandatory standards of information 
and consultation provided by statutory law or by collective agreements. The aim of Article 27 
is to protect the interests of the individual worker against the dominant position of the 
employer in situations in which those interests could be substantially affected. Apart from the 
need to protect workers in extraordinary situations, such as collective redundancies and 
                                               
899 III. e 
900 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (1989), Arts. 17-18. 
901 Bercusson, supra at 27. 
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transfers of undertakings, Article 27 also reflects the difficulties associated with globalization 
of the economy and the increased importance of transnational companies and mergers of 
undertakings.  
Blanke argues that Article 27 has as much or more to do with the protection of human 
dignity specified in Article 1 of the CFREU than with traditional social rights and the 
objective of democratisation of the economy. As such it promises greatly to expand the scope 
both of traditional 
social rights and of practices of democratisation, to encompass threats to workers’ dignity in 
the many new forms these threats assume in a globalised economy, society and 
environment.’902 
Despite the fact that employee involvement signifies a very narrow part of human 
rights, and perhaps it is safe to say that its recognition is rather low, its importance shall not 
be overlooked. The European Social Charter is a human right convention of the Council of 
Europe, which establish a wide range of economic and social rights that are crucial for human 
dignity. Due to its wide geographic coverage, its role is indispensable in promoting human 
rights across the European continent. The CFREU addresses issues which form the core of 
labour law and industrial relations in Europe. Thus, inclusion of the right to information and 
consultation in this instrument signifies the stance of employee involvement as a fundamental 
human right. 
The significance of employee involvement in the development of democratic 
institutions is enormous. The estrangement of people from the handling of their own affairs at 
a workplace in a long run will lead to the abdication of not only the employees but the citizens 
towards participation which is a real danger to democracy. Thus, employee involvement shall 
be seen as essential to issues of social justice, human rights and democracy and must be 
promoted as such. 
Considering the approach of the Weimar Republic regarding employee involvement as 
a starting point, followed by the provisions of the human rights instrument and by the various 
economic theories developed in past decades, it is proved that – EMPLOYEE  INVOLVEMENT 
HAS A DUAL NATURE: IT HAS TO BE REGARDED BOTH AS AN ECONOMIC QUESTION AND AS A 
HUMAN RIGHT (H1). 
 
  
                                               
902 Blanke, supra at 50. 
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III Global Extension of Democratic Participation 
 
A The Transnational Model – Employee Involvement in the 
European Union 
 
The European Union addressed employee involvement in general in three major directives,903 
the European framework directive on information and consultation (2002/14/EC), the (recast) 
directive on European works councils (2009/38/EC) and the directive on employee 
involvement in the European Company (2001/86/EC). 
The Framework Directive provides for minimum requirements applicable throughout 
the Community904 and leaves the practical arrangements to be defined and implemented in 
accordance with national laws and industrial practices. 905  This ambiguity provides 
considerable room for Member States to manoeuvre when they decide on their own domestic 
system, which could lead to uneven level of protection to workers of different countries. This 
shortcoming is especially visible in the national measures concerning the definitions of an 
undertaking and an establishment, the practical procedures, the notion of confidentiality, the 
protection of the employees’ representative, and the issue of sanctions.906 Though Directive 
2002/14/EC was crafted with the best intention and manoeuvred pretty well between the fairly 
different interests and traditions of industrial relations of the Member States, the sometimes 
vague wording and the ample room for national transpositions resulted in a variety of 
domestic systems with very different level of actual rights and obligations. Practically, such a 
flexible framework is not suitable to provide equal level of information and communication 
for workers of the European Union. 
Council Directive 94/45/EC 907  introduced European Works Councils or alternative 
procedures in order to ensure information and consultation for employees of multinational 
companies on the progress of the business and any significant decision at European level that 
could affect their employment or working conditions. This Directive was repealed and 
replaced in 2009 by the recast Directive 2009/38/EC.908 The EWC Directive provides for the 
establishment of a European Works Council or an Employee Information and Consultation 
                                               
903 Besides this general frame, a range of directives secure the right of information and consultation of workers in 
specific situations, such as in case of collective redundancies (98/59/EC), transfer of undertaking (2001/23/EC).  
The directive on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at 
work (89/391/EC) also contains important regulations on participation. In total, more than 15 directives deal with 
information and consultation in some kind of a general or specific sense and thus form part of the social acquis 
in this regard.  
904 Art. 1.1. of Directive 2002/14/EC. 
905 Art 1.2. of Directive 2002/14/EC. 
906 Schömann (2006) supra 1ő. 
907 OJ [1994] L122/28. 
908 Directive 2009/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 OJ L 16.5.2009 28-44. 
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procedure. Negotiations are put in focus with the aim to activate central management or 
employees. 909  The parties either could decide to set up a European Works Council by 
concluding an agreement on the scope, composition, function and term of service of an EWC; 
or could agree to implement an Information and Consultation Process (ICP) instead, a less 
formalized form of employee involvement.910 Whether a EWC or an ICP is established, the 
minimum requirements provided for by the Directive do not need to be incorporated into the 
agreement.911 
The learning curve from the 1980s has been indeed very long and many of the initial 
problems have been addressed in the amends of the respective Directives. The change in the 
regulatory technique allowing more room for Member States for transposition with regard to 
the different traditions in industrial relations catered better for employee involvement. 
However, researches showed that such flexibility the actual implementation of the respected 
Directives resulted in great inequalities in national laws for the detriment of workers. The 
ambiguity is rising from the sometimes vague language of the Directives and the lack of 
appropriate enforcement mechanism, including sanctions. 
The research question I tried to answer in this section was (Q4) If employee 
involvement is a fundamental human right, thus, in that sense, has a universal value, what 
measures have been taken to promote it outside of the European terrain? The trend of 
globalization has brought many new challenges to business management. The competition has 
become fiercer, and the quest for profit maximization has made large concerns spur on social 
dumping to continuously fight for yet lower production costs. Such practices often lead to 
human rights violation at workplaces. The frequency and the severity of these malpractices 
tend to be higher in premises where national laws are less protective and the influential power 
of workers is low. Due to the lack of regulatory power of the EU, European based 
multinational companies are not obliged to respect the protective rules of the EU. MNCs tend 
to draw up internal codes of conducts (COC) to promulgate minimal standards to be applied 
by their subsidiaries and subcontractors. These internal rules however are often proved to be 
non-efficient in most of the fields they intend to regulate, including halting human rights 
violations, to improve working standards, or to enhance the voice of workers. Moreover, these 
company statues do not form a ground for liability when the rights of workers are violated. 
While the EU considers employee involvement as a prerequisite for the success of the 
restructuring and adaptation of undertakings to the new conditions created by the 
globalisation,912 it explicitly reserves the right to the employees working within the territory 
of the European Union. Since human rights are indivisible and universal, it raises the issue of 
how the existing level of protection provided by the EU could be transferred to subsidiaries of 
Europe-based MNCs located outside of the territory of the European Union. The limited 
personal scope of legal instruments (European Social Charter, CFREU, various EU 
Directives) concerning employee involvement overlook the fact that transnational companies 
often operate subsidiaries outside of the Member States/Contracting States. The activity of 
these undertakings significantly contributes to the overall performance of a group, and the 
                                               
909 Art. 5.1. of Directive 2009/38/EC. 
910 Art 4.1. of Directive 2009/38/EC. 
911 Art. 6.4. of Directive 2009/38/EC. 
912 Directive 2002/14/EC Recital (9) 
202 
 
different (generally lower) standards of the non-EU countries constitute a competitive edge 
for most European multinationals. The research question followed from these findings was, 
(Q5) What role the European Union could have in better safeguarding employee involvement, 
as a fundamental human right? 
In its opinion the EESC urges the European policy-makers to create appropriate 
incentives and improve the requisite legal framework with no interference with the national 
competences though. Further, the EESC implies that European company law shall cater more 
for employee involvement. The role what employee involvement could play in regaining 
economic competitiveness underlines the need for corrective actions against the short-term of 
corporate values and for increased corporate transparency.913 Though the Opinion envisages 
an innovative approach to mitigate the negative effects of economic turmoil by strengthening 
the role of employee involvement in business management, it only focuses on business 
activities located in the territory of the European Union. Such limited territorial scope 
overlooks that transnational companies often operate subsidiaries outside of the Member 
States. The activity of these undertakings significantly contributes to the overall performance 
of the group. To mention one aspect, transnational companies often benefit from the cheap 
labour force and low influential power of the employees working in non-Member States. 
While acknowledging that the different albeit generally lower standards of the non-EU 
countries constitute a competitive edge for most European multinationals, consolidation of  
the business practices cannot be complete if it does not reach out to the branches situated 
outside of the European Union. 
To overcome this discrepancy, I made a normative proposal to change the personal 
scope of Directive 2002/14/EC on Information and Consultation together with Directive 
2009/38/EC on the European Works Council to ensure that all employees employed by a 
European multinational company have sufficient access to information and are consulted on 
matters relevant to their employment. Both directives are equally important in that sense, as 
Directive 2009/38/EC is the ‘agent’ which enables employees to have access to information 
and serves as a forum for consultation. 914  Even though the EU is reluctant to refer to 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, there is an example for external action in environment protection. 
One of the biggest challenges to controlling the activities of European corporations operating 
outside of the territory of the EU is the territorial sovereignty of States. The exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction faces both legal and political obstacles. A general rule of 
international law affirms that one state cannot take measures on the territory of another state 
by means of the enforcement of national laws without the consent of the latter. Such an 
expansion of the competences, especially in the field of employment and industrial relations, 
is not free from controversy. On the other hand, the international scope of the activity of the 
European Union have to be guided by principles which have inspired its own creation, 
development, and enlargement, and which seek to advance in the wider world: democracy, the 
rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the 
                                               
913 Opinion of the EESC on Employee involvement and participation as a pillar of sound business management 
and balanced approaches to overcoming the crisis, SOC/470, Brussels, 20 March 2013, Points 2.5 and 2.6. 
914 Art 1. 2 of Directive 2009/38/EC. 
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principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.915 The importance of employee 
involvement both as a human right or and as a tool to enhance economic competitiveness is 
significant regarding democracy. 916 Thus, the second hypothesis (H2) DUE TO ITS HUMAN 
RIGHTS CHARACTER, EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT CANNOT BE REGARDED AS A PRIVILEGE OF 
EUROPEAN CITIZENS, BUT HAVE TO BE TREATED AS A UNIVERSAL RIGHT OF EVERY WORKER AND 
HAS TO BE SAFEGUARDED WITH SUFFICIENT LEGAL PROVISIONS was proved to be correct. 
Moreover, observations Sinzheimer made on the function of labour law are important 
to be remembered here. Protection of employees has essential importance to society, as the 
working power of man is not only an individual but also a social asset.917 The worker serves 
the employer directly, but also serves society indirectly, argues Sinzheimer further, and thus 
society owes the worker an equivalent return for his service, and this equivalent return is the 
protection itself. 
On a Kantian recognition of human dignity,918 for Sinzheimer the democratization of 
the industrial sphere through the economic constitution might have brought equality and real 
freedom for workers—freedom which is not manifested in the way that freedom of contract 
allowed exploitation, but freedom from subordination in employment relations. The right to 
employee involvement has to be kept protected both as a fundamental right and a tool to 
enhance economic competitiveness. Moreover, this protection cannot be limited to the 
territory of the European Union in the context of globalization. The recognition of the 
humanity of workers through involvement ought to be seen as a shared responsibility of 
global economic actors. 
 
B Participation Model of the New Hungarian Labour Code 
 
Political changes were rather rapid in Hungary, between 1988 and 1992 key legislative 
movements laid down a completely new system, including industrial relations. Act No XXII 
of 1992 – the third Labour Code – was based on the principle of freedom of association and 
strived to create genuine, democratic form of participation. As a part of the reforms, works 
councils were institutionalised, although it is argued that the introduction of works councils 
was lacking genuine historical origins or theoretical foundations. 919  Decisions of the 
                                               
915 Art 205 of TFEU and Art 21 of TEU. 
 Sinzheimer believed that political and social democracy could only exist if they are accompanied by economic 
democracy. In his view, economic democracy has two complementary pillars: the self-regulation of the industrial 
actors (employers’ associations, trade unions, works councils) and the rights of workers to participate in the 
management of the economy. See, Hugo Sinzheimer, Das Wesen des Arbeitsrecht, in Arbeitsrecht und 
Rechtssoziologie: gesammelte Aufsätze und Reden, Ruth Dukes, Constitutionalizing Employment Relations: 
Sinzheimer, Kahn-Freund, and the Role of Labour Law (2008) 35 Journal of Law and Society, 346; Michel 
Coutu, With Hugo Sinzheimer and Max Weber in Mind: The Current Crisis and the Future of Labour Law, 
(2012-2013) 3Ő űomp. Lab. L.& Pol’y J. 60ő-7 
916 Art 205 of TFEU and Art 21 of TEU. 
917 Dukes, supra 345. 
918 Ibid. 
919 Gy Kiss, Munkajog [Labour Law] (Budapest, 2005, Osiris), 451-53. 
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Constitutional Court concerning trade unions also shaped the reforms of industrial relations 
and had important, yet rather detrimental impact on the bargaining position of trade unions.920 
The Constitutional Court rendered its decision considering the provisions of Article 54(1) of 
the Constitution on the right of disposal. The right of disposal is an integral part of the right to 
human dignity declared in as a natural right of which no one may be deprived. The 
Constitutional Court stated that the right of disposal is a "general right to personhood", which 
encompasses various aspects of personhood, such as the right to free personal development, 
the right to free self-determination, general freedom of action or the right to privacy. 
Due to the recent re-codification of Labour Law in Hungary, it seemed important to 
examine the changes concerning employee involvement in Hungary. While Act No I of 2012 
maintains the democratic principles of its predecessor concerning works councils, it has 
brought significant changes to the regulation of industrial relations. Since the changes 
substantially affected the stance of works councils, the research question articulated regarding 
this matter was (Q6) Whether the provisions of the new Hungarian Labour comply with the 
European norms, such as the European Social Charter and Directives 2002/14/EC and 
2009/38/EC? 
The new Labour Code successfully cleared away most of the confusion originated in 
the horizontal dual channel model of Act No XXII of 1992; however, my findings concerning 
the rights of works councils are rather negative. The preference of the lawmaker towards 
works council over trade unions is by and large exhausted in declarations, unfortunately 
works councils do not possess stronger rights than before. The Labour Code defines the 
function of works council as an institution which monitors the compliance of employers’ 
practices with the employment regulations. However, the existing rights of works council are 
not sufficient to provide effective control over employers. The protection of employee 
representatives also raises concerns. Whereas it is uncontested that ‘regular’ members of 
works council deemed employee representatives (for example the regulations concerning 
confidential information are binding on them), only the chairperson is protected against unfair 
dismissal. This practice goes against the requirements set forth by Directive 2002/14/EC and 
violates Article 22 of the European Social Charter as well as the provisions of ILO 
Convention No 135.921 
 The available remedies for violating the regulation concerning employee involvement 
are not as effective as they were before. Further to this, the sanctions related to the unlawful 
practices of employers, eg, the violation of information, consultation and co-determination 
rights are not dissuasive enough to prevent the malpractice of employers. However, it is 
argued that without dissuasive sanctions and proper remedies, the right to conclude a 
workplace agreement covering subject matters of a collective agreement is not a sign of 
empowerment of works councils, but a rubber stamp on the workplace rules unilateral drawn 
up by employers. 
 As a conclusion, it would be required to review the provisions concerning works 
councils. Whereas revision of some regulations would require redesigning the industrial 
relations, revisiting sanctions and extending the protection to work council members would be 
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easily achievable, yet immediately required to meet the conditions set forth by EU Directives 
and the European Social Charter. 
 
IV Non-Democratic Participatory Models 
A The Japanese Model of Participation 
 
Japan has gone through rapid economic and political transformation after the war, but such 
change was not accompanied by the evolvement of democratic values in the society. 922 
However the legislative environment has changed noticeably in favour of employee 
participation over the years, deficiency in workers’ influencing ability is still remarkable. The 
’life-long employment’ system, a flagship institution of Japanese labour market, completely 
lacks democratic decision making processes and its underlying philosophy has attempted 
employee participation to gain acceptance in the corporate culture. On the other hand, 
possibly due to the weak perception of democracy in a society as whole, employees working 
outside of the life-long employment system have not been able to implement participation 
rights at their workplaces either, despite the fact that the legal environment has persuaded 
labour and management to include such institution more fully to their decision making 
processes. The research question I examined in this chapter was how the traditional decision 
making patterns influence employee Involvement in Japan?  (Q7) 
While technical development and production efficiency were remarkable after the end 
of the Second World War, much less development and modernization could be traced in 
internal relations of the production units. The feudal relations were deep-rooted in the society 
and tied production methods to the commodity production patterns with its master-servant 
relations. The reform programs initiated by the Occupation were thrown onto a relatively 
immature system of industrial relations. The major pieces of labour legislation were not 
products of gradual, bottom-up developments. The Occupation’s labour policy, alongside the 
economic reconstruction, was a part of the defeudalisation process.923 It included the total 
demilitarisation and the transformation of the social and economic forces that had had a major 
role in the “imperialist adventure” of Japan.924  
Changing the industrial relations was one of the top priorities for SCAP in 1945.925  General 
MacArthur believed that trade unions are “schoolhouses of democracy”, and re-establishing them 
would help preventing future aggression and supply workers with democratic ideals, as well as serve 
                                               
922 See for example, M Schalber, ’The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia’ 
(OUP, 1985); M E. Caprio and Y Sugita, ’Democracy in Occupied Japan: The U.S. Occupation and Japanese 
Politics and Society’ (Taylor and Francis, 2007); űJ Coyne, ’After War: The Political Economy of Exporting 
Democracy’ (Stanford University Press, 2008). 
923 Takemae 2003:307 
924 Ibid. 
925 Supreme Command of Allied Powers 
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as a general index of political liberalisation.926 The newly enacted regulations had a revolutionary 
impact on the long-repressed labour movements. In a couple of months, unionisation rate surpassed 
the pre-war peak and the upsurge had been continued until 1949, when the unionisation rate was more 
than 50 per cent.927 After the surrender, the corporate leaders, still under the shock of total defeat, had 
not developed a coherent economic vision. Trade Unions, on the other hand, via shop-floor activities, 
managed to create their own voice in how to run the company, brought up plans for industrial 
recovery, and pressed for higher wages.928 Trade Unions had major impact on reordering the economy, 
and through their members they had decision making power in the everyday work, effectively 
realising economic democracy.929 
Production-control struggles radically pushed workers to take over production. Intelligence 
recorded several attempts, involving altogether almost 40,000 people, which aimed for workers self-
management. 930 After the radical demonstrations in 1946, SCAP promptly drafted a harsh public 
security ordinance, sentencing those who are engaging in ‘act prejudicial to Occupational objectives’ 
to prohibitive fines and prison terms of up to 10 years at hard labour. 931  The ‘schoolhouses of 
democracy’ seemed to be shut down. The formal prohibition of the strike was a turning point in the 
Occupation.932 It was a denial of workers basic right, which had just been declared by the Occupation 
two years before. The reasoning, that the Japanese economy and society was not mature enough to 
deal with the general work-stoppage recalls the patriarchal rhetoric of the tennosei.  
The same patriarchal tone is detected by Woodiwiss in the way how the New Constitution of 
Japan933 declares the rights and duties of workers.934 Woodiwiss claims that in such legal environment, 
other labour laws, namely the Labour Relations Adjustment Law of 1946 and the Labour Standard 
Law of 1947 had no choice but follow the pre-war state partiarchalism.935 Therefore, as Woodiwiss 
points it out, the employment relation in Japan remained very much a status relation rather than a 
contractual one.936 
According to Nakane’s comprehensive analysis on Japanese society, 937  it shall be 
assumed that workplaces have dedicated role in the employees as well as their families’ life. 
Nakane argues that the kinship which is normally seen as a basic unit of human attachment is 
replaced in Japan by a personalised relation to a corporate group based on work. This is called 
marugakae, which could be translated to English as ‘under patronage’. The company has a 
fairly patriotic approach towards the employees, providing workplace security and more or 
less steady employment conditions. As a return, the employer requires unconditional loyalty 
to the group (eg, the employer) and sacrifice of the employee’s ties to other groups, including 
emotional participation. The Japanese concept of such ‘one-ness’ refers to the ultimate 
integrating power of the group which restricts the behaviour of its members, including that of 
the leader himself. Albeit stable, a system based on unchangeable social manners is rigid. 
Institutional position and title defines the employee’s position in the company and individual 
                                               
926 Takemae 2003: 311 
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930 Takemae 2003:314 
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932 Takemae 2003:320-321 
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traits or achievements are overlooked. It links to one of the characteristics of the Japanese 
employment system, which is addressed as the ‘seniority based promotion and wage systems’.  
Extreme consciousness on hierarchy affects intra-group communications. Junior 
members carefully avoid any open confrontations with their superiors. The avoidance of the 
expression of one’s negative opinion rooted in the fear that it may disrupt the harmony of the 
group, which could easily jeopardize one’s position within the group. Therefore the 
expression of opinion in a group is pretty much determined by the group member’s position 
which negatively influences the limits of freedom of speech. Opposing the majority could 
lead to isolation within the group and could be subjected to various disciplinary measures. 
The authority of the seniors is unquestionable and juniors ought to carry out orders without 
the slightest sign of hesitation. Refusal or even questioning is a trace of disloyalty and 
considered as a violation of the group integrity.938   
Any popularity or recognition awarded to the individual shall be enjoyed by the group 
and not the individual and no individual popularity shall exceed that of the senior or boss, 
otherwise the harmony of group is breached.939  Individual freedom of action is also limited 
by the radius of the group, actions shall always be for the group and decision making is 
allowed only in direction provided by the group. On the other hand, the leader of the group is 
far from autocratic. In fact, the better and stronger the leader, the more strongly he is able to 
tie subordinates emotionally. In this paternalistic relation protection is repaid with 
dependence, affection with loyalty. Thus the leader is never independent or separable from the 
group, but a part of the organization up to the point that he has almost no personal identity and 
surrenders himself for the interest of the group.940 
This mutual dependence is manifested in the consensus-looking decision making 
system of ringi-sei. In ringi-sei the decision making right is not dedicated to a specific 
member of a group, but all input is seemingly considered before the final conclusion. Group 
cohesion is strong, therefore no individual liability (not even that of the leader) is presumed in 
case of mistakes. Though it is often labelled as democratic decision making process, due to 
the interdependence of the group members and their leader, balance and stability within the 
group can only be maintained on the expense of the minority.941 The marugakae does not 
allow individuals to take their own actions or decision, as in every moment they are controlled 
by the group. Joint decision making blurs the boundaries of leadership and – at least on the 
surface – enhances group cohesion. Yet the lack of clear responsibilities and liability 
indirectly increases the individual’s dependence on a group. 
The ‘Japanese miracle’, the rapid growth of the economy and striking success of 
Japanese companies on both domestic and international markets after the wartime destruction 
directed much attention to Japanese industrial relations, which are often characterized as 
harmonious. The consensus-oriented decision making processes of management was also put 
into spotlight as a backbone of economic democratization. However, the threat that someone 
becomes the one who disturbs the harmony of the group could easily be converted to 
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monetary loss. This personal insecurity was detected by Turner too; workers often explained 
their passivity by the ultimate fear of losing their jobs and therefore of endangering their (and 
their families) livelihood. 942  This sense of powerlessness contributes to the fact that 
employees feel themselves rather like subjects than participants. Frustration occurs when 
decision are made by the employer affecting the daily life of the employees, without sincere 
consultation and tension between labour and management remains, but well covered by the 
indirectly forced silence of the former one. Anger and betrayal are, in turn, lead to 
apolitically. 
Japan has been treated as the fortress of industrial democracy mostly because of the 
well-established informal ways of participation. However, in reality it is much hindered by the 
lack of actual democratic conduct within the workplace units, including trade unions. The 
exaggerated hopes in the reinforcement of the informal ways of participation are only able to 
masquerade the inherent conflicts between labour and capital, but cannot substitute the 
genuine democratic decision making processes. As Otto Kahn-Freund warns us, the false 
belief of “unity”, meaning that there are not really two sides of the industry, would easily lead 
to suppression of trade union activity and paternalistic attitude of the employer towards its 
employees, yet there is no possibility to eliminate the conflicts – the immanent ingredients of 
all industrial societies.943 
Not denying the importance of joint accountability and collective achievements as an 
ethical integrating power of the community under certain circumstances,944 the principal of 
personal responsibility shall however be emphasised. To empower human dignity one must 
not accept that anyone else has the right to impose personal values on others without that 
person’s endorsement.945 However, as Kahn-Freund stated elsewhere, freedom is ambiguous 
and misleading in labour relations, as the employees’ will is only legally, but not socially free; 
thus the principal purpose of labour law is to support the balance between the power of 
management and labour. Nevertheless, legal regulations are secondary in influencing the 
forces of the labour market, and can only make a modest contribution to the degree of 
effective organisation of the workers.946  
 
B Participation during State-Socialism in Hungary 
 
The beginnings of the Hungarian works council movement had many similarities with that of 
the Weimar Republic. Restarting production and creating social justice through worker 
participation and achieving fair redistribution were the key goals of the movements. Also, the 
early legal regulations were in both cases blurry, the exact rights and duties of works council 
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were not clear, providing grounds for numerous law suits between factory owners and works 
council representatives. 
However, in Hungary the Communist Party soon recognised the potential in 
institutions based on workers’ participation, and tried its best to harness it as fast as it could. 
Its tactic included the strengthening of its powers systematically in enterprise level 
participatory institutions, the blurring of the limits, and then the gradual elimination of shop 
committees’ participatory functions, and trade unions’ interest representation roles. The 
official communist party rhetoric marketed the process as the maximisation of workers’ 
interest representation; however, the actual objective was the termination of the democratic 
institution of participation. The authority of shop committees, instead of being clarified, was 
gradually shrunk. New institutions, production committees were set up, charged with the 
responsibility of elaborating new working methods, production procedures, performance 
standards, and wage payment principles to ensure increased, and more efficient industrial 
production. Political cleansing was used to increase the control of the Party. The role of the 
trade unions, too, changed. In accordance with the new guidelines, their main task is to 
organise, increase production, and organise socialist work contests, and rationalising work 
processes in the factory, completely overshadowing the role of interest representation. As a 
parallel process their independence dropped paving the way for MKP’s political committee to 
declare that the trade unions must serve the party. The research question I examined under 
this chapter was (Q8) whether participation could function in a genuine manner in an 
autocratic regime? 
When the crisis of political power caused industry management to become paralysed, 
workers again took charge of direction during the 1956 revolutionary events. The workers 
councils established in October 1956 played a special role among the fast changing 
conditions. As opposed to the 1945 shop committee movement, this time the election of the 
enterprise level organisations was followed by units of a higher level: workers councils were 
at district, and city level, but even at the counties. An important point in the organisation of 
workers councils was the convocation of the workers councils’ parliament with the 
participation of the delegates of major factories. The parliament accepted the basic principles 
of the workers councils’ rights and operation regulating the relationship of workers, workers 
councils, the director, and the state. Workers councils could not, therefore, be regarded the 
continuation of the trade union movement, but are the outcome of a new grass-root initiative. 
The multiple layer of organisation again showed similarities with the planned structure of the 
Weimar works councils. 
The government attempted to separate workers councils and so called revolutionary 
councils, and tried to handle them by different legal means. Seeing the commencement of the 
work of central as well as local units, a government decree acknowledged the newly 
established grass-root organisations named revolutionary committees. Few days later 
however, the dissolution of revolutionary committees was ordered. ‘űleansing’ was once 
again ordered by the Party. They did their best to discredit those dismissed, and branded them 
as counter-revolutionists. These measures clearly disintegrated the factory collective, and 
increased the workers’ reluctance to openly support the workers councils. At the same time, 
the government, quoting economic difficulties, returned to the previous methods of central 
administration, and arrests meanwhile also began to target the members of the factory workers 
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councils. Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP) regulated the party policy regarding 
workers councils, which, naturally, equalled the implementation of the party’s leading role. 
The official ideology claimed that in a socialist state there is no justified need for the 
independent protection of workers’ interests. In connection with that statement was the state’s 
ownership, and its role as a unifier of social interest, and the financial management in a plan 
economy framework. 947  That, at the same time, also foreshadowed that trade union 
committees could not take over the rights of the workers’ councils. 
A further barrier to genuine participation was that the lawmaker tried to make works 
councils fit to the traditional framework of the management of state-owned companies. 
Theoretically it was the works councils’ duty to involve through their activity the workers of 
the factory in the financial management of companies, in the control of production, in 
promoting the realisation of the plan economy, and the consolidation of the workers’ 
ownership of state companies. At the same time it was also expressed immediately that the 
shaping and operation of works councils must not affect the company director’s sole 
responsibility. The system of the plan economy narrowed their right of consultation to an even 
smaller area. 
A further limitation came from the fact that the resolution ordered to settle issues not 
regulated in the resolution along the principles of ‘democratic centralism’, and ’mutual 
socialist cooperation’. Űut the principle of democratic centralism required that the company’s 
well-founded, that is legitimate interests had to be ranked above those of the workers, and 
social interest as provided by legislation superseded that of the enterprise, or even the 
workers. That principle was followed also within the trade union through the fact that the 
lower ranking trade union organ was obliged to execute the resolutions of the higher ranking 
organ.948 
There was no point for subscribers to the central ideology to advocate that common 
social interest would eventually enable the creation of common corporate and individual 
interest, and that there is no need for instruments of public law to guarantee work peace 
because “cooperation of comrades, and mutual socialist assistance are an objective necessity 
even if occasionally the opposite happens”, therefore, in a socialist establishment the work 
collective is held together by a harmony of objectively implemented and implementable 
interests.949 In reality, the ‘harmony of interests’ was usually achieved to the detriment of 
workers.  
Given the fact that the living and working conditions of workers showed no apparent 
improvement, the effort of works councils were hardly noticeable to workers. Moreover, the 
role of the works councils operating on shop floor level, and under the auspices of the trade 
union, workers could hardly differentiate between the trade union and works councils. The 
distinction was made even more difficult by the rules applicable to the election and 
composition of the works councils. Its composition was subject to the requirement that ‘there 
should be a sufficient number of trade union officers to guarantee the cooperation of the trade 
union and the works council work, and that to also ensure that the ‘key figures of the 
communist system should participate’, ie, ‘people with the appropriate sense of political 
                                               
947 Űeránné-Kajári (1992:99) 
948 Weltner (1961:478) 
949 Weltner (1961:72) 
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identity’.950 This, on the one hand, further increased the party’s control, and, on the other, it 
was sufficiently murky to ensure large enough grounds for political screening as the law 
provided no specific reason to recall a party functionary, while incompatibility had to be 
stated concerning all political, economic, and other activities, and behaviours that were 
against the interests of the working people. 
The new Labour Code of 1967 set forth that the purpose of the Act is to regulate how 
workers could contribute to, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution (Act No 
XX of 1949) and through channels of the trade union, the regulation of work and living 
conditions and how they could facilitate the improvement of the productivity of an enterprise 
and control its activity. The basic concept of the Labour Code was to enhance indirect 
participation through trade unions and leave a narrow space for direct involvement. However, 
the overall leeway of the Labour Code was not so significant. Trade unions were seemingly 
given an important role, but the structure and nature of participation was rather limited in 
reality due to the all-encompassing presence of the Party. After the launching of the new 
economic mechanism in 1968 soon it became apparent that the economic reforms were not 
sustainable without political changes. The economic independence of enterprises would have 
required directors to be appointed based on objective criteria regarding leadership and 
management skill and workers should have had a word in the selection process. 
However, the envisaged economic reorganization called for political pluralism, similar 
to the concept which had been initiated by Imre Nagy and to what was demanded during the 
19ő6 revolution. To maintain the ‘soft dictatorship’, there was no other possibility than to 
bring the whole economic reform program to an end. Thus, re-centralization eventually 
overshadowed the enterprises’ self-government regarding participation. The regulatory scope 
of code of conducts was further curtailed by the obligation of directors to consult and seek 
agreement with the enterprise level trade union unit and KISZ, organizations which were not 
at all independents from party politics. New regulations concerning participation provided 
that production committees were entitled to inquire information on production plans and goals 
and to articulate their opinion only on the execution of these plans. While forums of indirect 
participation were entirely brought under the umbrella of trade union movement, the Party’s 
influence on direct participation was increased. 951  These measures indeed did not bring 
workers closer to the idea of workplace democracy. 
An empirical research completed by Lajos Héthy and űsaba Makó found that a 
significant percentage of workers thought that their participation in the socialist workers 
movement was merely part of their tactic to achieve higher wages, and all they wanted was to 
ensure ‘ideological coverage’ for themselves. The inappropriate working of workplace 
democracy hindered the workers’ ability to identify with the company’s mission. Interviews 
with workers suggest that the production was a remarkably formal institution. At the same 
time the socialist brigade movement, similarly to the operation of other institutions of 
workplace democracy drowned in its own formality, and/or became the cover institution of 
implementing individual interests.” Workers could not have a say in the decision making 
                                               
950 Weltner (1961:578-673) 
951 MSZMP Political űommittee’s Decision on the independence of trade union activity of May 10, 1966; see, 
MSZMP határozatok és dokumentumok 1963-1966 [Documents and Decisions of MSZMP 1963-1966] 
(Űudapest, 1968, Kossuth Kiadó), 288. 
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process by means of the formal pathways created for them. Thus participation in reality was 
transferred to informal channels. 
Again, the Party’s all-encompassing nature was emphasised; it was argued that the 
Party, considering the interest of the working class and the entirety of the society, has to 
formulate the economic and social goals and must lead the society in unity to achieve these 
goals, without which socialist development has not been possible. Participation was envisaged 
as a tool to serve this unity by meeting production goals, overcoming technical challenges and 
strengthening diligence at workplaces.952 It was decided that the impetus on democracy had to 
be given in line with the principles of democratic centralism.953As the Party had effective 
control over all aspects of the society, it was understood that its influence on fostering 
workplace democracy would also be prevailing – as it was described in the Party’s decrees.954 
The importance of employee involvement – direct or indirect – in enterprises’ 
economic activity was unquestioned; however, its actual impact if it is treated solely as an 
economic tool is doubtful. Participation does not appear either in the state socialist Hungarian 
regime or in Japan as a human right. 
 
V Final Conclusion 
 
To prove the third hypothesis (H3) PARTICIPATION IS SUBJECT TO SIMULTANEOUS 
RECOGNITION OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND THE FORCE OF SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON THE EXTENT 
AND REACH OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, I drew conclusions from the fourth part of the 
dissertation concerning non-democratic participation models. I found that the right to 
information and consultation is an individual right, in a sense that it should be enjoyed 
unconditionally by every employee. 955  Therefore, it is not possible to have genuine 
participation in regimes which deny the existence or even question the importance of 
individual freedom. 
There are many similarities between the Japanese and the state-socialist model of 
participation. First, both system emphasise the importance of group harmony over individual 
interest and practically deny the reason of existence of the latter. Thus, they regard 
participation as tool which helps people understand the group interest and execute plans or 
orders which are considered to serve such interest at best. Group interest could be the interest 
of a brigade, a shop, a company or a collective, a party, the socialist community itself. In both 
                                               
952  L Héthy ’Az üzemi demokrácia és a munkások’ [Workplace democracy and workers] (Űudapest, 1980, 
Kossuth Kiadó), 218. 
953  A Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt XI. kongresszusának jegyzőkönyve [Minutes of the 11th Congress of 
Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party] (Űudapest, 197ő, Kossuth Kiadó), Ő67, ő00. 
954 Az üzemi demokrácia néhány elvi kérdése. Az MSZMP határozatai és dokumentumai 1967-1970 [On some 
of the theoretical issues of workplace democracy. Decrees and documents of MSZMP, 1967-1970], 384. 
955 E Ales ‘Information and űonsultation within the undertaking’ in Recasting Worker Involvement? Recent 
trends in information, consultation and co-determination or worker representatives in a Europeanized Arena’ 
(Kluwer, 2009) 13. Similarly, Otto Kahn-Freund argued that the right to strike is an individual right; see, O 
Kahn-Freund ‘The Right to Strike: Its scope and limitations’ (Strasbourg, 1974, Council of Europe), 5 ff. 
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systems the top-down operation and decision-making methods made workers feel somewhat 
betrayed. As a reaction, workers oppose mostly passively by ignoring the participation forums 
and by leveraging on informal channels. Reforms created to enhance activity and therefore 
increase productivity were stopped halfway, when it became apparent that the recognition of 
individual freedom and interest would be necessary alongside the newly created or renewed 
instruments of participation. 
Thus, it is not enough if a system is devoted to group- or collective-oriented rights, 
what matters is the simultaneous recognition of individual freedom and to the force of social 
influences on the extent and reach of individual freedom.956 As the examples of Japan and 
state-socialist Hungary demonstrates, it does not make substantial difference regarding the 
results, whether the denial is rooted in feudal patterns or a consequence of all-encompassing 
Party politics, there is no substitute for individual freedom – and individual responsibility 
either. As Sen argues, any affirmation of social responsibility that replaces individual 
responsibility is counterproductive. 
The success of the European model of participation lies in two interconnected factors. 
One is the notion of participation that encompasses employee involvement as a human right 
and as a tool for economic efficiency. Two is that participation has a solid foundation based 
on principles of democracy. Acknowledging participation as a human right is a guarantee that 
the person is not treated as subject, as ‘serf’, but a person with human dignity who has a say in 
decisions made on matters affecting her life. Participation at workplace helps to fight 
commodification and objectification of human beings. More specifically, employee 
involvement at workplaces is an important tool in employees’ hand to balance the superior 
economic power of employers. Through the democratization of decision making at the 
workplace freedom could be brought to employees and therefore they could be eased from 
subordination in employment relations. While businesses are required to respect their 
employees’ right to get involved in decision-making processes and employees need to learn 
how to leverage their participatory rights, it is the state’s responsibility to create enforceable 
legal norms and promote economic democracy.  
Only democracy can create an environment that fosters the substantive freedom of 
people to lead lives which they have reason to value, that enhances the real choices they have, 
and that thereby promotes social justice. Observations Sinzheimer and Sen made on the 
importance of democracy have to be remembered here. Protection of the human dignity of 
employees has essential importance to society, as the working power of man is not only an 
individual but also a social asset. The right to employee involvement has to remain protected 
and be promoted not only as tool to enhance economic competitiveness but also as a 
fundamental right. Moreover, this protection cannot be limited to the territory of the European 
Union in the context of globalization. The recognition of the humanity of workers through 
involvement ought to be seen as a shared responsibility of global economic actors. 
                                               
956 R ű Grady, ‘Workplace Democracy and Possessive Individualism’ (1990) ő2 The Journal of Poltics, 1; 
contrary to this: S L Schweizer ‘Participation, Workplace Democracy, and the Problem of Representative 
Government’ (199ő) 27 Polity 3. 
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I A kutatási feladat rövid összefoglalása 
 
A munkavállalói részvétel alatt olyan, egymástól különbözĘ mechanizmusokat értünk, 
amelyek lehetĘvé teszik, hogy a munkavállalók befolyásolják a munkahelyi döntési 
folyamatokat. A részvétel a munkahely bármely szintjén lehetséges, számos közvetlen és 
közvetett formája létezik. A munkavállalói részvétel témaköre egyaránt foglalkoztatja a 
közgazdaságtan és a jogtudomány mĦvelĘit, fontos eleme a munkaügyi kapcsolatok jogának 
is. A dolgozat a munkavállalói részvételre mint kettĘs természetĦ jelenségre tekint, egyrészt 
vállalati versenyképességet fokozó eszközként, másrészt olyan emberi jogként, amely 
jelentĘsen hozzájárul az emberi méltóság kiteljesítéséhez. Korábbi kutatások eredményeit 
felhasználva ezt a kettĘsséget elsĘsorban a közvetlen képviselet területén mutatom ki és 
elemzem. A dolgozat legfontosabb megállapítása, hogy e két komponens egymástól nem 
elválasztható. 
A kutatás kezdetén az alábbi hipotéziseket állítottam fel: 
H1 A MUNKAVÁLLALÓI RÉSZVÉTEL KETTėS TERMÉSZETĥ, EGYSZERRE 
VERSENYKÉPESSÉGET NÖVELė GAZDASÁGI ESZKÖZ ÉS EMŰERI JOG. 
H2 EMŰERI JOGI TERMÉSZETÉŰėL FAKADÓAN A MUNKAVÁLLALÓI RÉSZVÉTEL UNIVERZÁLIS, 
NEM ÉRTELMEZHETė KIZÁRÓLAG AZ EURÓPAI MUNKAVÁLLALÓK PRIVILÉGIUMAKÉNT, 
KITERJESZTÉSE ÉS VÉDELME ÉRDEKÉŰEN MEGFELELė JOGI ESZKÖZÖKET KELL IGÉNYŰE VENNI. 
H3 MUNKAVÁLLALÓI RÉSZVÉTEL NEM JÖHET LÉTRE EGYÉNI AUTONÓMIA HIÁNYÁŰAN, 
EZÉRT FONTOS, HOGY EGYIDEJĥLEG ISMERJÜK EL AZ EGYÉNI SZAŰADSÁG KÖZPONTI SZEREPÉT 
ÉS A TÁRSADALMI HATÁSOKNAK AZ EGYÉNI SZAŰADSÁGRA GYAKOROLT EREJÉT. 
 
A dolgozat a hipotéziseket az alábbi szerkezetbe foglaltan igazolja. Az elsĘ rész a részvétel 
fogalmát határozza meg, ehhez kapcsolódóan kitekintést nyújt a gazdasági demokráciával és a 
munkaügyi kapcsolatok demokráciájával foglalkozó elméletekre is. A bevezetĘ feldolgozza 
az ILO adott témakörre vonatkozó definícióját és az Európai Unió fogalom-meghatározásait 
is. Az elsĘ rész ismerteti a hipotéziseket és a kutatási kérdéseket, valamint a feldolgozás 
módszertanát. 
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 A második rész a munkavállalói részvétel kettĘs természetének eredetét mutatja be, 
rövid áttekintést adva a Weimari Köztársaság participációra vonatkozó koncepciójáról, illetve 
azokról a kurrens közgazdaságtani elméletekrĘl, amelyek a munkavállalói részvételt mint 
gazdasági versenyképességet befolyásoló tényezĘt elemzik, akár pozitív, akár negatív 
oldalról. A második rész részletesen bemutatja a munkavállalói részvételt inkorporáló emberi 
jogi dokumentumokat. 
A harmadik rész a részvétel európai dimenziójára összpontosít. ElĘször azokat az 
irányelveket mutatom be röviden, amelyek a részvétel általános szabályait rögzítik, így a 
2002/1Ő/EK irányelvet a munkavállalók tájékoztatásáról és a velük való konzultációról, az 
Európai Üzemi Tanács létrehozásáról szóló 2009/38/EK átdolgozott irányelvet, illetve az 
európai részvénytársaság statútumának a munkavállalói részvétel tekintetében történĘ 
kiegészítésérĘl szóló 2001/86/EK irányelvet. Ezt követĘen bemutatom, hogy milyen lehetĘség 
kínálkozna az uniós jogalkotás számára annak érdekében, hogy a munkavállalói részvétel joga 
ne csupán az európai unió területén dolgozó munkavállalók privilégiuma legyen. Érvelésem 
központi eleme, hogy bár az extraterritoriális jogalkotás megítélése ellentmondásos akár az 
Európai Unión belül is, bizonyos célok érdekében sikerrel fordult az EU ehhez a politikához, 
amely a részvétel kiterjesztése szempontjából is megfontolandó lehet. Ez a rész fogalmazza 
meg a dolgozat normatív javaslatát is, amely a 2002/1Ő/EK és a 2009/38/EK irányelvek 
személyi hatályának kiterjesztésére tett javaslat. Ezután részletesen bemutatom az új Munka 
Törvénykönyvének (2012. évi I. törvény) a munkavállalói részvételt érintĘ változásait, 
összehasonlítva azt a korábbi szabályozással. Az elemzés célja, hogy a megvizsgálja a magyar 
szabályoknak az uniós irányelvekkel, illetve az Európai Szociális űhartával való  
megfelelĘségét. Ebben a körben a jogalkotási javaslatom az üzemi tanács (üzemi megbízott) 
törvényben foglalt jogainak megsértésével hozott munkáltatói intézkedések erĘteljesebb, a 
jogsértéstĘl visszatartó erejĦ szankcióval való sújtása: az érvénytelenség 
jogkövetkezményeinek alkalmazása, illetve pénzbírság kiszabása. Szükséges a munkavállalói 
képviselĘk munkajogi védelmének helyreállítása is, hiszen a jelenlegi szabályozással hazánk 
nemzetközi normát sért. Szükséges lenne továbbá a munkavállalók képviseletének 
átgondolása a csoportos létszámleépítés és a munkajogi jogutódlás kapcsán is, e területeken a 
munkavállalókkal való konzultációt az üzemi tanács meglétéhez kötni aggályos. 
A dolgozat negyedik része a munkavállalói részvétel japán modelljét az 
államszocializmus magyar szabályait vizsgálja. Az elemzés célja, hogy kimutassa, a politikai, 
gazdasági és társadalmi közegnek, illetve a demokráciáról vallott társadalmi felfogásnak a 
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munkavállalói részvételre gyakorolt hatását. Az értekezés ötödik, befejezĘ része összefoglalja 
a kutatás eredményeit. 
 
II A kutatás módszertana 
 
A munkavállalói részvétel fogalmának meghatározásához harmadlagos forrásokat használtam, 
így különösen a témával foglalkozó enciklopédiákat és szótárakat. EbbĘl nyilvánvalóvá vált, 
hogy a részvétel fogalma úgy munkajogi, mint emberi jogi szempontból részletesen 
feldolgozott. A kutatás legfontosabb elsĘdleges forrásai az egyes munkavállalói részvételi 
modellek keretét biztosító jogszabályok és egyéb jogi instrumentumok. A dolgozat a sorra 
veszi a weimari, a japán és a magyar participáció fejlĘdését azt meghatározó joganyag 
feldolgozásával és bemutatásával. Az egyes participációs intézmények funkciójuk alapján 
kerülnek összehasonlításra. A disszertáció a nemzeti jogokon túl az Európai Unió joganyagát 
is elemzi, valamint feldolgozza a releváns nemzetközi jogi instrumentumok rendelkezéseit is. 
Az egyes intézmények funkciójának értelmezéséhez további elsĘdleges forrásokat is igénybe 
vettem, így elsĘsorban nemzeti bírósági ítéleteket, illetve az Európai Unió Űíróságának 
döntéseit és az Európai Szociális űharta esetjogát. 
A kutatás során ugyanakkor célul tĦztem ki, hogy a munkavállalói részvételt új 
oldalról közelítsem meg, amely túlmutat a korábbi kutatási eredmények összefoglaló 
ismertetésén, és annak társadalmi és gazdasági hatásait is bemutatja. Annál is inkább, mert a 
gazdasági válság hatására a participáció különbözĘ formái ismét a kutatások középpontjába 
kerültek, mint a válság negatív hatásait enyhítĘ lehetséges eszközök. Ennek érdekében 
nemcsak a participáció jogszabályi hátterét mutatom be, hanem elsĘsorban másodlagos 
források segítségével igyekszem az egyes munkavállalói részvételi modelleket azok 
társadalmi és gazdasági közegében is elhelyezni. A magyar történeti háttér bemutatásakor 
ugyanakkor nagyban támaszkodtam elsĘdleges forrásokra is, így a Szakszervezeti Levéltár 
anyagára és a Politikatörténeti Intézetben fellelhetĘ archív dokumentumokra. 
A kutatás interdiszciplináris megközelítése elengedhetetlenné tette, hogy a 
participációt ne csupán jogi, hanem gazdaságtudományi szempontból is megvizsgáljam. 
Ugyanakkor a disszertáció egy jogtudományi kutatás eredményeit foglalja össze, így a 
242 
 
dolgozat a participációra vonatkozó, közgazdaságtudományban használt matematikai 
bizonyításokat nem mutatja be. 
 
III A tudományos eredmények rövid összefoglalása és 
azok hasznosítása, illetve a hasznosítás lehetĘségei 
 
A A tudományos eredmények rövid összefoglalása 
 
A kutatás az alábbi hipotézisekre épül: 
H1 A MUNKAVÁLLALÓI RÉSZVÉTEL KETTėS TERMÉSZETĥ, EGYSZERRE 
VERSENYKÉPESSÉGET NÖVELė GAZDASÁGI ESZKÖZ ÉS EMŰERI JOG. 
H2 EMŰERI JOGI TERMÉSZETÉŰėL FAKADÓAN A MUNKAVÁLLALÓI RÉSZVÉTEL UNIVERZÁLIS, 
NEM ÉRTELMEZHETė KIZÁRÓLAG AZ EURÓPAI MUNKAVÁLLALÓK PRIVILÉGIUMAKÉNT, 
KITERJESZTÉSE ÉS VÉDELME ÉRDEKÉŰEN MEGFELELė JOGI ESZKÖZÖKET KELL IGÉNYBE VENNI. 
H3 MUNKAVÁLLALÓI RÉSZVÉTEL NEM JÖHET LÉTRE EGYÉNI AUTONÓMIA HIÁNYÁŰAN, 
EZÉRT FONTOS, HOGY EGYIDEJĥLEG ISMERJÜK EL AZ EGYÉNI SZAŰADSÁG KÖZPONTI SZEREPÉT 
ÉS A TÁRSADALMI HATÁSOKNAK AZ EGYÉNI SZAŰADSÁGRA GYAKOROLT EREJÉT. 
 
A politikai demokrácia és a gazdasági fejlĘdés egymástól történĘ szétválaszthatóságát hirdetĘ 
elméleteket mára meghaladottaknak mondhatjuk. A paradigmaváltás elsĘsorban a jóléti 
közgazdaságtant megújító fejlĘdés-elméleteknek vagy képesség-elméleteknek köszönhetĘ.957 
Ezen elméletek képviselĘi szerint a társadalmi egyenlĘtlenségek kezelése nem képzelhetĘ el a 
demokrácia és a gazdasági fellendülést egymástól szétválasztó, hagyományos dichotómiára 
                                               
957 M ű Nussbaum, ‘űreating űapabilities’ (űambridge, 2011, Harvard University Press). 
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építve, ezért olyan új szemlélet bevezetése szükséges, amely az emberi méltóságot helyezi 
középpontba, ugyanis a gazdasági mutatók javulása önmagában nem eredményezi a 
szegénység, a diszkrimináció megszĦnését vagy a várható élettartam növekedését. A 
megszokott, a piaci szabadversenyt a tervutasítással szembeállító, leegyszerĦsítĘ 
szemléletmód, amely erĘsen jellemzi a neoklasszikus közgazdaságtan fĘáramát, nem tudott 
megfelelĘ választ adni a növekvĘ GDP ellenére fennmaradó gazdasági-társadalmi 
problémákra. A fejlĘdést tehát nem lehet önmagában a növekvĘ termelésben és fogyasztásban 
és az emelkedĘ reáljövedelemben meghatározni, mivel az sokkal inkább az úgynevezett 
emberi képességek kiteljesítésének folyamataként értelmezendĘ és nem feleltethetĘk meg 
egymással a gazdasági prosperitás hagyományos fogalmával. Amartya Sen a képességek 
fogalmán keresztül köti össze a szabadságot és egy egyéni kiteljesedést, érvelése szerint a 
fejlĘdés és az életminĘség összefügg azzal, hogy egy adott személy milyen lehetĘségek közül 
választhat egy adott társadalomban.958 
Az egyéni szabadság – ide értve a döntéshozatalban való részvétel lehetĘségét is – 
elismerése hiányában nem képzelhetĘ el valódi gazdasági fejlĘdés sem, a gazdasági és a 
politikai demokrácia egymással szorosan összefügg. 959  EbbĘl következik a kutatás elsĘ 
hipotézise: 
H1 A MUNKAVÁLLALÓI RÉSZVÉTEL KETTėS TERMÉSZETĥ, EGYSZERRE 
VERSENYKÉPESSÉGET NÖVELė GAZDASÁGI ESZKÖZ ÉS EMŰERI JOG. 
Az elsĘ hipotézis alátámasztására az alábbi kutatási kérdéseket fogalmaztam meg: (Q1) 
Melyek a munkavállalói részvétellel foglalkozó legmeghatározóbb közgazdaságtudományi 
elméletek? (Q2) Hogyan jelenik meg a munkavállalói részvétel emberi jogi 
instrumentumokban? (Q3) Milyen szerepet játszik a munkavállalói részvétel a gazdasági 
válság negatív jelenségeinek leküzdésében? 
A munkavállalói részvételnek a gazdasági versenyképességre gyakorolt pozitív hatása 
vitatott. 960  A döntéshozatali eljárások természetesen nagyban befolyásolják a gazdasági 
                                               
958 A Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford, 1999, OUP), 8. 
959 Hugo Sinzheimer, Das Wesen des Arbeitsrecht, in Arbeitsrecht und Rechtssoziologie: gesammelte Aufsätze 
und Reden (1976); Hugo Sinzheimer, Eine Theorie des Sozialen Rechts (1936) XIV Zeitschrift für öffentliches 
Recht. 
960 Például, Michael ű. Jensen and William H Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, October, 1976; E. F. Fama and M. C. Jensen, 
Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26. No. 2, 1983; R. B. Freeman and 
E. P. Lazear, An Economic Analysis of Works Councils, in Works Councils: Consultation, Representation, and 
Cooperation in Industrial Relation. 
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társaságok dinamikáját: minél több szereplĘt vonunk be, annál több idĘre van szükség a 
döntés meghozatalára, így az egész eljárás drágább lesz. A hatékonyság-elméletek 
képviselĘinek érvelése szerint a munkavállalói részvétel a tulajdonosok érdekeivel ellentétes, 
mivel számukra a legkedvezĘbb az, ha az adott termék vagy szolgáltatás elĘállítása, illetve 
nyújtása a legköltséghatékonyabban történik. Ennek cáfolatára számos olyan elmélet született, 
amelyek költségnövekedés ellenére a részvétel pozitív hatása mellett érvelnek. Ezek közül a 
dolgozat az útfüggĘség elméletét, a tulajdonhoz és az emberi tĘke koncepciójához kapcsolódó 
okfejtéseket, valamint a behaviorista közgazdaságtan eredményeit mutatja be részletesebben. 
 Az évtizedes elméleti vita mellett nem elhanyagolhatók a gyakorlati kutatások 
eredményei. A 2007-ben kezdĘdĘ gazdasági válság hatásai igen hamar megmutatkoztak a 
munka világában is,961  mintegy rákényszerítve a szociális partnereket arra, hogy együttes 
erĘvel lépjenek fel a válság kezelése érdekében.962 Ez a gazdasági kényszer több kutatás 
alapjául szolgált az elmúlt években, és annak ellenére, hogy ezek eredményei egymással nem 
minden tekintetben összevethetĘk, mégis megállapítható a szociális párbeszéd (ide értve a 
munkahelyi szintĦ részvételt is) pozitív összefüggése a válság sikeres kezelésével.963 
 A munkavállalói részvétel emberi jogi természetének vizsgálatakor Hugo 
Sinzheimernek a politikai, gazdasági és társadalmi demokrácia összefüggéseire vonatkozó 
elméletébĘl indultam ki, amelyek összekapcsolhatók Amartya Sen fentebb már ismertetett 
gondolataival is. További fontos elméleti alapot adott Lehoczkyné Kollonay űsilla 
megállapítása, amely az élet alapvetĘ kérdéseit érintĘ demokratikus döntéshozatalt alapvetĘ 
emberi jognak tekinti, amely lehetĘvé teszi, hogy az egyének ne a döntések tárgyai, hanem 
azok aktív alakítói legyenek.964  
Annak ellenére, hogy a munkavállalói részvétel megjelenik emberi jogi 
dokumentumokban, így az Európai Szociális űhartában és az Európai Unió Emberi Jogi 
űhartájában, elismertségük mégis nagyban függ egy adott állam politikai berendezkedésétĘl. 
További figyelmet érdemel, hogy kizárólag európai emberi jogi instrumentumok 
                                                                                                                                                   
960 A. A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory, 58 J Poll. Econ. 211, 1950 
961 A munkanélküliségi ráta 7.Ő százalékról (2007) egy even belül 7.7 százalékra ugrott 2008 októberére. Ld, 
European Commission, Economic forecast, Spring 2008, 1 European Economy. 
962  S űluwaert, I Schömann and W Warneck (2010), ’The European interprofessional and sectoral social 
dialogues and the economic crisis’ in Benchmarking Working Europe 2010 (Brussels, 2010, ETUI), 75. 
963 ű E Triomphe, R Guyet and D Tarren, ‘Social Dialogue in Times of Global Economic űrises’ (Eurofund, 
2010), V Glasner and Ű Galgóczy, ‘Plant-level responses to the economic crisis in Europe (ETUI-REHS, 2009), 
I Guardiancich (ed) ‘Recovering from the crisis through social dialogue in the new EU Member States: the case 
of Űulgaria, the űzech Republic, Poland and Slovenia’ (ILO (Eű), 2010); Ű Segol, M Jepsen and P Pechet (eds) 
Benchmarking Working Europe 2014 (ETUI-ETUC, 2014,). 
964  Cs Kollonay-Lehoczky ‘The fundamental Right of Workers to Information and űonsultation under the 
European Social űharter’ in Dorssemont and Űlanke (eds) ‘The Recast of the European Works Council Directive 
(Intersentia, 2010) 3-4; emphasis in origin. 
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rendelkeznek a részvételrĘl, annak ellenére, hogy az ILO és az OEűD is erĘfeszítéseket tesz a 
szélesebb körĦ elismertség érdekében. 
 Amint azt a dolgozat is bemutatja, a munkavállalói részvétel kihatással van a 
gazdasági versenyképességre – akár pozitív, akár a negatív értelemben tekintünk az 
összefüggésre. Ugyanakkor, ahogy erre Sen is rámutatott, az emberi jogok és demokrácia 
olyan princípiumok, amelyek minden körülmény között védelmet kell, hogy élvezzenek, 
függetlenül attól, hogy kapcsolódik-e hozzájuk pozitív gazdasági hatás.965  
Ebben az összefüggésben az egyén életét érintĘ döntésekben való részvétel egyben 
szabadság, amely értékessé teszi az emberi életet és a döntési lehetĘségeken keresztül 
lehetĘvé teszi az egyéni elképzelések pluralitását és a választásainkért vállalt egyéni 
felelĘsséget. EbbĘl következik a dolgozat második hipotézise: 
 
H2 EMŰERI JOGI TERMÉSZETÉŰėL FAKADÓAN A MUNKAVÁLLALÓI RÉSZVÉTEL UNIVERZÁLIS, 
NEM ÉRTELMEZHETė KIZÁRÓLAG AZ EURÓPAI MUNKAVÁLLALÓK PRIVILÉGIUMAKÉNT, 
KITERJESZTÉSE ÉS VÉDELME ÉRDEKÉŰEN MEGFELELė JOGI ESZKÖZÖKET KELL IGÉNYŰE VENNI. 
Kollonay szerint az emberi méltóság és a szociális demokrácia védelme megköveteli, hogy az 
emberi jogokat az államok a magánjogi jellegĦ jogviszonyokban is, amilyen például a 
munkaviszony is, védelemben részesítsék. Az emberi jogi egyezményeknek és az Európai 
Unió vonatkozó irányelveinek áttekintése után a következĘ kutatási kérdést fogalmaztam 
meg: (Q4) Amennyiben a munkavállalói részvételt emberi jognak tekintjük, és ekképpen 
univerzális értékként fogjuk fel, milyen eszközök állnak rendelkezésünkre ahhoz, hogy 
érvényesülését az európai térségen kívül is biztosítsuk?  
Az ILO és az OEűD eszközrendszerének bemutatását követĘen a nem állami 
szereplĘk eszközrendszerét elemeztem. A kutatási kérdésre azt a válasz adható, hogy 
kikényszeríthetĘ jogszabályi rendelkezések hiányában a munkavállalói részvétel lehetĘsége 
nem biztosított. A soft law eszközök, bár szerepük különösen a multinacionális vállalatoknál 
kétségtelenül fontos, mivel a piac egyre inkább számon kéri az emberi jogok érvényesülését a 
vállalati politikában, mégsem képesek betölteni a szabályozási Ħrt. 
Az Európai Unió a munkavállalói részvétel általános kérdéseit három alapvetĘ 
jelentĘségĦ irányelvben szabályozza, ezek az Európai Közösség munkavállalóinak 
tájékoztatása és a velük folytatott konzultáció általános keretének létrehozásáról szóló 
                                               
965 A Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford), 3, 16. 
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2002/1Ő/EK irányelv, az Európai Üzemi Tanács létrehozásáról vagy a közösségi szintĦ 
vállalkozások és vállalkozáscsoportok munkavállalóinak tájékoztatását és a velük folytatott 
konzultációt szolgáló eljárás kialakításáról szóló 2009/38/EK irányelv és az európai 
részvénytársaság statútumának a munkavállalói részvétel tekintetében történĘ kiegészítésérĘl 
szóló 2001/86/EK irányelv. 
Az irányelvek természetesen az európai gazdasági térségen belüli tevékenységre 
vonatkozóan állapítanak meg szabályokat, de felmerül a kérdés, hogy lehetőség lenne-e arra, 
hogy az Európai Unió fellépjen a munkavállalói részvételnek a kiterjesztésének érdekében? 
(Qő) Ennek azért lehet kiemelt szerepe, mert számos multinacionális vállalat köszönheti 
profitabilitását az Európán kívül folytatott tevékenységének, mégpedig gyakran kihasználva a 
harmadik állam gyengébb védelmet biztosító munkajogi szabályozását, illetve az itt dolgozó 
munkavállalók kiszolgáltatott helyzetét.  
A harmadik országok munkavállalóinak védelme azonban ezen államok szuverenitását 
sértheti, és a területen kívüli joghatóság problematikáját veti fel. Ennek megítélése pedig 
ellentmondásokkal terhes az Európai Unión belül is. A nemzetközi jog korlátozott esetekben 
lehetĘvé teszi a területen kívüli joghatóságot, ennek elméleti alapja a szabályozandó kérdés 
függvénye.966 Ennek alapul vételével megvizsgáltam, hogy lehetséges lenne-e a 2002/14/EK 
és 2009/38/EK irányelvek személyi hatályának kiterjesztése. Az elméletem alátámasztására az 
Európai Unió környezetvédelmi politikájából mutattam be egy példát, amely véleményem 
szerint szoros hasonlóságot mutat a munkavállalói részvétel kérdésével, mivel döntésének 
megalapozásához az Európai Unió Űírósága egyaránt hivatkozik gazdasági és emberi jogi 
érvekre. 
Álláspontom szerint a fenti irányelvek személyi hatályának kiterjesztése hatékonyan 
hozzájárulna a munkavállalói részvételnek, mint emberi jognak a védelméhez azon 
munkavállalók esetében, akik európai székhelyĦ multinacionális vállalatok alkalmazásában, 
de az EGT-n kívül végeznek munkát. Állításomat az alábbiakra alapozom: az Európai Unió az 
Európai Üzemi Tanács intézményével egy páratlan keretet hozott létre a transznacionális 
vállalatok munkavállalóinak tájékoztatására és a velük való konzultációra. Az irányelv 
hivatkozik a belsĘ piac sajátos mĦködésére, amely maga után vonja a vállalkozások 
koncentrációjának folyamatát, több országot érintĘ vállalategyesüléseket, 
vállalatfelvásárlásokat, közös vállalkozások létrehozását és ebbĘl következĘen a 
                                               
966  Így például a nemzetközi jog lehetĘvé teszi az államok számára, hogy saját versenyjogi szabályaikat 
alkalmazzák azokban az esetekben is, amelyekben külföldiek más állam területén elkövetett cselekedetei  
közvetlen, jelentĘs és elĘre láthtó hatással bírnak az érintett államra (ld. A. Ahlstrom Oy v. Commission [1988], 4 
CMLR 901). 
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vállalkozások és vállalkozáscsoportok transznacionálissá válását. A gazdasági tevékenységek 
harmonikus fejlĘdése szükségessé teszi, hogy a két vagy több tagállamban mĦködĘ 
vállalkozások és vállalkozáscsoportok tájékoztassák a döntéseik által érintett munkavállalók 
képviselĘit, és velük konzultáljanak. Az irányelv lehetĘvé teszi, hogy a közösségi szintĦ 
vállalkozások munkavállalói megfelelĘ tájékoztatást kapjanak és konzultáljanak velük, 
amikor az Ęket érintĘ döntést nem abban a tagállamban hozzák, amelyben Ęket 
foglalkoztatják. Ugyanakkor a globális gazdaságban a multinacionális vállalatok 
munkavállalóira nem csak a belsĘ piac, hanem a társaságoknak a harmadik országokban 
folytatott tevékenysége is kihatással van, indokoltnak látszik tehát, hogy ezek a 
munkavállalók kölcsönösen értesüljenek a multinacionális vállalatok Ęket érintĘ gazdasági 
döntéseirĘl. A tájékoztatásra és a konzultációra vonatkozó szabályozást a 2002/1Ő/EK 
irányelv tartalmazza, így az ebben foglalt munkavállalói jogok az üzemi tanács kiterjesztett 
intézményén keresztül érvényesülhetnének. 
A személyi hatály kiterjesztésére vonatkozó javaslatnál különösen az alábbiakat 
vettem figyelembe. 1) A 2009/38/EK irányelvnek az ellenĘrzĘ vállalkozásra vonatkozó 
meghatározása. A 2009/38/EK irányelv alkalmazásában az „ellenĘrzĘ vállalkozás” olyan 
vállalkozást jelent, amely a tulajdonviszonyokból, a pénzügyi részesedésbĘl, illetve az 
irányítás szabályaiból eredĘen meghatározó befolyást gyakorol egy másik vállalkozásra 
(„ellenĘrzött vállalkozás”). A meghatározó befolyás kifejtésének képességét vélelmezni kell – 
az ellenkezĘ bizonyításának sérelme nélkül –, ha valamely vállalkozás egy másik tekintetében 
közvetve vagy közvetlenül: a) birtokolja a szóban forgó vállalkozás jegyzett tĘkéjének a 
többségét; b) ellenĘrzi a vállalkozás kibocsátott részvénytĘkéjéhez tartozó szavazatoknak a 
többségét; vagy c) kinevezheti a szóban forgó vállalkozás igazgatási, irányító vagy felügyelĘ 
testületei tagjainak több mint a felét. Ezek a feltételek nagy valószínĦséggel fennállnak az 
európai székhelyĦ multinacionális vállalatok harmadik országban lévĘ telephelyeinek 
esetében is, így állíthatjuk, hogy az ellenĘrzési kapcsolat létrejön közöttük.  
2) Az irányelv meghatározása a transznacionális jelentĘségĦ ügyek tekintetében. 
Ennek alapján transznacionálisnak tekintendĘ minden olyan kérdés, amely a közösségi szintĦ 
vállalkozást vagy közösségi szintĦ vállalkozáscsoportot összességében, illetve ennek két 
különbözĘ tagállamban található legalább két telephelyét vagy vállalkozáscsoportjához 
tartozó vállalkozását érinti. A globális gazdaságban ez a feltétel a fentiekben kifejtettek 
alapján az Európán kívüli országokban található telephelyekre is teljesül. 
3) A 2009/38/EK irányelv hatálya kiterjed azokra a tagállami telephelyekre is, 
amelyek esetében a központi irányítás nem tagállamban mĦködik. Ennek alapján tehát 
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azoknak a gazdasági társaságoknak, amelyeknek az Európai Unió kívül van a központi 
irányításuk – az irányelvben foglalt egyéb feltételek teljesülése mellett – kötelességük 
tiszteletben tartani az európai polgároknak a tájékoztatáshoz és konzultációhoz való jogát.  
Amennyiben nem vitatjuk a munkavállalói részvétel emberi jogi természetét, felmerül 
a kérdés, hogy a „másik irányban”, azaz amikor a központi irányítás valamely tagállamban 
mĦködik, de a munkavállaló nem tagállami telephelyen dolgozik, akkor miért nem ismerjük el 
ugyan ennek a jognak az érvényességét? A dolgozat kiindulópontja az emberi jogok 
univerzalitása, ezért véleményem szerint a munkavállalói részvétel jogára nem lehet az 
Európai Unió polgárainak kizárólagos jogaként tekinteni, annak kiterjesztése a lehetĘ 
legszélesebb körben indokolt, így az Európai Uniónak szükséges élnie azokkal a 
lehetĘségekkel, amelyek ezt bármilyen módon elĘsegítik. 
Ellenérvéként felhozható, hogy egy ilyen intézkedés hatalmas költségeket okozna a 
gazdasági társaságoknak, így komoly piaci hátrányt szenvednének. Ezért ahelyett, hogy a 
részvételi jogokat szélesítené, egy ilyen szabályozás inkább arra ösztönözné a vállalatokat, 
hogy székhelyüket az Európai Unión kívülre helyezzék át. EgyfelĘl, ha hihetünk az 
ismertetett empirikus kutatásoknak, illetve az irányelv bevezetĘjében foglaltaknak, akkor a 
részvételi jogok kiterjesztése inkább tovább fokozná a versenykepésséget. A 
székhelyáthelyezés pedig ugyancsak költséges lépés, nem is beszélve az esetleges befektetĘi 
és fogyasztói bizalomvesztésrĘl, amely egy ilyen döntéssel járhat. 
Ugyanakkor arról sem szabad megfeledkezni, hogy a 2002/1Ő/EK és a 2009/38/EK 
irányelveknek számos problémás pontjuk van. Az Európai Unió szabályozási koncepciójának 
változása nemcsak azt eredményezte, hogy több évtizedes holtpont után végül sikerült 
elfogadtatni a szabályokat, hanem azt is, hogy a nagyobb tagállami mozgástér a szabályok 
átültetésében egyenlĘtlenségekhez vezetett. A rugalmas szabályozás lehetĘvé teszi, hogy a 
tagállamok saját nemzeti joguknak és/vagy gyakorlatuknak megfelelĘen határozzanak meg 
bizonyos fogalmakat, így akár ugyanazon a vállalkozáson, illetve vállalkozáscsoporton belül 
is eltérĘ bánásmódban részesülhetnek a munkavállalók. Ezek közül a problémás területek 
közül elsĘsorban az üzleti titok fogalmát, a munkavállalói jogok megsértése esetén 
alkalmazandó szankciókat és a munkavállalói képviselĘk védelmének a körét emeltem ki a 
dolgozatban. Ezek a problémák nyilvánvalóan „továbböröklĘdnének” és feltehetĘen 
eszkalálódnának is abban az esetben, ha az irányelvek személyi hatályát kiterjesztenénk.  
A magyar munkajogi szabályok újraalkotása felvetette annak kérdését, hogy a 2012. 
évi I. törvény, a Munka Törvénykönyvének a munkavállalói részvételre vonatkozó 
rendelkezései megfelelnek-e az európai követelményeknek, így az Európai Szociális Charta 
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rendelkezéseinek és az Európai Unió vonatkozó irányelveinek? (Q6) Annak ellenére, hogy az 
új Munka Törvénykönyve továbbra is elkötelezett a munkavállalói részvétel demokratikus 
értéke mellett, a vizsgálataim több ponton rámutattak arra, hogy az új szabályok nem minden 
esetben felelnek meg az európai elvárásoknak. 
Az új Mt. sikeresen kezelte a korábbi szabályozás számos ellentmondásos kérdését, 
így szétválasztotta az üzemi tanács és a szakszervezetek egymással párhuzamos, esetenként 
egymást potenciálisan gyengítĘ jogosítványait. Az új szabályozás látszólag az üzemi tanács 
intézményét preferálja a szakszervezetekkel szemben, azonban a jogalkotó szándéka inkább a 
szakszervezetek meggyengítésében, mintsem az üzemi tanács megerĘsítésében érhetĘ tetten. 
Az üzemi tanács nem szerezett a korábbinál erĘsebb jogosítványokat, sĘt, bizonyos 
szempontból a korábbihoz képest inkább gyengült az üzemi tanácsok pozíciója. 
Mindenképpen kiemelést érdemel, hogy a jogszabály már nem fĦzi az érvénytelenség 
jogkövetkezményét az üzemi tanács (üzemi megbízott) együttdöntési jogainak megsértésével 
hozott munkáltatói intézkedéshez. Ezen kívül lényeges, negatív változás, hogy míg korábban 
az üzemi tanács valamennyi tagja munkajogi védelmet élvezett, az új szabályozás a védelmet 
az üzemi tanács elnökére korlátozza. Ezek az új szabályok alapvetĘen érintik az üzemi tanács 
mĦködését, annak a munkáltató szemében elfoglalt szerepét és súlyát. Az üzemi tanács 
jogainak megsértése esetére kilátásba helyezett szankcióknak megfelelĘen elrettentĘ 
hatásúnak kell lenniük, különben nem biztosított a munkavállalók emberi jogának adekvát 
védelme. 967  MegfelelĘ szankciók nélkül az üzemi tanács nem a munkavállalói részvétel 
eszköze, hanem a munkáltatói intézkedések pecsétnyomója lesz. A munkajogi védelem 
személyi körének szĦkítése egyértelmĦen ellentmond az Európai Szociális űharta 22. 
cikkelyének, a 2002/1Ő/EK irányelv rendelkezéseinek, illetve az ILO 13ő. számú 
egyezményében foglaltaknak. 
Fontos kiemelni azt is, hogy az új Mt. az üzemi tanács feladataként a munkaviszonyra 
vonatkozó szabályok megtartásának figyelemmel kísérését jelöli meg. Ez a munkavállalói 
részvétel intézményének a jogalkotó általi teljes félreértésére enged következtetni. Mindezek 
a szabályok sajnálatosan hozzájárultak ahhoz, hogy a hazai kollektív munkajogi szabályozás, 
illetve a szociális párbeszéd kabaréba illĘ fordulatot vett.968  
                                               
967Kollonay, supra, 30. 
968 Most notably Act XCIII of 2011 on the National Economic and Social Council (Nemzeti Gazdasági és 
Társadalmi Tanács), which abolished tripartite social dialogue in Hungary, or, as a matter of fact, social 
dialogue per se. Another example could be the Permanent Consultation Forum (Versenyszféra és a Kormány 
Állandó Konzultációs Fóruma), which was not even established by a legal instrument. 
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A doktori értekezés negyedik részében azt vizsgáltam, hogy a társadalmi hatások 
miként befolyásolják a munkavállalói részvételt. Ennek keretében két részvételi modellt, a 
japánt és az államszocializmus kori magyar szabályozást vizsgáltam meg. A munkavállalói 
részvétel társadalmi beágyazottságához kapcsolódik a dolgozat harmadik hipotézise: 
 
H3 MUNKAVÁLLALÓI RÉSZVÉTEL NEM JÖHET LÉTRE AZ EGYÉNI AUTONÓMIA ELISMERÉSE 
HIÁNYÁŰAN, EZÉRT FONTOS, HOGY EGYIDEJĥLEG ISMERJÜK EL AZ EGYÉNI SZAŰADSÁG 
KÖZPONTI SZEREPÉT ÉS A TÁRSADALMI HATÁSOKNAK AZ EGYÉNI SZAŰADSÁGRA GYAKOROLT 
EREJÉT. 
 
A harmadik hipotézishez kapcsolódó elsĘ kutatási kérdés így szólt: (Q7) Mennyiben 
befolyásolják a tradicionális döntéshozatali eljárások a munkavállalói részvételt Japánban? 
Ennek megválaszolásához elĘször röviden áttekintettem a második világháborút követĘ 
demokratizálási folyamatot. Ennek legfontosabb elemének azt tekintem, hogy az amerikai 
megszállás által oktrojált demokratikus állammodell idegen volt a korábbi berendezkedéstĘl, 
annak ellenére, hogy a XIX. században lényeges változásokon keresztül ment keresztül az 
ország. Ennek türkében az új modell sikere vitatható. A munkaviszonyt, illetve az ahhoz 
kapcsolódó döntéshozatali mechanizmusokat alapvetĘen feudális típusú kapcsolatok 
jellemzik, amelyet a rövid idĘ alatt, erĘs külsĘ nyomásra bevezetett, majd félbehagyott 
reformok nem tudtak megváltoztatni. A japán „gazdasági csoda” régóta elemzések tárgya 
szerte a világon. A gazdaság ugrásszerĦen megnövekedett teljesítĘképességét támogatta a 
szenioritás-alapú, erĘsen hierarchizált foglalkoztatási modell. Ugyanakkor a jólét növekedése 
nem hozta magával a társadalom demokratikus átrendezĘdését. Ez a munkahelyeken is 
megfigyelhetĘ jelenség, annak ellenére, hogy a jogalkotó támogatóan viszonyult a 
munkavállalói részvételhez. Az erĘs alá-fölérendeltségen alapuló, az egyéni szabadság 
létjogosultságát megkérdĘjelezĘ döntési mechanizmusok relativizálják a részvétel 
jelentĘségét. 
A második ide kapcsolódó kérdés így hangzott: (Q8) Létrejöhet-e valódi 
munkavállalói részvétel autokratikus berendezkedésű rendszerben? A kérdés 
megválaszolásához a munkavállalói részvétel magyar szabályozásának változásait elemeztem 
az 19ŐŐ és 1989 közötti idĘszakban. Magyarországon az 19ŐŐ októbere után megváltozott 
politikai feltételek lehetĘvé tették, hogy a munkások a vállalatirányításban demokratikusan 
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választott szerveik, az üzemi tanácsok útján maguk is részt vehessenek. Az üzemi tanácsok az 
eredeti jogalkotói szándék alapján jelentĘs potenciálra számíthattak a gazdasági életben, így 
mĦködésük és vezetĘik hamar a Magyar Kommunista Párt érdeklĘdésének homlokterébe 
kerültek. A vizsgálat elsĘsorban levéltári anyagokra alapozva megállapította, hogy a 
kommunista párt kezdeti célja az üzemi tanácson belüli minél jelentĘsebb befolyásszerzés 
volt, azonban a pártvezetĘség számára hamar nyilvánvalóvá vált, hogy az intézmény 
demokratikus természete a hatalomépítésük útjában áll. E felismerést követĘen nem volt 
kérdéses, hogy az üzemi tanácsokat fel kell számolniuk. Ugyanakkor a részvétel iránti igény 
továbbra is megmaradt (nemcsak munkahelyi szinten), így a történeti áttekintésben ezért 
különös figyelmet szenteltem az 19ő6-os forradalomban életre hívott munkástanácsoknak. A 
hivatalos retorikában mindvégig fontos szerep jutott a munkások részvételének a szocialista 
demokrácia, illetve a gazdaság építésében, azonban a párt mindenre kiterjedĘ ellenĘrzése 
lehetetlenné tette, hogy azt valóban demokratikus módon gyakorolják a dolgozók.  
A japán és a szocialista magyar modell sok tekintetben hasonló. Mindkét rendszer 
paternalista szemléletĦ, és elĘtérbe helyezi a közösség szerepét és jogait az egyénnel 
szemben. Ez az elĘnyben részesítés olyan mértékĦ, hogy az egyéni érdekek érvényre juttatása 
nem lehetséges. A közösség tágan értelmezhetĘ, lehet a csoport, a brigád, a kollektíva, a 
munkásság vagy az egész társadalom, a közösséghez tartozás pedig olyan érdek (vagy érték), 
amely felülírja az egyéni érdeket. További hasonlóság, hogy mindkét rendszer a részvételre 
kizárólag, mint termelést fokozó eszközre tekint. Sem az szocialista magyar, de még a 
jelenkori japán rendszer sem rendelkezik egyértelmĦ, emberi jogi fogalom-meghatározással, 
így természetszerĦen nehezen beszélhetünk azok elismerésérĘl. Ugyanakkor a részvétel 
emberi jogi jellegének tagadása vagy fel nem ismerése azt eredményezte, hogy a 
munkavállalók hosszú távon csalódtak a participáció intézményében, ennek a csalódottságnak 
pedig jobbára passzivitásukkal adnak hangot vagy egyéni érdekeik érvényesítésére informális 
csatornákat keresnek, adott esetben azt a hamis látszatot keltve, hogy részvételi jogukra nem 
tartanak igényt. 
A két rendszer hasonlóságainak feltárásával a kutatás eredményei a munkavállalói 
részvétel szemszögébĘl igazolják Sen tézisét, amely szerint nem lehet sematikusan 
szembeállítani a szabadversenyes kapitalizmust a tervgazdasággal és kizárólag a gazdaság 
növekedésére alapozott adatokra támaszkodva mérni a fejlĘdést. Sen emlékeztet a szabadság 
kétféle olvasatára is: a pozitív és a negatív szabadság megkülönbözetésére. A szabadság 
pozitív értelemben azt jelenti, amit az egyén megtehet vagy elérhet, míg negatív értelemben a 
korlátozásoknak azt a hiányát jelenti, amelyeket az egyén az állammal vagy egy másik 
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egyénnel szemben gyakorolhat. 969  Sen rámutat arra is, hogy a negatív szabadság ilyen 
értelmezése belsĘ feszültségtĘl terhes, e konfliktus feloldásához új megközelítés szükséges, 
amely egy adott társadalom vagy gazdaság értékelésekor a szabad választás értékét és annak 
kiterjedtségét, az egyéni választások pluralitását és a választásokért vállalt felelĘsséget is 
figyelembe veszi.970 
A dolgozat végkövetkeztetései az alábbiakban foglalhatók össze. A munkavállalói részvétel 
joga egyéni emberi jog, így az minden munkavállalót megillet.971 Az egyéni jogi jellegbĘl 
következĘen olyan rendszerekben, amelyek tagadják vagy megkérdĘjelezik az egyéni 
szabadság létjogosultságát, nem jöhet létre valódi participáció. A részvételnek a termelésre 
gyakorolt hatása lényeges, de jóval túlmutat azon. A részvétel az egyén szempontjából 
választási lehetĘséget nyújt, és biztosítja, hogy az egyén a saját életével kapcsolatos 
döntéseket hozzon. Azaz, szabadságot biztosít.  
A szabadság a fejlĘdés nélkülözhetetlen eleme. A participáció európai modelljének – 
benne a magyar részvételi intézménnyel – sikere két, egymással szorosan összefüggĘ tényezĘ 
eredménye. Az egyik, hogy az Európai Unió a részvételre mint kettĘs intézményre tekint, 
elismeri az emberi jogi jellegét és egyben a versenyképesség növelésének egyik eszközeként 
kezeli. A másik a demokrácia iránti elkötelezettség. Demokratikus rendszerekben a részvétel 
létjogosultsága nem kérdĘjelezĘdik meg. A munkavállalói részvétel emberi jogi jellegének 
elismerése garancia az emberi méltóság tiszteletben tartására a munkahelyeken.  
űsak az egyéni szabadságot tiszteletben tartó és támogató, demokratikus 
rendszerekben képzelhetĘ a munkavállalói részvételnek az a formája, amely valóban fokozza 
a munkáltató gazdasági versenyképességét. A munkavállalóknak a döntési folyamatba való 
bevonása hozzájárul a munkáltató lényegesen nagyobb gazdasági erejével szembeni 
egyensúly létrehozásához és megtartásához, ezáltal csökkentve a munkavállalók 
kiszolgáltatottságát. Ezáltal a munkavállalói részvétel hatékony eszköze lehet a szociális 
igazságosság megvalósításának. Ehhez azonban szükséges, hogy az államok biztosítsák a 
munkavállalói részvétel gyakorlásához szükséges jogszabályi kereteket, nemcsak az Európai 
Unión belül, hanem minden munkavállaló elismert jogaként. A munkavállalók emberi 
méltóságának tiszteletben tartása valamennyiünk közös felelĘssége. 
                                               
969 A Sen,’ Freedom of űhoice: űoncept and űontent’ (1988), 32 European Economic Review, 269-94. 
970 A Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford, 1998), 148. 
971 E Ales ‘Information and űonsultation within the undertaking’ in Recasting Worker Involvement? Recent 
trends in information, consultation and co-determination or worker representatives in a Europeanized Arena’ 
(Kluwer, 2009) 13. Similarly, Otto Kahn-Freund argued that the right to strike is an individual right; see, O 
Kahn-Freund ‘The Right to Strike: Its scope and limitations’ (Strasbourg, 1974, Council of Europe), 5 ff. 
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B A kutatási eredmények várható hasznosítása 
 
A dolgozat eredményeinek gyakorlati jelentĘségét több tényezĘ is alátámasztja. ElsĘként, 
hogy a munkavállalók számára alapvetĘ jelentĘségĦ, hogy megértsék, a részvétel miként 
képes befolyásolni a munkaviszonyukkal kapcsolatos kérdéseket. Lényeges továbbá, hogy 
tisztában legyenek azzal, hogy a részvétel milyen jogokat és kötelezettségeket foglal 
magában. Különös tekintettel arra, hogy a dolgozat érvelésének egyik központi eleme, hogy a 
munkavállalói részvételi jogok egyéni emberi jogok. A kutatás eredményeit remélhetĘen 
hasznosnak találják az üzemi tanácsok tagjai és a szakszervezeti tisztségviselĘk is, akár 
mindennapi munkájuk során, akár mint a munkavállalói képviselettel kapcsolatos stratégiájuk 
jövĘbeni elemeként. 
Másodsorban a munkáltatók számára is hasznos lehet, ha nemcsak a munkavállalói 
részvétel jogi szabályozásával vannak tisztában, hanem ismerik annak gazdasági és szociális 
aspektusait is. Annál is inkább, mert a dolgozat rámutatott arra, hogy a részvétel akkor képes 
igazán betölteni a funkcióját, ha a szereplĘk maguk is meg vannak gyĘzĘdve annak 
fontosságáról. Kizárólag formális szabályok érvényre juttatása nem pótolja például a felek 
meggyĘzĘdését a konzultáció szükségességérĘl vagy a kölcsönös bizalmat. A hasznosulás 
ezen eleme különösen a multinacionális vállalatok tekintetében lehet jelentĘs. Jelenleg 
nincsen olyan kötelezĘ érvényĦ szabály, amely elĘírná, hogy a multinacionális vállalatok 
biztosítsák a részvétel jogát azon munkavallóiknak, akik nem az európai térségben dolgoznak. 
Ezért a különfajta önkéntes vállalások (vállalati kézikönyvek, űSR politika) szerepe 
felértékelĘdik ezen a területen is. Különösen szerencsés lenne, ha a dolgozat eredményei 
eljuthatnának a társaságok humánpolitikáért felelĘs munkatársainak kezébe, mivel nekik a 
vállalatokon belül általában jelentĘs befolyásuk van a részvétel alakítására.  
Harmadsorban a dolgozat rámutatott a magyar Munka Törvénykönyve néhány 
javításra szoruló rendelkezésére. Az ebben a tekintetben megfogalmazott de lege ferrenda 
javaslatok viszonylag egyszerĦen megvalósíthatók lennének, ugyanakkor rendkívül nagy 
jelentĘségük lenne hazánk uniós normáknak és az Európai Szociális űhartának való 
megfelelése tekintetében. A javaslatok közül a részvételi jogok megsértésével hozott 
munkáltatói intézkedések megfelelĘ szankcionálása, illetve az üzemi tanács tagjaira 
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vonatkozó munkajogi védelem újbóli kiterjesztése a legfontosabbak. Jóval kevesebb reális 
esélyt látok az uniós szintĦ normák továbbfejlesztésére. A dolgozat ebben a körben normatív 
javaslatot fogalmaz meg a 2002/1Ő/Eű és a 2009/38/Eű irányelvek személyi hatályának 
kiterjesztésére. Az Európai Uniónak ezáltal lehetĘsége lenne arra, hogy a munkavállalói 
részvételi jogokat kiterjessze azokra a munkavállalókra, akik európai székhelyĦ 
multinacionális vállalatok Európai Unión kívüli telephelyein dolgoznak. 
Végül, de nem utolsó sorban a dolgozat eredményei hozzájárulhatnak a hazai (netán a 
japán) munkaügyi kapcsolatokat érintĘ kutatásokhoz, különösen a korábban még fel nem 
dolgozott archív anyagok. A dolgozat eredményei ezen kívül úgy munkajogi, mint emberi 
jogi oktatási programokban is hasznosíthatók. 
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